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I 
Introduction 
It is a sad reality that the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by internal 
armed conflicts exceeds the numb gees in the world. By the end of 2004, 
those who had been displaced within their own states were 25 million, and by the 
2 same period, the global number of refugees was estimated as 9.2 million persons. 
Such an unprecedented level of internal displacement is not an unexpected 
outcome in a world where internal armed conflicts are the common form of 
conflicts and in which the most atrocious forms of human rights and humanitarian 
violations that cause displacement occur. 3 The international community has 
witnessed such massive internal displacements in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda and continues to witness displacement in states in almost every region of 
the world, such as Turkey, the Russiaofe eration, Colombia, Sudan, Uganda, Sri 
Lanka and Indonesia. 4 
Internal displacement by internal armed conflicts is a major human 
rights and humanitarian catastrophe as in 'many cases, it breaks up the immediate 
family. It cuts off important social and cultural community ties; terminates stable 
employment relationships; precludes or forecloses formal educational 
opportunities; deprives infants, expectant mother and the sick of access to food, 
adequate shelter, or vital health services; and makes the displaced population 
especially vulnerable to acts of violence, such as attacks on camps, disappearance ý/ 
or rape. ' 5 In sum, IDPs W) Id become physically and materially more vulnerable T, 
to violations of human rights and humanitarian law than those who are not 
displaced. The vulnerability of IDPs can be better indicated by comparing them 
W refugees. Unlike refugees, who are protected by refugee law from the VIA 
circumstances and the persecutor that caused their displacement, IDPs are not 
specifically protected as such by international law and also do not enjoy the 
1 Norwegian Refugee Council, Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and 
Developments in 2004, March 2005, at p. 9. 
2 UNHCR, 2004 Global Refugee Trends: Overview of Refugee Populations, New Arrivals, Durable 
Solutions, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless and Other Persons of Concern to UNHCR, (Geneva, 2005) at 
p. 2. 
3 In 2004 there were 30 internal armed conflicts. From 1989 -2004 there had been only one 
or two inter-state armed conflicts per year, L. Harbom and P. Wallensteen, 'Armed 
Conflict and Its International Dimensions: 1964-2004' (2005)42 Journal ofPeace Research 
623, at p. 624. 
See ICRC, Annual Report 2004. 
W. Kalin and R. K. Goldman, 'Legal Framework' in R. Cohen and F. M. Deng, Masses in Flight: 
The Global Crisis ofInternal Displacement (Washington D. C, 1998) p. 73, at p. 74 
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protection of refugee law, since border crossing is a necessary condition to become 
a refugee. 6 
Disaster and development -induced displacement result in socio- 
economic impoverishment of the displaced persons and even if any coercion 
or violence is involved in the displacement of the latter category, it is not 
as much as that in an internal armed conflict. 7 The protection need of 
development induced IDPs is restoration of income-generating resources 
rather than the physical safety and emergency relief .8 Displacements caused 
by natural or man-made disasters involve few human rights issues, as the 
governments in such situations readily respond or, if unable to provide assistance, 
seek international assistance ( unless those disasters occur during an internal 
armed conflict with regard to conflict induced IDPs). 9 These IDPs are not 
exposed at all or not like conflict -induced IDPs, continuously exposed to 
abuse of human rights and humanitarian law violations, so that they become 
physically and materially vulnerable. Unlike the disaster or development 
induced IDPs, those who are internally displaced by internal armed conflicts 
are always affected, in addition to the acts of the state, by the acts of armed 
opposition groups. Therefore, disaster and development related displacement do 
not necessitate external displacement as in the conflict related displacement. 
On the other hand, displacement caused by internal armed conflict raises 
more human rights issues, ranging from civil and political rights to economic, 
social and cultural rights, because it is often a symptom of the problems related to 
structural inequalities that generate such internal armed conflicts. Root causes of 
such armed conflicts are the underlying structural injustices of 'national Political 
and economic systems, often manifested in discrimination based on racial, 
ethnic, religious, or cultural identity factors. " 0 
6 See below, Chapter, 1. 
7 'Broadly speaking, the disaster-related problems lie in the field of economic and social rights, 
rather than civil and political rights' so that they account for part of the problems of refugees and 
IDPs displaced for conflict reasons. 'Commentary to the Draft Declaration of International Law 
Principles of Internally Displaced Persons, ' Report of the 6Vh Conference of International Law 
Association, London, 2000 p. 791, at p. 796. 
8 M. Barutciski, 'International Law and Development- Induced Displacement and 
Resettlement' in C de Wet (ed. ), Development Induced Displacement: Problems, Policies and 
people (Oxford, 2006) p. 71, at p. 74. 
' W. Kalin, 'Legal Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Protection in International Human 
Rights Law, ' in Jean-Philippe Lavoyer (ed. ), Internally Displaced Persons, Report of the 
Symposium (23-25 October 1995) (Geneva, 1996) p. 15, at p. 16; N. Geissler, 'The International 
Protection of Internally Displaced Persons' (1999)11 IJRL 451 at p. 455. 
" F. M. Deng, 'Frontiers of Sovereignty: A Framework of Protection, Assistance, and Development 
for the Internally Displaced' (1995) 8 LJIL, 249, at p. 252 
3 
Therefore in such armed conflicts, civilians belonging to the minority 
groups are often considered 'as enemies, as inferior, as different, not as their 
people' due to their association with or their ideological support for the opposition 
armed groups or because of their being minorities in a society where the state 
apparatus becomes monopolised by and associated with the dominant ethnic or 
religious groups and for simply being the other group. " For instance , in the 
internal armed conflicts of countries like Sudan, Sri Lanka and Turkey, ethnic 
factors contributed to the displacement of civilians. 12 The existence of armed 
opposition groups in Turkey and Sri Lanka has been used by the governments to 
'justify campaigns of utter destruction against parts of their own population' which 
resulted in massive displacement. ' 3 As crises of national identity are 
manifested in the cause of displacement, which involves massive violation of 
human rights and cruel methods of combat, in its consequences by 
discriminatory treatment and human rights abuses and even in the official 
responses to humanitarian problems, IDPs would be profoundly affected and 
become severely vulnerable. 
Internal displacement in such internal armed conflicts not only takes 
place as a by-product of armed conflicts but is carried out as a method of 
combat or even an objective of armed conflict. Therefore, the right of IDPs 
to remain not only in their places of origin but even in places of 
displacement are threatened. Consequently, IDPs displaced by internal armed 
conflicts as opposed to disaster induced IDPs would often be left during 
displacement in an environment which is not conducive to their 
restructuring and leading a life in safety and dignity in their new places by 
engaging in economic, educational and other activities to improve their lives. 
It can be derived from the above discussion that displacement by internal 
armed conflicts is a symptom of harm as well as clearly a hann in itself 
which has human rights implications. Therefore, it is crucial to address the 
pressing problem of internal displacement by internal armed conflicts rather 
than disaster or development induced displacement, as the problems 
" R. Cohen, Masses in Flight: People Under Assault in their Own Countries, Inaugural Lecture, 
University of Missouri, 16 January 2001, at p. 4 
(http: //www. brookings. edu/fp/projects/idp/articles/stl-address-cohen. htm); R. Cohen and F. M. 
Deng, Masses in Flight, at p. 6. 
12 R. Cohen and F. M. Deng, Masses in Flight, at p. 20. 
" R. Cohen, Masses in Flight: People Under Assault, at p. 6. 
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confronting IDPs in the latter situations, are lesser in quality and quantity 
than those in the former. 
As far as IDPs are concerned, international protection in its broad sense would 
include, inter alia., physical protection from abuses of human rights and 
humanitarian law, material protection by providing humanitarian assistance, and 
legal protection. Since this study is confined to the legal protection of IDPs, the 
relief operations of the international humanitarian organisations and the United 
Nations agencies on the ground do not form part of this study. 14 International legal 
protection is important to provide the legal basis to the activities of 
international humanitarian organisations for protection of IDPs affected by 
human rights abuses as well as material deprivation. Without such a legal basis, 
admission of international organisations to a state has to depend on the 
discretion of the state concerned. 
Protection in the definition of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross ( ICRC ) covers 'all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights 
of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies 
of law (i. e. human rights law international humanitarian law, refugee law). 915 This 
definition presupposes the existence of a normative framework in the protection of 
displaced persons and its effective implementation or enforcement. Applying this 
definition to the context of this study it may be stated that legal protection means 
all the measures taken for the observance of international human rights and 
humanitarian law (refugee law is not applicable in the context of this study, except 
for interpreting human rights law by analogy) in response to displacements arising 
from violations of relevant international law as well as to prevent displacements 
even before their occurrence. Thus, international protection measures must contain 
reactive as well as proactive aspects with regard to the problem of displacement 
and its consequences. To elaborate further, such measures should be adopted in 
four situations: firstly, they are needed to prevent the occurrence of displacement 
in situations of internal armed conflicts, as the risk of displacement exists in such 
situations; secondly, protection measures are necessary to put an end to existing 
" See generally for such protection, C. Phuong, The International Protection of Internally 
Displaced Persons (UK, 2004); N. Hashimoto, 'The United Nations and Internally Displaced 
Persons : At the Crossroads of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs' in A. Bolesta (ed. ), Forced 
Migration and the Contemporary World. - Challenges to the International System (Poland, 2003) 
V8. p 
As cited in 'Protection of Internally Displaced Persons', Inter -Agency Standing Committee 
policy Paper, New York, 1999 at p. 4. 
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violations, that cause displacement or that occur consequent to the displacement; it 
is furthermore necessary to extend international protection to prevent the 
recurrence of violations to stop further internal or external displacement of 
civilians; finally, international protection in the form of remedies must be provided 
to those displaced persons whose rights have been violated. 16 Therefore, problems 
relating to legal protection of IDPs can arise either at the normative level due to the 
inadequacy of international law or at the implementation or enforcement level 
because of the ineffectiveness of the control mechanisms to ensure respect for 
such law or at both levels. 
17 
The very basis of the formulation of United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, ( hereafter UN Guiding Principles ) which has drawn from 
the existing human rights and humanitarian law and refugee law by analogy, is the 
recognition of the fact of existence of protection gaps with regard to IDPs at the 
normative level. 18 However, UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
tries to accommodate a wide range of situations of displacement that occur in non- 
conflict situations, such as in generalized violence, natural or man-made disasters 
and large scale development projects, with conflict induced displacement. 19 
Moreover the situations intended to be covered by it are not exhaustive, as 
indicated by the phrase 'in particular' before the enumeration of situations. 20 
Cumulative addressing of the protection of IDPs from broadly differing 
situations, which in fact entail different kinds of needs, is not a convincing 
method of extending protection to conflict induced IDPs. Such IDPs have 
different needs from other persons internally displaced in normal conditions. This 
complicated method is compounded by the adoption of an approach which 
resorts to the convergence of human rights and humanitarian law to provide human 
rights protection to conflict induced IDPs with others, displaced in general 
disturbances and normal situations. 
16 Based on the activities of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights of IDPs, 
Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons, Walter Kalin, E/CN. 4/2005/84 (31 December 2004), para. 78 
17 H. J. Steiner and P. Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, 2 nd ed., 
(Oxford, 2000), at p. 562 state that the implementation and enforcement mechanisms make the legal 
norms 'real' by becoming a bridge between states and the norms. 
" Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement E/CN. 4/1998/53/Add. 2 (11 February 1998) Annex. 
19 Ibid., Introduction- Scope and Purpose, para 2 states that 'internally displaced persons are persons 
or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, 
situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, 
and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border. '; Principle 6 (2) (c) of the 
UN Guiding Principles. 
20 ibid. 
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Conflict induced IDPs are also not considered separately from those 
displaced by generalised violence in the Declaration of International Law 
Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, adopted by the International Law 
Association ( hereafter ILA Declaration on IDPs ). 2 1 As international humanitarian 
law applicable to internal armed conflicts excludes situations of general 
disturbance and internal violence, a separate consideration of the protection of 
conflict induced IDPs is necessary. 22 The current combination of distinct 
situations not covered by the existing standards of humanitarian law in one 
framework would tend to dilute the authority of the distinctive system of 
international humanitarian law and thereby its acceptance and application. It is 
therefore necessary to consider internal displacement by internal armed conflicts 
separately. 
In this context, the objective of the study is to examine the 
international legal regimes of human rights and humanitarian law concerning the 
protection of persons internally displaced by internal armed conflict. Such an 
examination is undertaken in the context of the convergence between both 
systems of law in internal armed conflicts. In addition, international criminal 
law and refugee law by analogy are considered wherever relevant. Apart 
from examining the existing international legal protection at the normative level, 
the effectiveness of such protection at the implementation level in providing 
specific protection of IDPs is also considered. In this regard the discussion evolves 
on the basis of the following sub questions: 
1. Who can be considered as persons internally displaced by internal armed conflict? 
What is the legal justification for providing specific international legal protection 
to IDPs? What is the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law 
in internal armed conflicts? To what extent do they converge? How can the 
relationship between the international human rights law and humanitarian law 
be used in providing maximum protection to the IDPs in internal armed 
conflicts? 
2. Does a right to remain which makes the forced displacement of civilians unlawful 
in internal armed conflicts exist? If such a right exists, to what extent does it 
" Reprinted in (2000) 12 YRL p. 673; Art. I (I) of the ILA Declaration on IDPs describes IDPs as, 
6persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee or leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence as a result of armed conflicts, internal strife or systematic violations of human 
rights, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. ' 
22 See below, Ch. 1 
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protect civilians from forced displacement in internal armed conflicts? To what 
extent does the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement precisely restate 
the law? 
3. To what extent is the problem of displacement addressed by humanitarian law and 
human rights law in terms of its consequences? Are there any gaps in the existing 
law? Is there any need to clarify the existing law to make it specific enough to meet 
the needs of IDPs? Is there any possibility of formulating IDP specific rights by 
cross-fertilization of humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law by 
analogy? Does the UN Guiding Principles accurately restate the existing law? 
4. To what extent do the existing international humanitarian and human rights 
mechanisms provide protection specifically to displaced persons? Is such 
protection effective with regard to the problems of IDPs? 
5. How can the outcome be ameliorated to provide an improved protection to 
persons displaced by internal armed conflict? 
For this purpose this study is divided into five parts. Part 1, which 
follows this introduction, discusses the conceptual basis for protection of 
persons internally displaced by internal armed conflicts by analogy to the 
concept of refugee in international law and adopts a working definition in 
this regard. The relationship between human rights and humanitarian law and 
the extent of their mutual convergence that can contribute to the improvement 
of the protection of IDPs is discussed in detail. 
The main focus of Part 11 is on the examination of the extent of 
specific legal protection of IDPs from causes of displacement whether due to 
deliberate measures or as a by-product of armed conflict in the existing 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law. 
Part III examines the existing protection of IDPs in terms of their specific 
needs consequential upon displacement in terms of international human rights 
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and refugee law 
by analogy. Similarly to the previous chapter, this examination is also based 
on the mutual convergence between international human rights humanitarian 
law. 
Part IV analyses in detail the effectiveness of the implementation and 
enforcement of international human rights and humanitarian law by global and 
regional human rights mechanisms and by the International Criminal Tribunals 
8 
of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the International Criminal Court and by 
national Courts by virtue of universal jurisdiction. 
Part V deals with the justification and necessity for the adoption of a 
specific treaty for the protection of IDPs. 
The general Conclusions presents the conclusions and suggestions for 
the legal protection of IDPs on the basis of the study. 
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Part I 
Preliminary Issues 
Introduction 
In evaluating the international legal framework for the existence of 
protection concerning displaced civilians, examining each system, namely, 
international human rights, humanitarian, criminal and refugee law (by analogy) as 
impermeable normative systems is not desirable, as such an approach does not 
recognise the shortcomings of each system in the situation of armed conflicts to 
provide a comprehensive and coherent protection to IDPs. This is because, in 
the spectrum of protection of civilians and IDPs. human rights law and 
humanitarian law are at one end and international criminal law and refugee 
law is at the other. Refugee law plays a reactive protective role in relation to 
external displacement of IDPs resulting from actual violations of or fear of 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law norms. A reactive protection is 
also provided by the 'overlapping area of protection' in international criminal law 
which makes certain serious violations of human rights norms, and humanitarian 
law norms committed in internal armed conflicts, international crimes subject to 
punishment. ' 
Despite the independent nature of these legal regimes, they are bound by a 
common thread, namely, the protection of human beings in difficult situations and 
in the context of this study, in internal armed conflicts. Any improvement by 
examination of international law concerning the protection of IDPs, without 
consulting these relevant legal regimes, would result in inadequate protection. 
Therefore, standard setting that takes into account the convergence among the 
three regimes and emerges as a result of cross-fertilization, would effectively 
improve the protection of IDPs. 
In this context, a working definition of IDPs by analogy to the 
definition of refugee is provided in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 examines the 
relationship between international human rights and humanitarian law for 
possible cross-fertilization between them. 
' M. C. Bassiouni, 'Enforcing Human Rights Through International Criminal Law and Through an 
International Criminal Tribunal' in L. Henkin and J. L. Hargrove (eds. ), Human Rights: An Agenda 
for the Next Century (Washington D. C, 1994) p. 347, at p. 35 1. 
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1. Conceptualizing the Protection of IDPs 
A. Definition of IDPs 
To embark on the task of examining and providing international legal protection to 
IDPs, a working definition of IDPs is necessary to determine the basis of their 
entitlement to protection. ' As forced and involuntary displacement (in the sense 
that people are obliged to move) has an adverse impact on the enjoyment of many 
human rights, a needs based approach is necessary to improve the legal protection 
of IDPs. For a needs based legal protection, the definition of IDP should be 
formulated in such a way as to indicate the causes of displacement and the form of 
protection needed for those who are displaced, in order to identify and to enunciate 
in detail the standards of protection. As international law has already provided 
legal protection to externally displaced persons, justification for such protection 
to IDPs can be made by analogy to the definition of a refugee for the 
formulation of a working definition of IDPs. 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which covers 
displacement by persecution in both peaceful and conflict situations is applicable 
to those refugees forced to displace by persecution in internal armed conflicts. 2 
According to that definition, a refugee is one who has a 'well founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country. 3 Persecution includes sustained or systematic violations of 
humanitarian law such as relocation measures, policy of ethnic cleansing and 
1 C. Beyani, Internally Displaced Persons in International Law, Oxford, 1995, at p. 22. 
2 For the application of Refugee Law in internal armed conflicts, see G. S. Goodwin-GIII, The 
Refugee in International Law, 2 nd ed., (Oxford, 1996), at pp. 75-76; J. C. Hathaway, The Law of 
Refugee Status (Toronto, 199 1) at pp. 185-188; W. Kalin, 'Refugees and Civil Wars: Only a Matter 
of Interpretation? ' (1991) 3 IJRL 435; J. Henkel, 'Who is a Refugee' in Asylum Law, Report and 
Papers delivered at the first international judicial conference at London, I and 2 December 1995, 
p. 17; Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson, Pursuant to Section 65(3)of Immigration Act, Civilian 
Non-Combatants Fearing Persecution in Civil War Situations, Immigration and Refugee Board, 
Canada, March 7,1996; M. R. Von Sterngberg, 'The Plight of the Non-Combatant in Civil War and 
the New Criteria for Reftigee Status' (1997) 9 IJRL 169. 
1 Article IA (2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees( hereafter 1951 
Refugee Convention); Article 1(2), (3) of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
reprinted in (with the changes to Article IA(2) of the Convention) in 1. Brownfie and G. S. 
Goodwin -Gill (eds. ), Basic Documents on Human Rights, 4thed. (Oxford, 2002) p. 112. 
indiscriminate attack on civilians and their objects carried out against those 
belonging to the adverse racial, religious or political group. 4 However, the 1951 
Convention is narrow in its protection, as it only protects those who are the 
potential targets of persecution on discriminatory grounds stated therein and 
excludes those externally displaced who are the victims of the general effects of 
armed conflicts and human rights violations but still require the same basic 
needs. 
However, Von Sternberg argues that, if those externally displaced 
victims were an internationally protected category of people by a treaty or a 
customary law, then they would fall within the definition of refugee in the 
1951 Refugee Convention on the basis of a social group which has an 
economically marginalized condition that the group is powerless to change. 5 
According to Von Sternberg, in such a case, if the IDPs who are displaced by 
general violence or effects of armed conflicts and in need of basic survival 
requisites manage to cross an international frontier, they would fall within the 
6social group' ground of the refugee definition of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention on the basis of specific designation of IDPs as a class that is in 
need of special protection and the refusal of the state to permit international 
humanitarian assistance to such group. 6 The basis of this argument is that the 
failure of the state to provide basic needs for the survival of IDPs at the national 
level and the unwillingness of the state to permit provision of humanitarian 
assistance to IDPs by international organisations in accordance with its human 
rights and humanitarian law obligations is 
of a particular social group. 7 
a differential treatment on the basis 
Any distinction or exclusion should be considered as discrimination if it 
has the 'purpose or effect' of nullifying or affecting the equal recognition or 
4 M. R. Von Sternberg, The Grounds ofRefugee Protection in the Context ofInternational 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Hague, 2002) at pp. 116- 123; also see below, Section 
C, 1, a. 
5 Based on the opinion of Lord Hoffrnan in Islam (A. P. ) v. Secretary of the Statefor Home 
Dept., Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another Ex Parte Shah, (1999) 2 
AlLE. R 545 (House of Lords) and the liberal viewpoints of Arthur Helton, Grahl -Madsen 
and Guy Goodwin-Gill that social group is an open-ended category, M. R. Von Stemberg, 
ibid., at pp. 194 and 221-230. 
6 M. R. Von Sternberg, ibid., at p. 309. 
I Ibid., at pp. 298-31 1. 
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exercise of rights by all citizens. 8 Thus, if the IDPs are not provided with basic 
necessities due to the failure of their own state to take affirmative action, it 
should be considered as persecution on the basis of 'social group. ' Here the 
persecution by the state is not so much with a 'discriminatory motive' (that 
provides the 'purpose' of discrimination) with respect to IDPs for reasons of 
their race, religion, language or political opinion but because of the act of the state 
'in disregard of the rights of a specifically protected class so that the underlying 
action is discriminatory in effect. ' 9 Such a broad interpretation of 'social group' to 
accommodate persons internally displaced by general effects of armed conflicts 
and consequent economic marginalisation due to the inaction of the state can 
derive further support if the internal armed conflict is fought on race, religion or 
language or other discriminatory grounds. However to fall within the ground of 
4social group, ' IDPs should have been designated as a 'beneficiary of a treaty or 
customary norm"O and since this is not the position with regard to IDPs, this 
interpretation of Von Sternberg cannot be considered for the purpose of 
justifying international protection to IDPs by analogy with the definition of 
refugee. 
Except for the Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa of 1969 and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of 1984, the 
international treaty-based definition of refugee does not explicitly cover the 
victims of internal armed conflicts. The regional refugee instruments protect those 
who are compelled to leave their places of habitual residence to seek refuge in 
another place outside their country of origin due to 'events seriously disturbing 
public order' in either part or the whole of their country of origin, 11 and refugees 
(who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been 
threatened by ... 
internal an-ned conflicts. ' 12 However, unlike under the former, 
under the latter Declaration a refugee claimant has to prove the real risk of harm 
arising from the abuse of power rather than the subjective perception of the refugee 
claimant. In addition to the real risk of harm to him/herself, the refugee claimant 
8 Ibid., at p. 236. 
'Ibid., at p. 23 7(emphasis added by the author). 
"Ibid., at p. 309. 
II Article 1 (2) of the 1969 Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Affica, 
reprinted in 1. Brownlie and G. S. Goodwin -Gill (eds. ), Basic Documents, p. 722. 
12 Section 111(3) of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, OAS/Ser. LN/11.66, doc. 10, rev. 
1, pp. 190-3. 
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has to establish that other persons in the same country are also exposed to such a 
harm by the internal conflict that affects the whole country. 13 These definitions 
demonstrate the fact that lack of state protection, which is the underlying rationale 
of the concept of refugee, can arise from other causes apart from persecution such 
as incidental effects of armed conflicts that affect not only the civil and political 
rights but also the economic and social rights. 
Despite the persecution- based, narrow protection of the 1951 Convention, 
State practice reflects a 'universal recognition of humanitarian obligations towards 
those in need. ' 14 States extend complementary protection by international human 
rights law to 'persons in need of protection' in their national laws, when it is 
decided that the asylum seeker is not entitled to asylum but his/her life is 
threatened if he/she is returned to his/her country of origin during such conflicts. 15 
As complementary protection is a legal status provided upon individual 
determination of protection needs, it should be distinguished from temporary 
protection provided in mass displacements. 16 
In large-scale arrivals of people as a result of the indiscriminate effects of 
internal armed conflicts, the concept of temporary protection /refuge is adopted 'to 
ensure immediate access to safety and protection of basic human rights, 
including protection from refoulement ... .' 
17 The customary principle of non- 
refoulement is the basis also of the concept of 'temporary protection/refuge. ' 18 
There is a general consensus as to the customary nature of the concept of 
130. Shoyele, 'Armed Conflicts and Canadian Refugee Law and Policy' (2004)16 IJRL 547, 
at p. 553. 
14 G. S. Goodwin- Gill, 'Non Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers' in The Ninth Sokol 
Colloquium on International Law, New Asylum Seekers : Refugee Law in the 1980s (Hague, 1988) 
p. 103, at p. 105. 
15 For instance, Canada-Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, Article. 97; also see below 
Ch. 5, Section B, 3. 
16 LYNHCR, 'The International Protection of Refugees: Complementary Forms of Protection', April 
2001, para. 27. 
17 Ibid., para. 26. 
'8 G. S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee at p. 200 ; temporary protection was granted during the 1990s in 
Europe as a protective response to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia where large numbers of 
people fled human rights abuses and armed conflict; this concept is also known as 'temporary 
reftige' and can be traced back to 1936 when safe haven was provided to the fleeing people by 
France and Britain, for the duration of the Spanish civil war. ibid., at p. 559. 
14 
temporary protection / refuge, 19 even though views differ as to the jurisprudential 
basis of temporary refuge. 20 
The protection of temporary reftige, however, is different from the 
protection of refugee status under the 1951 Convention. Temporary refuge is 
granted for a pre-defined period and extending only a temporary stay for the 
duration of armed conflict with the minimum standards for treatment as opposed 
to the protection of asylum. 21 Voluntary repatriation is thus considered as a lasting 
solution with regard to temporary reftige. 
The foregoing discussion indicates the extent of recognition of protection 
needs by international law of those who are displaced due to threats to their 
lives, liberty and security of person by the effects of internal conflicts and human 
rights violations. Despite the selective application of such protection, inclusion of 
broader categories of persons, in particular, those included in the regional refugee 
instruments for international protection, clearly demonstrates the inadequate 
theoretical basis of the legal definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
strengthens the theoretical basis of the concept of refugee. 
The general concept of refugee is broader than the legal concept in the 
1951 Refugee Convention, because the persecution requirement in the latter is one 
form of expression of the absence of protection by the state of origin that justifies 
19 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 'Note on International 
Protection', A/Ac. 96/951 (13 Sept 200 1) para. 16; Am Vibeke Eggli, Mass Refugee Influx and the 
Limits of Public International Law (Hague, 2002) at p. 166; but see K. Hailbronner, 'Non- 
Refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful Legal 
Thinking? ' in The Ninth Sokol Colloquium on International Law, New Asylum Seekers: Refugee 
Law in the 1980s (Hague, 1988) p. 123. 
20 Goodwin-Gill, 'Non- Refoulement' at p. 105, maintains that the protection needs of those whose 
lives and freedom are threatened if returned to their country of origin is based on the customary 
principle of non- refoulement; also see E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, 'The Scope and Content 
of the Principle of Non- Refoulement: Opinion' in E. Feller et al (eds. ), Refugee Protection in 
International Law: UNHCR' s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge, 
2003) p. 87, at p. 120, para. 108; Executive Committee Conclusion No. 19, 'Temporary Refuge', 
1980,31s' Session; Article 3(2) of the Council of the European Union Directive on Minimum 
Standards for giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons 
2001/55/EC (20 July 2001); but Perluss and Hartman consider that temporary reftige is not an 
extension of the concept of refugee law but a norm of customary humanitarian law, D. Perluss 
and J. F. Hartman, 'Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm' (1986) 26 Virginia 
Journal ofInternational Law 551, at p. 602. 
21 As Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee at p. 202, states, '[t]he concept of temporary refuge/temporary 
protection, in the contexts of large movements, thus stands paradoxically as both the link and the 
line between the peremptory, normative aspects of non-refoulement and the continuing 
discretionary aspect of a State's right in the matter of asylum as a permanent or lasting solution, 
and in the treatment to be accorded to those in fact admitted. ' Executive Committee Conclusion 
No. 22, 'Protection of Asylum seekers in Situations of Large- Scale Influx' 198 1. 
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international protection of refugees. 22 Similar international protection should be 
granted to 'persons deprived of all other basic needs' due to unwillingness or 
inability of the state to protect people displaced by the general effects of 
hostilities. 23 Those who are obliged to relocate by conflict are thus obviously 
considered as refugees according to the general concept of refugees. As Patmogic 
states, the difference between refugee as a general concept and a legal concept iS, 24 
[i]n the general concept, a refugee is a person who flees to find refuge and who 
feels compelled to leave his normal place of abode on account of any kind of 
circumstance. ... In the international legal concept, a refugee is an alien who finds himself outside his country of origin or nationality for serious reasons. ... Thus, while in municipal law the term refugee can also be applied to nationals, in 
international law the refugee is an alien. 
As such, the general concept of refugee which is based on forced displacement, 
regardless of the circumstances and destination of displacement, is broader than 
the legal definition of refugee in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 25 
As proposed by Shacknove, the concept of refugee includes persons 
who are deprived of physical security, other human rights as well as subsistence 
needs due to absence of the protection of the state of origin and 'who have no 
remaining recourse other than to seek international restitution of their needs, 
and who are so situated that international assistance is possible. 26 The possibility 
for international protection in the form of assistance arises when a state of 
nationality prefers to permit access to such assistance or a state is unable to prevent 
the provision of such protection. 27 Latter situation arises when the refugees are 
deprived of their economic, social and cultural rights in internal armed conflicts. 28 
In this sense, the concept of refugee is broader to include, in addition to the 
22 A. Shacknove, 'Who is a RefugeeT (1985) 95 Ethics 274, at p. 277. 
23 ibid. 
24 j. Patmogic, 'Refugees-A Continuing Challenge' (1982) 30 Annuaire de droit international 
medical, 73 at p. 74 as cited in J. C. Hathaway, The Law ofRefugee Status, at p. 29, n. 3. 
25 C. Phuong, 'Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Conceptual Differences and 
Similarities' (2000) 18 NQHR 215, at p. 222. 
2' A. Shacknove, 'Who is a RefugeeT at pp. 277,28 1. 
27 A. Shacknove, ibid, at p. 283. 
28 See below, Ch. 5, Section E. 
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protection of asylum, the other forms of international protection such as 
material assistance and diplomatic assistance. 29 
Such a conclusion can be further implied from the non-insistence of the 
requirement of alienage in the concept of refugee . 
30 According to Shacknove 
reftigeehood is a severed political bond between citizen and the state, which 
31 is not always manifested by border-crossing. Shacknove cites the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of the United States which recognises IDPs on the basis of 
persecution as refugees, applying that status to members of the opposition from 
Argentina and Chile and to Soviet Jews, for resettlement. 32 Such instances are 
limited and cannot provide the physical protection of asylum to conflict induced 
refugees without their crossing international borders. Alienage is an 'essential 
element' of the legal definition of refugee as opposed to a 'constitutive 
element' underlying the concept of refugee and places the refugee within the 
practical reach of the international community, especially of the country of asylum, 
to determine the refugee status. 33 Though crossing the international border is not 
necessary to invoke the international legal protection to receive international 
humanitarian assistance in terms of the concept of refugee, it is necessary for 
the international legal protection of asylum or temporary refuge in tenns of 
the legal definition of refugee. 
The conceptual basis discussed by Shacknove is obviously broad 
enough to include IDPs displaced by internal armed conflicts and provides 
justification for international legal protection. As such, it can be stated that 
IDPs and refugees have conceptual similarities as both have been subjected to 
displacement from their places of origin or residence by internal armed conflicts 
due to persecution, by systematic violations of human rights and by the 
29 A. Shacknove, Who is a RefugeeT at p. 277, n. 8. means by 'access, ' the supply of material 
assistance and diplomatic assistance. ' 
30According to J. C. Hathaway, the requirement of border crossing is included only for three 
historical reasons, namely, protecting IDPs would necessitate more resources than are available to 
the international community, providing protection to internal refugees would result in states 
shifting their responsibility onto the international community and the concern that any attempt to 
protect the needs of internal refugees would result in interference with the territorial sovereignty of 
the state concerned, and not on any conceptual grounds, The Law of Refugee Status, at pp. 31-32; 
A. Shacknove, 'Who is a Refugee? ' at p. 277. 
" A. Shacknove, at pp. 277,283. 
32 Ibid., at pp. 283-84, n. 20 
" See D. Turton, 'Refugees and 'Other Forced Migrants', ' Reftigee Studies Centre Working 
Paper No. 13, Oxford, October 2003, at p. 15; J. C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, at pp. 31- 
32. 
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effects of hostilities that threaten their lives, safety or freedom; have similar 
protection needs as a consequence; and are unable to get the protection of their 
own state due to the inability or unwillingness on the part of the state. 34 
Despite the conceptual similarity between refugees and IDPs which 
justifies their international legal protection, they cannot be considered as the 
same in terms of international law. Therefore, IDPs cannot be referred to as 
'internal refugees' as has been used by some scholars and in some cases 35 
despite the conceptual justification for such use. The term IDPs is used for 
practical purposes, associated with the concern to avoid weakening the 
protection available under the legal definition of refugee under 1951 
Convention, of which alienage is an 'essential element. 936 
Similarly, the conceptual similarity between refugee and IDP would 
not lead to de-emphasis on the element of alienage to the extent of a legal 
synthesis between IDPs and refugees to justify the assertion of international 
protection to IDPs by the international community. 37 This is because such in 
-country protection for IDPs based on identical legal status would render the 
protection of asylumno longer necessary. 38 The legal position that can be caused 
by the factual situation of IDPs is not similar to that of refugees, as IDPs remain 
within the territory of their own state and are entitled to the protection of 
their own state. Therefore, the international legal protection of refugees is 
'substitute' in its nature, due to the absence of protection from their own state 
which they have left, 39 whereas the international legal protection of IDPs is 
34 See J. C. Hathaway, The Law ofRefugee Status, at pp. 29-30; E. Mooney, 'The Concept of Internal 
Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons As A Category of Concern' (2005)24 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 9, at p. 14 states, 'internally displaced persons are denied the protection 
and assistance of their government, they are of legitimate concern to the international community. ' 
35 J. C. Hathaway, Ibid., at p. 29; J. Schrijvers, 'Fighters, Victims and Survivors: Constructions of 
Ethnicity, Gender and Refiageeness among Tamils in Sri Lanka' (1999)12, Journal of Refugee 
Studies 307, at p. 309; G. Melander, 'Internally Displaced Persons' in G. Alfredsson and 
P. Macalister-Smith (eds. ), The Living Law ofNations: Essays on Refugees, Minorities, Indigenous 
Peoples and the Human Rights of Other Vulnerable Groups in Memory of Atle Grahl-Madsen 
(Kehl, 1996) p. 69, at p. 70; Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, Judgment of 24 February 
2005, Application Nos. 57947/00,57948/00 and 57949/00, para. 193. 
36 D. Turton, 'Refugees and 'Other Forced Migrants" at p. 16. 
37 L. T. Lee, 'Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Toward a Legal Synthesis' (1996) 9, 
Journal ofRefugee Studies 27, at pp. 30-38, Lee proposes a legal synthesis of IDPs and refugees, by 
de-emphasising border-crossing as a determining element for eligibility of international protection 
of refugees on historical, practical, juridical and human rights grounds; L. T. Lee, 'The Refugee 
Convention and Internally Displaced Persons' (2001) 13 IJRL 363, at p. 366. 
" C. Phuong, 'Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees' at p. 224. 
39 J. C. Hathaway, The Law ofRefiigee Status, at p. 124. 
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4 complementary' in nature, as it provides protection along with national protection, 
if the national protection is not available or not adequate. 40 Without the 
factual similarity of the location of displacement, a legal synthesis of lDPs and 
refugees is not possible, despite other similarities between them and the fact 
that both are entitled to human rights as human beings, regardless of their 
41 nationality. Moreover, such a legal synthesis is not necessary to provide 
international protection to IDPs in the form of assistance by international 
humanitarian organisations. 
The differences in the protection of refugees according to reasons of 
their displacement, cannot be brought into the protection of IDPs on the basis 
of conceptual similarity between them. Melander differentiates between those 
who are externally displaced, due to persecution as human rights refugees and 
due to the effects of an armed conflict, as humanitarian law refugees according to 
their international legal protection which is more favourable to the former 
category. 42 According to Melander the same distinction to be maintained 
between human rights IDPs and humanitarian law IDPs as the latter is provided 
with less international legal protection. 43 Notwithstanding the distinction between 
both categories of refugees with regard to international legal protection, such a 
distinction of IDPs is misleading due to the reasons, that these categories are not 
precise as both situations overlap for instance, in an internal armed conflict fought 
on ethnic lines; whether displaced by armed conflict or by persecution, IDPs are in 
need of protection of their human rights especially due to their material 
deprivation; that human rights protection is not confined to persecution alone but 
includes other violations of human rights as an element of violence in internal 
armed conflicts as well as humanitarian law violations; therefore humanitarian 
40 C. Phuong, 'Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees' at p. 224 
41 For a human rights based argument L. T. Lee, 'Internally Displaced Persons and Reftigees' at 
pp. 36-37. 
42 G. Melander, 'Internally Displaced Persons, ' at pp. 69-70. 
4' G. Melander, ibid., justifies this on the basis that international humanitarian treaty law with 
regard to protection of IDPs by internal armed conflict is less developed and contain ineffective 
monitoring system, 'Internally Displaced Persons' at pp. 70-71; such an argument ignores the role of 
human rights law and customary humanitarian law in such situations. Moreover, ineffective 
monitoring cannot be considered as a reason for making distinction between IDPs on the basis of 
normative protection. 
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law violations whether based on discriminatory grounds or not could violate 
the human rights of IDPs as well. 44 
In particular, such a distinction between refugees should not be brought 
into the definition of IDPs, as IDPs are nationals who are entitled to the equal 
protection of their own state and if that protection is not extended to 
them then they should be provided with international protection. The 
considerations applicable to asylum seekers are different from those 
applicable to IDPs as the former displace to a state other than their own state 
which does not have the same human rights obligations as their own state 
towards asylum seekers. 
The requirement of alienage in the legal definition of refugee can be 
considered therefore in a positive manner to emphasize the distinct and greater 
protection needs of IDPs than of refugees, due to the factual situation of the 
IDPs. This is because, as with refugees, the failure of IDPs' own state to provide 
protection due to its inability or unwillingness is a necessary element for their 
international protection. IDPs are still within the territory of their national 
state, and they are entitled to the protection of their own state in terms of 
human rights and humanitarian law, in the same way as other fellow citizens, 
but the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection. 
Compared with refugees, who move out of the territory of their national 
state and are therefore free from the control of that state, IDPs are more 
vulnerable, because they remain within the territory of their own state which 
has subjected them to persecution or where their lives and survival were in 
peril due to the effects of hostilities. As Deng observes, '[o]verwhelmingly, they 
live under adverse conditions of a hostile domestic environment, where their 
access to protection and assistance is constrained by national sovereignty, despite 
their severe vulnerability. 45 Refugees are in a more protected situation by virtue of 
the international legal status provided for them by the 1951 Convention. Despite 
the similarity between IDPs and refugees, in the plight that caused 
displacement, the difference in the protection afforded to them can be clearly 
illustrated, for instance, by the armed conflict in Darfur, Sudan. Among the 1.4 
" See below, Ch. 2 for the convergence of human rights law and humanitarian law that 
contributes to the human rights approach to the protection of IDPs in internal armed conflicts. 
45 F. M. Deng, 'Frontiers of Sovereignty' at p. 250. 
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million Sudanese subjected to forced displacement in the armed conflict in Darfur, 
200,000 Sudanese who managed to cross the border and enter into Chad were 
protected as refugees, whereas those 1.2 million internally displaced within Sudan, 
although having similar needs, had to wait for international protection, as the 
Sudanese government was unwilling to provide assistance. 46 
As far as IDPs are concerned, the difference between those who are obliged CP -- 
to move due to the accidental effects of cross fire or indiscriminate violence and 
those who are forced to move due to a differential attack on them as a particular 
group, on discriminatory grounds, is that the former are 'victims' and the latter are 
the 'targets' of armed conflicts. 47 IDPs themselves can be both 'victims' and 
'targets' in armed conflicts. Therefore these two categories of IDPs are not 
always mutually exclusive, as in internal armed conflicts displacement of 
civilians occurs due to 'multiple, overlapping, and interrelated reasons. A8 
Yet the commonality between both groups that causes displacement 
is the element of coercion which exists regardless of the nature of 
displacement, whether forced (deliberate) or involuntary (as a by-product of 
armed conflict). In such situations the test can be that '[i]f a real choice exists 
for the persons concerned as to whether to leave or not, in other words, if they 
could reasonably be expected to choose to remain in their home areas, their 
movement is voluntary. 49 In other words, coercion in relation to displacement can 
be defined as 'reduction in the options in the choice' available to the IDPs 50 to 
stay in their place of origin or habitual place of residence and to return 
to the same or to have a stable life elsewhere in the country in safe and 
dignified conditions. 
In additiQn, the consequences that follow from the displacement of both 
categories of IDPs are similar in nature. Even those displaced by the effects of 
46 See, Report of the Representative of Secretary-General on Internally Displaced persons, Francis 
M. Deng, Mission to Sudan- The Darfur Crisis, E/CN. 4/2005/8 (27 September 2004) para. 10 
47 A. R. Zolberg, A. Suhrke and S. Aguayo, Escape ftom Violence: Conflict and Refugee Crisis in 
the Developing World (Oxford, 1989) at p. 269. 
48 R-Cohen and F. M. Deng, Masses in Flight, at p. 23. 
49Report of the Representative of the S ecretary- General, Mr. Francis Deng, Compilation and 
Analysis of Legal Norms, Part IP Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection Against Arbitrary 
Displacement, E/CN. 4/1998/53/Add. I (I I February 1998) para. 3. 
50H. Adelman, 'The Place of IDP Research in Refugee Studies'(2003) at p. 6 
(http: //www. idp. ntnu. no/conference/conference_papers. asp? page=literature&literaturid=76... ) 
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internal armed conflicts or by violations of human rights may undergo 
'fundamental marginalization' because of the incapacity of the government due to 
lack of adequate resources, which is equally harmful to the 'civil or political 
discrimination' suffered by IDPs who have been subjected to deliberate forced 
displacement. 51 Broadly speaking, all such IDPs are in one way or other the 
'victims' of human rights violations, because of the failure of the government 
concerned to provide protection due to its inability or unwillingness. 
Thus, based on this discussion, there are three factors that should be taken 
into account in formulating a working definition of IDPs for the sake of 
providing international legal protection: forced displacement or displacement by 
the effects of conflicts and human rights violations beyond the control of the state 
or caused by the state; failure of the person's own state to provide protection due to 
unwillingness or inability on its part; and the person's remaining in the 
situation of displacement within their own territory. 52 The first factor is the 
condition precedent for the application of the definition. 53 The second factor is 
determined in accordance with the causes and consequences as stated in the first 
factor. The third factor differentiates the legal concept of refugee from that of 
IDPs and activates the international legal protection of IDPs when the first and 
second factors have been satisfied. 
The definition of the UN Guiding Principles adopted 'forced' 
displacement to describe the deliberate displacement by parties to the conflict 
and 'obliged' to leave to cover displacements otherwise compelled by human 
rights violations or the effects of conflicts. 
54 Such a distinction is maintained in 
the working definition adopted by this study for the purpose of examining 
specifically the international legal protection to both type of IDPs. It is based 
on the rationale for the international protection of IDPs, namely, coerced 
displacement is an exceptional situation that results in specific protection 
needs by its very nature as opposed to non-displacement which is considered as 
relatively the normal situation in armed conflicts, which would not involve as 
much specific protection needs as internal displacement. 
51 J. C. Hathaway, Law ofRefugee Status, at pp. 13 8-39 
52 C. Beyani, Internally Displaced Persons at p. 25; R. Cohen and F. M. Deng, Masses in Flight, at 
5; 
17. p 
C. Beyani, ibid. 
54 R. Cohen and F. M. Deng, Masses in Flight, at p. 17. 
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The definitions of IDPs provided in the LN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement and the Declaration of International Law Principles on 
Internally Displaced Persons of the International Law Association include IDP 
situations other than internal armed conflicts and are not explicit as to the 
situation in which their protection ceases to exiSt. 55 Though it is difficult to state 
precisely the circumstances in which their protection cease to exist, since the 
protection of IDPs is based on their movement, the need for such protection 
presumably ends when their displacement is reversed, whether by return in safety 
and dignity to their original places or by a permanent and durable resettlement in 
56 some other place within the state and their protection needs are fulfilled . The 
working definition adopted in this study includes such situations to underscore the 
protection needs of IDPs. 
Moreover the definition refers to the tenns 'flee' or 'leave' to include 
both spontaneous and systematic displacements. It includes both those who are 
actually subjected to human rights and humanitarian law violations or effects of 
hostilities and those who leave in fear of imminent dangers, as indicated by the 
phrases 'as a result of or 'in order to avoid. ' Based on the above discussion, a 
working definition is adopted for the purposes of this study stating the basis of 
international legal protection and implying the protection needs of IDPs. 
Accordingly, internally displaced persons can be described as persons or groups of 
persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence by internal armed conflicts as a result of or in order to avoid 
systematic human rights violations and the effects of internal armed conflicts, who 
have not crossed an internationally recognised State border, and are not able to 
return, reintegrate or resettle voluntarily, in safety and dignity or despite such 
return or resettlement, their protection needs related to displacement have not 
been fulfilled. 
Para 2 of the Introduction to the LYN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement ; Article 
I of the ILA Declaration on IDPs. 
56 See for the discussion of this aspect, below, Ch 6, Section D. 
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2. Normative Frameworks 
A. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Their 
Relationship and the Protection of IDPs 
Though there are differing views as to the exact nature of the relationship 
between the regimes of humanitarian law and human rights law, the academic 
opinion has emerged that the two regimes are related but distinct-' As these 
two regimes are related to the extent they converge with each other, both sets of 
norms can be applied cumulatively in internal armed conflicts where their scope of 
protection overlaps, in order to maximize the protection of IDPs .2 Their inter- 
relationship can be used to strengthen the normative protection of IDPs in two 
ways: by reinforcing both systems through each other; and by interpretation of 
laws in the context of each other. 3 
As international human rights and humanitarian law differ 
fundamentally from each other, without identifying the similarities between the 
two systems in certain aspects, cross-fertilization would not be possible. At the 
same time, compromising the differences between the normative structures 
would affect not only the validity of such a process but also the credibility 
and the benefit of different methods of protection afforded by such systems. 
Therefore, to provide IDPs with the benefit of dual protection of these 
regimes, it is important to examine the normative structure of these systems to 
1 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, (Cambridge, 2002) at p. 193, n. 2; T. Meron, The 
Humanization of Humanitarian Law (2000)94 AJIL at p. 240; F. J. Hampson, 'Human Rights Law 
and International Humanitarian Law: Two Coins or Two Sides of the Same Coin? ' in Bulletin of 
Human Rights, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Refugee Law (New 
york, 1992) pp. 46-54; R. E. Vinuesa, 'Interface, Correspondence and Convergence of Human Rights 
and International Humanitarian Law' (1998)1 YIHL 69, pp. 69-1 10; C. Greenwood, 'Rights at the 
Frontier-Protecting the Individual in Time of War' in B. Rider (ed. ), Law at the Centre: The 
Institute o Advanced Legal Studies (Hague, 1999) p. 277; for a detailed evaluation of differing )f 
views see generally, J. Patmogic and B. Jakovljevic, International Humanitarian Law in the 
Contemporary World (San Remo, 1991) at pp. 21-30. 
2 See W. Kalin and L. Gabriel, 'Human Rights in Times of Occupation: An Introduction' in 
W. Kalin (ed. ), Human Rights in Times of Occupation: The Case of Kuwait, (Berne, 1994) p. 1, at 
p. 27; Hans-Joachim Heintze, 'On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and 
International Humanitarian Law' Law' (2004) 86, No. 856 IRRC 789, at p. 793; L. Doswald-Beck 
and Sylvain Vite, 'International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law' (1993)No. 293 JRRC 
94; T. Meron, 'Human Rights in Time of Peace and in Time of Armed Strife: Selected Problems' in 
T. Buergenthal (ed. ), Contemporary Issues in International Law: Essays in Honor of Louis B. Sohn 
(Kehl, 1984) 1; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 3 1, 'The Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 13 (26 May 
2004) para. 11. 
3 See below, Chapter 8, section 2. 
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identify any similarities between them, while also appreciating their differences or 
specificities, so they may influence and enrich each other. 4 
As far as the material field of application ( Ratione materiae ) of 
human rights law is concerned, in terms of Article 4 (1) of the 1966 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR) except for 
certain non-derogable norms specified in Article 4(2), a state may temporarily 
suspend other human rights during a 'public emergency which threatens the life of 
the nation. ' Though an armed conflict situation is not explicitly stated therein, it 
does not seem to exclude a situation of internal armed conflict as an extreme 
emergency, if that adversely affects the life of the nation .5 Similarly, Article 15 
of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) and 
Article 27 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (hereafter 
ACHR) permit derogation from human rights norms 'in time of war' as one 
of the situations of 'public emergency threatening the life of the nation. -)6 
Though certain human rights norms are derogable during armed conflict 
situations, the protection of the human rights regime as a whole does not cease 
to apply during such situations. As the International Court of Justice observes in 
its advisory opinion in the Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons case, 
'the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not 
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby 
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. 7 
This view of the Court was later confirmed by its advisory opinion in the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. 
4 To similar effect see the observation of Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 
Kovac and Vukovic, Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(hereafter ICTY ) Case No: IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T Judgment of 22 February 2001, 
paras. 471 and 496, in borrowing the definition of torture from human rights law. 
5 M. Nowak, U. N Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary (Strasbourg, 1993) 
at p. 78; absence of reference to war is deliberate as such reference was considered as indirectly 
legitimizing war and inappropriate in a United Nations instrument. 
ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR and 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereafter 
ACHPR) are reprinted in 1. Brownlie and G. S. Goodwin -Gill (eds. ), Basic Documents, 
respectively in pp. 182,398,671 and 728; ACHPR however does not contain a derogation 
clause. 
7 Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, reproduced in (1996) 17 HRLJ 331, para. 25; Human Rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations: Israel (CCPR/C/79/Add. 93 (18/08/1998), para. 10 
8 Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, General List No. 131 (hLtp: //www. ici-cii. orR). 
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Derogation of certain human rights does not mean that the states are 
free to take any measures in derogation of such human rights. Article 4(l) of 
the ICCPR 'subjects both this very measure of derogation, as well as its material 
consequences, to a specific regime of safeguards'9 similar to Article 15 of the 
ECHR and Article 27 of the ACHR. Thus, in order to invoke the measure of 
derogation under these provisions, apart from the fact that the situation of 
internal armed conflict must be a public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation, the State must have officially declared a state of emergency. Official 
proclamation of emergency is a condition precedent for the derogation of human 
rights, as it is essential that the affected public should know the exact scope of the 
emergency and its impact on their human rights, to satisfy the principle of legality 
and rule of law. 10 Without the official declaration of emergency, a state cannot 
rely on the provision of derogation to take strict measures, notwithstanding the 
existence of a situation of internal armed conflict. " 
The other procedural requirement is the notification of such state of 
emergency to other state parties through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations so as to subject the protection of IDPs during such time to the 
international monitoring. ' 2 
The consequences of derogatory measures are limited by the substantive 
principles, namely, the principle of non-derogability, which requires that certain 
human rights stated in the derogation clause cannot be derogated even in 
situations of public emergency threatening the life of the nation, 
13 the principle of 
proportionality, which requires that any derogatory measures must be strictly 
proportionate to the exigencies of the situation, the principle of non-discrimination, 
which requires that derogatory measures must not involve discrimination and the 
principle of consistency, which requires that the derogatory measures must not 
be 
9 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, 'States of Emergency' (Article 4) 
CCPR/C/2 I /Rev. I /Add. 11 (31 August 200 1) para. 1. 
10 Ibid., para. 2; however, Articles 15 and 27 of the ECHR and ACHR do not explicitly state such 
a requirement. 
11 M. Nowak, U. N. Covenant, at p. 80; see below Chapter 8, Section 1. 
12 However, non-compliance with this requirement do not affect the validity of the 
derogatory 
measures, M. Nowak, ibid; Landinelli Silva et al. v. Uruguay 
Communication No. 34/1978, 
CCPR/C/12/D/34/1978 (8 April 1981) para. 8.3; Human Rights Committee, General Comment, 
'State of Emergency' para. 17; J. F. Hartman, 'Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the 
Article 4 Derogation Provision' (1985)7 HRQ, 89, at p. 103. 
13 Such non-derogable human rights vary in the ICCPR and two other regional human rights 
instruments i. e., ECHR and ACHR; the ICCPR contains seven rights and the other two 
respectively contain four and eleven rights. 
4, 
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inconsistent with other international obligations of the state. 14 This fourth 
principle can include the international humanitarian law and thereby would 
become an important means for the convergence of both laws. These safeguards 
not only ensure the legality of the invocation of derogation measures and their 
consequences but also emphasize the fact of continued application of human 
rights during internal armed conflicts. Such continued applicability necessitates 
the interpretation of human rights and humanitarian law norms in the context 
of each other. Therefore it can be stated generally, that IDPs are protected by 
human rights law during internal armed conflicts to the extent they are considered 
as non-derogable and by the derogable norms to the extent that they are 
safeguarded by the requirements stated in the provisions of derogation. 
Unlike international human rights law, which is designed to be operated 
primarily during times of peace, 15 for the application of international 
humanitarian law the existence of the factual situation of an internal armed 
conflict is a pre-condition. 16 Being a lex specialis to be applicable during armed 
conflicts to protect civilians, humanitarian law is not subject to any derogation. 
Compliance with the latter does not moreover, depend on the requirement of 
reciprocity, as it imposes unilateral mandatory obligations. 17 Depending on the 
nature of armed conflict, the extent of the application of humanitarian law 
varies and so does the protection of IDPs. 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions requires an 
4armed conflict not of an international character' for its application and 
Additional Protocol 11 requires a higher criterion than common Article 3 for 
the existence of a non- intern ati onal armed conflict and, in turn, for the 
application of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 11 to IDPs. 18 
14 j. Oraa, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law, ( Oxford, 1994) at p. 13 9; 
Article 15 of the ECHR does not contain the requirement of non-discrimination. 
15j 
. Dugard, 'Bridging the Gap Between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Punishment of Offenders', (1998)No. 324 IRRC p. 445, at p. 446; C. Greenwood, in 'Historical Development and 
Legal Basis', D. Fleck (ed. ), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 
(Oxford, 1995) at p. 9. 
16 H. McCoubrey, 'Yugoslavia at War: International Laws of Armed Conflict and the Yugoslav 
Crisis' (1992) 136 Solicitors Journal 914, at p. 914; D. Weissbrodt, 'Ways International 
organizations Can Improve Their Implementation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in 
Situations of Armed Conflict', in E. L. Lutz, H. Hannum &K. J. Burke (eds. ), New Directions in 
Human Rights (Philadelphia, 1989) p. 63, at p. 71 
17 R. E. Vinuesa, 'Interface, ' at p. 77. 
11 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, of August 12 1949 ; Geneva Convention 11 
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Internal disturbances are explicitly excluded from the negative definition of armed 
conflicts in Additional Protocol 11.19 The minimum requirement for the 
application of the norms of customary international humanitarian law, as stated 
in the Tadic case, is a 'protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a 
state. 920 This authoritative definition of the Appeals Chamber is pertinent for 
the applicability of common Article 3 because of the latter's undefined, 
general nature. 21 
Though the definition of the Appeals Chamber is 'not particularly 
helpful in elucidating the level of violence that may be necessary, ' 22 
the references to the protracted duration of armed violence and to the 
organization of armed groups, however, presuppose the ability of the 
insurgents to maintain resistance against the adversary and therefore a 
certain intensity in the armed conflict and also of the organisation of the 
parties to the conflict. 23 As such it could be stated that exclusion of 
situations of internal disturbances from the scope of common Article 3 is 
confirmed. 24 Armed conflicts between armed groups, where the government is 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, of August 12 1949; Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, of August 12 1949; Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of August 12 1949 (hereafter common Article 3); Article 
1 (1) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, And Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11) of 8 June 
1977 (hereafter Additional Protocol 11), reprinted in (1977) 16 ILM 1442. 
19 Article 1(2) of the Additional Protocol 11. 
20 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A272, Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, Decision on the 
Appeal on jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70. 
21 This definition was applied to common Article 3 armed conflict in the Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter 
ICTR ) Judgment of 2 September 1998, para. 619. 
22 A. McDonald, 'Introduction to International Humanitarian Law and the Qualification of Armed 
, 
fugee Law in Context: The Exclusion Clause (Hague, 1999) Conflicts, ' in P. J. van Krieken (ed. ), Re 
p. 79, at p. 92. 
23 See, Akayesu, Trial Chamber I para. 620. 
24 L. Moir, Law of Internal Armed Conflict, at p. 37, n. 20; Article 8 (2)(d)of the ICC Statute 
explicitly excludes internal disturbances from the scope of common article 3 armed conflicts, the 
statute of International Criminal Court (here after Statute of the ICC); D. Schindler, 'The Different 
Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols' (1979)11 Recued 
des Cours 117, at pp. 146-47; Article 1(2) of the 1996 Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices to the 1980 UN Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed 
to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (hereafter 1996 Amended Protocol 11 
to the 1980 UN CCW) reprinted in A. Roberts and R. Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War 3rd 
ed. (Oxford, 2000); Article 1(2) of the 1980 UN CCW as amended in 21 December 2001; Article 
22(2) of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
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disintegrated or is too weak to suppress such conflicts, are also covered by 
common Article 3 and the customary definition of internal armed conflicts. 25 
Customary international law as an independent source of law is 
valuable to overcome the application difficulties in humanitarian treaty law, 
even if the norms 'belonging to [these] two sources of international law appear 
identical in content. '26 The application problem of treaty law arises in internal 
armed conflicts: where the state concerned is not a party to the Geneva 
Conventions or Additional Protocol 11; 27 where the state concerned denounces 
the Geneva Convention; 28 where the parties concerned deny the application of 
Additional Protocol 11, on the ground that the armed conflict has not reached 
the required threshold or existing treaty law does not contain certain rules on 
conduct of hostilities or the rules it contains are only in skeleton form. 29 
Moreover, the existence of customary international law is significant to 
in the Event of Armed Conflict 1999; for a contrary view, see R. Abi-saab, 'Humanitarian Law 
and Non-International Armed Conflicts', paper presented at the ICRC-Graduate Institute Training 
Seminar on International Humanitarian Law for University Teachers, Geneva, 10-15 August 
1998, at p. 16 ; F. Hampson, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts', in 
M. A. Meyer (ed. ) Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 
1981 Weapons Convention (London, 1989) p. 55, at p. 67 argues for an extensive application of 
common Art. 3 on 'humanitarian grounds if no other. ' 
25 However, Additional Protocol 11 always necessitates armed forces of a state as one of the 
parties to the conflict and therefore it is not applicable to conflicts between armed groups, 
S. S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol IF in Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zirnmermann 
(eds. ), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, 1987) 1319, at p. 1351; in such situations customary 
humanitarianlaw canbe resortedto. 
26 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. U. S) ICJ 
Judgment of 27 June 1986 (Merits) para. 178; customary international law is customary practice 
of states followed with the conviction of legal obligation and thus constituted by two 
elements namely, the objective one of 'general practice' (usus) and the subjective one of 
'accepted as law' (opinio juris), Article 38(l) of the 1945 Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. 
27 Due to universal acceptance of the Geneva Conventions, the customary nature of common 
Article 3 would not make much difference to application; however as Additional Protocol 11 is 
concerned, some states involved in internal armed conflicts such as Sudan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia 
and Somalia are not parties to it. 
28 By virtue of Article 158 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 that states, '[i]t 
[denunciation] shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall 
remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from 
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and dictates of the 
public conscience. jemphasis added] The word 'conflict' in this provision is broad enough to 
include common Article 3, Jean S. Pictet, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the 
protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva, 1958) at p. 625. 
29 Such a situation is referred to in the Martens Clause in para. 4 of the preamble to the 
Additional Protocol 11 as, 'in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person 
remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience. I 
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establish the individual criminal responsibility of armed opposition groups. 30 The 
existence of customary norms is useful in formulating IDP - specific 
international human rights standards such as the UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, to overcome the application problems of humanitarian law 
to provide a common international protection to IDP in internal armed conflicts 
rather than an ad hoc and inadequate protection depending on the application of 
Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol 11 to the state concerned. 
The 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) can be 
regarded as a persuasive indication of customary international law for two 
reasons: due to its adoption by a large number of states and the guiding 
principle that the crimes within the scope of the Statute of the ICC should 
be indicative of customary international law. 31 It was considered that the ICC 
should have jurisdiction over only those crimes which are universally 
recognised as such; therefore in order to become a party to the Statute of 
the ICC, there is no pre -condition that the state party concerned should 
have already become party to other humanitarian law instruments containing 
similar substantive norms. 
32 As such, for the examination of customary 
humanitarian law, the Statute of the ICC, which declares the law that existed 
during the negotiations of its adoption, even though it does not necessarily 
represent the present position of customary law in certain respects, is relevant. 33 
To the present position of customary law, the ICRC Study on customary 
international humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflict which is 
more extensive than that in the Statute of the ICC, should be taken into 
account. 
34 
The consequence of the customary definition of armed conflict as stated in 
the Tadic case and confirmed by the Statue of the ICC is the removal of the 
30 T. Meron, 'The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian 
Law' (1996) 90 AJIL 23 8, at-p. 246. 
, 31D. Robinson and H. Vdp Habel, 'War Crimes in Internal Conflicts: Article 8 of the ICC Statute' 
(1999) 2 YIHL 193, at p-208; j,., -Moir, Law ofInternal Armed Conflict, at pp. 160-6 1. 
32 D. Robinson and H, 'Von H; 4bel, ibid. 
33 Art. 10 of the SlaUA6 of the International Criminal Court (hereafter ICC) UN 
Doc. No. A/CONF. 183/9 reproduced in (1998)3 7 ILM 999. 
34 Jean-Marie, Henckaerts, and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Volume I: Rules (Cambridge, 2005); but see for a contrary view W. Abresch, 'A Human Rights 
Law of Internal Anned Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, ' (2005)16 
EJIL 74 1, at pp. 749-50. 
30 
distinction between common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 11 armed 
conflicts . 
35 The reference to protracted armed conflict in 'other serious 
violations of the laws and customs' applicable in internal armed conflict and its 
omission from the serious violations of common Article 3 in the Statute of the 
ICC, cannot be subjected to a contrario interpretation, because the Appeals 
Chamber in the Tadic case in fact referred to an identical definition only with 
regard to common Article 3 conflicts. 36 Therefore there is no reason whatsoever 
to differentiate between the situations as they are more or less the same and strictly 
related. 37 
The requirement of protracted armed conflict in the Statute of the ICC 
maintains the less stringent definition of internal armed conflict stated in the Tadic 
case, which eliminates the Additional Protocol 11 requirements of control of 
territory and sustained and concerted military operation for the application of 
certain rules of conduct in hostilities. The low threshold required in terms of 
duration ( implies certain level of intensity) and organisation of armed groups 
(implies the ability to carry out humanitarian law obligations) for the application 
of customary humanitarian law 38 is a step forward in the protection of IDPs 
during internal armed conflict, as it removes the difficulties hitherto prevailing in 
the distinction between the legal application of common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol 11. It thereby renders an extensive body of substantive norms applicable to 
an internal armed conflict. 
Despite the possibility of concurrent application of international 
human rights law and humanitarian law in public emergency which is also 
an internal armed conflict, territorial field of application (Ratione loci ) of 
the two regimes are not always the same. An emergency is an exceptional 
situation or crisis that affects the entire population and either the whole or 
part of the territory of a state and amounts to a threat to the organized life of 
35 L. Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law 
(Cambridge, 2002) at p. 142; the only difference is that the definition in the Statute of the ICC 
uses the term armed 'conflict' instead of armed 'violence used in the definition of the 
Appeals Chamber in Tadic. 
11 Article 8(2)(c ) and (e) of the Statute of the ICC. 
37L. Zegveld, The Accountability, at p. 142; but see for a contrary view: R. Provost, International 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, (Cambridge , 2002) at pp. 268-69; L. Condorelli, 'War 
Crimes and Internal Conflicts in the Statute of the International Criminal Court' in M. Politi & 
G. Nesi (eds. ), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impuni4, 
(Ashgate, 200 1) p. 107, at pp. 112-13. 
38 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, at p. 43. 
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the community . 
39 Thus, a state of emergency can be declared in situations 
that fall short of armed conflicts, such as internal disturbances, natural 
disasters and public disasters, if they threaten the life of the nation. 40 
Therefore, it seems that public emergency situations need not necessarily be 
internal armed conflicts. 
Likewise, not every internal armed conflict situation is a public 
emergency situation. This occurs when states decide not to derogate from their 
human rights obligations, despite the existence of an internal armed conflict. 41 This 
means that the derogation of human rights norms in times of national emergency 
under Article 4 of the ICCPR is not automatic but is a conscious act of the state. 
However, a state cannot declare a state of emergency even in an internal armed 
conflict, if the situation does not meet the exceptional threat requirement in 
the provisions for derogation. If a State has not formally declared a public 
emergency, it cannot then rely on such a situation as a justification for taking 
measures in derogation of human rights. 42 The absence of a declaration implies 
the conclusion of the state authorities that no derogations were necessary in such a 
conflict situation. 43 As will be discussed later, this aspect is an important condition 
precedent for the convergence of international humanitarian law with human 
rights norms. 
This is in contrast with the application of humanitarian law, which applies 
regardless of the subjective judgment of the parties to the confliCt. 44 Accordingly, 
even if a state does not recognise the existence of an internal armed conflict in its 
territory, a court can decide its existence according to an objective criterion in 
order to protect civilian victims and in the context of this study to protect displaced 
39Lawless v. Ireland, judgment, I July 1961, (1979-80) IEHRR 15, at p. 3 1; The Greek Case (1969) 
12 Yearbook of the ECHR para. 153; 'Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', (1985)7 HRQ 3, at p. 7, 
Principle 39. 
40 j. Oraa, Human Rights,, at p. 33. 
4' El Salvador and Nicaragua lifted the emergency respectively in 1987and 1988 despite the on 
going armed conflict, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1987- 
88, Ch. IV OEA/Ser. LN/11.74, doc. 10 rev. 1, (16 Sept 1988) [http: //www. cidh. org]; Russian 
Federation did not declare a public emergency during internal armed conflict in Chechnya. 
42 Cyprus v. Turkey, Application Nos, 6780/74 and 6950/75,10 July 1976, ( 1982) 4 EHRR 482, 
para. 527. 
43 F. Pocar, 'Human Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Armed Conflicts' in L. C. Vohrah et aL(eds. ), Man's Inhumanity to Man, (Hague, 2003) 729, at 
p. 735. 
44 Akayesu, Trial Chamber 1, para. 603. 
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civilians and potential IDPs. 45 Moreover, there are situations where the existence 
of an internal armed conflict in part of a state's territory does not suffice to 
trigger a public emergency because it does not threaten the life of the whole 
nation. In such a situation, IDPs would remain under the protection both of 
human rights law without derogation, and of the relevant humanitarian law norms. 
Despite the application of human rights law without any derogation in the above 
discussed situations, states can resort to laws to restrict the rights of IDPs in tenns 
of limitation clauses. For instance, in the context of an internal armed conflict 
occurring in the part of a country, a state can enact laws 'to protect national 
security, ' to restrict the movement of IDPs belonging to a minority group to other 
46 parts of the country, by imposing severe conditions . However, it should be noted 
that even such limitations of human rights are subject to the safeguard of the 
principle of proportionality. 47 
Conversely, a 'public emergency which threatens the life of the nation' 
which is also an internal an-ned conflict situation, can exist concurrently in a 
part of a state such as in one of its provinces. 48 In such circumstances, the principle 
of proportionality which requires that the derogatory measures must be taken only 
to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, would limit the 
geographical extent of the applicability of such measures. 49As a result, the IDPs in 
that part of the territory where armed conflict is taking place and in respect of 
which a public emergency situation has been declared will be subject to limited 
protection of the human rights regime, as opposed to civilians displaced to other 
parts of the country. IDPs who have moved from the area of conflict may be 
protected by human rights law without derogation, unless a state of emergency is 
declared in the whole state. 50 
45 Abella v. Argentina Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Annual Report 1997 of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser. LN/Il. 98, doc. 6 rev. (13 April 1998) where the 
Commission decided the situation as an internal armed conflict; but European Court of Human 
Rights was reluctant in cases involving Turkey and Russian Federation, See below, Ch. 8, Section 
1; see for a detailed discussion, R. Provost, International Human Rights, Ch. 7 on 'Legal Effect of 
Characterisation', at pp. 277-342. 
46 See below, Chapter 5, Section B, 1. 
47 J. Oraa, Human Rights, at p. 140. 
48T. Buergenthal, 'To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations' in 
L. Henkin, (ed. ), The International Bill o Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New )f 
York, 198 1) p. 72, at p. 80. 
49 Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency, ' para. 4. 
50 For instance, in Sri Lanka, despite the existence of an armed conflict in the Northern and 
Eastern parts of the country, a state of public emergency is being declared with respect to the 
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As far as humanitarian law is concerned, armed conflict even in one part 
of the territory will render it applicable to the whole territory, regardless of the 
absence of actual combat activities in other parts .51 Neither common Article 3 nor 
Additional Protocol 11 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions contain an explicit 
provision regarding their territorial applicability. 52 However, it could be inferred 
from common Article 3 and Article 2(1) of Additional Protocol 11 that the 
territorial applicability is based on the criterion of 'persons' and not on 
4 places. ' 53 This means that the application of Additional Protocol 11 is based 
on the persons affected, regardless of whether they are in the narrow area 
of conflict or in an area which is far way from it. 54 
This was supported by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case, where 
it was stated that the humanitarian law is applicable from the beginning of the 
armed conflict to the cessation of hostilities, until a peaceful settlement is 
reached. 55 Until that time, it is applicable to "the whole territory under the 
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there. 9ý56 This 
clearly indicates that the international humanitarian law norms apply not only 
even beyond the narrow geographical zone of actual hostilities, but also to the 
areas within the control of a party to the conflict. Therefore, IDPs have the 
benefit of the protection of both regimes. Such a broader territorial application is 
essential; otherwise, those IDPs who have moved from the combat area to 
relatively safer areas of the country within the control of an adverse partY57 
and are often sub ected to discriminatory treatment in the form of torture and 
extra judicial killings, would not fall within the protection of international 
whole state. 
51 Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 70. 
52 Akayesu, Trial Chamber 1, para. 635. 
53S. S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol IF at p. 1360; common Article 3 is applicable to 
persons who do not take active part in hostilities 'at any time and in any place whatsoever; ' 
Tadic Jurisdiction, para. 69; Additional Protocol 11 applies to 'all persons affected by an 
armed conflict as defined in Article L' 
5'Akayesu, Trial Chamber 1, para. 635. 
55 Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 70. 
56 Ibid., para 70; M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch, and W. A. Solf, New RulesfOr Victims ofArmed Conflicts: 
Commentary to the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions o 1949 (The Hague, )f 
1982) at p. 630; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Third Report on the Human Rights 
Situation in Colombia, OEA/Ser. LN/11.102, Doc, 9 rev. 1 (26 February 1999) para. 83 (hereafter, 
Third Report on Colombia). 
57 See Akayesu, Trial Chamber 1, para. 636; IDPs moved as such would be regarded as 'in the hands 
of or in the power of the party which controls the territory, Jean S. Pictet, Commentary, at p. 47. 
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humanitarian law. 58 The protection is, therefore, extended to actual and 
potential civilian victims in areas free from combat activities, who are and 
have been affected by abuse of power for conflict- related reasons, in all phases 
of their displacement. 59 
This means that human rights law differs from humanitarian law, which 
applies to the whole territory on the basis of the organised or collective 'source' of 
the conflict, even if it occurs in a part of the territory. 60 International human 
rights law, rather, considers the collective 'effect' of the emergency on the 
community as a whole, even as regards the declaration of an emergency in part of a 
territory. 61 In order to declare a state of emergency which would permit the states 
to derogate from many rights, the existence of exceptional threat is necessary. 
Therefore, the thresholds for a state of emergency and an armed conflict 'remain 
unconnected, and the conclusion as to one does not necessarily affect the other, ' 
62 
reflecting the independent nature of the applicability of the two systems. 
But whenever the material field of application of human rights law and 
humanitarian law overlaps, there is a possibility of convergence. 
The other difference between humanitarian law and human rights law is in 
their personal field of application ( Ratione personae) which is concerned 
with the issue of responsibility of the parties to the conflict and the protection 
of victims including IDPs. 
As humanitarian law binds both State and armed opposition groups, the 
protection of IDPs within the control of the parties to the conflict is not 
problematic. However, human rights law makes the State alone responsible for 
58 Sudanese law differentiated between "squatters" who arrived in the capital, Khartoum mainly 
due to drought and famine in southern Sudan before 1984 and the war "displaced" civilians, mainly 
southemers and Nuba, who arrived after 1984, allowing only the former to settle in Khartoum. 
See 
Amnesty International, 'In Search of Safety: the Forcibly Displaced and Human Rights in Africa', 
AFR 0 1/05/97 (20 June 1997) ; these displaced southern Sudanese were subjected to round ups and 
other restrictive practices different from others in the city, R. Cohen and F. M. 
Deng, Masses in 
Flight, at p. 28; the minority Tamil IDPs from north or east of Sri Lanka who moved to the capital 
of Colombo faced such risks including arbitrary arrests and detention, Amnesty 
International, 
Canadian Section, 'Amnesty International's Concerns With Respect to Tamils Returned to Sri 
Lanka', (Ontario: Refugee Coordinators' Office, 18 May 2000); however, humanitarian law 
applicable in internal armed conflicts does not protect IDPs from arbitrary arrests and 
detention but 
provides only for their humane treatment during detention and 
due process in criminal proceedings, 
Common Article 3and Articles 4,5 and 6 of Additional Protocol 11 of 1977. 
'9 See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber I of the ICTR (6 
December 1999) para-96. 
60 R. Provost, International Human Rights, at p. 272. 
61R. Provost, ibid; J. Oraa, Human Rights, at p. 33. 
62 R. Provost, ibid. at p. 275. 
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vio ations o"cts committed by armed forces or by paramilitary groups, with 
its consent it acquiescence. It would also become responsible for the violent 
activities of individuals against other individuals in internal armed conflicts, 
such as the forced displacement of IDPs by armed opposition groups or by 
violent activities of an adverse group of civilians (horizontal effects) if it fails to 
protect against such acts. 63 Such responsibility of states to protect arises 
due to the obligation to 'ensure respect' for those rights stated in the ICCPR at 
64 the horizontal level between individuals. A state would become responsible 
for deliberate inaction for the acts of law enforcement officials or paramilitary 
groups for instance, in racially motivated forced eviction and displacement. 65 
States are obliged to exert due diligence in protecting IDPs from attacks by 
armed opposition groups as well, but this is subject to the 'availability of means' 
and the 'foreseeability of harm. ' 66 When IDPs are in territory controlled by armed 
opposition groups, a state cannot reasonably be expected to exert due 
diligence due to its factual inability and therefore cannot be responsible in 
international law for failure to ensure their rights. In such situations, the 
responsibility for such acts by the armed opposition groups will have to be covered 
by international humanitarian law to protect IDPs. However non-state entities 
can also be made criminally responsible for human rights related violations that 
constitute international crimes, namely, crimes against humanity and genocide. 67 
As such, the protection of international humanitarian law has an important 
role in internal armed conflict to hold the armed groups responsible for their 
violations. International humanitarian law is based on international 'public order 
norms which impose obligations directly on individuals as well as on states and 
63 M. Nowak, UN Covenant, at p. 38; Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur, R. Ago, 'State 
Responsibility', Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 1,24 th Session, 1972, p. 72, 
at p. 126, para. 145. 
64 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20: 'Replaces General Comment 7 
Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)' 10/03/92 
para. 2; Human Rights Committee, 'The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation', para. 8; Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C, No. 4, para. 172; Osman v. United Kingdom, 
Application no. 87/1997/871/1083) Judgment of 28 October 1998, paras. 115-116; 155/96 The 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centrefor Economic and Social Rights v. 
Nigeria, 15 th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, 2001-2002, p. 3 1, paras. 57-58. 
65 Dzemqjl et al. V Yugoslavia, CAT/C/29/D/ 161/2000 (02/12/2002) para. 9.2. 
66 See for a detailed discussion L. Zegveld, The Accountability, at p. 188-196; see below, Chapter 5 
Section B, 3. 
67 Articles 6 and 7 of the Statute of the ICC. 
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groups, ' whilst international human rights law regulates the relationship between 
the governed and their government, with the objective of protecting individuals 
from the abuse of state power. 68 The international public order basis of 
humanitarian law is reiterated by the imposition of individual obligations on 
armed forces of both state and non-state parties to the conflict as power- 
holders in an armed conflict situation. Unlike human rights violations, 
humanitarian law violations are prosecuted and punished because they exceed 
the individual interests and affect the collective human interests of human beings. 69 
As human rights violations are concerned with individual interests, the right of 
action is often given to the victims for the redress of compensation or restoration of 
the previous situation (status quo ante) by the state. 70 However, since gross or 
systematic human rights violations affect the collective interests of human 
beings, opposition armed groups can also be prosecuted and punished for crimes 
against humanity and genocide in international criminal law. Therefore, 
any convergence of humanitarian law ( including international criminal law ) 
with human rights law would cover the obligations of state parties to the 
conflict alone in internal armed conflicts. 
As far as the persons entitled for the protection of human rights are 
concerned, human rights law protects the physical integrity and dignity of 
persons within the jurisdiction of a state in all circumstances, and regardless 
of their nationality. 7 1 Therefore, despite the fact that IDPs are not Provided 
with specific protection similar to that of women and children by any 
international human rights instruments, internally displaced persons by 
internal armed conflicts who are the nationals of a state are entitled for the 
general protection of human rights law. 72 
68 R. Provost, International Human Rights, at p. 98. 
69 Ibid., at p. 104. 
70 ibid. 
71 C. H. M. Waldock, 'Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of the 
European Convention' (1965) 11 ICLQ p. 1, at p3; Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948 states that '[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. '; para 2 
of the Preamble to the ACHR; see for its extra-territorial applicability, Mission Report of Special 
Rapporteur, G. Giacomelli, on Israel's Violations of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories 
occupied Since 1967, E/CNA/S-5/3 (17 October 2000) para. 7; however, some human rights are 
granted only to nationals, e. g., Article 25 of the JCCPR; T. Meron, 'The Humanization' at p. 240. 
72 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) ; 1979 Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Reprinted in I. Brownlie and 
G. S. Goodwin -Gill (eds. ), Basic Documents, respectively at pp. 241 and 212. 
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International humanitarian law applicable in international armed conflicts 
provides protection to civilians belonging to an adverse party. 73 Such application 
is not significant as regards IDPs in internal armed conflicts, despite the fact that 
parties to the conflict have common nationality. The very fact of forced 
displacement itself is sufficient to indicate the discriminatory treatment on ethnic, 
language and religious or similar grounds practised against one group of civilians, 
as an adverse party in internal armed conflicts. Such practices are prohibited by 
common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 11 which stipulate that the treatment 
of civilians should be 'without adverse distinction. 974 
However, the matter of concern here is the applicability of humanitarian 
law to IDPs from the ethnic group of a party to a conflict if the former are 
targeted as collaborators with the adverse party by the latter because of 'their 
attitude towards the conflict. '75 The preliminary part of subsection (1) of common 
Article 3 states: 
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or 
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
The reference to 'without adverse distinction' in the above section of common 
Article 3 does not 'qualify the overriding requirement of humane treatment of all 
persons taking no active part in hostilities, and in particular does not restrict 
the acts prohibited by that article to acts committed with a discriminatory 
73 T. Meron, 'Human Rights in Time of Peace and in Time of Armed Strife' at p. 10; in 
international armed conflicts, international humanitarian law is applicable to nationals of enemy 
state as protected persons. D. Schindler, 'Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship 
of the Laws', (1982)31 Am. Univ. L. Rev, at p. 938; see Article 4 of the 17V Geneva Convention of 
1949; however even in international conflicts, there are exceptions which render the application of 
some provisions of Geneva Convention IV to all persons within the territory under control of the 
party to the conflict including its own nationals, Art. 13 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949 and 
Art. 75 of Additional Protocol 1; also see Prosecutor v. DelalicMucic, Delic and Landzo ( Celebici 
case ) Trial Chamber, IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para. 266 for the influence of human rights 
on the concept of 'protected persons' in customary law which enabled a flexible interpretation. 
74 Articles 2(l) and 4 (1) of Additional Protocol 11. 
75 j. Pictet and C. Pilloud, 'Article 75 -Fundarnental Guarantees' in Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, 
and B. Zimmermann (eds. ), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, 1987) p. 86 1, at p. 867. 
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motivation .. )76 The violations of humane treatment need not be accompanied by 
discriminatory intent. It is sufficient if there is a serious breach of common Article 
3 or Article 4(2) of Additional Protocol 11, which protect the important value of 
humane treatment, and that such breach results in serious consequences for the 
victims. This reasoning is applicable even to the rules of hostilities. Therefore 
77 it is applicable to all 'affected' residents within the jurisdiction of a state , 
regardless of their position as persons belonging to the same or a different 
ethnic group of a party to the conflict which commits harmful acts. For instance, 
killing of civilians belonging to the same ethnic group of an armed 
opposition group for ideological differences is prohibited in common Article 
3 and recruitment of displaced children of their own ethnic group as child 
soldiers or combatants by the parties to the conflict is prohibited in Additional 
Protocol 11.78 Principle of humanity is the basis for such protection extended to 
civilians in international humanitarian law applicable to internal armed 
conflicts. 79 
Additional Protocol 11 provides protection to all those individuals who 
are not taking part in hostilities at the given time in contrast to those who are 
taking a direct part in hostilities. Thus, an individual can lose his right to 
protection of his life by his conduct, i. e., by engaging in hostilities, and not on the 
basis of his nationality. Similar to human rights law, common Article 3 and 
Additional Protocol 11, although they do not explicitly refer to IDPs, protect them 
as civilians. Being predominantly civilians, IDPs would be covered by any 
reference to civilians as persons 'affected' by the abuse of power or by conduct of 
hostilities in armed conflicts, by common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 11.80 
Common Article 3 and Articles 4 to 6 and 7 to 9 of Additional 
Protocol 11 protect all 'persons who do not take a direct part' in hostilities without 
specifying the word 'civilian. ' Undoubtedly IDPs are covered as those who do not 
take a direct part in hostilities. As humane treatment is offered to all within the 
" Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000), 
para. 2 2; the same reasoning can be extended to Additional Protocol 11 as it supplements common 
Article 3. 
77 S. S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11' at p. 1359; also see Arts. I and 2 of Additional 
Protocol 11. 
78Article 3 (1)(a) of the 1949 IV Geneva Convention; Article 4(3)(c)of Additional Protocol 11. 
79T. Meron, 'Human Rights in Time of Peace and in Time of Armed Strife' at p. 10. 
80 Common Article 3; Art. 2(1) of Additional Protocol 11. 
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power of the parties to the conflict, without making a distinction between those 
'who had taken part in hostilities and those who had not, ' the concept of 
civilians is not relevant here. 81 Therefore, both those who do not take part in 
hostilities and those who have ceased to take part in hostilities (hors de combat 
are similarly protected as victims. 82 
'Civilians' are referred to and defined in Part IV of Additional Protocol 11 
as those who 'for such time' do not 'take a direct part in hostilities' in contra- 
distinction to those who do take part in hostilities. 
83 Accordingly civilians are 
persons who are not members of armed forces or groups and those who do not take 
84 direct part in hostilities . This means that insurgents who are identifiable as such, 
even if they are not involved in hostilities at the time, are liable to be attacked as a 
legitimate military target, as distinguished from civilians. 85 This fact renders the 
position of civilians precarious because of the difficulties often involved in 
distinguishing insurgents and civilians in internal armed conflicts. 86 Therefore in 
such circumstances, those persons who are of doubtful identity must not be 
targeted. 87 Otherwise the immunity of civilians would be rendered meaningless. As 
stated by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, persons whose identity 
is in doubt can be regarded as 'legitimate military targets only for such time as they 
actively participated in the fighting' 88 'Active' or 'direct' participation in the 
hostilities means, 'acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause 
actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces. ' 89 Thus, 
humanitarian law in internal armed conflicts has adopted a pragmatic solution in 
providing protection to 'civilians' according to the actual behaviour of an 
individual which causes immediate consequences during the conduct of 
hostilities. This means that those who indirectly help parties to the conflict by 
81G. Abi-saab, 'Non-International Armed Conflicts' in UNESCO , International Dimensions of 
Humanitarian Law (Dordrecht, 1988) p. 217, at p. 235; S. S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at 
p. 1359. 
82 See L. Zegveld, The Accountability, at p. 61; however hors de combat may be subjected to 
criminal prosecution subject to judicial guarantees for their alleged participation in the conflict 
against the state. 
83 G. Abi-Saab, 'Non-International Armed Conflicts' at p. 235. 
84 The terin combatant is not mentioned in Additional Protocol 11. 
85 The war crime of treacherous killing or wounding of a combatant adversary in internal armed 
conflict implies making them legitimate target of attack, Art. 8(2)(e) (ix ) of the Statute of the ICC 
86 In particular, when the insurgents stay among civilians without wearing uniforms or bearing 
arms openly, L. Moir, The Law ofInternal Armed Conflict, at pp. 5 8-69. 
87 L. Moir, ibid., at p. 59. 
88 Third Report on Colombia, para. 189. 
89 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Chamber, para. 100. 
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offering information or food would not be regarded as persons taking an 
6active' or 'direct' part in hostilities. IDPs are therefore protected as civilians as 
long as they do not take direct part in hostilities. 
Accordingly, humanitarian law is applicable in internal armed conflict to all 
IDP civilians who are 'affected' by an internal armed conflict, regardless of their 
ethnicity, religion, language or attributes. This basic human rights approach of 
humanitarian law in internal armed conflict as a system to be applicable to the 
nationals of a state without any distinction can be used in the cross-fertilization 
between these systems. Therefore the mutual convergence between these two 
systems in the personal field of application can be used as a basis for the 
improvement of normative protection of IDPs. 
Despite the differences between human rights and humanitarian law, 
due to their similarity and overlap in the material field of application, 
personal field of application and territorial field of application an interplay 
could occur between these two regimes at the normative level in three 
situations in internal armed conflicts. Firstly, in a state of concurrent recognition 
of both an internal armed conflict and public emergency situation, interplay could 
occur through the principle of consistency in Article 4(l) of the lCCPR with 
regard to derogable and non- derogable norms; secondly, in an internal armed 
conflict even in the absence of a public emergency situation, interpretation and the 
reinforcement of non- derogable human rights and humanitarian law norms such 
as right to be free from torture or right to life may be achieved by mutual 
reference due to the concurrent application of these norms in such situations; 
thirdly, in an internal armed conflict situation, where a state does not declare a 
state of emergency but restricts existing human rights on the pretext that such a 
human right is not recognised or recognised to a lesser extent, convergence of 
two systems may take place through Article 5(2) of the lCCPR as such limitation 
would be in compliance with other human rights and humanitarian law obligations 
of the state party concemed. 90 However, the latter situation cannot be considered 
for the purposes of determining the internationally acceptable common criteria for 
derogable human rights norms as it depends on the domestic incorporation of 
90 For instance, the right to property; see similar provisions, Article 60 of the ECHR and Article 
29(b) of the ACHR. 
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international humanitarian law by a particular state. 91 Nevertheless its protective 
value to IDPs in internal armed conflicts of the state concerned should not be 
underestimated, as any infringement of it can be monitored by international human 
rights mechanisms. 
In the concurrent existence of public emergency and internal armed 
conflict, an inter-play between these two systems is evident with regard to 
derogable and non-derogable human rights norms. A state has no discretion in 
taking derogatory measures inconsistent with its other international obligations, 
including its humanitarian law obligations, under a treaty law or customary law to 
regulate internal order and safety under a particular human rights convention 
such as Article 4 of the ICCPR. 
92 However, such convergence of law is only 
possible if the state formally declares a public emergency under a relevant 
human rights convention, in order to derogate from human rights normS. 93 In a 
state of emergency which constitutes an internal armed conflict, the derogable 
norms under a particular human rights instrument cannot be validly derogated 
from, if those norms are 'restated in, or otherwise protected by, the applicable 
humanitarian law. 94 Such overlap between substantive norms would im-prove the 
lacuna in the definitive criteria for deten-nining the extent of derogation of 
human rights norms. 
As such, in an internal armed conflict, human rights law and 
humanitarian law can be interpreted in the context of each other. For instance, 
in human rights law, apart from judicially pronounced execution, to deprive 
91 F. J. Hampson, 'Using International Human Rights Machinery to Enforce the International Law of 
Armed Conflicts' (1992)31 Military Law and Law of War Review 119, at pp. 126-127; however, 
Article 53 of the ECHR and Article 29(b) of the ACHR which have the similar effect whether or 
not such international agreements internally incorporated. 
92 Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency, 'para. 9; a state cannot derogate from its 
other human rights obligations under treaties containing similar obligations of the ICCPR, for 
which it is a party: when such treaties do not contain derogation clauses, e. g, International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (hereafter ICESCR), International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966(hereafter 
CERD), Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984(hereafter CAT) and CRC 1989, reprinted in 1. Brownlie and G. S. Goodwin 
-Gill (eds. ), Basic Documents, respectively at pp. 172,160 and 229; when such treaties have 
additional non-derogable norms other than that of the ICCPR, e. g., ECHR, ACHR; it cannot 
also derogate from customary human rights norms of non-derogable nature in addition to 
those non-derogable norms in the ICCPR such crimes against humanity and genocide; see 
below for discussion of these and other norms. 
93 L. Zegveld, 'Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: 
A Comment on the Tablada Case' (1998) No. 324 IRRC 505, at p. 510 (in the context of Article 
27(l) of the ACHR). 
94 L. Moir, Law ofInternal Armed Conflict, at p. 196. 
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anyone of life is not generally permitted, whereas in humanitarian law, the killing 
and injuring of civilians as collateral effects of armed conflict is permitted to the 
extent that the rules of hostilities are observed. To interpret the arbitrary 
deprivation of life in human rights law, humanitarian law applicable to internal 
armed conflicts can be used as lex specialis. 95 
However, without a declaration of public emergency or martial law, 
states cannot claim that their attacks on civilians and civilian objects are 
carried out in an exceptional situation and therefore the non-derogable right 
against 'arbitrary deprivation of life' should be interpreted in the light of 
international humanitarian law. 96 Moreover, the term 'arbitrary' in the right to 
life also includes 'non-observance of the procedural condition' in Article 4 of 
the ICCPR, such as, declaration of state of emergency to warrant the conduct 
of state in the light of an exceptional emergency instead of normal situation. 97 
Contrary interpretation would result in the deaths of civilians being regarded 
as not arbitrary and thereby provide justification for such collateral loss of 
lives under international humanitarian law which otherwise could not be 
justified under international human rights law. According to Pocar, therefore, 
the existence of an internal armed conflict is not adequate to render the term 
'arbitrary' in the right to life to be interpreted in accordance with humanitarian 
law. 98 
Declaration of emergency or martial law is necessary in internal armed 
conflicts in the protection of IDPs to reduce the abuse of power by the state in 
the adoption of measures of derogation from the derogable rights. 
However, it is not desirable to insist on such a requirement with regard to the 
right against arbitrary deprivation of life by ignoring the reality of existence 
of a high intensity internal armed conflict. In a high intensity armed 
conflicts state tend to use means and methods of combat in the hostilities. 
Therefore insisting a declaration of emergency or notification would result to 
" Advisory opinion in the Legality of the Threat or Use offuclear Weapons, 1996, ICJ, para. 25. 
96 F. Pocar, 'Human Rights, ' at pp. 735-36; the states have to provide the details of the relevant facts 
that warranted the declaration of public emergency to the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR 
to conclude that 'valid reasons exist to legitimize a departure from the normal legal regime 
prescribed by the Covenant, ' Landinelli Silva et al. v. Uruguay, para. 8.3. 
97 F. Pocar, ibid., at p. 73 5, n. 13; such a requirement is not explicitly stated in the ICCPR; but 
Article 15 of the ECHR explicitly provided for such a requirement. 
98 F. Pocar, ibid., at p. 735- 
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the detriment of IDPs by excluding the application of more direct rules of 
international humanitarian law. 99 
Moreover, both regimes can be reinforced through each other to 
maximise the protection of IDPs, despite the differences between the types of 
standards therein. The rules of humanitarian law concerning the protection of 
IDPs are prescribed in the form of standards of treatment to be adhered to by 
persons holding powerful positions rather than in the form of rights of 
individuals. 100 This is because the normative framework of humanitarian law 
emphasizes the role of power holders and therefore individuals cannot assert rights 
against a state or insurgents. In contrast, human rights law bestows rights on 
individuals, which are derived from the 'inherent dignity of the human person'. 101 
An individual right - holder can assert his rights against a state bound by those 
norms. Even though this is the position with regard to civil and political rights, 
where economic, social and cultural rights are concerned such assertion of rights 
against a state is difficult due to the 'progressive' nature of the 
implementation and to their too general nature. ' 02 
Whilst humanitarian law as a legal regime is designed to reduce the 
practical difficulties of civilian population in armed conflict situations and 
therefore pays equal attention to their needs for both protection and 
assistance, the obligations stated therein can be used to elaborate the 
obligations of the state in terms of socio-economic rights as lex specialis. 103 Due 
attention has to be paid, however, to the non-derogable nature of the rights in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 
99 See below, Chapter 8, Section B, 1, for the requirement of derogation from right 
to life in Article 15 (2) of the ECHR which is not present in Article 4 of the lCCPR or 
Article 27 of ACHR. 
100 R. Provost, International Human Rights, at pp. 32-33. 
10' Paras. 2 of the Preambles to the 1CCPR and ICESCR of 1966. 
102 T. C. Van Boven, 'Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights' in K. Vasak, (ed. ), The 
International Dimensions ofHuman Rights, vol. 1 (Connecticut, 1982) p. 43, at pp. 51-53. 
103 See L. Doswald-Beck & S. Vite, 'International Humanitarian Law' at pp. 107-112; T. 
Jasudowicz, 'The Legal Character of Social Rights From the Perspective of International Law 
as a Whole' in K. Drzewicki et al., Social Rights As Human Rights: A European Challenge 
(Turku, 1994) p. 23, at pp. 34-39; Committee on ICESCR, General Comment No. 15, 'The 
Right to Water' E/C. 12/2002/11 (20 January 2003) paras. 21 and 22 and nn. 20 and 2 1; also 
see below, Ch. 8, Section A, l, for such an approach by Special Rapporteurs on Socio- 
economic rights; J. Pejic, 'The Right to Food in Situations of Armed Conflict: The Legal 
Framework' (2001) 83, No. 844 IRRC 1097. 
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( hereafter ICESCR), in the manner of application of such rights in internal 
armed conflicts. 104 Therefore, the lex specialis nature of international 
humanitarian law, in particular, the rules of conduct of hostilities, can be 
considered for application or elaboration of certain aspects of general standards 
of socioeconomic rights of IDPs in particular, the obligation of the state to 
respect suchrights, in internal armed conflicts. 105 
Interpreting socioeconomic rights in the light of humanitarian law 
norms is important for the coherent and consistent application of international 
law as a system. However, the humanitarian law rules concerning provision of 
basic needs to IDPs ( if there are any) within the control of the parties to the 
internal armed conflict can be considered in the identification or 
reinforcement of minimum obligations only a short term or perhaps medium 
term, as opposed to long term obligations of a state, due to the broader 
scope of socio-economic rights than the obligations of former. 106 For 
instance, Article 12 (1) of the ICESCR recognizes the 'right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. ' States 
are required to take steps to achieve this right by creating 'conditions which 
would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness. ' 107 Certain obligations with regard to right to health of IDPs who are 
wounded or sick, or shipwrecked, can be reinforced by reference to international 
humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflicts, namely, the right to be 
protected and to be treated humanely and to receive without delay the medical care 
and attention required by their condition without any distinction on any grounds 
other than medical ones, as stated in Article 7 of the Additional Protocol 11. 
Therefore as stated by the International Court of Justice, 
108 
104 As ICESCR contains only a limitation clause in Article 4. 
105 Report of the International Law Commission 'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ' 56 th Session, A/59/10 
(2004), para. 308; also see Article 31(3) ( c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969 which considers the principle of lex specialis as one of the factors in the consideration of 
6any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties' in the 
interpretation of treaties that includes customary international law as well. 
106 'A rule was never "general" or "special" in the abstract but always in relation to some other rule. 
... 
The adoption of a systemic view was important precisely in order to avoid thinking of lex 
specialis in an overly formal or rigid manner. Its operation was always conditioned by its legal- 
systemic environment. ' Report of the International Law Commission, Supplement No. I O(A/59/1 0) 
2004, para. 304; See, below, Ch. 5, Section E. 
107 Article 12(2) of the ICESCR. 
108 The ICJ in the Legal Consequences of the Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied 
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[m]ore generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights 
conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of 
provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible 
situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian 
law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be 
matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the question 
put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of 
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law. 
It follows that humanitarian law as a whole cannot be considered as lex specialis 
to human rights law but only with regard to the third possible situation 
referred to by the Court. A more specific and effective rule of international 
humanitarian law in relation to the subject matter can therefore be used to 
interpret the scope of the socio-economic rights as to their specific application 
in internal armed conflicts but not to replace or restrict the scope. For 
instance, the prohibition of destruction of civilian objects indispensable for the 
survival of civilians in international humanitarian law can be considered as a 
specific obligation to respect of the right to food in internal anned conflicts. 
Reinforcement and interpretation of humanitarian law through human 
rights law would also improve the protection of IDPs in an internal armed conflict. 
For example, the importance of the obligations stated in Article 7 of Additional 
Protocol 11 is fully understandable only by resorting to the right to health as stated 
in Article 12 of the ICESCR. Similarly, torture is not defined in humanitarian law 
and therefore can be interpreted by resorting to the definition of torture in the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture of 1984.109 
The normative convergence of the two systems is beneficial to the 
implementation of international humanitarian law, through the human rights 
enforcement mechanisms as alternative methods of enforcement. 110 This can 
Palestinian Territory, considered international humanitarian law as lex specialis to human 
rights law in the context of ICCPR and ICESCR, para. 107. 
'0' Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Case No: IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1 -T , Judgment 
of 22 February 2001, para. 467 the ICTY adopted the definition of torture in Article I of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
punishment, 1984 (CAT). 
110 L. Moir, Law of Internal Armed Conflict, at p. 197; C. Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian 
Law (Laws of War) in F. Kalshoven (ed. ), The Centennial of the First International Peace 
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occur by using humanitarian law in an indirect way as an authoritative 
interpretational guide of human rights law. The general criticisms with regard to 
such use of humanitarian law through human rights law by the human rights 
mechanisms are that they cannot improve the monitoring of compliance with 
humanitarian law and it is an 'inadequate way' to attain this objective; and that 
the one-sided implementation of the humanitarian law, i. e., only with states, would 
undermine the system of humanitarian law as a whole, by transforming it into a 
law applicable to states alone. "' However, given that there does not exist a 
separate monitoring body with the competence to receive individual 
communications, or a reporting procedure for violations of humanitarian law, it is 
desirable to have the human rights mechanisms to interpret human rights 
violations in the context of humanitarian law, even if this approach is 
'inadequate. ' Moreover, the second criticism is an overstatement because the law 
cannot be transformed into a regime only applicable to states, as humanitarian law 
would have other enforcement mechanisms such as the ICC or the national 
courts by the assertion of universal jurisdiction against both parties to an 
internal armed conflict. 
Such application of international humanitarian law through human 
rights law would be useful firstly, to clarify and determine the normative 
contents of human rights applicable in internal armed conflicts to IDPs; and 
secondly, to ensure compliance with humanitarian law applicable in internal 
armed conflicts in an 'indirect way. ' 112 This would be beneficial for the protection 
of IDPs, despite the fact that the human rights mechanisms only have the 
competence to decide on the violations of human rights. 
The above examination indicates that although the two systems are 
different in many aspects, they are markedly similar in their objective of affording 
protection to civilians in internal armed conflicts. A normative convergence is 
Conference: Reports and Conclusions (Hague, 2000) p. 16 1, at p. 240; Hans-Joachim Heintze, 'On 
the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection, ' at p. 799. 
11 J. K. Kleffner and L. Zegveld, 'Establishing an Individual Complaints Procedure for Violations 
of International Humanitarian law' (2000) 3 YIHL 384, at p. 389; Hans-Joachim Heintze, ibid., at 
pp. 798-99. 
112 C. Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law, (Laws of War)' at p. 240 states that 
investigating an alleged violation of right to life in internal armed conflicts would thus necessarily 
result in the investigation of the conduct that involve alleged violation of the laws of armed 
conflict. 
F. J. Hampson, ' Using International Human Rights Machinery', at p. 12 1. 
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possible between these two regimes when there is an overlap of substantive 
norms in an internal armed conflict situation. The convergence between them is 
useful in the protection of IDPs, as they can strengthen each other by filling the 
gaps in both systems, in particular to improve the human rights standards specific 
to IDPs. However, this process should not fail to take into consideration the 
independent existence of each system, which is necessary in providing the 
benefit of dual protection to IDPs. 
48 
Conclusion to Part I 
Despite the conceptual similarities between the IDPs and refugees, their 
international legal protection is different due to the important element of 
alienation in the legal definition of refugee. This element is an inevitable 
condition of the present world order which is based on the territorial 
sovereignty of states. 
IDPs are protected by international human rights and humanitarian 
law. These two regimes mutually converge with each other in personal, 
material and territorial field of application in internal armed conflicts. 
Therefore, examination of these regimes as mutually exclusive for the 
protection of IDPs is not convincing. Because it does not elicit the 
actual status of the existing protection to IDPs in international law 
against causes and consequences of displacement. 
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Part 11 
Protection From the Causes of Displacement 
Introduction 
Any analysis of a protection regime for IDPs is obviously concerned with their 
specific protection needs during displacement. However providing an effective 
protection to IDPs means that at least they should be protected from forced or 
otherwise involuntary (by effects of hostilities and other human rights violations 
as an element of conflict) displacement to reduce or to prevent displacement at 
the primary level. The ideal way to prevent displacement altogether, whether 
forced or otherwise involuntary, is the prohibition of the proximate cause of 
displacement, namely, internal armed conflicts. However, internal armed conflicts 
are not Prohibited by international law, as are international armed conflicts-1 
Therefore, to deal effectively with the problems of displacement, it is axiomatic 
that the issues that cause displacement in an internal armed conflict must be 
prevented or minimized by law. The vulnerability of IDPs to physical hann and 
economic marginalisation during displacement, whether by force or otherwise 
involuntary, necessitates protection to IDPs during such displacement, which 
would be palliative in nature as opposed to preventive, as it is not concerned with 
the causes of displacement, but rather with the needs of the consequences of 
displacement. Therefore, the task of providing effective protection for civilians as 
potential IDPs from forced and other involuntary displacement should concentrate 
on preventing the displacement itself, in addition to dealing with its consequences. 
Displacement is a 'cause of harm in itself not only because it often results 
in multiple violations of human rights at the point of departure and during 
displacement, but because if extensively carried out it may amount to genocide 
or crimes against humanity. 2 The latter situation arises in conflicts fought on 
discriminatory grounds, where the displacement is used as a method of combat 
or as an objective of conflict. For the purposes of identifying protection needs, 
it is therefore necessary to deal with the causes of displacement. Thus, a 
P. Malanczuk(ed. ), Akehurst's, Modern introduction to International Law, 7h rev. ed. ( London, 
1997) at pp. 318-19; M. N. Shaw, International Law, 4th ed. (Cambridge, 1997) at p. 798. 
2 M. Stavropoulou, 'The Right Not to be Displaced', (1994)9, American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 689, at pp. 744-45; M. Stavropoulou, 'The Question of a Right not to 
be Displaced' (1996) 90 ASIL Proceedings 549, at pp. 553-4; see above, Chapter 1. 
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distinction must be made with regard to forced displacement and the 
displacement resulting as a by-product of armed conflicts and human 
rights violations. 
The focus of this part is therefore on the examination of the scope of 
international human rights and humanitarian treaty and customary law as well 
as international criminal law concerning the specific protection of conflict 
induced IDPs from the causes of displacement. 
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3. Protection Against Arbitrary Displacement 
Forced displacement constitutes a multiple violation of human rights because it is 
carried out on the basis of policies that have the purpose or effect of compelling 
people to displace from their places of origin or habitual residence against their 
will and depriving them of their material necessities. For instance, forced eviction 
constitutes a gross violation of the 'right to adequate housing, the right to 
remain, the right to freedom of movement, the right to privacy, the right to security 
of the home, the right to security of tenure, the right to food and a variety of 
additional rights. " Forced displacement or transfer of civilians may be carried out 
either directly as such or by adopting the use of force or threat of force or measures 
of inducement and against the will of the civilians subjected to such transfer. 
Direct acts of forced displacement can be carried out by various 
methods: forced eviction or expulsion; evacuation or relocation; and the 
implantation of settlers. Forced eviction occurs when individual civilians or a 
group of civilians are subjected to coercive and involuntary removal from their 
homes, lands and other property and prevented from residing or working in 
such residence or property or place. Forced evacuation or relocation of civilians 
occur when civilians are moved to designated sites or camps against their will by a 
party to the conflict for strategic purposes, such as to have control over them. 
Implantation of settlers is a discriminatory form of settlement in which civilians 
who are transferred to a place without their consent become IDPs. If the 
implanted population receive preferential treatment over those civilians 
already in such areas, this may lead to discrimination and displacement of the 
latter. 2 As such displacements are actively carried out by the state or armed 
opposition groups, coercion is present in such situations to a greater degree 
than in other non-deliberate displacement and therefore people do not have the 
choice or cannot reasonably be expected to stay in such situations. Therefore, 
such forced displacement itself should be viewed as unlawful and people protected 
from it. 
1 Resolution of the sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, I 995/29, para. 1. 
2 Report of the Representative, Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection Against Arbitrary 
Displacement, paras. 14-15. 
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Forced displacements can also be carried out by systematic use of 
force or coercive measures or systematic violations of human rights that have 
the effect of changing the demographic composition in an area. For 
instance, by destruction of homes and property belonging to an ethnic 
group. Here, a policy of the state to systematically displace the civilians on the 
pretext of armed conflict or in a subtle manner can be presumed. 
Even in displacement other than the forced or deliberate type, which 
occurs as a by-product of an internal armed conflict where civilians are 
obliged to move as a result of or to avoid the dangers of armed conflict or 
human rights violations that generally threaten there life, health, liberty and 
security, such displacement may have consequences that adversely affect the 
enjoyment of other human rights concerning physical and material protection. 
Except for the displacement by direct act of the state, in fact it is difficult to 
distinguish at times whether a displacement is a forced one by indirect 
means or as a consequence or by-product of armed conflicts. The latter 
displacement is, however, not compelled by the deliberate interference of the 
state but by the coercive circumstances. 
Therefore it is not the cause of the displacement that has to be addressed 
specifically in such displacements, but the consequences, such as physical 
vulnerability and material deprivation during displacement. Addressing the causes 
of such displacement, however, should focus on the risks that compelled such 
internal displacement. Protection from such displacement can be provided 
indirectly by effective legal protection of human rights and humanitarian law 
norms that protect civilians, civilian objects and their survival from 
indiscriminate attacks. 
As far as forced displacement is concerned, since it directly affects the right of 
civilians to remain in their places of origin or habitual residence, to address 
protection from displacement, it is important to examine to what extent forced 
displacements are prohibited in international law as arbitrary. 
A. Forced Displacement Per se as a Violation of Human Right 
in order to consider whether forced displacement is a vlolation of human 
rights in itself, the existence of a right to remain in safety and dignity or a 
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right against arbitrary displacement is a prerequisite. 3 The positive aspect of the 
right to remain in the place of the choice is recognised in Article 12 of the 
ICCPR, Article 2 of the Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR, Article 22 of the ACHR 
and Article 12 of the ACHPR on the right to freedom of movement and 
freedom to choose residence. 4 The negative aspect of it, namely, the right against 
arbitrary displacement, can be implicitly derived from the general essence of the 
freedom of movement and residence. 5 The Human Rights Committee in its general 
comment has clearly stated that subject to the restrictions in Article 12(3), the 
right to reside in a place of one's choice within the territory protects from 'all 
forms of forced internal displacement' persons or groups lawfully present 
within a state by virtue of nationality. 6 
However, McFadden argues that the freedom of residence 'is an 
illusive freedom, and only partially protects a right to stay. A 'freedom to 
choose' clearly covers the initial decision to move to a place, but not so 
clearly the continuing residence in a place. ' 7 Conversely, Roos agrees with the 
right to remain in a continued sense, but limits the right to 'residence' in the 
freedom of movement only to the 'current residence, ' which need not necessarily 
be one's homeland or place of origin. 8 Homeland or place of habitual residence 
3 Ibid., para. 4. 
4 See also Article V111 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948 
(hereafter American Declaration); Article 2(l) of the Protocol 4 to the ECHR; Article 22(l) of 
ACHR; and Article 12(l) of the ACHPR; Article 5 (d)l of the CERD; W. Kalin, 'The Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement- Introduction, '(1 998)l 0 IJRL 557, at p. 561; G. J. L. Coles, 'The 
Human Rights Approach to the Solution of the Refugee Problem :A Theoretical and Practical 
Enquiry', in A. E. Nash(ed. ), Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees Under International 
Law, ( Nova S cotia, 198 8) p. 195, at p. 222, n. 2; C. Beyani, Internally Displaced Persons, at p. 5 6. 
5 International Law Association, 'London Conference 2000, Committee on IDPs, Report and Draft 
Declaration, ' Report of the 69h Conference London, 2000, p. 833, at pp. 801-802; R. Higgins, 
'Liberty of Movement within the Territory of a State: The Contribution of the Committee on 
Human Rights' in Y. Dinstein & M. Tabory (eds. ), International Law at a Time of Perplexity: 
Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Dordrecht, 1989) 325, at p. 336; Resolution of the sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 'The Right to Freedom 
of Movement' 1996/9, para. 3. 
6 Human Rights Committee, 'Freedom of Movement (Art. 12)' ICCPR General Comment No. 27, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 9 (02/11/99) para. 7; M. Scheinin, 'Forced Displacement and the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights' in A. F. Bayefsky and J. Fitzpatrick, (eds. ), Human Rights and 
Forced Displacement (Hague, 2000) p. 66, at p. 67. 
7 p. M. McFadden, 'The Right to Stay' (1996)29, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1, at 
p. 35 ( emphasis by the author ). 
' S. R. Roos, 'The 'Right to Live and Remain in One's Place of Origin': A United Nations' 
Rhetoric or Internationally Recognized Human Right? -Reflections on the Potential of a 
Controversial Right to be Universally Recognized, ' (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International 
Law 517, at p. p. 539. 
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means Ca distinct geographical location within the territory of a State. '9 The 
claim of a right to remain in one's home land or place of origin needs the 
proof of 'the time factor and the element of being emotionally rooted in 
a place of residence. "o This distinguishes it from the right to freedom of 
residence, which simply protects the residence of a person fo r whatever 
reason that person chooses to stay in that place. " Such a broader scope of this 
right is beneficial as it even protects IDPs from secondary forced 
displacements from the places towhich they have been displaced. 12 
The right to choose one's residence cannot be narrowly interpreted as 
referring to an initial decision to choose to stay, as it can clearly include the 
continuing choice to reside as well. 13 In its general sense, the right to 
remain in the residence of choice can apply to a place of origin or 
homeland as long as the civilians habitually reside in such place at the time of 
displacement, 14 even though such a right does not specifically protect a right to live 
and remain in one's homeland or place of origin as such. 15 For the 
purposes of protection from internal displacement, residing habitually in a 
place, regardless of whether it is one's place of origin or not, is a precedent 
condition. Only persons uprooted from their home, territory, area or region 
9Final report of the Special Rapporteur Al-Khasawneh, Human Rights and Population Transfer, 
E. /CN, 4/Sub. 2/1997/23 (27 June 1997) para. 13. 
10 S. R. Roos, 'The Right to Live, ' at p. 539. 
11 S. R. Roos, ibid., at p. 539. 
12 Medecins Saris Frontieres, 'Escalating Attacks in North Darfur, Sudan, Force Civilians to 
Flee Repeatedly' (0 1.12.2004); repeated displacement makes IDPs extremely vulnerable and 
provision of humanitarian assistance difficult. 
(http: //www. msf. oriz/msfintemational/invoke. cfm? objectid=Dee9lB21-93CA-47B8-A7A... 
13 In Maria Mejia v. Guatemala, Case 10.533, Report No. 32/96, Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 16 October 1996, OEA/Ser. LN/11.95, Doc. 7rev, (14 March 1997) para. 65 stated 
that, intimidation to prevent the IDPs to return to their original place of residence is a violation of 
their right to choose residence. 
14 Miskitos v. Nicaragua, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation 
of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, 
OEA/Ser. LN. 11.62, doc. 10 rev. 3, (29 November 1983). 
" Such a right to remain in one's place of origin or homeland and to return thereto is 
articulated as an independent right, not based on the right to remain component of the right 
to freedom of movement and residence or right to arbitrary interference with home; right to 
one's homeland also include right to a nationality and the territorial locus of a population 
within the state; see generally, S. R. Roos, 'The Right to Live' in particular, at pp. 536-541; 
A. de Zayas, 'The Right to One's Home Land, Ethnic Cleansing, and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia' (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 257, at p. 258; 
Final Report of the Special Rapporteur Human Rights and Population Transfer, Annex 11 
Draft Declaration on Population Transfer and the Implantation of Settlers, Article 4 (1) states 
that, [e]very person has the right to remain in peace, security and dignity in one's home, or on 
one's land and in one's country. ' 
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would be considered as IDPs. Thus, in its general sense, the right to freedom of 
movement covers in all its aspects the transfer of population in an area 
of a particular civilian group, whether by forcible relocation or by 
implantation of settlers, as these practices infringe upon the people's right to 
remain. 16 In addition, it covers the more specific form of forced displacement, 
namely the ethnic cleansing of civilians belonging to an ethnic group, 
17 as a direct violation of Article 12 . 
Decided cases with regard to the protection from forced 
displacement of indigenous people who have special ties with the land 
indicate that protection of the continued right to remain in homes and habitual 
places of origin is possible within the freedom of movement and right to 
choose residence. In the case of Miskito Indians, approximately 8,5000 Miskitos 
in Nicaragua were compulsorily relocated from the Coco River to a 
settlement in another area. The Inter- American Commission on Human Rights 
observed that the process of forced relocation is a 'traumatic experience, 
particularly when it concerns Indian populations with strong ties to their land 
and homes' and decided that once the military emergency was over, the Miskitos 
should be permitted to return to Coco River region; otherwise, such a prolonged 
stay would become discriminatory punishment. 18 The Commission came to this 
reasoning only within the general sense of the right to remain, when it 
considered the situation of Miskitos who have close ties to their place of origin. 
The right to remain was further reiterated in the precautionary measure granted by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the case of Afro-Colombian 
Communities in 49 Hamlets in the Naya River in Colombia to protect the Afro- 
Colombian Communities from forced displacement, when they were threatened by 
the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) in an attempt to make them 
leave the area. 19 Similarly, in the case of Peace Community of San Jose De 
`C. Meindersma, 'Legal Issues Surrounding Population Transfers in Conflict Situations' (1994) 
XLI Netherlands International Law Review 3 1, at p. 67. 
17 See Special Decisions by the Human Rights Committee Concerning Reports of Particular States: 
Bosnis and Herzigovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia. (7/10/93) A/48/40, Annex VII (decision) A. Bosnia 
and Herzigovina para. I (a); C. Meindersma, ibid., at p. 67. 
I'Miskitos, para. 31. 
19 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2002, OEA/Ser. LN/11.117, 
Doc. I rev. 1 (7 March 2003) Ch. 111, para. 2 1; 515 families of Afto-Colombian descent (2,125), 
members of the Jiguamiando Basin Community Council. Annual Report of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, 2002, Ch. 111, para. 45; Article7(1) of the Turku Abo Declaration of 
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Apartado and in the case of the Communities of the Jiguamiando and the 
Curbarado in Colombia, the Inter- American Court granted provisional measures 
to protect the continued stay of the communities which had cultural ties to 
those lands, without any kind of coercion or threat. 20 
Except for Article 16 (1) of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
of 1989, explicit reference to a right against arbitrary displacement is not 
provided for in any human rights instrument .21 However this Convention is not 
very helpful in the determination of the existence of a general right to 
remain as it is only applicable to indigenous or tribal peoples. 22 
The right to remain can be implicitly derived from the rights concerning 
home in Article 17 of the ICCPR, which protects against 'arbitrary or unlawful 
interference' with privacy, family and home, Article II (I) of ICESCR on right 
to adequate standard of living including housing, 23 Articles 6(2) and 16 of CRC of 
1989 on survival and development of the child and right against arbitrary 
interference with privacy, family and home; and Article 5 (e) (iii) of the CERD on 
the right to housing without racial discrimination. The right to remain in the 
'home' in Article 17 of the ICCPR is not restricted as an aspect of 
privacy, but an explicit protection in its own right. 24 Forced eviction from 
informal settlements is considered by the Human Rights Committee as a 
violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR and thus emphasizes its right to remain 
component against forced eviction. 25 
Minimum Humanitarian Standards, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1991/55 (2 December 1990) reprinted 
in M. Sassoli and A. A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching 
Materials on Contemporary Practice in International ? Humanitarian Law (Geneva, 1999) 519 ; 
Resolution of the sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
1995/13 (18 August 1995) para. l, '[a]ffirms the right of persons to remain in peace in their own 
homes, on their own lands and in their own countries. ' 
20 Peace Community of San Jose De Apartado Order of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 18 June 2002, 'Decides' section, para. 4; Communities of the Jiguamiando and the 
Curbarado, Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 6 March 2003, paras. 1-2, 
'Decides' section para. 3; in the latter case in para. 6 of his concurring opinion Judge Cancado 
Trindade, observed that such measures have already protected the 'right to circulation and 
residence of numerous human beings. ' 
21 Article 16(l) states that'[s]ubject to the following paragraphs of this Article, the peoples 
concerned shall not be removed from the land which they occupy. ' 
22 Article 1(2) states that, '[s]elf -identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a 
fundamental critenon for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention 
apply. ' 
23 Articles IX and XI of the American Declaration; Article 8 of the ECHR; Article II of the ACHR. 
24 F. Volio, 'Legal Personality, Privacy, and the Family' in L. Henkin (ed. ), The International 
Bill ofRights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 198 1) p. 185, at p. 196. 
25 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Kenya, CCPR/CO/83/Ken (29 
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The right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his 
family, including housing, expressed in the ICESCR, can be interpreted as 
implying a right to remain, as this is important for the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights. The Committee on ICESCR viewed the 
right to adequate housing as a 'right to live somewhere in security, peace and 
dignity. 926 Thus the right to adequate housing in the ICESCR can be violated by 
forced eviction in internal an-ned conflicts. 27 Similarly, the African Commission 
has also observed that, 28 
[a]lthough the right to housing or shelter is not explicitly provided for under the 
African Charter, the corollary of the combination of the provisions protecting the 
right to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical health, cited under 
Article 16 above, the right to property, and the protection accorded to the family 
forbids the wanton destruction of shelter because when housing is destroyed, 
property, health and family life are adversely affected. 
In this regard the Commission has noted that this implicit right to adequate housing 
protected in the Charter also 'encompasses the right to protection against forced 
eviction. 29 Moreover, such a right can also be implicitly derived from the right to 
30 peaceful enjoyment of property in the CERD, ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR . 
Therefore, a contrario interpretation of these rights to housing, privacy, family, 
survival and property emphasises the right against arbitrary eviction. 31 
It is to be noted however that forced eviction of people from their homes, 
whether by destruction of homes or otherwise, cannot necessarily be considered 
forced internal displacement unless such a purpose or effect is indicated by 
April 2005) para. 22. 
26 Committee on ICESCR, General Comment NoA: 'The Right to Adequate Housing (Article 
11.1 )' ( 13/12/9 1) para. 7. 
27 Committee on ICESCR, General Comment No. 7, 'The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Art. 11.1) : Forced Eviction' (20/05.97) para. 5; Analytical Report compiled by the Secretary 
- General on Forced Evictions, E/CN. 4/1994/20 (7 December 1993) paras. 73 and 76 state 
that practice of forced evictions is mainly a serious violation of the right to adequate 
housing. 
28 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights 
v. Nigeria, para. 60. 
29 Ibid., para. 63. 
30 Article XXIII of the American Declaration 1948; Article 5(d)(v) of the CERD; Article I of the 
Protocol No. I to the ECHR; Article 21 of the ACHR; Article 14 of the ACHPR. 
31 Violations of Articles 8 and Article I of Protocol No. I to the ECHR,: Selcuk and Asker v. 
Turkey, Application No. 12/1997/769/998-999, Judgment of 24 April 1998, paras. 86-87; 
Bilgin v. Turkey, Application No. 23819/94, Judgment of 16 November 2000, paras. 108-109. 
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discriminatory and systematic practice of forced evictions. 
32 In cases against 
Turkey the destruction of houses, property and crops of Kurds in South-East 
Turkey which compelled consequent displacement of civilians from villages was 
not, however, considered as an act of forced displacement, even though such acts 
were considered inhumane treatment, violations of private and family life, home 
33 and peaceful enjoyment of property. Such acts can be considered as a 
violation of the right to remain or the right against arbitrary displacement if 
carried out systematically against a particular ethnic groups in association with 
other violent acts or threats which might lead from the overall context to a 
reasonable conclusion of a policy of forced displacement on the part of State. In 
other words, forced displacement contains elements of movement and coercion 
which are only present in forced eviction when it is carried out as a 
systematic practice against a particular ethnic group with other acts of 
violence or threats. 34 
Forced eviction may constitute one of the causes or methods of internal 
displacement. Therefore, the right to remain component in the right to privacy, 
family and home and the right to adequate housing are necessarily rights against 
arbitrary eviction or right against 
35 homelessness 
. They do not protect persons 
from arbitrary displacement per se, even if the arbitrary eviction in some 
situations may result in internal displacement. Conversely, forced displacement 
may affect these two rights, in addition to other rights such as the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of property. Therefore, the protection against arbitrary 
32 Analytical Report compiled by the Secretary - General on Forced Evictions, para. 18 states 
that, 'not every case of forced eviction leads to internal displacement and not all internally 
displaced persons are displaced due to the practice of forced evictions. ' 
33 In Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 21893/93 (16/09/96), para. 8l, the European Court of Human 
Rights Stated that forcible expulsion on the part of security forces was not established in: Selcuk 
and Asker v. Turkey, (24 April 1998) paras. 79,86, Dulas v. Turkey 25801/94, Judgment, (30 
January 2001) para. 54 and Altun v. Turkey Application No. 24561/94 (I June 2004) para. 52, as the 
Court stated that the applicants were obliged to leave the village as a result of destruction of their 
houses; but in Orhan v. Turkey Application No. 25659/94, Judgment (18 June 2002) para. 379, 
forced evacuation was found by the Court but it was not decided whether such an evacuation per se 
is a violation of Arts. 8 and I respectively of European Convention on Human Rights and its 
Protocol No. I. 
34 Analytical Report compiled by the Secretary - General on Forced Evictions, paras. 18. 
Because the practice of forced evictions violates the right to freedom of movement and 
residence in such situations, Analytical Report, ibid., para. 65. 
35 committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to adequate Housing: Forced Evictions' para. 5; 
Resolution of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, 'Forced Eviction' 1995/29 (24 August 1995) recognises the component of right to 
remain as the right to a secure place to live in peace and dignity. ' 
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displacement provided by the right to freedom of movement and residence on 
the one hand by and on the other by the right to adequate housing and the 
right against arbitrary interference with home is not one and the same, albeit the 
latter two can provide indirect and preliminary protection against 
displacement by providing protection against arbitrary eviction. 36 
A human right is criminalized due to the importance of the 'social or 
human interest protected by this right in the common shared values of the 
international community' and of the apparent need to protect this right through 
international criminalization. 37 Such international criminalization of the violation 
of right to freedom of movement and residence has led to claims of crimes 
against humanity and genocide being invoked against forced displacement. 38 The 
categorisation of persecution (through forced displacement) as a crime against 
humanity is an explicit recognition of this fact as it is defined as 
'intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international 
law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity. ' 39 
This is further evident from the observations of International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia ( hereafter ICTY ) where the values protected by 
the prohibitions against forcible displacements were identified. It was stated 
that the prohibition 'aims at safeguarding the right and aspiration of individuals to 
live in their communities and homes without outside interference. 40 In Prosecutor 
v. Simic, Tadic and Zaric, the Trial Chamber identified the underlying value 
protected by the crime against humanity of forcible transfer as the 'right of the 
victim to stay in his or her home and community and the right not to be 
deprived of his or her property by being forcibly displaced to another location. 41 
36 See for such an approach, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to 
the United Nations Secretary-General , Geneva, 25 January 2005, para. 330. 37 M. C. Bassiouni, 'Enforcing Human Rights, ' at p. 349. 
38 Provost, Human Rights, at p. 107; Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency, ' at p. 8, n. 7; 
the General Comment of the Human Rights Committee, on 'States of Emergency' generally states 
the connection between crimes against humanity and the violation of corresponding human rights 
and in particular by illustration the connection with regard to the right to freedom of movement, 
paras. 12,13(d); K. Ambos and S. Wirth, 'The Current Law of Crimes Against Humanity : An 
Analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000, (2002)' 13 Criminal Law Forum 1, at p. 30. 
39 Article 7(2) (g) of the Statute of the ICC. 
40 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, (17 September 
2003) para. 218. 
41 prosecutor i,. Simic, Tadic and Zaric, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgement, (17 October 2003) 
para. 130. 
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Thus, it is the right to remain which is protected by the prohibition against forcible 
12 displacement. 
Though population transfer per se is not prohibited as genocide except in 
Article 6(e) of the Statute of the ICC, and only with regard to forcible transfer of 
children of the group to another group, the value of the right to remain can be 
derived from other prohibitions concerning the right to physical existence in 
the crime of genocide which can be affected by forced displacement. 43 
That forced displacement is prohibited by international humanitarian treaty 
and customary law applicable in internal conflicts and prohibited as a war crime 
in the Statute of the ICC further strengthens the notion of right against arbitrary 
displacement during internal armed conflicts. 44 However, the value of this 
humanitarian law prohibition is of limited help to support the right to remain, as 
human rights are applicable in peace time and to everyone including armed forces 
and groups within the jurisdiction of a state, unlike humanitarian law. 
The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the UN 
Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced 
Persons articulate a 'right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced' from 
45 his or her home, or place of habitual residence. Such a formulation of a right 
against arbitrary displacement was implicitly derived not only from the right to 
freedom of movement and residence but also from the right to home and housing. 46 
42 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, Case No. IT-02-54-T 
(16 June 2004) para. 69. 
43 Y. Dinstein, 'Crimes Against Humanity' in J. Makarczyk (ed. ), Theory of International Law at 
the Threshold of the 21" Century, Essays in Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski, ( Hague, 1996) 
891, at p. 905 observes the link between crimes against humanity and genocide as '[s]ince the crux 
of the crime of genocide is the extermination or persecution of a civilian population, it can be 
subsumed under the heading of crimes against humanity. Indeed, genocide may be looked upon as 
the most paradigmatic crimes against humanity. ' See below, Section, C, 1, a. 
44 Article 17 of the Additional Protocol 11. 
45 Principle 6 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; Principle 5 of the Principles 
on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Final Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Housing and Property Restitution in the Context of 
Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2005/17 (28 June 2005) 
Annex, (endorsed by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights by 
resolution 2005/2 1, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2005/L. Il/Add. 2 (I I August 2005). 
46 Report of the Representative, Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection Against Arbitrary 
Displacement, at para. 4; M. Stavropoulou, 'The Question of a Right not to be Displaced, ' at 
pp. 549-550; W. Kalin, 'The Guiding Principles on Internal Displ acement- Introduction, ' at p. 
561; but the Article 4 of the ILA Declaration on IDPs on the right not to be arbitrarily 
displaced is based on the freedom of movement and residence. see ILA, Report of the 69 th 
Conference, London, 2000, at pp. 801-803; the United Nations Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in Resolution 1996/9 ' The Right 
to Freedom of Movement' (23 August 1996) where it affirmed the right to remain of IDPs in 
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Such an articulation of a right is unwarranted as it has been based on rights that 
protect a different but to some extent related values, namely, the right to be 
free from forced eviction. Such an approach would weaken the right to freedom of 
movement and residence which is broad enough to deal with forced displacement 
from home and habitual place of residence. Therefore a right against arbitrary 
displacement as de lege lata based on the freedom of movement and residence 
would certainly receive wide recognition to strengthen the protection of persons 
from forced displacement. 
The expression of a right to be 'protected' against arbitrary displacement 
in the UN Guiding Principles is, better one than the 'right not to be arbitrarily 
displaced, ' as the former can be interpreted to some extent as emphasizing 
positive measures to be adopted with regard to arbitrary displacement. The 
ILA Declaration on Internally Displaced Persons which requires respect for the 
right not to be arbitrarily displaced to the 'fullest extent possible in accordance 
with international law' cannot be justified, as the right against arbitrary 
displacement is absolute. 47 It should be respected without any qualifications. 
Explicit provision of a right to remain will have the effect of directly 
imposing obligations on the state to take positive measures to prevent or to 
minimize displacement of persons. In a similar vein, Principle 5 of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement requires all authorities to 'respect 
and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including human 
rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid 
conditions that might lead to displacement of persons. 48 Even though this 
Principle sets out positive and negative measures to be taken by the 
authorities in terms of human rights and humanitarian law obligations 
generally, it is not based on a specific legal obligation concerning 
displacement. Without an explicit right to remain it does not add anything 
significantly to the protection of IDPs from displacement but merely restates 
the obligations already existing in all the human rights and humanitarian law 
which provides indirect protection from displacement. 
terms of the freedom of movement and in Resolution 1998/27 ' Forced Population Transfer' 
(26 August 1998) considered practice of forced population transfer, eviction, relocation, 
ethnic cleansing and other forms of forced displacement as deprivation of right to freedom 
movement. 
47 Article 4(l). 
48 Principle 5. 
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Since right to remain is a non-absolute right only against arbitrary 
displacement, non-arbitrary displacements such as those caused as a by-product 
of armed conflict are not violations of such a right. Nor does it require to 
take positive measures to prevent displacement as a by-product of armed 
conflicts. States are however obliged to ensure the right to remain in safety 
and dignity by taking positive measures to prevent widespread or systematic 
violations of human rights that inspire terror among civilians and have the 
reasonable foreseeable effect of displacement. Deliberate systematic or 
widespread targeting of civilians ( intention to displace is not clear in such 
situations) is the criterion that distinguishes the latter category from the 
former since occasional targeting of civilians cannot be considered as 
violating positive obligations of the right to remain that would lead to 
displacement. 
As such, it can be stated that Article 12(l) of the ICCPR 'is 
established as an integrated right containing a general principle to which 
restrictions are the exceptions and not the rule. 49 fbUS , 
from this perspective, 
except for the restrictions justified on grounds stated in Article 12(3) of the 
ICCPR relevant to the state of emergency in internal armed conflict namely, 
4national security' and 'rights and freedoms of others, ' any relocation should be 
based on the consent of the civilians concerned . 
50 Even such restrictions should 
be provided by law and be 'consistent with the other rights recognized' in the 
ICCPR, including the right against arbitrary interference with family and home. 51 
With regard to derogations from the right to remain during internal armed 
conflicts, displacements should not be inconsistent with other international 
49 Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur Awn Shawhat Al-Khasawneh, The Human Rights 
Dimensions ofPopulation Transfer Including the Implantation of Settlers, , E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1994/18 
(30 June 1994), para. 36; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27, 'Freedom of 
Movement' para. 13; C. Beyani, Internally Displaced Persons, at p. 56. 
50 Beyani, ibid., at p. 57; Art. 16(2) of the 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention; in 
Miskitos case, Report on the Situation of Human Rights, Section. Right to Residence and 
Movement, para. 27, n. 32, Inter-American Commission referred to the 1952 resolution of Institute 
of international Law as a general principle of international law which states that '[w]here the 
relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall 
take place only with their free and informed consent. ' This resolution was cited as an authority by 
C. Beyani, ibid., at p. 52 and Progress Report of Special Rapporteur, The Human Rights Dimensions, 
para. 25; but J. Oraa, Human Rights at p. 199 expresses doubts about the relevance of the Inter- 
American Commission's application of 1952 resolution in the Miskitos case as it was concerned 
with internal transfer and this resolution is concerned with the issue of 'international transfer of 
populations through agreements between States, and usually linked to situations of war. ' 51 Article 12(3) of the ICCPR. 
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obligations including human rights, humanitarian law and international criminal 
law obligations. 52 Therefore, except for the permitted grounds for restriction or 
derogation, in the absence of consent for the transfer or displacement on the 
part of the civilians, such movement could be considered as caused by coercion 
and thus forced and arbitrary. 
The right to remain in safety and dignity should be explicitly stated, in 
addition to its negative articulation, namely, the right against arbitrary 
displacement as a component of freedom of movement and residence. This will 
provide a clear legal basis for stating the formal positive obligations to be adopted 
by the state and strengthen the value to be protected and thereby avoiding or 
minimizing conditions that would lead to displacement in situations where 
such a result is reasonably foreseeable. In other words, such a formulation 
will provide a legal basis for broader interpretation to protect the value of 
peoples to remain in their habitual places of residence. 53 
B. Commentary on the Right to Remain 
Those who oppose the right to remain state that 'it is no more than a 
consequentialist concern arising from the failure to respect already existing human 
rights. ' 54 According to this view, civilians flee if they are in danger and if there 
is no danger there is no need for them to flee; therefore there is no need for 
a right to 'prevent them from fleeing', as that can be achieved by the enforcement 
of the other rights. 55 Goodwin-Gill goes further and extends beyond the basic 
rights of personal security and livelihood to 'social, cultural and political rights that 
are part and parcel of community building, stability and community development, 
including political rights (the right to vote, to stand for election, to participate in 
government), and perhaps also the entitlement, actual, potential or putative, of 
52 Article 4 of the ICCPR; see below, Section C. 
53 See for similar construction, the right to life in Article 6 of the ICCPR. 
54 J. C. Hathaway, in Panel Discussion, 'Forced Movement of Peoples' (1996) 90 ASIL Proceedings 
545 at p. 562; J. M. Henckaerts, ibid., at p. 563, states similarly that, '[i]f we enforced all other 
human rights effectively, we would not have to deal with it. ... The consequence is also 
illegal and 
is based on other illegalities. ' 
55 J. Hathaway, ibid. 
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peoples within nation States to a measure of recognition, autonomy or self- 
government. ' 56 
This opposition basically forms part of the reaction against the discourse 
that concentrates on the protection of internally displaced persons. " On that basis, 
it is argued that displacement is a symptom of harm and that focus on the 
protection of IDPs (on the basis of the right to remain) would undermine efforts 
to address the root causes. According to such opponents, giving prominence to 
the right to remain would lead to another problem of undermining the right to 
leave one's country and the right to seek asylum. 58 Such criticisms were mainly 
expressed based on the experience of UN safety zones or safe havens in 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where IDPs were compelled to stay in unsafe 
conditions and thereby seeking asylum in a foreign country was delayed by 
such measures . 
59 For instance, in July 1995 the UN sanctioned safe area of 
Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina was subjected to attack and capture by 
the Bosnian Serb Army. Around 25,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians were 
transferred across Bosnian - Muslim held territory and the 
middle-aged l3osnian 
Muslim men were separated from their families and execute According to 
such opponents, the right to remain has been relied on in the creation of safe 
havens in Northern Iraq, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and South western Rwanda, only 
for the purpose of implementing the non- entry policies of Turkey, the European 
states and Zaire respectively. 61 
To deal with the problems of forced displacement under the respective 
provisions of violated rights in the exclusion of right to remain in safety and 
dignity could not be an effective method to protect civilians fleeing from 
systematic human rights violations, given the high degree of coercion involved and 
56 G. Goodwin-Gill, 'The Right to Leave, the Right to Return and the Question of a Right to 
Remain' in V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed. ), The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary 
International Law Issues (Hague, 1996) p. 93, at p. 94. 
57 J. Hathaway, 'Forced Movement of Peoples, ' at p. 562. 
58 M. Stavropoulou 'Question of a Right Not to be Displaced', at p. 553; B. S. Chimini, 'The 
Incarceration of Victims : Deconstructing Safety Zones' in N. Al-Nauimi, R. Meese (eds. ), 
International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade of International Law 
(Hague, 1995) p. 823, at pp. 824-5; see below, Ch. 5 section B. 2. for the discussion of safety zones; 
G. S. Goodwin-Gill, 'Right to Leave', at p. 102. 
59 B. S - Chimini, 
ibid., at p. 85 1. 
60 prosecutor v. Krstic , Case No. IT-98-33-T , Judgement (02 August 
200 1) para. 1 
61 J. C. Hathaway, and R. A. Neve, 'Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal 
for Collectivized and Solution - Oriented Protection' (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
117, at p. 135; B. S. Chimm, 'Incarceration of Victims' at pp. 835-841 ; B. Frefick, Safe Havens, 
Broken Promises, (1998) http: //www. refugees. org/world/articles/safehavens-98. htm. 
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the ensuing mental suffering and the traumatic conditions. In such instances the 
other rights merely serve as 'defensive right against encroachments on particular 
aspects of freedom' and do not guarantee against the loss of one's place of 
origin by violations of human rights. 62 
Moreover, people would not be forced to move in the instance of a mere 
violation of a human right, even if it is a non- derogable one, unless the particular 
individual were persistently targeted or threatened with such a consequence in 
an environment of systematic violations of human rights against his or her 
ethnic group. Likewise, people are not forced to move for violation of every 
type of human rights as opposed to non- derogable norms, unless there is 
systematic oppression which makes their lives difficult. 
The fact that remaining in safety and dignity is consequential on the 
adherence to some fundamental human rights does not mean that the forced 
displacement resulting from the violation of such human rights could be prevented 
merely by enforcing the violated right, without giving regard to the unlawful or 
arbitrary consequence. There needs to be a right against arbitrary displacement, 
to Protect the fundamental value to remain in home, land or place of habitual 
residence which can be invoked by the individuals when it is threatened. 63 
Moreover, in a forced displacement actively carried out by the government 
to transfer people to an assigned area or settlement, it is the right to remain or the 
right against arbitrary displacement that is directly at stake and not other human 
rights violations. 64 Hathaway even maintains that it is crucially important to 
preserve the distinction between the right to remain and the right not to be 
65 displaced . 
Such a contention is flawed, as the underlying value of the right not 
to be displaced is the right to remain. 
Moreover, the right to remain is not absolute in the sense that the 
opponents of the right to remain argue. The right to remain is a protection 
against arbitrary displacement. In that sense, displacements which occur due to the 
effects of armed conflicts and human rights violations as inherent elements of 
62 S. R. Roos, 'Right to live' at p. 524. 
63 M. Stavropoulou 'Question of a Right Not to be Displaced', at p. 553. 
64Committee on CRC, Concluding Observations: Burundi, CRC/C/15/Add. 133 (16 October 
2000) para. 38 expressed concern at severe violations of right to freedom movement and 
Residence in the context of the state party's regroupment policy. 
65 J. Hathaway, 'Forced Movement of Peoples, ' at p. 562. 
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violence are not arbitrary. 66 However, states have positive obligations under 
the right to remain to specifically take measures against incidents of human 
rights violations that can be reasonably expected to result in displacement 
which is different from taking positive measures generally under other 
human rights provisions. 
As discussed earlier in this study, displacement is not only a symptom of 
harm but a harm in itself in certain situations. The fact that it is a symptom of 
harm, such as underlying socio- economic problems or minority problems, cannot 
be a reason why such a problem should not receive legal protection. After all, 
external displacement of persons protected by refugee law is a symptom of 
harm that exists in the state of origin. Arguing that if the existing human rights 
were protected within the state of origin, people would not have to seek 
asylum is not a satisfactory answer to the problems relating to the protection of 
refugees. The existence of refugee law is not an answer to all the problems of 
IDPs, as not all IDPs are in a position to seek asylum and not all of them are 
protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention. On the other hand, a right to remain 
in safety and dignity would lend an opportunity to address the causes of 
displacement. In particular to human rights mechanisms can address the 
causes of displacement that are in violate right to remain in their impartial 
analysis of the facts, so that the situation may be remedied accordingly. This 
would create a sharp awareness and attention to address the problem of 
displacement effectively. 
Any forced displacement, whether internal or external, is a traumatic 
condition and civilians tend to avoid or delay the most extreme form of 
displacement, namely, the external one, if there is an alternative safe area. 
Safety zones as a form of protection for providing personal safety and material 
assistance may effectively ensure the right to remain and thereby also have the 
incidental effect of reducing further internal displacement or external 
displacement to another country. 
In fact, declaring a certain part of the territory, such as a village, as a safe 
area can be seen as an in situ protective measure to be taken by the state 
party to ensure respect for the right to remain in safety and dignity or right 
66 See below, Section C. 1. 
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67 against arbitrary displacement. This can be useful for both civilians who have not 
already been displaced and for IDPs from other areas of the territory who seek 
shelter from shelling and aerial bombardment. But these are unilateral declarations 
by a state party and are a form of assurance of safety to civilians and IDPs 
from any attacks in its conduct of hostilities in such areas. 
One specific form of such protection is requesting civilians or IDPs to 
take shelter in a specific place of worship before launching an attack. Whether it 
provides a genuine protection or not depends on the nature of the conflict. 
If the state party is the violator of the right to remain by persecutory acts against 
minorities such declarations cannot be relied on as those IDPs might be used as 
human shields against military operations. For instance, in the Russian Federation, 
the village of Katyr-Yurt, declared by the government as a 'safe zone, ' was later 
subjected to indiscriminate attack by Russian federal military forces, which 
resulted in killing of people, many of whom were IDPs from other districts in 
Chechnya where fighting was taking place. 68 However, such declarations can offer 
genuine protection of the right to remain where the threatened displacement is a 
by-product of armed conflicts. 
Apart from these, humanitarian law provides for protective zones in 
such as hospital and safety zones that can be 'established by the parties to the 
conflict, outside the combat zone in order to shelter certain categories of the 
civilian population, which, owing to their weakness, require special protection 
(children, old people, expectant mothers, etc. ) from long-range weapons, 
especially from aerial bombardment. 69 Such zones can also protect civilians 
from indirect effects of armed conflicts such as shortage of food, clothing and 
medicine. The concept of protective zones to reduce the human suffering from the 
effects of hostilities is only provided in international armed conflicts . 
70 However, 
the obligations to provide protection and respect for wounded and sick civilians, 
6care and aid' for children and the 'general protection' of civilians against 
dangers arising from military operations, can necessitate the creation of such 
67 Article 2(l) of the ICCPR; the other protective measure concerning the right to remain is to 
respect the human rights of the ethnic groups to prevent their displacement. 
68 Isayeva v. Russia, Application No. 57950/00, Judgment of 24 February 2005, paras. 16, and 19 
69 Art. 14 of IV Geneva Convention of 1949; J. S. Pictet, Commentary IV, at pp. 120 and 12 7. 
70Y. Sandoz, 'The Establishment of Safety Zones for Persons Displaced Within Their Country of 
origin, ' in N. Al-Nauimi & R. Meese (eds. ) International Legal Issues Arising Under the United 
Nations Decade ofInternational Law (Hague, 1995) p. 899, at p. 920. 
68 
zones, at least with regard to such vulnerable categories of civilians by the party 
which has the control over such civilians or which is defending against the 
attack in non-international armed conflicts .7' The main features of such protective 
zones created in terms of humanitarian law are: the consent of the parties 
involved in the armed conflict; defined parameter of the protective zone; 
demilitarised nature; temporary nature; and absence of protection by military 
means. 
However, by analogy, in internal armed conflicts such protective zones 
may be established at the initiation of ICRC and notified to the parties to the 
conflICt. 72 For instance, to protect the wounded and sick, a combined hospital and 
safety zone was established in 1990 in the premises of Jaffna hospital and 
around the hospital (including the hospital compound) under the initiation and 
protection of the ICRC in northern Sri Lanka. A number of rules applicable to such 
zones in international armed conflicts by analogy were reiterated, in order to be 
respected by all parties to the conflict. Such protective zones are not an 
obstruction of the free movement of IDPs to another part of the state or to seek 
asylum. 
The safe areas created by the United Nations Security Council resolution 
under Chapter VII in cases of humanitarian necessity when the territorial state is 
unwilling or unable to provide protection against abuse of human rightS73 were 
proved to be unsafe to IDPs due to their non-consensual formation and militarised 
activities within those areas. 
74 In such situations, the IDPs within the safe area 
75 
would be trapped as it would be subject to siege by hostile forces. It is therefore 
unlikely that an IDP would be able to exercise the right to freedom of movement 
in order to move to another part of the state or right to seek asylum. 76 
71 Articles 7(l), 4(3) and 13(l) of Additional Protocol 11. 
72 See ICRC press release, Delegation in Sri Lanka, Nov, 6 1990; also see M. H. Hoffmann, 'The 
Application of International Humanitarian Law in Sri Lanka: A compliance Based Case Study on 
the Rules of War, ' (2001)30 IYHR 209, at pp. 215-16; Common Art. 3(3). 
73 See generally, S. P. ',, Subedi, ýThe Legal Competence of the International Community to Create 
'Safe Havens' in 'Zones of lunnoil' ' (1999)12 Journal ofRefugee Studies 23. 
74 The northern Iraq safe havens were attacked by Turkey; attacks and massacres of civilians took 
place in the Srebrinica safe haven in Bosnia; and massacre of civilians occurred in Kibeho safe 
haven in Rwanda. See generally, B. Frelick, Safe Havens, Broken Promises. 
75 B. Frelick, ibid 
76 K. Landgren, 'Safety Zones and International Protection: A Dark Grey Area' (1995) 7 IJRL 
436, at p. 456. 
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Chimni describes the safe havens in the context of Iraq and foriner 
Yugoslavia, as 'a vast prison house in whose confines individuals stay or 
4(voluntarily" go, for it protects them from the outside world. It is a prison because 
577 escape into the world "outside" is not a serious possibility;... . Though the 
original purpose of creating the safe areas in Bosnia was the containment of 
refugee flow to other European countries so as not to facilitate the ethnic 
cleansing, it turned out unwittingly to have very same outcome. In a situation of 
persecution and ethnic cleansing which violates the right to remain in safety and 
dignity, creation of safe areas without consensus of the parties to the conflict is 
not a feasible method. 
This does not mean that in-country protection of IDPs is not possible. 
Forms of in-country protection closer to protective zones in humanitarian law, 
like the Open Relief Centres (ORC) in Sri Lanka, which were created in 1990 
with the informal agreement of the parties to the conflict and strictly demilitarised, 
can be useful. 78 The fact that they were established in an area controlled by both 
Government and the LTTE discouraged any territorial claims . 
79The movement of 
IDPs to and from the centres was not restricted, although their arrival at the 
ORCs was registered . 
80 The ORC did not compromise the right to seek asylum 
and provided a 'relatively safe environment' to IDPs caught in the conflict who 
could not avail themselves of the protection of the government or rebels and were 
practically not in a position to flee as refugees or who wished to stay close to 
their land and property in a conflict that varies in its intensity. 81 
However, it is uncertain whether such ORCs can be repeated in conflicts 
in other states. The main reasons for their continued existence are that both 
parties to the conflict are aware of the impact of the international opinion on 
human rights and civilian casualties; the conflict in Sri Lanka so far cannot be 
compared to the situations that existed in Rwanda or Bosnia, as in the former 
77 B. S. Chimm, 'Incarceration of Victims, ' at p. 851; B. S. Chimm, ibid., at p. 840 states that, 'UN 
peacekeeping forces were ordered to prevent people from fleeing Sarajevo. ' 
78 UNHCR 's Operational Experience with Internally Displaced Persons, (Geneva, 1994) para. 15 1; 
W. D. Clarance, 'Open Relief Centres: A Pragmatic Approach to Emergency Relief and Monitoring 
During Conflict in a Country of Origin' (1991)3 IJRL 320, at p. 325. 
79K. Landgren, 'Safety Zones', at p. 452. 
80 Ibid., at pp. 452-53. 
81 Nonetheless, after the establishment of ORCs in Sri Lanka, Indian Naval Forces, blockaded the 
Palk Strait, UNHCR 's Operational Experience, 1994, at p. 49. 
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the different communities still live and work together. 82 Moreover, the ORC 
was established at the location of an existing Catholic shrine and sanctuary at 
Madhu, in Mannar island, the identity of which has developed over centuries as a 
sacred place and a pilgrimage site. 83 In addition, the 'small size and the transitory 
nature' of the safe area also limited its political or military significance. 84 
During 1992,1993 and 1999, however, even the ORC at Madhu 
Church premises was subjected to measures amounting to militarization by the 
armed opposition group, cutting off of food rations to IDPs originated from rebel 
held areas by the government, and occupation by the military. The IDPs therein 
were forcibly relocated elsewhere and became the target of attack by both parties 
to the conflict, resulting in civilian casualties. This indicates the unstable protection 
offered to IDPs by these safe areas. 85 As there was no military presence or other 
enforcement measure against any attack by the government forces or armed 
opposition group, the IDPs in ORCs cannot ultimately be protected against such 
attacks. 86 It can be derived from these experience that any protection provided 
by safe areas to IDPs would be of a lower quality than asylum. 
Safe areas created under humanitarian law provisions by the ICRC or 
similar to ORCs by the UNHCR may be preferable. 87 However, in an armed 
conflict fought on a policy of ethnic cleansing, the creation of safe areas may 
not be useful as it would further the policies of a party to the conflict. Such a 
concentration of IDPs in one place would facilitate ethnic cleansing and the 
use of IDPs as human shields, as opposed to its protective purposes. For 
instance, Human Rights Watch warned that the plan to create 'safe areas' in Darfur 
concluded between the United Nations special envoy and the Sudanese 
government on August 5,2004, for displaced and resident civilians, may 
82 K. Landgren, 'Safety Zones' at p. 453. 
83 UNHCR's Operational Experience, para. 152; J. Hyndman, 'Preventive, Palliative, or Punitive? 
Safe Spaces in Bosnia- Herzegovinia, Somalia, and Sri Lanka' (2003)16 Journal of Refugee 
Studies 167, at p. 180. 
84 J. Hyndman, ibid., at p. 18 1; K. Landgren, 'Safety Zones, ' at p. 452. 
85 J. Hyndman, ibid. , at pp. 180-8 1. 86 K. Landgren, 'Safety Zones' at p. 453. 
87 J. Hyndman, 'Preventive, Palliative, or Punitive? ' at p. 182 states that 'every effort to develop 
appropriate measures that have the consent of the warring parties should be made, leaving the UN 
Security Council as the last and least desirable venue for decisions on the establishment of safe 
space. The Security Council has always been a venue for the debate and negotiation of state 
security; the protection of internally displaced persons is a secondary consideration in this context. ' 
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consolidate ethnic cleansing that has already taken place in Darfur. 88 
According to the terms of agreement, the Sudanese government would identify the 
sites of safe areas and Sudanese security forces would protect the IDPs in such 
areas. Since the forced displacement of these people was perpetrated by the very 
same forces, and in the light of the previous practice of 'peace villages' in the 
Nuba Mountains in Southern Sudan by the Sudanese government where IDPs are 
forcibly confined and abused, as well as the government policy of resettling 
nomads in the lands left by the IDPs from Darfur, such an effort of 'forced 
resettlement or consolidation of ethnic cleansing' in the name of 'safe areas' was 
objected to by Human Rights Watch. 89 Therefore, creation of safe areas should 
be on a case by case basis according to the needs of the IDPs and the nature 
of the conflict. It should also be based on the consensus of the parties and 
strictly demilitarised. 
In-country protection by the creation of safe havens can be useful in the 
situation of civilians fleeing from the general effects of armed conflict, as their 
vulnerability to attack may be less than in the situations of persecution. If 
civilians fleeing persecution in an ethnic cleansing situation are required to take 
shelter first in safety zones, may amount to denial of the right to leave their 
country and seek asylum in a foreign country. 90 Different forms of safe havens 
such as less formalised Open Relief Centres operated by the UNHCR in Sri Lanka 
illustrate the situation where IDPs on the move can 'freely enter or leave and 
obtain essential relief assistance in a relatively safe environment. ' 91 
In this sense, it cannot be stated that emphasizing the right to remain 
excludes or substitutes the right to seek and enjoy asylum or freedom of 
movement, since the right to remain can still be ensured by different forms of in- 
country protection without compromising the right to seek asylum. Here they have 
88 Human Rights Watch, 'Darfar: U. N 'Safe Areas' Offer No Real Security : U. N Security Council 
Should Reject Plan that Would Undermine Return of Civilians' (I September 2004) 
(http: //hrw. org/english/docs/2004/09/0 I /darfur9286 
- 
txt. htm). 
'9 It lacked the consent of the armed opposition group and the duration was not specified. 
90 L. Franco, 'An Examination of Safety Zones for Internally Displaced Persons as a Contribution 
Toward Prevention and Solution of Refugee Problems', in N. Al-Nauimi, R. Meese (eds. ), 
International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade of International Law 
(Hague, 1995) p. 871, at p. 8 83. 
91 W. D. Clarance, 'Open Relief Centres', at p. 325; B. Clarance, 'Protective Structure, Strategy and 
Tactics: International Protection in Ethnic Conflicts' (1993)5, IJRL 585, at pp. 589-590 states that, 
'the open nature of the centre meant that the surrounding population could seek safety there 
whenever they felt threatened, and leave when the situation improved. ' 
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the choice to exercise their right to remain in safety and dignity, along with their 
freedom of movement elsewhere within or out of the country. 
The right to remain cannot be ensured at the expense of IDPS safety and 
dignity by denying the other aspects of the right to freedom of movement such as 
right to move freely within the country or to leave the country to seek such safety. 
As the human rights are derived from the attributes of the human personality, 
whether to seek in-country protection such as in safe havens and to remain in the 
country of origin or to seek asylum is a matter to be decided ultimately by the 
IDPs themselves. The decision cannot be imposed on them by the state, or by 
the international community, at the cost of the danger to their lives. Such 
practices of containment without protection is an abuse of the obligation of the 
states imposed by the objectives of refugee and human rights law to not to 
frustrate the exercise of the right to leave to seek and to enjoy 
92 asylum. 
Criticisms of the right to remain as a reason for creation of safe 
areas and thereby denying the right to seek asylum is based on misconception of 
the scope of the right to remain, due to the failure to delineate the aspects related 
to it. The freedom of movement and residence from which the right to remain in 
safety and dignity is derived also guarantees 'against compulsory residence in an 
area designated by the State. 93 The integrated effect of the right to residence and 
the freedom of movement implies the right to remain in safety and dignity and, in 
the absence of safety in a place, subject to the restrictions in Article 12(3), the 
freedom to move to a safer place within the territory. This would provide 
protection against IDPs being prevented from moving to another safer part of 
the state, in particular by keeping them within a safe area or safe havens created 
to protect them from abuses of human rights and effects of armed 
conflicts. 
This right to free movement can concern the initial movement to become 
internally displaced, or secondary movement during a displaced situation, for 
further protection. For instance, safe areas can either be established in places 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, 'Right to Leave' at p. 99; also see below, Ch. 5, Section B. 2. 
93 R. Higgins, 'Liberty of Movement' at p. 336; see Human Rights Committee, 'Freedom of 
Movement, para-5; Principle 9.1 of the UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for 
Refugees and Displaced Persons states '[n]o one shall be arbitrarily or unlawftilly forced to remain 
within a certain territory, area or region. ' 
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where the civilians have not yet become IDPs or in areas where they have become 
IDPs or where such a declaration would attract IDPs to such areas. 94 
Creation of UN safe areas as a measure to contain the IDPs affected by 
persecution and other human rights violations and therefore endeavour to seek 
asylum is incompatible with refugee law and human rights law as it creates a 
threat to the well established principles of the right to seek asylum and freedom 
of movement. 95 Restricting the movement of IDPs already affected by ethnic 
cleansing and other human rights violations by creating safe areas 'may lead to the 
forcible transfer of population to the zone' and therefore is a violation of the right 
96 to freedom of movement of IDPs. Therefore, creation of safe areas should not be 
regulated as a method of protection to IDPs, as stated explicitly in the ILA 
Declaration of the International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, 
but may be established on an ad hoc basis according to the needs of the situation 
on the ground. 97 
C. Derogations 
Given the fact of the non-absolute and derogable nature of the right to 
remain as derived from the freedom of movement and residence, an articulation of 
a right against arbitrary displacement from a person's home or place of habitual 
residence is important. Equally important is to determine the extent of 
derogation from this right. This can be done by identifying specific instances 
of arbitrary displacement that violates the right against arbitrary 
displacement. 
Arbitrary interference contains 'elements of inappropriateness, injustice, 
lack of predictability and due process of law. '98 Unlawful interference means 
94 A different form of restriction of internal movement occurs if either party to the conflict 
besieges the community of civilians in their places of habitual residence; for instance, in 
Columbia, civilians in La Gabarra zone were besieged and prevented from fleeing by paramilitaries 
and guerrilla groups to use them to cultivate coca, Global IDP Survey, 'Besieged and Embargoed 
Communities Trapped in War and Hunger (2005), ' www. idpproject. or)z ; moreover civilians in 
Columbia, in particular, indigenous and Afro-Colombian people are forced to stay in their places 
for to be used as human shields, military purposes, Project Counselling Service, (PCS) Internal, 
Confined Communities in Columbia (29 November 2004) at p. 3. 
95 B. S. Chimni, 'Incarceration of Victims' at p. 832. 
96 Ibid., at p. 832. 
97 principle 14(3) of the ILA Declaration on IDPs states, that, 'Safe areas may be established where 
appropriate. ' 
98 Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon, CCPR/C/83/D/1 134/2002 ( 10 May 2005) para. 5.1; M. Nowak, U. N. 
Covenant, at p. 292. 
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interference on grounds not permitted by national or international law-99 
Arbitrary interference with a right is not to be considered as the same as 
unlawful interference, as the former is broader and includes the latter as 
well. 100 Therefore interference provided by the law which is not in 
compliance with the provisions, aim and objectives of the ICCPR and not 
reasonable in specific circumstances is arbitrary-101 In other words, regardless of 
the lawfulness of the measure, it should be reasonable (proportionate) and 
necessary to the purpose to be achieved. 
102 
As such, even a displacement carried out on legal grounds can become 
arbitrary if it is carried out in a manner far worse than necessary, such as 
without providing necessary survival needs. 103 However, except for those 
interferences that are prohibited in international law as forced displacements, 
the instances that constitute arbitrary displacement cannot be explicitly stated for 
the reason that 'arbitrarily' 'aims at the specific circumstances of an individual 
case and their reasonableness (proportionality), making it difficult to comprehend 
in abstracto. ' 104 It is therefore appropriate to adopt the term arbitrary rather than 
unlawful to define the circumstances in which the legality of displacement is 
affected. 
Therefore the grounds of legitimate derogation and a clear delineation of 
the extent of obligations of the State party for the protection of IDPs against 
arbitrary displacement must be derived from the requirements of the derogation 
clause in Article 4 (1) of the ICCPR. 
1. Legality of Displacement 
To begin with, '[a]ny form of forced population transfer from a chosen place of 
residence, whether by displacement, settlement,... or evacuation, directly affects 
the enjoyment or exercise of the right to free movement and choice of residence 
99 C. Meindersma, 'Legal Issues Surrounding Population Transfers' at p. 81, points out, that 
'[a]lthough most population transfers violate established principles of fundamental rights, no single 
legal instrument currently exists prohibiting population transfer in its various forms. ' But see the 
UN Guiding principles on Internal Displacement, Principle 6(l), (2)(a), (b)(e). 
100 Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon, para. 5.1. 
101 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16, 'The Right to Respect of Privacy, 
Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation ( Art. 17) 
(08/04/88) para. 4. 
102 M. Nowak, UN. Covenant, at pp. 292-93. 
103 K. Ambos and S. Wirth, 'The Current Law of Crimes Against Humanity' at p. 60. 
104 M. Nowak, U. N. Covenant, at p. I 11. 
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within states 105 However, what constitutes forced movement, or in other 
words the legitimate grounds for derogation from freedom of movement and 
residence, can be derived by reference to the principle of consistency in Article 4 
of the ICCPR, which in turn refers to the human rights and humanitarian standards 
that are part of customary norms or peremptory norms. Such norms are useful in 
identifying the grounds of legality of a displacement as they are binding on all 
states regardless of their treaty obligations and non-derogable even in times of 
internal armed conflict. 106 
Forced displacement is an involuntary displacement carried out for reasons 
not permitted under international law with the intention of permanently displacing 
the civilians. 107 Forced displacement is generally carried out by the policies which 
have the purpose or the effect of altering demographic composition. Thus for the 
purposes of the right to remain or right not to be arbitrarily displaced, forced 
displacement means forced removal of the ' persons concerned by expulsion or 
other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without 
grounds permitted under international law. ' 108 If the displacement is not based on 
the grounds permitted in international law, the legality of such displacement can 
be determined from the voluntary nature of the movement. If the movement is 
based on the individual's free will to leave, then it is lawful. This means that if 
a genuine choice exists for the person concerned as to whether to stay or not, 
such movement is voluntary. 109 
Another difficulty arises in certain situations due to the passive role 
of the state, when considering whether the displacement is a forced one or 
otherwise involuntary as result of violence as an element of conflict. In 
situations where State may tolerate or condone the displacement policies then 
it may be difficult to determine its involvement. For instance, toleration of 
'threatening and intimidating acts that are calculated to deprive the civilian 
population of exercising its free will, such as the shelling of civilian objects, 
105 Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur, The Human Rights Dimensions, 30 June 1994, 
para. 37. 
See Report of the Representative, Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection Against Arbitrary 
Displacement, para. 4. 
"I Simic, Tadic and Zaric, para. 134. 
108 Article 7 (2)(d) of the Statute of the ICC. 
109 Report of the Representative, Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection Against Arbitrary 
Displacement, para. 3. 
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the burning of civilian property, and the commission of -or the threat to 
commit-other crimes "calculated to terrify the population and make them 
flee the area with no hope of return" ' 110 by its armed forces, paramilitary 
or other armed elements. Such acts would make a person's real choice to 
remain not possible due to adverse effects and consequences for the 
enjoyment of human rights and prompt the civilian to flee. These effects and 
consequences can be sufficient to determine the illegality of the displacement 
and the obligations of the State concerned with regard to those persons 
displaced in circumstances where the role of the state with regard to 
displacement is not clear. "' In sum, either the state must have actively 
caused the displacement of civilians or have tolerated such policies and that 
displacement is a 'reasonably foreseeable' consequence. " 2 In either situation, 
forced displacement is a deliberate act or inaction of the state. ' 13 
In Vaca v. Colombia, the author was forced into exile to another country 
due to numerous instances of harassment, death threats, some of which were 
from the military and police authority, harassment with phone calls and messages 
telling him to leave the area, attempts on his life by agents of the State and 
the failure of the state to ensure his personal safety despite repeated complaints. 114 
Attempted murder left the author with permanent damage to his body. The Human 
Rights Committee considered that since there had been violation of the right to 
security of the person under Article 9 of the ICCPR and no effective remedies 
were in place, the State had failed to ensure his right to remain under Article 12(l) 
of the ICCPR and thereby violated this provision. 115 In this case, although the 
Committee noted the argument of the State that the right to remain is indirectly 
affected by other violent acts, the specific threat to the personal security of the 
author and the lack of effective remedies led the Committee to come to this 
Simic, Tadic and Zaric, para. 126. 
Report of the Representative, Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection Against Arbitrary 
Displacement, para. 5. 
112 See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, para. 78. 
113 See ibid; see below, Section, C. 1. a for policy of tolerance that constitutes crimes against 
hurnanity. 
114 Vaca v. Colombia, CCPR/C/74/D/859/1999 (15 April 2002) paras. 2.5,3.4 and 7.3; Maria 
Mejia v. Guatemala, paras. 64-65. 
115 Vaca v. Colombia, para. 7.4. 
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conclusion on the basis of the failure of the State to adhere to its positive 
obligations. 116 
Here, the author had been repeatedly targeted and not randomly, 
like any other civilians in internal armed conflicts. Moreover he was 
threatened to leave the area. No action was taken to investigate or to 
prosecute the state officials involved. The effects of such acts of state 
officials objectively point to the conclusion that displacement was the reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the same, in the light of the professional activities 
of the author, including his membership of various commissions set up by the 
government to resolve violence in the region. 
Conversely, in a case against El Salvador, the author was subjected to 
arrest, torture, interrogation threats and imprisonment and specifically threatened 
with disappearance if he returned home. These reasons forced the author to 
move from his home town. After his departure, his house was broken into and 
searched. 1 17 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights decided that 
there had been a violation inter alia., of Article 22 of the ACHR on freedom of 
movement. In this case, the intention of the state authorities to displace the 
author by threat was clearly discerned. ' 18 
Thus, the above cases indicate that whenever persons are targeted 
with actual violations or threats of violations of human rights in a systematic 
manner coupled with the threats to displace, the intention to displace can be 
objectively derived from such acts. Failure to refrain from such acts against 
civilians or to repress or prevent such acts will result in violation of right 
against arbitrary displacement. In such circumstances, displacement can be 
regarded as a violation of Article 12(l) of the ICCPR, due to the failure of the 
state to respect or ensure respect the freedom of movement and residence. 
Failure to take positive repressive as well as preventive measures to 'ensure the 
necessary conditions for unimpeded enjoyment' of the right to remain under 
116 ibid. 
117 Report No. 5/94, Case 10.574 (1 February 1994) Annual Report of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights 1993, OEA/Ser. LN. 85, Doc. 9 rev. (I I February 1994) para. 1. 
118 Ibid., 'Conclusions' Section, para. 3. 
78 
Article 12(l) would be a violation of the same in conjunction with Articles 
2(l) and (2) of the ICCPR. 119 
Forced displacement by the deliberate action or inaction of the 
authorities of a state has to be distinguished from displacement by non-intentional 
actions of the authorities. ' 20 There may be displacement in any armed conflict due 
to collateral effects of armed conflicts and general human rights violations as a 
constituent aspect of violence. Such a situation can be explained as an inevitable 
consequence of an armed conflict, as without abolishing the internal an-ned 
conflicts in international law, it is difficult to avoid displacement altogether. Such 
displacement, although involuntary and coercive ( but to a lesser degree than in the 
forced displacement ) is not a violation of the right against arbitrary displacement. 
As such instances are not based on persecution and targeting to displace the 
civilians, they do not involve the element of coercion which is unlawful. The state 
is not actively involved in the displacement of civilians but the choice of 
civilians to remain is reduced and there is a possibility of their return to their 
homes once the intensity of the conflict has decreased. Thus, such displacements 
cannot be regarded as engaging the obligation of the state under Article 12(l) 
of the ICCPR. However, terror tactics by systematic targeting of civilians that 
would lead to displacement even without the intention to displace can violate 
the right to remain for failure to take positive obligations to prevent 
displacement. 12 1 Therefore whenever it is difficult to discern whether a 
displacement is due to the deliberate inaction of the state to prevent the acts 
calculated to displace the civilians so as to constitute a violation of right 
against arbitrary displacement, the positive obligations of the right to remain 
may be engaged if the displacement of civilians is the reasonably 
foreseeable outcome. 
Against this background, it is pertinent to discuss the legality of forced 
displacement. Since the right to remain in safety and dignity or right against 
arbitrary displacement aspect of freedom of movement is a general principle or 
rule, any permissible transfers of civilians should be seen as an exception and 
"9M. Nowak, UN Covenant, at pp. 55-56; Art. 2(2) of the ICCPR provides for 'legislative or other 
measures' to give effect to the rights; see 
for similar obligations: Articles I of the ECHR, I of the 
ACHR and I of the ACHPR. 
120 G. J. L. Coles, 'The Human Rights Approach, ' at p. 198. 
121 See above, section, A 
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therefore should be narrowly construed. Even in an internal anned conflict where 
a state of emergency has not been declared, carrying out such exceptional 
measures of transfer or relocation made on the ground of 'national security, ' 
should be in accordance with the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality. 
As far as the principle of consistency is concerned, Art 17(l) of 
Additional Protocol 11 permits relocation or transfer of civilians only on the 
grounds of imperative military necessity and for their own protection. Any 
internal displacement other than for these two purposes in internal 
armed conflicts cannot be justifiable in terms of Article 4 vis-a vis 
Article 12 of the ICCPR on the right to remain. 122 However, the practical 
problem with this is that in internal armed conflicts, any forcible displacement 
may be justified on the basis of military necessity or for the safety of civilians. For 
instance, the regroupment policy as implemented in Burundi in 1999 by the Tutsi- 
dominated government against Hutu civilians was claimed by the government 
to be a security measure for the protection of civilians from attack by Hutu armed 
opposition groups. 123 However, it seems to have had the purpose of exercising 
greater control over a 'suspect population. ' 124 Relocation of civilians for the latter 
purpose by singling out an ethnic group cannot, however, be justified. 
Even if the regroupment was justifiable within Article 17 (1) of 
Additional Protocol 11, such a measure should only be a temporary one. 125 -fb,. S 
is because Article 4 (1) of the ICCPR stipulates that such measures should be 
proportionate to the aim pursued and therefore they cannot last beyond the 
necessity of such an aim. ' 26 Moreover, collective punishment of civilians for their 
perceived support for insurgents is a violation of the right against arbitrary 
displacement, since it does not fall within the two purposes permitted by Article 17 
of Additional Protocol 11. In addition, such a punitive displacement is explicitly 
prohibited by Article 4 (2) (b) of Additional Protocol 11 and customary 
122 See below, Section E. 
123 Amnesty International, 'Conditions in "Regroupment" (Forced Relocation) Camps: Burundi, ' 
Al Index: AFR 16/13/00 (29 June 2000) at p. 1; Report of the Representative of the Secretary- 
General, Profiles in Displacement: Forced Relocation in Burundi, E/CN. 4/2001/5/Add. 1 (6 March 
2000) paras. I 1- 12. 
124 Amnesty International, Ibid. 
125 Report of the Representative, Profiles in Displacement: Burundi, para. 14 
126 See below, Section, C. Lb. for the application of the principle of proportionality. 
80 
international humanitarian law and may also constitute torture, cruel or inhuman 
and degrading treatment it is therefore an unlawful displacement in terms of 
human rights law. 127 
Similarly, the Human Rights Committee observed in its general Comment 
on Article 4 of the ICCPR that crimes against humanity which must not be 
committed at any time can also be used as a criterion to decide the legitimate 
scope of derogation of human rights, including the right to freedom of movement 
and residence. 128 A displacement carried out by a State is unlawful if the purpose 
or effect of such displacement constitutes a crime against humanity. 129 
Accordingly, if an action of forced displacement carried out under the authority of 
the state entails individual criminal responsibility for persons involved in such 
action for a crime against humanity, the state is responsible for such action, 
without the excuse of the existence of a public emergency which also constitutes 
an internal armed conflict. ' 30 Therefore any transfer of civilian population 
without grounds permitted under international law by direct acts or indirectly by 
other coercive means constituting crimes against humanity, is a violation of the 
right against arbitrary displacement. However it should be noted that to consider 
such a prohibition within the non-derogable scope of the right to freedom of 
movement, it has to satisfy the stringent elements of the crimes against humanity. 
a. Protection Under International Criminal law 
The examination of the scope of the crimes against humanity and genocide 
that prohibits forced displacements is important as they are relevant in the 
protection of IDPs in two ways. The first is in order to determine the legality of 
displacement which is adopted as a derogatory measure under the derogation 
provision of human rights treaties. If the purpose or the effect or consequence of 
displacement constitutes a crime prohibiting displacement under crimes against 
127 Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Dimensions, paras. 18,21; ethnic 
cleansing of civilians on the basis of racial discrimination also violates peremptory human rights 
norms. para. 20 ibid; see Special Decisions by the Human Rights Committee Concerning Reports of 
Particular States: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia. 
128 Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency, ' para. 12; Human Rights Committee extends 
the non-derogable norms beyond the list included in Art. 4(2) and observes that '[s]tates parties in 
no circumstances invoke article 4 of the Covenant as 
justification for acting in violation of 
humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law... .' ibid., para. 11. 
129 Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Dimensions, paras. 19-2 1. 
130 Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency, ' n. 7. 
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humanity or genocide, it would then be regarded as a violation of the right to 
remain, as such a measure is inconsistent with the international obligations of the 
state. 
This unlawful objective of displacement has to be distinguished from the 
unlawful method used in carrying out displacement that constitutes a crime 
against humanity or genocide. However, both have the effect of affecting the 
legality of displacement. 13 1 The second is to determine the elements which make 
certain activities international crimes giving rise to individual criminal 
responsibility for forced displacement. ' 32 To begin with, generally, intentional or 
deliberate displacement can constitute genocide and crimes against humanity per 
se and crimes against humanity in the form of persecution, apartheid and other 
inhumane acts through forced displacement. 
'Systematic expulsion from homes, ' of a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious civilian group 'with intent to destroy, in whole or part' can constitute an 
act of genocide under Article 6 (c) of the Statute of the ICC which prohibits 
'deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part. ' 133 However if the civilians are compelled to 
move from their houses due to the imposition of difficult conditions of life, 
it would be regarded merely as a consequence of genocide. 
134 Therefore, for 
forced expulsion of civilians in itself to be regarded as constituting 
genocide under Article 6(c) of the Statute of the ICC, it must be established that it 
has been carried out in order to physically destroy the group as a 'slow death 
measure' and in addition with the 'intent to destroy the group in whole or in 
part. ' 135 The forced expulsion of civilians with 'special ties' to the land 'has 
proved to be a most effective expedient to their physical destruction. ' 136 
It should be noted, however, that except under Article 6(e) of the 
Statute of the ICC which specifically prohibits genocide by 'forcibly transferring 
131 Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur, The Human Rights Dimensions, para. 22. 
132 See below, Ch. 7, Section, A. La. 
133 Akayesu, Trial Chamber 1, para. 506; Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, PCNICC/200/l/Add. 2 (2 November 2000), p. 7, n. 4; see 
Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Madic (Rule 6 1) ICTY Trial Chamber 1,11 July 1996, IT-95-5-R61 
and IT-95-18-R61, (1998)108, ILR, paras. 94 and 95 for ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide. 
134 See M. Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and 
the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court ( Oxford, 2002) at p. 448. 
135 See ibid., at pp. 448-49. 
136 C. Meindersma, 'Legal Issues Surrounding Population Transfers' at p. 62. 
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children of the group to another group, ' there is no other indication in reference 
to the crime of genocide that it can be committed generally by forced transfer of 
civilians. In terms of Elements of Crimes, Article 6(e) of the Statute of the ICC 
prohibits not only physical transfer by a direct act but also transfers by indirect 
acts of threats or other coercive measures. 
137 Forcible transfer of children 
would have an impact on the future cultural existence of the group, as such 
transfer would destroy the cultural identity of such displaced children. Article 6(e) 
of the Statute of the ICC seems to refer to something more akin to cultural 
genocide, as opposed to physical genocide, as the aim of the transfer is not the 
physical destruction of such transferred children of the specific group. 
Such an outcome can occur in the guise of a lawfully permitted 
situation of transfer. For instance, Additional Protocol 11 requires the consent of 
parents in evacuation of children from areas of hostilities for safety reasons, but 
such consent could have been obtained under a coercive environment. 138 
Forced transfer of civilians may be brought within the scope of Article 6 (b) 
of the Statute of the ICC as 'causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group' in order to constitute genocide. Since this category is not confined to 
'permanent and irremediable' 139harm, it may include forced transfer in itself 
as a form of inhuman treatment. ' 40 Therefore, forced removal of civilians in itself 
is sufficient to constitute genocide by causing serious bodily and mental harm to 
them. Not only is it often carried out under inhumane conditions which forces them 
to leave everything behind, it may lead to serious bodily and mental harm and 
cause the death of large number of civilians-' 41 For instance, in the case of 
Molosevic et al., the second amended indictment described a fate that often 
befalls displaced civilians (though not in the context of genocide) as follows: 
137 'The term "forcibly" is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a 
coercive enviroriment', Elements of Crimes, at p. 7, n. 5. 
138 Art. 4(3)(e) of Additional Protocol 11. 
139 Akayesu, Trial Chamber, paras. 502-504. 
140 In terms of Elements of Crimes, '[flhis conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted 
to, acts of torture jape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment. ' at p. 6, n. 3; M. Boot, 
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, at p. 444; see below for discussion of forced 
displacement as an inhuman treatment. 
141 C. Meindersma, 'Legal Issues Surrounding Population Transfers', at p. 62. 
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thousands of Kosovo Albanians who fled their homes and were forcibly transferred 
as a result of the conduct of the forces of the FRY and Serbia and the deliberate 
climate of terror that pervaded the territory of Kosovo, were forced to seek shelter for days, weeks or months in other towns and villages, and/or on forests and 
mountains throughout the province. Some of these internally displaced persons 
remained inside the province of Kosovo throughout the time period relevant to this indictment and many persons died as a consequence of the harsh weather 
conditions, insufficient food, inadequate medical attention and exhaustion-142 
Invoking protection under this section is therefore much easier than under Article 
6(c) of the Statute of the ICC, since there is no need that the harm be 'serious' 
enough to threaten the 'physical destruction' of the gToup as in the latter. 143 
The prohibited nature of massive violations of human rights as crimes 
against humanity in treaty and customary international law is evident by the 
requirement that they be 'committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population. ' 144 The requirement that the attacks be 
either widespread or systematic in nature excludes isolated attacks and 
necessitates the existence of a planning or policy element. The 'widespread or 
systematic' requirements in the Statute of the ICC are alternative in nature. 145 
However, the meaning provided for 'attack directed against any civilian 
population' in Article 7(2) (a) seems to have introduced a conjunctive approach 
requiring widespread and systematic attack for the purposes of ICC Statute. The 
'attack directed against any civilian population' means, 'a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph I against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy 
to commit such attack. ' 146 The words 'multiple commission of acts' imply a 
widespread element and 'pursuant to or in furtherance of a ... policy' requires a 
systematic attack, but involving a lower threshold than the requirement of 
'widespread or systematic' attack in Article 7( 1). 147 Even in the absence of the 
142 The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic et al., Case No. IT-99-37-PT (29 
October 2001) Second Amended Indictment, para. 59. 
143 W. A. Schabas, 'Article 6: Genocide' in O. Triffterer (ed. ), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Baden, 1999) p. 107, at 
p. 113. 
144 Art. 7(l) of the ICC Statute. 
145 H. Von Habel, 'Crimes Against Humanity Under the Rome Statute, ' in P. J. Van Krieken, (ed. ), 
Refugee Law in Context: The Exclusion Clause, (Hague, 1999)p. 105, at p. 109. 
146 Article 7(2) (a) of the Statute of the ICC. 
147 D. Robinson, 'Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome Conference, ' (1999)93 AJIL 
43, at p. 48; H. Von Habel, 'Crimes Against Humanity' at p. 109. 
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requirement of a widespread or systematic attack' in the Statute of the ICTY, the 
ICTY has interpreted that this requirement was implicit in the requirement 
that the attacks be committed against 'any civilian population. ' 148 Thus, a mere 
widespread attack which is not systematic cannot be considered as a crime 
against humanity without the involvement of an element of policy on the part of 
the state or a defacto authority. 
The policy with regard to crimes against humanity need not be 
implemented through deliberate attack on civilians, but can be implemented 'by a 
deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such 
attack. ' 149 This is the situation in the case, for example, of the policy of 
tolerance attributed to the government of Sudan, reflected in the deliberate 
failure to stop the crimes of forced displacement and wanton destruction of 
villages committed in Darfur by Janjaweed, a government-supported militia. 
Such a policy of tolerance can be imputed on a government even in a 
situation where there is no governmental support or instruction to the militia but 
violations can be said to be encouraged through government inaction. This can 
occur, for instance, if the government has the intention to destroy the armed 
opposition group and for that purpose to destroy the villages and forcibly displace 
civilians who are perceived to be providing support for that group, and when a 
militia commits such crimes, the government can encourage it to carry out such 
crimes in impunity by its inaction. 150 An 'explicit or implicit approval or 
endorsement' is necessary to consider that such crimes have been tolerated by 
governmental authorities. 15 1 However, such a policy can be imputable if only the 
entity concerned is capable and legally obligated to stop such crimes. 152 it 
should be noted in this regard, that, even though a government is responsible to 
148 Prosecutor v. Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgment (7 May 1997) 
para. 648; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, (3 March 2000) para. 202 
149Elements of Crimes, at p. 9, n. 6; see K. Ambos and S. Wirth, 'The Current Law of Crimes 
Against Humanity, ' at pp. 30-34. 
150 In the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 Sept 2004, (25 January 
2005), (Chair person, Antonio Cassese) para. 126, the Commission stated that, 'if it is established 
that the government used the militias as a 'tactic of war, ' even in instances where the Janjaweed 
may have acted without evidence of government support, government officials may incur criminal 
responsibility for joint criminal enterprise to engage in indiscriminate attacks against civilians and 
murder of civilians. ' 
151 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, (14 January 
2000) para. 555. 
152 K. Ambos and S- Wirth, 'The Current Law of Crimes Against Humanity', at p. 34. 
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take positive actions with due diligence to protect the human rights of all the 
civilians within its territorial jurisdiction, it cannot be reasonably expected to 
take measures to prevent all the crimes committed by non-state entities, 
especially armed opposition groups, against civilians within an area or part of 
the territory controlled by the latter. 
As indicated by these elements of crimes, the invocation of crimes 
against humanity for the protection of IDPs is relatively more difficult than for 
war crimes, because of the policy element involved in the former. In crimes 
against humanity, an individual is not protected for his individual attributes but 
rather because of his membership of a targeted civilian population .1 
53 
To protect civilians through crimes against humanity, a broad definition of 
the term of civilian population is required. Otherwise, the presence of combatants 
among displaced civilians, which is common in internal armed conflict, would 
exclude the acts from the protection of crimes against humanity, for the 
reason that they are not 'directed against any civilian population. ' 154 The broad 
humanitarian scope of crimes against humanity, similar to common Article 3 and 
Protocol 11, makes the relevant rules applicable to 'any' civilian population 
within the jurisdiction of a State, regardless of their nationality. The requirement 
that attacks should be directed against any civilian population obviously excludes 
attacks directed against combatants as victims of crimes against humanity, 'unless 
such persons form part of a group predominantly civilian. ' 155 To be included in 
such a 'predominantly civilian' group, individuals who should be present among 
such civilian population are those who at one time engaged in resistance activities 
and are hors de combat. 156 The presence of such persons does not modify the 
civilian nature of such a civilian population so as to exclude them from protection 
against attack, due to its predominantly civilian nature. 157 This aspect would 
protect IDP camps against attacks perpetrated merely for the reason of the 
presence therein of some former combatants. 
153 Tadic, Trial Chamber, para. 644. 
154 Article 7 (1) of the Statute of the ICC. 
155 W. J. Fenrick, 'Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes, ' (1999) 37 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law767, at p. 779; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., para. 549. 
156 Tadic, Trial Chamber, para. 643; Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 
Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, (26 February 200 1) para. 180. 
157 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, para. 180 ; Blaskic, para. 214. 
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Despite the limitation in the invocation of the protection of crimes against 
humanity due to the policy or planning element involved, several positive factors 
can be identified in the protection of IDPs. Crimes against humanity can be 
committed in situations both peace times and in internal and international armed 
conflict situations. 158 Therefore, the applicability of such protection in armed 
conflict situations does not necessarily involve the difficulties of the 
characterization of an internal armed conflict. Moreover, crimes against humanity 
may be committed in pursuance of a state or 'organisational policy' of an armed 
opposition group though such policy need not be explicitly formulated. 159 It 
follows that the lack of protection in human rights law for violations committed 
other than by government armed forces, is rectified to some extent by holding 
armed opposition groups equally responsible for crimes against humanity. 
Deliberate displacement of civilians on a massive scale in pursuance of a 
policy of 'ethnic cleansing' would fall within the element of crimes against 
humanity to constitute persecution. ' 60 Since the crime against humanity of 
persecution alone requires a discriminatory intent, it would specifically cover acts 
committed by the policy of ethnic cleansing. ' 61 'Ethnic cleansing' is described by 
the UN Commission of experts in its final report as '... a purposeful policy 
designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror- 
inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group 
from certain geographic areas. To a large extent, it is carried out in the 
name of misguided nationalism, historic grievances and a powerful driving 
sense of revenge. This purpose appears to be the occupation of territory to 
the exclusion of the purged group or groups. ' 162 In other words, it describes 
a 'set of human rights and humanitarian law violations, ' committed against 
a religious or ethnic group as a matter of policy to remove them from their 
native places. ' 63 For instance, to achieve a 'Greater Serbia, ' Serbians adopted the 
158 But see Art. 5 of the Statute of the ICTY. 
159 Kupreskic et al., Trial Chamber, para. 551; Kordic and Cerkez, para. 18 1. 
"' Kupreskic et al., para. 705. 
16 1 Art 7(l) (h) of the Statute of the ICC. 
162 Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
780(1992), S/I 994/674,27 May 1994, p. 33, para. 130. 
163 D. Petrovic, 'Ethnic Cleansing-An Attempt at Methodology'(1994)5 EJIL 342, at p. 342; 'Those 
methods of "ethnic cleansing" include, in particular, murder, sexual assault, intimidation, 
harassment and the destruction of sacred and cultural buildings. ' Prosecutor v. Karadzic and 
Afladic (Rule 61), para 62; 'Sexual assaults occurred in several regions of Bosnia and 
87 
policy of 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the civilian 
population and in that course committed many violations of humanitarian law, 
such as shelling and burning of Bosnian Muslim houses, mass executions of 
Bosnian Muslim men, torture and mistreatment of civilians in an organised 
manner within and outside detention camps to terrorise the civilian 
population to coerce them to flee from their places and prevent their return. 164 
As far as persecution committed through unlawful attacks on civilians is 
concerned, the international humanitarian law rules applicable in the conduct of 
hostilities become important. Persecution through forced displacement can be 
committed such as by shelling or bombing of civilian population and burning of 
houses and livestock in pursuance of a general policy of an armed opposition 
group or a governmental policy to spread terror among civilians of a specific group 
so as to deter them from returning to their homes. 165 In persecution, the purpose 
behind the killing of civilians is to expel the group from the village, rather than 
annihilation of the group as such, as in genocide. 166 
Persecution is defined as an 'intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the 
group or collectivity. ' 167 The first limitation on invoking the protection of this 
crime concerns the requirement of severe deprivation of fundamental rights, which 
means a 'gross and blatant denial' of such rights on the 'same level of gravity' as 
the other acts of crimes against humanity, and therefore not every attack is 
included within its ambit. 168 The second limitation is that it is only restricted to 
those rights recognised as fundamental rights, which would certainly include the 
non-derogable rights in Article 4 of the ICCPR and other rights recognised as 
general principles of international law. Persecution is, therefore, basically gross or 
Herzegovina, in a systematic fashion and using recurring methods (e. g. gang rape, sexual assault in 
camps, use of brutal means, together with other violations of International Humanitarian Law). 
They were performed together with an effort to displace civilians such as to increase the shame and 
humiliation of the civilians and of the community they belonged to in order to force them to leave. ' 
(emphasis added) Karadzic and Afladic, para 64. 
164 Prosecutor v. Krstic, paras. 41,43,66-69,122,123,125,145-49. 
165 Kupreskic et al., para. 749. 
166 Ibid., para. 75 1; the Trial Chamber described the difference between them as, [p]ersecution is 
only one step away from genocide-the most abhorrent crime against humanity-for in genocide the 
persecutory intent is pushed to its uttermost limits through the pursuit of the physical annihilation 
of the group or of members of the group. ... in the crime of persecution the criminal intent is 
instead to forcibly discriminate against a group or members thereof by grossly and systematically 
violating their human rights. ' Ibid. 
167 Art. 7(2)(g) of the Statute of the ICC. 
168 Kupreskic et al., para. 62 1. 
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systematic violation of the fundamental rights of a group which share common 
bonds of race, religion, ethnicity etc. 
The Statute of the ICC limits the acts which grossly deprive civilians of 
fundamental rights to any act enumerated as crimes against humanity or to 
any war crimes or genocide within the jurisdiction of the Court . 
169 Deliberate and 
systematic killings of civilians, their organised detention, expulsion, attacks on 
property which constitute destruction of livelihood for certain civilians and 
burning of residential property committed with disregard for the lives of civilians 
can constitute persecution. 170 Therefore any widespread or systematic commitment 
of war crimes against a group of civilians who share common bonds, in order to 
remove them from an area, can constitute persecution. 
However, the restrictive scope of persecution which is connected only to 
the crimes stated in the Statute of the ICC is not useful to cover forced 
displacement through persecution committed through a variety of acts in internal 
armed conflicts. It does not cover persecution caused by disproportionate attack 
or starvation of civilians, which are prohibited by customary international 
humanitarian law in internal armed conflicts but are not included in the Statute of 
the ICC as war crimes in internal armed conflicts. 
A forced transfer of civilian population can also constitute apartheid under 
crimes against humanity, if committed 'in the context of an institutionalised regime 
of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other 
racial group or groups' and 'committed with the intention of maintaining that 
regime. ' 171 Implantation of settlers or establishment of settlements in a region 
inhabited by a minority population and providing preferential treatment to the 
former over the already existing minorities, if results in institutional i sed 
systematic discrimination against such civilians and forces them to displace, can 
constitute apartheid. However, apart from the general threshold for the crimes 
against humanity, that they should be either widespread or systematic, a similar 
requirement of systematicity in the crime of apartheid itself and the requirement of 
'69 Art. 7(l)(h) of the Statute of the ICC- 
170 Kupreskic, et aL, paras. 628-63 1. 
17 1 Arts. 7 (1) 0), (2)(h) of the Statute of the ICC. 
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both oppression and domination would impose a heavy burden when trying to 
invoke the protection of such crime for the IDPs. 
172 
The crime against humanity of 'forcible transfer of population' covers the 
unlawful forms of such displacement as exemplified by the phrase, 'without 
grounds permitted under international law. ' In determining the grounds not 
permitted under international law during internal armed conflict, the war crime 
concerning direct forced displacement in Article 8 (2)(d)(viii) can be of guidance, 
but to a limited extent, as it covers only relocation carried out by direct acts. 173 
However this particular crime against humanity is wider in scope as it prohibits 
deportation or forcible transfer not only by direct acts but also by indirect coercive 
means, in internal armed conflicts. 174 ThUS I expulsion or other coercive acts' 
include 'the full range of coercive pressures on people to flee their homes, 
including death threats, destruction of their homes, and other acts of persecution, 
such as depriving members of a group of employment, denying them access to 
schools and forcing them to wear a symbol of their religious identity. ' 175 As 
civilians are forced to displace on their own as a result of such indirect coercive 
means, as opposed to a direct act of forced transfer by a party to the conflict, 
the phrase 'deported or forcibly transferred' is used interchangeably with 'forcibly 
displaced. 1176 It should be noted, however, that these acts need not be committed 
with a discriminatory intent, as in the case of crimes of persecution committed 
through deportation or forced transfer. 
Deliberate displacement could occur under the pretext of unavoidable 
consequences of armed conflict. Though it is difficult at times to verify whether a 
displacement has occurred as a consequence of armed conflict or as an 'objective' 
of armed conflict or as a method of combat, in widespread or systematic 
activities rather than in individualised, scattered acts of hostilities, it is relatively 
172 According to Article 7(2)(h) of the Statute of the ICC crime of apartheid means, 'inhumane acts 
of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any 
other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime'; 
C. K. Hall, ' "The Crime of Apartheid" ' in 0. Triffterer(ed. ), Commentary on the Rome Statute, p. 
167, at pp. 168-9. 
173 See below, Section, E for detailed discussion. 
174EleMentS ofcrimes, at p. 11, n. 12 
175 C. K. Hall, ' "Prohibited Movements Population, " ' in O. Triffterer, (ed. ), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute, p. 16 1, at p. 162. 
176 Elements ofcrimes, at p. 11, n. 13. 
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easier to establish a forced displacement. 177 A single or scattered occurrence of 
such damage during an attack on a military objective can be justifiable in terms of 
collateral damage to civilians and their property. But if it occurs in a widespread 
manner and results in displacement of civilians of a particular ethnic or religious 
group, it raises doubts not only as to the legality of such collateral damage but also 
as to the objective of such attacks. The International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur, Sudan indicated that. ' 78 
[w]ith regard to specific patterns in the displacement, ... it appears that one of the objectives of the displacement was linked to counter-insurgency policy of the 
government, namely to remove the actual or potential support base of the rebels. 
The displaced population belongs predominantly to the three tribes known to make 
up the majority in the rebel movements, namely the Masaalit, the Zaghawa and the 
Fur, who appear to have been systematically targeted and forced off their lands. 
The areas of origin of the displaced coincide with the traditional homelands of the 
three tribes, while it is also apparent that other tribes have practically not been 
affected at all. 
This description of events clearly reflects a situation of a crime against humanity 
of forcible transfer or even a particular crime of persecution through forced 
displacement. 179 
Forced displacement of civilians was considered as constituting 'other 
inhumane acts' in crimes against humanity by the ICTY. Since Article 5 of the 
crimes against humanity does not refer to forcible transfer as a crime, this was 
considered under 'other inhumane acts' under Article 5(i) of the crimes against 
humanity. Inhumane treatment can be stated as an intentional act or omission that 
6causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitutes a serious attack 
on human dignity' 180 The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic considered 
that forcible transfer of groups of civilians as expressed in Article 17 (1) of 
Additional Protocol 11 is a form of other inhumane act under crimes against 
humanity-' 81 Apart from the requirement that such displacement should contain the 
elements of crimes against humanity, rendering it as serious as other crimes 
covered in Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY, the ICTY seems to have added a 
"' See UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford, 1997) at 
p. 102 - 178 Report of the international Commission of Inquiry on Darfar,, at p. 86, para. 328. 
179 See ibid., at pp. 86-87, paras. 331-3321. 
180 Celebici, Trial Chamber, para. 543. 
181 ibid., para. 566. 
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discriminatory element, so that forcible displacement carried out against 'persons 
belonging to a particular ethnic, religious, political or racial group, or serious 
widespread or systematic manifestations of cruel or humiliating or degrading 
treatment with discriminatory or persecutory intent' would be considered as 
adequate to constitute an inhumane act. 182 The vulnerability of the civilian 
belonging to ethnic, religious, racial groups subjected to forced displacement is 
much greater than in cases of forced displacement carried out for instance on 
the basis of wealth or resources to render such treatment inhuman. 
b. Legality of Displacement in Human Rights Law 
If the principles of non-derogability, proportionality and non-discrimination in 
the derogation clause are not complied with regard to displacement of civilians, 
such a measure cannot be considered as in compliance with international law and 
therefore would be in violation of the right against arbitrary displacement. 
In addition to the above discussed customary standards that prohibit 
displacement under humanitarian law and international criminal law, the non- 
derogable human rights form the basis of standards of international law that 
prohibit displacement of civilians. Some of these non-derogable norms have the 
status of peremptory norms orjus cogens. Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR on right 
to life and the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment can be 
stated in this category. Identifying the peremptory norms which cannot be 
derogable at any time, can be useful in limiting the conduct of states which have 
not become parties to the ICCPR. 183 These standards would determine the 
legality of forced displacement and therefore render the displacement unlawful in 
its strict sense. 
Even if the displacement of civilians is on legitimate grounds, the 
legality of the transfer of civilians can be affected by the manner in which such 
displacement is carried out. They may not be forced displacements in the 
strict sense as they are carried out on grounds permitted by international law, but 
are clearly arbitrary. There are 'standards which provide safeguards against abuse 
"' Kordic and Cerkez, para. 270, n. 372. 
183 The human rights which could be considered as peremptory norms cannot be subject to 
reservations as well, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24, 'Issues Relating to 
Reservations made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols 
Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, ' (04/11/94) para. 8. 
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of emergency powers and which relate to the manner of derogation and therefore, 
to the manner of displacement or transfer. ' 184 These are concerned with the 
regulatory standards such as principle of proportionality of the derogation 
provisions. The regulatory standards would render a seemingly lawful population 
displacement as arbitrary. For instance, the relocation carried out for a permitted 
ground in internal armed conflict may not be proportionate due to the non- 
compliance with the provision of survival needs. However, the consequence of 
displacement not based on legitimate grounds or based on legitimate grounds 
but not adhered to regulatory standards is the same as they affect the 
validity of a displacement measure. 
Since the derogatory measures are of an 'exceptional and temporary 
nature, ' 185 even if a displacement is carried out by the organs of a State, on the 
legitimate grounds of Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol 11, it can become a 
violation of freedom of movement and residence, unless the measure is 'necessary 
and reasonable in the circumstances and proportionate to the emergency. ' 186 The 
proportionality of the relocation measure to an emergency, can be evaluated 
in terms of its severity, duration and geographic scope. 187 
The adoption of derogatory measures of displacement for the reasons 
stated in Article 17 (1) of Additional Protocol 11 can considered as proportionate 
to the exigencies of the situation, only if such derogatory measures are proved to 
be strictly necessary to respond the gravity of the threat. Therefore, any 
displacement which is 'manifestly disproportionate' to the exception of 
military necessity in humanitarian law is unlawful. 188 Despite the existence of 
an internal armed conflict that warrants a declaration of a state of emergency, each 
derogatory measure must be justified as necessary in the exigencies of the 
situation. 189 If an alternative measure other than displacement, can be adopted 
to achieve the same end, for instance, by resort to limitation clauses, a derogatory 
184 Progress Report of Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Dimensions, para. 16 ( c) . 
185 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 5, 'Derogation of Rights' (31/07/8 1), para. 3. 
186 j. Oraa, Human Rights, at pp. 175,151; this requirement is not explicitly stated in the ICCPR 
and ECHR but ACHR Art. 27(l) explicitly incorporates this principle. 
187 Siracusa Principles, ' Principle 51; Progrss Report of the Special Rapporteur, Human Rights 
Dimensions, para. 61. 
188 Progress Report of Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Dimensions of Population 
Transfer, para, 19. 
'89 Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency, ' para. 4. 
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measure cannot be regarded as strictly necessary. ' 90 Any such derogation which 
is not strictly necessary to the threat may become arbitrary as it contains 'elements 
of ... unreasonableness, ' which are not proportionate to the threat. ' 91 
The scope of removal of civilians carried out as a derogatory measure, 
whether due to military necessity or safety of civilians in internal armed 
conflicts, should be proportionate to the aim pursued. As such removal of 
civilians would result in the loss of homes, lands and property that generate 
income for their basic survival needs, it is important that such relocated civilians 
be provided with shelter and other basic survival needs for the duration of such 
relocation. Article 17(l) of the Additional Protocol 11 stipulates that in such 
situations, the 'civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions 
of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. ' 192 Non-adherence to the provision 
of survival needs and conditions of safety makes such displacement clearly illegal 
under international humanitarian law. In addition the customary international 
humanitarian law that requires family members not to be separated must be 
respected in such transfers carried out by the State. 193 
Such measures can be derived from human rights standards as well, 
because Articles 9 and 17 of the ICCPR and Articles 10 and II of the ICESCR 
guarantees personal security, non-arbitrary interference with family and adequate 
food, clothing and shelter. 194 Otherwise a fair balance between the rights 
derogated, namely, right to remain in safety and dignity and the aim pursued 
cannot be struck and the displacement would become a disproportionate measure. 
The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement do not include this 
requirement in Principle 6(2) on prohibition of arbitrary displacement, but in 
Principle 7 as standards to be adhered in carrying out of displacement. Failure 
to adhere to such standards should be included as an instance of arbitrary 
displacement to effectively strengthen the scope of the right against arbitrary 
displacement. Non-adherence to the provision of survival needs and 
"' 'Sircusa Principles', Principle 53. 
'91 M. Nowak, UN Covenant, at p. 292. 
192 See for this aspect in determining the lawfulness of relocation, below, section E. 
193 Article 4(3)(b) of the Additional Protocol 11 ; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald- 
Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at p. 463. 
194 See W. Kalin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations (Washington, D. C, 
2000) at p. 2 1. 
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conditions of safety makes such displacement clearly illegal under 
international humanitarian law. 
Moreover enforced displacement of substantial portion of civilians of an 
ethnic group cannot be proportionate in its scope to the aim pursued by the State. 
Such a measure aimed at a particular ethnic group may be branded as violating the 
principle of non-discrimination. For instance, the Burundian government in 1999 
forcibly relocated 80% of the population living around the capital, Bujumbura, in 
53 regroupment camps throughout the province; the majority of them were 
from the Hutu ethnic population. 195 
In addition, derogatory measures should be proportionate in their duration 
to the aim pursued as 'once the emergency has ended, or its gravity has 
diminished, the derogation measures have no justification. 196 It is not necessary 
that the return of displaced civilians take place only when the proclaimed public 
emergency is over or on the cessation of an internal armed conflict. Return of 
civilians can take place during such situations depending on the variation of the 
intensity of the threat and accordingly the measures should be made lenient. 197 
This means, the measure of displacement should not last longer than that is 
necessary to the exigencies of the situation and therefore, when the military 
necessity or insecurity of civilians ceases to exist, or the intensity of threat is 
reduced, IDPs who wish to return must be permitted to do so. Otherwise, a 
displacement would be regarded as disproportionate to the emergency. Therefore 
any displacement which is disproportionate to the exceptions of military necessity 
and the security of civilians would be unlawful. 
In the Miskitos case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
considered the legality of the measure of relocation adopted with regard 
to Miskitos, an indigenous racial and ethnic group in Nicaragua. This was 
considered in terms of the right to freedom of residence and movement in 
Article 27 of the IACHR in the context of public emergency situation. It upheld 
the government's contention that it was carried out for the reasons of military 
195 Human Rights Watch, 'Emptying the Hills: Regroupment in Burundi', June 2000, 
vol. 12, no. 4 (A). 
196 j. Oraa, Human Rights, at p. 168. 
197 j. Oraa, ibid., at p. 149. 
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necessity and not on any discriminatory grounds. 198 I'lie Commission reached 
such a conclusion on the basis that in such circumstances the forced movement 
was proportionate in addressing the threat posed by the emergency. 199 However 
the Commission opined that the Miskitos who choose to return to their original 
places should be permitted to do so once the emergency was over, otherwise 
measures of relocation may become a 'form of discriminatory 
punishment. ' 
200 
It further stated that to impede the return of those wishing to do 
so would imply that the compulsory transfer was permanent and in violation of 
the right to movement and residence . 
20 1 This is because, forced displacements 
are made with the intention to displace the civilians, and not to allow them to 
return to their places of origin. They are therefore permanent in nature and 
thereby result in the destruction of the right to remain. 202 This is in contrast to the 
temporary nature of lawful displacements and the temporary suspension of the 
right to remain. According to the principle of proportionality, displacement should 
be proportionate to the duration of the emergency. This aspect emphasizes the 
temporary nature of the displacement and the right of internally displaced civilians 
to return to their original places once the danger which justified the displacement 
ceases to exist, if they wish to do so. 
As the Human Rights Committee pointed out, 'Article 4 may not be 
resorted to in a way that would result in derogation from non-derogable rights. -)203 
198 In this case the Commission proceeded on the basis of a defacto emergency that existed at the 
time of this compulsory relocation, even though the official declaration of emergency was 
subsequent to the relocation. But see J. Oraa, Human Rights, pp. 197-199 observes that this case is 
not strictly decided under the principle of consistency of the derogation. Since the reference of the 
Commission to the consent of civilians as a requirement for a valid massive relocation is not in line 
with the requirements of the laws of war, which does not require such consent in relocation for 
military reasons or safety of civilians. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Miskito Case, para. 3 1. 201 Ibid., para. 24. 
202 In Prosecutor v. Simic, Tadic, and Zaric, para. 134 the Trial Chamber of the ICTY with 
regard to forcible transfer as a crimes against humanity stated that, it 'requires an element of 
permanency in relation to the intention of the accused. An important consideration in this 
context will be the intended goal of the relocation. ... whether persons forcibly displaced were 
able to return to their former place of residence at a later time has no bearing on the 
assessment of the legality of the original displacement; thus, the duration of the displacement 
has no impact on its illegality. Otherwise, the perpetrator who had the intent to permanently 
displace the victim would unjustifiably benefit from such return. ' 
203 Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency' para. 15; 'Siracusa Principles, ' emphasizes, 
that the states have an affirmative duty to take precautions to prevent the de facto violations of 
non-derogable rights in carrying out a derogatory measure, Principle 59, at p. 28. 
96 
The non-derogable nature of these rights is useful in internal armed conflicts to 
determine the legality of displacement. These rights can affect the legality of 
displacement in two ways. Firstly, a displacement is unlawful if the purpose or 
the effect of such displacement violates the non-derogable non-nS. 204 For instance, 
the purpose of displacement of civilians is unlawful if it is punitive, to subject 
205 the civilians to torture and inhuman treatment. In such an event, displacement 
would be unlawful and constitute a violation of the right against arbitrary 
displacement and relevant non-derogable norms. Secondly, a displacement that is 
carried out in a manner that violates non-derogable norms such as the right to 
life, or the right to be free from inhuman treatment for instance, by direct and 
indiscriminate killings of civilians or without basic survival requisites or by 
destruction of houses and property, is not legal and is therefore arbitrary. 206 In 
such a context, the State party could become responsible not only for the violation 
of the right to freedom of movement and residence but also for violations of 
207 other non-derogable norms concerned . 
Ethnic groups or minorities are often exposed to the risk of being 
subjected to deliberate relocation measures in internal armed conflicts. In this case, 
the principle of non-discrimination under Article 4 of the ICCPR serves an 
important purpose. The non-discrimination clause in Article 4 of the ICCPR 
prohibits derogatory measures if only they are taken 'solely' on discriminatory 
grounds. Therefore, it is possible to carry out displacement of civilians of a 
specific ethnic group in internal armed conflicts, such as for military necessity. 208 
This may cause a serious lapse in the protection of IDPs in internal anned 
conflicts in the light of the fact that the other prohibitions of discrimination in the 
204 Progress Report of Special Rapporteur, The Human Rights Dimensions, para. 19. 
205 Ibid., para. 2 1. 
206 Human Rights Committee considered that the enforced resettlement of TaJiks citizens 
carried out in violation of non-derogable human rights by the government of Uzbekistan 
was a forced displacement in violation of Article 12 of the ICCPR, Concluding Observations: 
Uzbekistan, CCPR /CO/71/UZB (26 April 2001) at para. (16); see for detailed discussion of 
the manner of displacement, Global IDP Project, 'Uzbekistan: Authorities Deny Return of 
Several Thousand Villagers Displaced From TaJik Borders' (18 October 2005) 
(www. idpproject. org). 
207 In Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, para. 9.2 the Committee of the CAT considered burning and 
destruction of houses as acts of inhuman treatment; however, in individual opinions, two members 
of the Committee considered that forced eviction and 
forced displacement were not merely 
Inhuman treatment but constitute torture; Dulas v. Turkey paras. 
54-55; Bilgin v. Turkey, paras 10 1- 
103; Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, paras. 75-80; however such destruction of houses which was 
considered as inhuman, was not carried out 
during forced displacement. 
208 j. Oraa, Human Rights,, at p. 172. 
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lCCPR are derogable . 
209 However race as a ground of discrimination even during 
a public emergency is strengthened by the International Covenant on the 
Elimination All Forms of Racial Discrimination without the requirement of 
6solely' as opposed to Article 4 of the ICCPR. This can be considered as 
another international obligation and a higher standard of protection respectively 
under Articles 4(l) and 5(2) of the ICCPR to remove any concerns posed by 
the term 'solely' in Article 4 of the ICCPR. 210 
The absence of the word 'solely' in the derogation clause of the ACHR 
containing the non-discrimination requirement, however, does not prevent states 
from taking derogatory measures of relocation against a particular group of 
civilians. Such measures were taken by the Nicaraguan government against 
Miskito Indians, on the grounds of military necessity and the safety of civilians. 
This measure was decided by the Inter-American Commission to be non- 
discriminatory. 
Thus, inclusion of the word 'solely' does not make any practical 
difference, as governments always justify their measures on other reasons 
necessary for the situation. 211 Protection against such measures can be provided 
by the principle of non-discrimination in association with other principles in the 
derogation clause which provide protection against disproportionate and 
unreasonable measures. 212 Such displacement of ethnic minorities would 
become discriminatory 'either if the differentiation of treatment lacks an 
objective and reasonable justification, or if there is no proportion between the 
213 means used and the legitimate end pursued . The principle of notification 
is 
provided for the facilitation of international scrutiny, so the legitimacy and the 
non-discriminatory nature of the measure of displacement can be determined even 
within this clause by an effective human rights monitoring body. 
209 Arts. 3,14(l), 24(l), 25 and 26. 
21 0 Art. 5(d)(1)(ii) of the CERD; similarly, Art. 11 ( c) of the Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973; and Art. 11 of the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. 
211 M. Nowak, UN Covenant, at p. 86; J. Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International 
System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency, (Philadelphia, 1994) at p. 63 states that 
'[e]ven without this term, however, the reference to discrimination in Article 4 conveys the 
implication that only arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions In the application of emergency 
measures would be outlawed. '; Oraa, Human Rights, at p. 176 states that the absence of 'solely' in 
IACHR or absence of non-discrimination clause in ECHR do not make any practical difference. 
212 According to Oraa, ibid., the situation of ECHR can be overcome by the principles of 
proportionality and necessity, ibid., at pp. 176-77. 
213 Oraa, ibid,,, at p. 14 1. 
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D. Protection of Minorities Against Arbitrary Displacement 
As discussed above, except for the principle of non-discrimination in the 
derogatory provisions, the protection against a displacement provided in the right 
to freedom of movement and residence does not provide a specific protection to 
minorities or indigenous people. 214 Specific protection against arbitrary 
displacement for them is important, as in many internal armed conflicts, minorities 
and indigenous people are the victims of forced displacement, for instance, 
Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Miskito Indians in Nicaragua, the Tamils in Sri 
Lanka. 215 
Forced displacement is often used to destroy the right to existence of 
minorities. The right to existence includes the physical existence, the 
subsistence as well as the cultural existence or identity of minorities. 216 
Minorities can be forced to flee from their homes and places of habitual residence 
or origin in order to cause their systematic deaths and thereby destruction of 
their physical existence. Similarly, in terms of a policy of ethnic cleansing, 
they can be forced to displace from their territories where they have religious and 
cultural heritage such as temples, mosques, churches and other buildings, in order 
to destroy their distinct identity. Therefore, minorities need special protection 
from forced displacement, in addition to the general protection provided in the 
freedom of movement and residence. The principle of non-discrimination in the 
derogation provision and Article 26 of the ICCPR is useful in the protection of 
certain minorities against removal from their land on discriminatory grounds, 
although it does not recognise or protect the existence of minorities as such. A 
specific protection as minorities beyond the discriminatory grounds is essential 
to give them an enhanced protection against measures that lead to arbitrary 
displacement. 
Article 27 of the ICCPR protects the rights of ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities in a state to 'enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language' as distinct from and additional 
"' Certain elements of non-discrimination are non- derogable, see Arts 2,4 of the 
1CCPR and CERD. 
215 See P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights ofMinorities (Oxford, 199 1) at pp. I- 
2. 
216 See Ibid., at p. 141. 
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217 to their other rights in the covenant. This is the only provision in the 
universal human rights conventions that recognises the right to identity of 
minorities. 218 Though it does not explicitly protect minorities from arbitrary 
displacement from places of their habitual residence, an indirect protection 
from such displacement can be derived in the obligation of states to respect 
enjoyment of culture, religion or language. Generally, the enjoyment of 
cultural life rather than the practising of religion and language of minorities 
would be affected by arbitrary displacement. Culture, in one of its 
manifestations, includes 'a particular way of life associated with the use of land 
resources, 5 in particular by indigenous communities and includes the 
traditional activities of fishing or hunting. 219 Enjoyment of cultural life in a 
land can go beyond such livelihood aspects and can include enjoyment of 
6customs, morals, traditions, rituals, types of housing, eating habits etc., that 
are characteristic of the minority' associated with their lands. 220 Since a broad 
approach to culture is adopted by the Human Rights Committee, it would 
be possible to include within the scope of Article 27 of the ICCPR, the 
protection against arbitrary displacement which threatens the way of life and 
cultural identity of ethnic minorities and forces them to displace from their 
lands. 221 This is evident from the observation of the Human Rights Committee 
with regard to forced resettlement of Tajiks ( ethnic minorities) citizens of 
Uzbekistan. 222 
It is to be noted that Article 16 of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention of 1989 explicitly prohibits arbitrary displacement of indigenous 
217 ECHR, ACHR or ACHPR do not contain minorities provision corresponding to Article 27 of 
the ICCPR. 
218 P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights ofMinorities, at p. 142 
2 19 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23, 'The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27)', 
CCPR/21/Rev. I/Add. 5, (08/04/94) paras. 3.2 and 7. 220 M. Nowak, UN Covenant, , at p. 501. 22 1 As stated by the Human Rights Committee, ' one or other aspect of the rights of 
individuals protected under that article-for example, to enjoy a particular culture-may consist 
in a way of life which is closely associated with territory and use of its resources. This may 
particularly be true of members of indigenous communities constituting a minority. ' 'The 
Rights of Minorities (Art. 27)' at para. 3.2; M. Nowak, ibid, -. but Li-Ann Thio, states that it 
is doubtful whether civilians belonging to minorities other than indigenous groups 
enjoy such rights related to lands under Article 27, Li-Ann Thio, Managing Babel. - 7he 
International Legal Protection of Minorities in the Twentieth Century ( Leiden, 2005) at 
pp. 229-30. 
222 Committee considered that such action of expulsion from homes was in violation of 
Articles 12,17 and in certain situations Article 27 of the ICCPR, Concluding Observations: 
Uzbekistan, CCPR /CO/7 I /UZB (26 April 200 1) at para. (16). 
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peoples from their lands. Article 27 is, however, derogable during a public 
emergency. But in terms of Article 5 (1) of the ICCPR derogatory measures of 
arbitrary displacement cannot carried out in such a way as to destroy the 
right to identity of minorities. 
The 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities which recognises the 
right to enjoy culture, religion and language of persons belonging to minorities, 
unlike Article 27 of the ICCPR, in addition, explicitly protects the 'existence 
and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of 
minorities. ' 223 Protection of the existence of minorities by states requires 
'ensuring adequate conditions for the existence and identity of the group as a 
whole. ' 224 This provision merely contains the obligation of the state towards 
the minority as a group and should not be considered as recognising a group 
right as 1992 UN Declaration only states the rights of individuals belonging 
to minorities. 
The other differentiating aspect of the 1992 UN Declaration is, it 
additionally recognises 'national minorities, ' in the sense that those who 
have been established on a territory for long time have stronger rights than 
those who have recently settled. 225 Such an addition does not have the effect 
of extending the scope of application beyond that stated in Article 27 of the 
ICCPR, because, national minorities are always related to one of the grounds 
stated therein. However, the advantage conferred by this addition is that, 
when a national minority is an ethnic minority which is broadly defined by 
a conception of culture including livelihood aspects, the people in question 
would have stronger rights regarding their culture and for the protection of 
their national identity. 226 
The 1992 UN Declaration does not contain a specific provision that 
prohibits arbitrary displacement similar to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
22' Articles 2 and I respectively of the 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, General Assembly 
Resolution 47/135 (1993). 
224 Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 
E/CN. 4/Sub-2/AC. 5/2005/2 (4 April 2005) para. 14. 
225 Ibid., para. 11 
226 Ibid., para. 6 
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Convention of 1989 or measures that chan e the demographic composition in 9 
areas inhabited by national minorities or measures of coerced assimilation which 
cause otherwise involuntary displacement, as in the European Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 1995.227 Therefore 
protection against arbitrary displacement from their territories has to be derived 
implicitly from the protection of existence and cultural identity of minorities. 228 
According to the Commentary to the UN Declaration, the protection of the 
existence of minorities includes their 'physical existence and their continued 
existence on the territories on which they live and their continued access to 
the material resources required to continue their existence on those 
territories. ' 229 In this sense, the right to existence of minorities is broadened 
to include physical, economic and cultural existence. Therefore, the right to 
continued existence of a minority group in terms of Article I of the 1992 
UN Declaration can be violated by policies of ethnic cleansing or forced 
transfer, which have the purpose or effect of displacing population 
belonging to minorities from the territory they live in so as to Physically 
remove them from the territory and policies which exclude minorities from 
access to subsistence resources in order deliberately to weaken their 
continued existence in the territory and force them to displace. Similarly, the 
return of the displaced minorities to their territories should not be obstructed 
as to do so would exclude their physical existence in the territory and 
access to resources required for their livelihood in those territories. 230 
. 
Similarly, respect for the cultural existence of a minority group in their 
territory under Article I of the 1992 UN Declaration requires protection of 
its religious and cultural heritage, including churches, mosques, temple sites and 
buildings in their territory. 231 Cultural heritage reflect the 'collective memory of 
227 Article 5(2) and Article 16 of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities of 1995; see generally, J. Jackson - Preece, 'Article 16' in M. Weller (ed. ), The 
Rights of Minorities in Europe: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (Oxford , 2005) p. 463; Article 16 of the 
Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention of 1989. 
228 Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities, para. 24. 
229jbid., para. 24 
230 Ibid., para. 24 
231 ibid. 
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humanity, examples of its greatest achievements ... symbolize human life itsel f, 
232 
and their destruction may cause displacement of population belonging to 
minority groups. For instance, in Bosnia, mosques such as the Ferhad Pasha 
Mosque, built in 1583, were destroyed by the Serbs in the belief that destroying 
the 'spiritual heart of their community' would make the Muslims leave their 
homes for ever. 233 
Notwithstanding the non-binding nature of the 1992 UN Declaration, it 
can be viewed as international minimum standards in the protection of 
minorities, since it received the broad support of states from all regions of the 
world before the General Assembly. 234 
Apart from the above discussed, the other instruments only provide an 
indirect protection against arbitrary displacement of civilians belonging to 
minority groups. The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of 
1966 prohibits arbitrary displacement of racial and ethnic groups, but not 
necessarilyas minorities because its main objective is to protect and promote 
racial and ethnic equality. 235 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 , provides protection for the physical existence 
of 'national, ethnical, racial or religious group' whether they are minorities or 
majority and therefore to some extent against forced displacement if carried 
out for the eventual physical destruction of minority groups. 236 This 
protection has become meaningful by the inclusion of genocide as a crime in 
the Statute of the ICC. 237 The major deficiency in the protection is that it does 
not protect linguistic and political groups as such. In internal armed conflicts, 
232 J. M. Henckaerts, New Rules for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict: The 
Significance of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of An-ned Conflict' (1999) 81, No. 835 IRRC 593, at pp. 619-20; Y. Sandoz 
'Competing Priorities: Placing Cultural Property on the Humanitarian Law Agenda' in M. T. Dulti 
et al (ed. ), Protection of Cultural Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict, Report on the Meeting 
of Experts Geneva, 5-6 October 2000 (Geneva, 2002) p. 21, at p. 22 states that '[t]o defend all 
cultures is to defend all of humanity. ' Failure to do so may constitute the crimes against humanity 
of persecution and genocide. 
233 See P. Maass, 'Cultural Property and Historical Monuments, ' in R. Gutman and D. Rieff (eds. ), 
Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know (London, 1999) at pp. I 10- 111. 
234 Li-Ann Thio, Managing Babel: The International Legal Protection of Minorities, at pp. 172- 73 
and 196. 
235 Article 5 (d) (i) of the CERD. 
236 Article 11 (b), (c) and (e) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 1948 ; see above, Protection Under International Criminal law. 
237 Article 6(b), (c) and (e) of the Statute of the ICC; see generally, P. Thornberry, 
International Law and the Rights of Minorities at pp. 67-73 for the relationship between 
Cultural genocide and protection of minorities. 
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these two groups are vulnerable to displacement. In the absence of protection 
for political groups, governments can persecute and displace racial, religious 
or ethnic groups on the ostensible grounds of their political opinions, 
without incurring international liability under the Genocide Convention. This 
has the effect of rendering the protection of the whole Convention less 
effective, as political opinion can provide a pretext in internal armed 
conflicts to suppress ethnic groups in the name of preservation of territorial 
integrity. 238 
Similarly, specific protection against arbitrary displacement on the basis 
of discriminatory grounds is provided in the Statute of the ICC, which prohibits 
the crimes against humanity of persecution and apartheid against any group on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural and religious grounds including 
minority. 239 Inclusion of political grounds in the crime of persecution, which is a 
common ground of persecution to eliminate civilians with opposing political 
views in internal armed conflicts, offers an added protection. Even though 
provisions that prohibit genocide and crimes against humanity do not 
specifically protect minority groups as such, they are most affected in 
internal armed conflicts and therefore virtually protected against systematic 
or large scale measures of forced displacement. 
International humanitarian law does not contain a specific protection 
against forced displacement of minorities as such, above and beyond the non- 
discrimination provision. The non-discrimination clause in Common Article 3 and 
Article 4 of Protocol 11 on humane treatment can cover forced displacement of 
minorities as cruel treatment to the extent they fall within the category of civilians 
affected by armed conflicts. In addition, Article 2 of Additional Protocol 11 
specifically provides for non-discrimination in the application including the 
prohibition of forced displacement in Article 17 of Additional Protocol. 
E. Protection Against Forced displacement in International Humanitarian 
Law 
Apart from forced displacement by government armed forces which has been 
discussed earlier under human rights law, civilians can be forcibly displaced by 
211 P. Thomberry, International Lam, and the Rights of Minorities, at p. 70. 
239 Article 7 (1)(b) and 0) of the Statute of the ICC. 
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opposition armed groups. During the internal armed conflict in Colombia in 1996, 
FARC, a guerrilla group, forced the displacement of civilians as a military tactic 
and disregarded the obligations of humanitarian law to provide the requisites 
for survival to those civilians. 240 In the internal armed conflict in Sri Lanka, in late 
1990, Muslim civilians were expelled from the north by the armed opposition 
241 group, LTTE . 
Common Article 3 does not contain an explicit provision against forced 
displacement or transfer of civilians within or outside the country. The 
absence of such protection in an internal armed conflict causes a serious gap in the 
protection of IDPs. However, consideration of forced displacement as a violation 
of the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment in common Article 3, 
improves their situation. 242 Cruel or inhuman treatment should involve 'an 
intentional act or omission, that is, an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate 
and not accidental, which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury or 
constitutes a serious attack on human dignity ... ' 
243 As such, forced displacement 
could be considered as inhuman treatment, as forced displacement is 'by definition 
a traumatic experience which involves abandoning one's home, losing property 
and being displaced under duress to another location. 244 A residual function can be 
performed by common Article 3 under the provision of cruel treatment in 
substance to include forced transfer of civilians within the country. The inhuman 
treatment provision of common Article 3 does not include an exhaustive list of 
such acts of cruel behaviour. Such a list was deliberately omitted, to accommodate 
the various and unpredictable forms of cruel behaviour by parties to the 
conflict. Forced displacement could therefore be covered by this provision as it 
240 Human Rights Watch, 'War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian 
Law' (New York, 1998) at pp. 205-206. 
241 J. Hampton (ed. ), Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey (Oslo, 1998) at p. 15 0. 
242 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11, ' at p. 1472, n. 1; As Hanckaerts asserts, ' ... Common 
Article 3 can be applied to prohibit deportations and transfers as "violence to life and person" 
and as an "outrage upon personal dignity. It is difficult to imagine an involuntary (mass) 
deportation that would not violate these standards. ' J. M. Hanckaerts, 'Deportation and Transfer 
of Civilians in Time of War, ' (1993)26 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law p. 469, at 
p. 517; Kupreskic et al., para. 5 66; C. Meindersma, 'Legal Issues Surrounding Population Transfers, ' 
at p. 54- 
'43 Prosecutor v. Krstic, para. 516; Celebici, Trial Chamber, 552; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, para. 186; 
in Celebici, the Trial Chamber considered inhuman treatment in Article 2 (b) on grave 
breaches of the ICTY as corresponding to the cruel treatment in Article 3 of the statute that 
includes common Article 3, para. 550. 
244KrStiC, paras. 523,532; Kupriskic et al., para. 566; see Arts.. 5(d) and 5(1) of the Statute of the 
ICTY. 
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is prohibited in Article 17 (1) of Additional Protocol 11 of 1977 which develops 
245 and supplements common Article 3. 
However, such protection against displacement of civilians under common 
Article 3 is restricted with regard to civilians within the control of the party to the 
conflict. Therefore forced displacement carried out by indirect coercive means 
such as indiscriminate attacks and terror tactics such as shelling by an adverse 
party against civilians not within its control cannot be protected by such 
provision. 246 
It is to be noted that displacement per se is not prohibited in international 
humanitarian law, as Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol 11 permits 
displacement for military necessity and safety of civilians. 247 However because of 
the resulting traumatic consequences, it requires the parties that carry out the 
displacement to provide basic survival needs for those displaced civilians. Any 
such direct displacement carried out for purposes other than military necessity and 
safety of civilians, without the consent of such civilians and without providing any 
basic survival needs, which renders the civilians impoverished, is a violation of 
Article 17 (1) of Additional Protocol II and can constitute inhuman treatment 
under specific circumstances. A displacement carried out for legitimate purposes, 
but without providing basic necessities, can also be considered as inhumane 
treatment, depending on the circumstances of a specific case, including whether it 
creates serious mental or physical suffering or constitutes a serious attack on 
human dignity. If a displacement is carried out indirectly under coercive 
circumstances in a manner violating humanitarian law norms, such as severe 
beatings, rape, killings and cruel separation from male family members, such 
forced displacement in such intimidating circumstances can be subject to 
protection as cruel treatment. 248 Therefore in terms of inhuman treatment, 
protection against forced displacement of civilians in its broad sense, including 
direct and indirect forced displacement is possible. 
The noteworthy feature of Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol 11, which 
in its entirety is considered as a customary international law, is that it prohibits 
forced displacement of both individuals and groups of civilians within the 
245 j. S. Pictet, Commentary IV, at p. 598. 
246 See G. Abi-saab, 'Non-International Armed Conflicts, ' at p. 235. 
247KrStiC, paras, 524-30. 
248KrStiC, paras. 517-18,530. 
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territory. 249 Such an individualised protection against forced displacement in 
Additional Protocol 11 is significant in its application to limit the freedom of 
movement in human rights law. This can be contrasted with the corresponding war 
crime in Article 8(2)(e)(viii) of the Statute of the ICC, which refers to 'civilian 
population. ' Therefore it seems that forced displacement is only prohibited when it 
is carried out against a minimum number of civilians. 250 
Article 17 (1) of Additional Protocol 11 explicitly protects against forced 
displacement of civilians within the country. However, the use of the term 
'ordering, ' similar to the provision related to the corresponding war crime in the 
ICC Statute, clearly indicates that only acts which are 'directly aimed at removing 
the respective civilian population fTom a given area are prohibited. 9251 
Therefore, displacement of civilians by indirect acts 'which do not possess such a 
character but which lead to the same result, such as the intentional starvation of the 
population in order to force them to leave from a certain area' is not covered. 252 
This can occur in situations where displacement of civilians is pursued as an 
'objective' of the armed conflict, by a party to the conflict to pursue its 
objective of forced movement indirectly by conducting the hostilities or misusing 
its power in such a manner as to leave the civilians with no option but to 
flee. 253 The fon-ner means of displacement of civilians not within the control of the 
parties to the conflict is not covered however within the ambit of Article 17(l) of 
Additional Protocol 11 as it is clearly concerned with the prohibition of forced 
254 displacement of civilians within their control . Those violations of conduct of 
249 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, at pp. 457 and 463; Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, at p-49, 
para. 166; Art. 8(2)(e)(viii) of the Statute of the ICC. 
250 A. Zimmermann, 'Prohibition of Forced Movement of Civilians' in O. Triffterer(ed. ), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute, p. 280, at p. 28 1. 
251 Ibid., at p. 281 in the context of Art. 8(2)(e) (viii) of the ICC Statute; H. Spieker, 'Twenty -Five 
Years After the Adoption of Additional Protocol II: Breakthrough or Failure of Humanitarian 
Legal Protection? ' (2001) 4 YIHL 129, at pp 151-53. 
252 A. Zimmermann, ibid; Article 17(2) of Additional Protocol 11 refers to 'compelling' the 
civilians to leave from their territory seems to be broader than 'ordering' to cover such indirect 
acts, M. Stavropoulou, 'The Right Not to be Displaced, ' at p. 727; see the definition of the term 
'forcible' transfer in crimes against humanity. Elements of crimes, at p. 11, n. 12. 
253p Kourula, Broadening the Edges, Refugee Definition and International Protection 
Revisited, (Hague, 1997) at p. 4; H. McCoubrey & N. D. White, International Organizations and 
Civil War, (England, 1995) at p. 115; Krstic, para. 147. 
254 See G. Abi-saab, 'Non-International Armed Conflicts, ' at p. 235. 
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hostilities carried out for indirect forced displacement can be protected by other 
255 provisions of Additional Protocol 11 such as Articles 13 and 14. 
Article 17(l) exceptionally permits displacement for the security of 
civilians and for 'imperative' military reasons. 256 Thus, any displacement is prima 
facie unlawful and the party that carries out such displacement has the burden of 
justifying its action on either of these grounds. Express provision as to 
displacement for security of civilians can be sub ected to abuse by the parties to the 
conflict to serve their own interests. However, the ground of military necessity has 
been formulated in a relatively strengthened manner by the requirement of 
'imperative' military necessity. This may reduce the chances of deliberate 
displacement, as it necessitates 'the most meticulous assessment of the 
circumstances. 257 Therefore 'imperative' military reasons based on political 
motives such as moving hostile ethnic groups to keep them under effective 
control or to weaken the support of civilians for the armed opposition groUP258 
or to change the demographic composition or to implant another ethnic group 
in such places, are not warranted. In sum, ordering the displacement or 
expulsion of civilians within the power of a party for 'racial, cultural or religious' 
reasons related to the conflict, to 'ethnically cleanse' them from the area is 
prohibited as a method of combat by Article 17(l) as they do not fall within the 
two exceptions. 259 Since the Protocol should be applied to all persons affected by 
an armed conflict 'without any adverse distinction' based on race, colour, 
255 These can also constitute independent war crimes on their own terms. 
256 Article 4(3)(e) of Additional Protocol 11 permits temporary removal of children, with the 
consent of their parents or guardians, to safe areas within the country to protect them 
from the imminent dangers of armed conflict. 
257 C. Meindersma, 'Legal Issues Surrounding Population Transfers', at p. 49; B. Rutinwa, 
'Refugee Claims Based on Violation of International Humanitarian Law: The "Victim's" 
Perspective, "' in International Association of Refugee Law Judges 4th Conference, The Changing 
Nature Of Persecution, (Switzerland, 2000) p. 25 1, atp. 254. 
http: //www. arkcra-ch/iarli/EN/Nature PDF/title. pdf 
258 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol II, ' at p. 1473, para. 4854; W. Hayden, 'The Kosovo Conflict 
and Forced Migration: The Strategic Use of Displacement and the Obstacles to International 
Protection, ' Journal o Humanitarian Assistance, http: //NkwNN--jha. sps. cam. ac. uk/b/b597. htm )f 
Document posted :3 June 2000 . 259H. McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law: Modern Developments in the Limitation of 
Wa rfa r e, 2 nd ed., (Dartmouth, 1998), at p. 267; Krstic, para. 527; in Karadzic and Madic, at 
pp. 115 et seq., the Trial Chamber of the ICTY discussed 'ethnic cleansing' as an unlawful 
method of displacement; the policy of ethnic may amount to genocide as well as crime against 
humanity ; principle 6(2)(a) of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
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language, religion, or social origin and so on, such a measure in pursuance of an 
ethnic cleansing policy is certainly prohibited. 260 
Despite these safeguards, Article 17(l) can be manipulated by parties to 
the conflict for their ulterior motives, even within the exceptions of the same such 
as collective punishment for civilians for their perceived support for insurgents. 261 
The policy of forcible regroupment implemented by Burundi in September 
1999 is a clear reflection of the such situation. 
In the course of ethnic armed conflict in Burundi between the Tutsi- 
dominated government and the rebel National Liberation forces (FNL) 
composed of the Hutu majority ethnic group, in September 1999, the 
government carried out a forced 'regroupment' of (mainly Hutu) civilians 
living in the area close to the capital, into camps. Human Rights Watch 
reported that about 350,000 civilians from the areas around the capital were 
forcibly relocated into 53 camps. 262 Though this measure was adopted in the 
pretext of extending protection to civilians from attacks of the rebel forces 
(FNL), the underlying intention was to deprive the rebels of the perceived 
support of Hutu civilians, so as to reduce the risks of attacks by rebels on 
the capital. 263 Notwithstanding the fact that Burundi is a party to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 11, there was a failure on the 
part of the government to prepare the sites of relocation or make provision 
for basic survival needs-water, hygiene, shelter, food and safety for the 
civilians in those camps as stated in Article 17 of Additional Protocol 11.264 
'Enforced residence in the camps exposed the displaced people to a number 
of other abuses by members of the Burundian armed forces, as well as to a 
greater likelihood of death by disease and malnutrition than theywould have 
260 Art. 2(l) of Additional Protocol 11. 
26 1 F. J. Hampson, Legal Protection Afforded to Children Under International Humanitarian Laiv, 
Report for the Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, (May 1996) para. 7.4, 
(hltp: //www2. essex. ac.. uk/c&acu/pai)ers&reports/fh. htm 
262 Human Rights Watch, 'Emptying the Hills'. 
263 IASC, 'Statement on Forced Relocation (Regroupment ) in Burundi', press release- IHA/694- 
20000119, (10/07/01) 
http: //www. reliefweb. int/w/rwb.... /c05ae9e8db89197b8525686boo7a5e28? OpenDocument. 
264 'They [civilians] were directed to sites, many of them on barren hilltops, far from any source of 
water. They were ordered to build shelters out of whatever 
branches and leaves they could find. 
Authorities provided no food, no water, and no building materials for them and said nothing about 
how long they would be required to live there. ... 
People slept on the open air until they were able 
to finish constructing their shelters. ' Human Rights Watch, 'Emptying the Hills' . 
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suffered had they remained at home. 265 The forced relocation measures 
adopted by the Burundian government could not be justified in terms of 
Article 17 of Additional Protocol 11.266 However, the problem is not the 
lacunae in the law, but the implementation of law in good faith by the parties. 
These problems can only be confronted by effective enforcement 
mechanisms. 
The enforced displacement under Additional Protocol 11 obliges the 
authorities to take 'all possible' measures to receive those displaced civilians in 
'satisfactory' conditions where basic survival needs are provided. It follows that 
if the displacement has to be continued due to military operations, and 
therefore the return of these displaced civilians to their homes is not 
possible within a relatively short period, the displaced civilians must be 
provided with relatively stable accommodation, proper feeding and sanitary 
arrangements suitable for long term survival, by the displacing party. 267 The 
mention of the safety of civilians requires that the displaced civilians' shelter be 
located away fTom the vicinity of military camps, 268 as such situations would 
make IDP camps vulnerable to attack and lead to IDPs being used as human 
shields. The importance of this obligation is that the provision of survival 
requisites is limited to situations of deliberate displacement of civilians as opposed 
to incidental displacement of civilians, as a consequence of armed conflict. 269 
Thus, the legality of the order of removal of civilians depends not only on two 
specific exceptions but also on the provision of the means of survival to 
those civilians. 270 However, parties to the conflict can avoid this responsibility 
265 ibid. 
266 See 1ASC, 'Statement on Forced Relocation' 
26' Though the expression 'all possible measures' is intended to cover the practical difficulties that 
arise in urgent situations, this does not in any way reduce the 'effect of the obligation, ' S. Junod, 
'Commentary on Protocol 11, ' at p. 1473. 
268 Ibid., at p. 1473, para. 4856; similar obligation concerning interned displaced civilians see 
Art. 5(2) ( c) of Additional Protocol 11. 
269But if these displaced civilians are subsequently interned in any relocation camps, they 
should be provided with such needs, Art. 5(l)(b) of Additional Protocol 11. 
270K. Dormann, Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge, 2002) at p. 475; in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, 
governments forcibly relocated the IDPs to permanent or semi-permanent sites without 
fulfilling 
the pre-conditions of survival for a legitimate displacement, but depending mostly on external 
hwrianitarian aid. Such relocations are not legitimate in terms of Article 17(l) of Additional 
Protocol 11, see J. Bennett, 'Forced Relocation in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi: Emerging Policy', 
(2000)7 Forced Migration Revieii, pp. 27-30. 
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altogether by displacing the civilians by indirect means so as to avoid the 
obligation under Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol 11. 
Article 17(l) does not state explicitly about the temporary nature of such 
relocation or the return of the displaced civilians. This is in contrast to the 
protection provided in international armed conflicts, where it is required that 
'[p]ersons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as 
hostilities in the area in question have ceased. ý27 1 However, given the exceptional 
nature of relocations under Article 17 (1) it can be implied that such measures last 
as long as the necessity of the situation. Otherwise, it would become a forced 
displacement which has a permanent nature, as the parties that carry out such 
displacements do not intend the return of the IDPs. 272 Whatever the case may be, 
this lapse can be complemented by human rights law, as the principle of 
proportionality requires that any such displacement should be temporary, and its 
duration cannot last longer than the aim pursued by such displacement. As far as 
armed opposition groups are concerned, they are not bound by the human rights 
law standard. 
27 1 Article 49 of the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the 
Time of War 1949. 
272 Simic, Tadic and Zaric, para. 134 ( in the context of crimes against humanity). 
4. Protection Against Displacement As a By-Product of Armed 
Conflict 
As discussed above, otherwise involuntary displacement Of civilians as a by- 
product of armed conflict or due to prevailing insecurity is not a violation of the 
right to remain. Such displacements are the result of violations of humanitarian law 
and human rights law. It is the consequences created by such displacement that 
give the impetus for the international legal protection of such IDPs who are 
obliged to leave to avoid the effects of conflicts, similarly to those subjected to 
forced displacement. 
international humanitarian law does not contain any rules of hostilities that 
prohibit displacement resulting as a consequence of attacks. The principle of 
proportionality that provides protection against disproportionate incidental deaths 
and injuries to civilians and damage to civilian objects does not include 
disproportionate displacements. As Gardam and Charlesworth state, the principle 
of proportionality as stated in Art. 51(5) of Additional Protocol I 
'does not require that factors such as long-term civilian casualties, either 
from injuries at the time of attack or from resulting starvation and disease, 
be taken into account in determining what is a proportionate attack. Neither are 
commanders required to assess to what extent attacks will lead to displacement 
of the civilian population and the creation of refugee problem. ... As things 
stand, however, long-term effects of attacks and the potential dislocation of 
civilians are not limiting factors in IHL. " 
Therefore, displacements by effects of armed conflicts or violations of human 
rights cannot become violations of the right against arbitrary displacement. Such 
displacements can be prevented or reduced if the state parties respect and ensure 
respect for their human rights obligations, and government armed forces and 
armed opposition groups respect and ensure respect for humanitarian law 
obligations. Civilians are often compelled to displace by the direct and 
' J. Gardam & H-Charlesworth, ' Protection of Women in Armed Conflict' (2000)22 HRQ 
148, at p. 161; Art. 51 (5) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, And Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I 
of 8 June 1977 ( hereafter Additional Protocol I), reprinted in (1977) 
16 ILM 139 1. 
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2 indiscriminate attacks on them and their objects, which destabilise their lives . 
Allegiance of civilians to a party to the conflict in internal armed conflict is 
derived from the lines of ethnicity or language or religion rather than their 
nationality. Civilians become vulnerable to attack and abuse in such situations. 
Therefore, adherence is required to the rules of humanitarian law that directly 
affect the civilians, such as rules prohibiting indiscriminate attack. As stated by 
Pictet, the objective of international humanitarian law is , ... to regulate 
hostilities in order to attenuate their [civilians] hardship. ' 3 Moreover, compliance 
with human rights norms in particular, the right to security of the person, the right 
to life and the right to be free from torture and inhuman treatment are 
important to prevent displacement. Adherence to these rules can have the effect of 
reducing but not totally avoiding displacement during internal armed 
conflicts. 
However, widespread displacements of an ethnic or linguistic or religious 
group might engage the responsibility of the states to take positive measures to 
minimize such displacements by taking measures to reduce systematic human 
rights and humanitarian law violations against them, as in such situations it is 
difficult to draw a fine line between forced displacement by coercive measures and 
otherwise involuntary displacement. 
A. Spreading Terror Among IDPS 
Acts which are designed to spread terror among civilians cause them to flee the 
area. For instance, not only 'indiscriminate and widespread shelling and regular 
bombardment of cities, but also assault, rape, abuse and torture of women and 
4 
children and mass killing' can inflict terror among civilians. These acts can be 
dealt with separately as specific violations of human rights, such as the right to 
life, or the right to be free from torture and inhuman treatment, or terrorising 
civilians by various acts as a whole can be regarded in itself as a violation of 
right to be free from inhumane treatment. 
2 'The Shelling of Srebrenica, particularly on 10 and II July 1995, and the burning of Bosnian 
Muslim homes was calculated to terrify the population and make them flee the area with no hope 
of return. ' Krstic, para. 147. 
1 J. Pictet, Development and Principles ofInternational Humanitarian Law (Dordrecht, 1985)at p. 1. 
4 Jean-Mane Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
at p. II (footnotes not cited). 
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Indiscriminate shelling cannot be regarded as a violation of the right to 
life without resulting in the deaths of civilians. It can, however, 'constitute 
violations of the right to humane treatment and respect for emotional integrity' in 
terms of Article 7 of the ICCPR, Article 3 of ECHR and Article 5 of IACHR. 5 
Conversely, injuries caused by assault or ill-treatment by the police or soldiers 
short of death can fall within Article 6 of the ICCPR if the 'unequivocal 
intention or aim behind the use of force' among other factors, is incompatible with 
the object and purpose of Article 6 of the ICCPR. 6 As the European Court 
mentioned, in 'exceptional circumstances' physical ill-treatment can be covered 
by Article 2 of the ECHR. 7 This means, then, that indiscriminate attacks for 
example, by air against civilians, that do not result in death can also be regarded 
as an infringement of right to life, since they are similar to attempted murder, 
due to the foreseeable nature of deaths involved in such attacks. 
Similarly death threats by security forces or persons who have connections 
with the government are not be covered by the right to life but can fall within the 
scope of the right to security of persons under Article 9 (1) of the ICCPR. 
According to the Human Rights Committee, although the right to security is 
referred to only in Article 9, the Covenant does not intend to narrow this concept 
to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. 8 As States have undertaken to take 
appropriate measures to protect the rights enshrined in the Covenant, an 
interpretation that excluded such threats to the personal security of civilians ( as 
non-detained persons) would render such an obligation ineffective to provide 
protection from displacement. Conversely, the right to security in Article 5(1) 
ECHR does not have any independent meaning apart from the right to liberty, to 
include protection from threats to life. 9 However, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights considered threats ( including by assault) that forced civilians to 
5 See Third Report on Colombia, 1999, Ch. IVf, para. 308; in Maria Mejia v. Guatemala, paras. 59- 
61 stated that causing wounds and attacks to intimidate civilians constitute inhumane treatment in 
terms of Article 5(l) of the ACHR. - 
6 11han v. Turkey, Judgment, Application No. 22277/93 (27 June 2000) para. 76. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Delgado Paez v. Colombia, (195/1985) ICCPR, A/45/40 vol. 11 (12 July 1990) at para. 5.5; 
jayawardena v. Sri Lanka 916/2000, CCPR/C/75/D/916/2000 (26 July 2002). 
9 S. Trechsel, 'Liberty and Security of Person, ' in J. Macdonald et al., (eds. ), The European System 
for the Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht, 1993) p. 277, at pp. 284-85; M. Nowak, UN 
Covenant, at p. 162. 
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leave their community and prevented their return as inhuman treatment in terms 
of Article 5 of the ACHR. 10 
Civilians are protected by Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol 11 and 
customary humanitarian law from intentional terror attacks such as air raids, 
shelling and sniping on civilians if the primary object of such is to spread terror 
among civilians and to cause their displacement from an area. " Such a terror 
attack is a specific form of the general prohibition of Article 13 on attack on 
civilians and therefore limited to acts of or threats of violence that cause death or 
serious injury to body or health of civilians. 12 As spreading is limited to the 
primary effect, bombing of a military objective which causes the incidental 
effect of terror among civilians is therefore excluded. 13 
This has to be, however, distinguished from Article 4(2) (d) of Additional 
Protocol 11, which also prohibits acts of terrorism against the civilians within the 
power of a party to the conflict and therefore would not include the above 
mentioned attacks but may include inter alia., assault, rape, indiscriminate mass 
arrests and torture. 14 Such acts of violence against a particular ethnic, linguistic or 
religious group of civilians might spread extreme fear and force them to displace 
to another relatively safe area within the state. 
B. Indiscriminate Attacks 
Apart from the specific physical impact, an attack can have other severe 
consequences, such as vulnerability to certain weapons, disruption of medical 
services, starvation, disease and cause displacement. Since the impact on civilians 
10 Maria Mejia v. Guatemala, paras. 59-6 1. 
11 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Rule 2, at pp. 9-1 1; in Prosecutor v. Galic, IT-98-29-T, Judgment of 5 December 2003, paras. 97 
and 138 the Trial Chamber I of the ICTY had not decided the customary nature of the crime of 
terror but on the basis of treaty law as violation of laws and customs of war under Article 3 of the 
statute of the ICTY. 
12 Prosecutor v. Galic, para. 13 8. 
13 Pictet, J., and Pilloud, C., 'Article 51 -Protection of the Civilian Population' in Y. Sandoz, 
C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmen-nann (eds. ), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p. 613, at 
p. 61 8, para. 1940; to the corresponding Article 51 (2) of Protocol I states that, it 'is 
intended to prohibit acts of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among 
the civilian population without offering substantial military advantage. ' In Prosecutor 
v. Martic (Rule 6 1) Case IT-95 -11 -R6 1, ICTY Trial Chamber (8 March 1996) (1998) 10 8 ILR 
40, para. 31 it was held that, the use of Orkan rockets which cannot be guided towards the 
target and of low striking force indicate that it was not to hit military targets but to terrorize 
civilians. 
14 See below, Chapter 5, Section, F for the scope of Article 4 and 13 of Additional 
Protocol II. 
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of such attacks is assessed in terms of immediate physical injury to or death of 
civilians, the long terms effects and their (indirect) consequences on civilian 
population are not taken into account. 
Article 14 of Additional Protocol 11 which prohibits direct destruction of 
objects indispensable for the survival of civilians to avoid starvation, does not 
specifically prohibit the collateral destruction of such objects, although this is 
covered by the general prohibition of disproportionate damage to civilian 
property. 15 As the principle of proportionality does not cover starvation, it is quite 
legitimate to cause starvation in an attack as a collateral effect. In other words, an 
attack does not become disproportionate due to resulting starvation or 
displacement. Therefore, starvation caused within a proportionate collateral 
damage can aggravate the existing malnutrition and mass displacement in 
developing countries which have already been affected by such problems caused 
by economic factors and natural disasters. 
Further, attacks on objects which are of 'dual uses' to civilians and the 
military, such as 'electric towers and oil and gas pipelines' 16 during conflicts, 
would cause severe indirect impact on civilians and cause displacement. Even in 
the case of legitimate attacks on such objects as military objectives, their 
indirect impact on civilian population is not considered as a factor to be 
considered for the purposes of assessing proportionality. 17 As Greenwood points 
out in the context of coalition attacks in Iraq in the Gulf war, on electrical power 
plants as a legitimate target and their indirect impact on civilians: 
[T]he majority of Iraqi electrical production facilities, however, were part of an 
integrated national power grid, which provided electrical power for both civilian 
and military use. Although the coalition attacks on power stations appear to have 
killed or injured few civilians and the immediate damage to civilian objects from 
these raids could not be said to have been excessive was that the infrastructure of 
civilian life ground to a halt as hospitals, sewerage plants water purification 
facilities and the like ceased to be able to operate. The resulting collapse of 
infrastructure vital to civilian life caused far greater civilian loss and damage than 
the bombing itself. 18 
" See below, Ch. 5, ibid. 
16 1ACHR, Third Report on Colombia, 1999, Ch. 1vc, para. 14 1. 
17 F. Hampson, 'Means and Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf in P. Rowe(ed. ), The 
Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law, (London, 1993) p. 89, at pp. 99- 100. 
18 C. Greenwood, 'A Critique of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949' in 
H. Durham, and T. McCormack (eds. ), 7"he Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of 
International Humanitarian Law (Hague, 1999) p. 3, at p. 12. 
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There is no such provision in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I for 'dual use 
objects, ' an object is either military or it is not. 19 Therefore such 'dual use' objects 
would not be subjected to the presumption of civilian objects . 
20 To be attacked 
lawfully however, these dual use objects must meet the dual criteria in the 
definition of military objective, which can be satisfied even with an indirect use 
of such objects by the military. 21 
Other options would be to include these 'dual use' objects into either 
22 Article 15 or 14 of Additional Protocol 11, to provide protection against attack . 
Electrical power plants do not fall within the prohibition of Article 15 of 
Additional Protocol 11 on works and installations containing dangerous forces, as 
they do not release 'dangerous forces' that result in direct civilian losses, but 
rather an 'indirect effect of loss of power' on civilian population. 23 
However, attacks on electrical power plants which have dual uses may fall 
within Article 14 of Additional Protocol 11, that prohibits attacks against objects 
indispensable for the subsistence of civilians, as the objects therein are non- 
exhaustive to allow inclusion of objects other than those enumerated therein, 
according to the context. 24 Because Article 14 does not contain a requirement 
similar to that in the corresponding Article 54 of Additional Protocol I which 
requires that attack should be made 'for the specific purpose of denying them for 
their sustenance value to the civilian population, ' the objects within the sphere of 
Article 14 cannot be attacked for any reason whatsoever. 25 In the context of 
contemporary internal conflicts, in order to protect the civilian population and to 
avoid their displacement, it is therefore highly desirable to provide specifically 
that certain dual use objects should be treated as civilian objects and protected 
from attack. 
The non-consideration of displacement of civilians as a factor in 
determining collateral injuries to civilians in hostilities makes even the mass 
displacement of civilians beyond the protection of humanitarian law. If the 
19 C. Greenwood, ibid., at p. 13; see below, Ch. 5, Section F. 2. a. for detailed discussion. 
20 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 326. 
21 See below, Chapter 5, Section, F. 2. a. 
22 These prohibitions are part of customary humanitarian law applicable to internal armed 
conflicts. J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 
Rule 42, pp. 139-142; Rule 54 pp. 189-193 respectively. 
23 F. Hampson, , 'Means and 
Methods of Warfare in the Conflict in the Gulf ' at p. 99. 
24 Sjunod, 'Commentary on Protocol IF, at p. 145 8. 
25 See below, Ch. 5, Section. E. 2. c. 
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foreseeable incidental displacement of civilians were considered as part of the 
principle of proportionality, it would be an alternative protection to civilians in 
the light of the gap of protection in Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol 11 
concerning deliberate displacement by coercive measures. Further, this would 
ease the determination as to whether the displacement occurred as a consequence 
of hostilities, of a lawful attack, or as a method of combat or as an objective 
of armed conflict, namely, ethnic cleansing. Another way to determine whether 
an attack is in accordance with humanitarian law is to take into consideration the 
cumulative effect of repeated attacks on military objectives resulting in civilian 
casualties, which would fall within the grey area between the 'indisputable 
legality and unlawfulness of the principle of proportionality. ' 26 
26 Kupreskic et al., para. 526. 
118 
Conclusion to Part 11 
The above discussion indicates that both human rights and humanitarian law 
provide protection against forced displacement. There is a right to remam or rIght 
against arbitrary displacement in human rights law and displacement is therefore 
exceptional. In internal armed conflict situations, international humanitarian law 
and international criminal law define the scope of derogation from the right to 
remain. However, the protection provided by international humanitarian law is 
limited to direct acts of forced displacement committed against civilians within 
the control of the parties to the conflict. The protection provided by human 
rights law is much broader, as it includes forced displacement by coercive 
measures, in addition to direct acts of displacement. Its regulatory standards 
provide protection from the abuse of emergency power by governments in 
carrying out arbitrary displacements in the pretext of lawful grounds of 
military necessity and safety of civilians. 
As other involuntary displacements occur without the active 
interference of the state to displace civilians, violation of the right to remain or 
the right against arbitrary displacement of civilians is not engaged. In that sense, 
such displacements are not arbitrary displacements. However, States have the 
obligation to take positive preventive measures in systematic human rights 
and humanitarian law violations when displacement is a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of such violations. Moreover, violations which 
prompted such displacement could engage the responsibility of states under other 
provisions of human rights and humanitarian law, and of armed opposition groups 
under humanitarian law. Therefore general compliance with human rights and 
humanitarian law would indirectly prevent or minimize the displacement of 
civilians. 
As it is the consequences of displacement that makes involuntary 
displacement to be viewed very much as a harm, the next Part examines the 
position of legal protection in relation to the needs that arise from such 
displacement in the light of possible convergence between human rights and 
humanitarian law. 
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Part III 
Protection from the Consequences of Displacement 
Introduction 
As discussed earlier, protection against forced displacement is crucial not so much 
because of the coercion involved in it but because of the consequential multiple 
violations of human rights. Similarly, even in other involuntary displacement in 
which the IDPs are obliged to move by the effects of armed conflicts, physical and 
material vulnerability as a consequence is often inevitable. This necessitates the 
protection of their specific needs during displacement. 
The needs of IDPs include: non-discriminatory treatment on the basis of 
displaced status; movement related needs, needs of family reunification; needs of 
documentation; survival needs and other basic needs such as food, water, medical 
facilities, shelter, housing, assistance in return, and continued education of children 
; and protection from violence or threat to life by attack against IDP camps; 
compensation or restoration of property; and return or reintegration or resettlement. 
Apart from the above protection needs, IDPs are vulnerable to arbitrary 
arrest and detention, disappearances, torture and inhuman treatment, sexual assault 
and recruitment of children into armed forces and groups during displacement. Since 
these violations can be a cause for initial displacement as well and are not specific 
to IDPs alone but also affect non-displaced civilians, such violations cannot be 
considered as protection needs specific to IDPs alone. Notwithstanding, a broad 
international protection against such violations has already been provided in 
human rights and humanitarian law. I 
1 See generally, Report of the Representative of Secretary -General, Francis Deng, Compilation and 
Analysis of Legal Norms, Part I, E/CN. 4/1996/52/Add. 2 (5 December 1995); for specific legal 
protection, J. Pejic, 'Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention 
in 
Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence' (2005)87 IRRC 375; for forced disappearances 
(2001) No. 62-63 of the International Commission ofJurists Review ; N. S. Rodley, The Treatment of 
Prisoners Under International Law 2 nd ed. (Oxford, 1999); Kelly D. Askin, 'Prosecuting Wartime 
Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, 
Enduring 
Obstacles' (2003)21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 288; G. Goodwin-Gill and 1. Cohen, 
Child Soldiers: the Role of the Children in Armed Conflict (Oxford, 1994); M. Happold, 'The 
optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict' (2003)3 YBIHL 226. 
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Protection During Displacement 
A. Protection Against Discriminatory Treatment 
Often in internal armed conflict situations IDPs are discriminated against on the 
basis of their displaced status, despite the fact that they are entitled to equal 
rights with non-displaced nationals. They can be discriminated against with 
regard to access to social services, educational facilities, unemployment assistance 
and adequate housing, access to personal documentation, medical care and 
exercising the right to vote especially in the place of displacement. ' For instance, 
the Muslim IDPs who were expelled by the armed opposition group (LTTE ) 
from the northern part of Sri Lanka were treated as a category who were 
discriminated against, as they were not registered as local residents in the 
2 Puttalam district to which they had displaced . Registration in the place of 
destination depended on obtaining a letter of confirmation from the north where 
they were earlier registered. This was simply not possible due to their forced 
displacement from that area. Moreover, the attitude of the government to avoid 
emergence of a 'pure' Tamil northern province without any other ethnic groups, 
made registration of IDPs in Puttalam difficult. 3 As a result, IDPs were not able to 
get government jobs or to pursue other work such as fishing (which requires formal 
registration with local administrative bodies), or to obtain the services of 
government institutions, as they were not granted to people not registered in that 
administrative region. 4 At the same time, voluntary movement of other people to 
another administrative region and their registration was much easier than the 
Muslim IDPs. 5 
Similarly, in the Russian Federation, since 1999 generally IDPs from 
Chechnya and in particular, ethnic Chechens who were displaced to other regions 
of the Russian federation, have been denied or found it more difficult than 
other Russian citizens to obtain the residence registration, necessary to 
' Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Serbia and Montenegro, 
CCPR/CO/8 I /SEMO (12/08/2004) para. 18; Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Colombia, CCPR/CO/80/COL (26 May 2004) para. 19. 
2 C. Brun, 'Local Citizens or Internally Displaced Persons? Dilemmas of Long Tenn Displacement 
in Sri Lanka' (2003)16 Journal ofRefugee Studies 376, at p. 377. 
3 Ibid., at pp. 386-87. 
4 Ibid., at pp. 383,390-9 1. 
5 Ibid., at p. 384. 
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exercise their rights as citizens such as the right to education, employment, 
social security, and heath services .6 By withholding registration of IDPs 
registered in Chechnya including 'even those of the majority, the government's 
4own') people, Slavic Russians', the government was pragmatic in its efforts to 
keep them within Chechnya to suppress the evidence of the prolonged and brutal 
armed confliCt. 7 However ethnic Chechens who are not IDPs and are permanently 
residing in regions of Russian Federation other than Chechnya have residence 
registration and are treated like other residents. 8 These instances indicate the 
possibility of discrimination on the ground of displacement for various reasons 
in internal armed conflicts fought on ethnic lines. 
To avoid such discriminatory treatment of IDPs, in addition to 
discriminatory grounds, the discrimination clause should include the status of 
'being displaced' as well. Such a status cannot be included as a ground in the non- 
derogable elements of non-discrimination in Article 4(l) of the ICCPR, as it 
contains an exhaustive list of grounds. 9 The status of 'being displaced' of IDPs 
can be included in the residuary term 'other status' of Articles 2(l) of the 
ICCPR and 2(2) of the ICESCR which provides for non- discriminatory treatment 
on the grounds of 'race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. "O Although these 
Articles are of subordinate nature and that they do not have an independent 
existence, they complement the rights and freedoms in the respective 
covenants. " Therefore, any measure despite its conformity with a substantive 
right, discriminates against the IDPs on the basis of their displaced status 
would violate the right concerned in conjunction with the provision on non- 
discrimination. 12 
6 Kate Desormeau, 'The Outside Inside: Chechen IDPs, Identity Documents and the Right to Free 
Movement in the Russian Federation, ' Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper No. 22 (University of 
Oxford, 2005) at p. 7 and 9; UNHCR, 'UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian 
Federation in the Context of the Situation in Chechnya', Geneva, February 2003, para. 53. 
7 Kate Desormeau, 'The Outside Inside: Chechen IDPs' at p. 11. 
8 IUNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation', paras. 56-58 and para. 82. 
9 Similarly Article 27(l) of the ACHR; there is no non-discrimination clause in Art. 15 of the 
ECHR. 
10 For similar non-exhaustive non-discrimination clause, Art. 14 of the ECHR 'other status'; Art. 1(1) 
of the ACHR 'any other social condition'; Art. 2 of the ACHPR 'other status. '; see below, Section 
E. 1. for the nature of the obligation of non-discrimination in ICESCR. 
1 A. F. Bayefsky, 'The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law' 
(1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal I at p. 4. 
12 See ibid. 
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Article 26 of the ICCPR which entitles every one to equal protection of law 
without discrimination but also prohibits any discrimination under the law or in 
fact by public authorities and guarantees equal and effective protection against 
discrimination can also include the status of displaced person in its 
discriminatory ground of 'other status. ' 13 This principle of discrimination in 
Article 26 of the ICCPR is applicable in this regard even to rights not provided 
for in the ICCPR. 14 Despite the broad application of this provision, it is derogable 
during internal armed conflicts. However, again in terms of Article 5(l) of the 
ICCPR, the application of Article 26 cannot be derogated to the extent to 
destroy it. 15 
Discrimination as stated by these articles can be understood 'to imply any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on 
an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. ' 16 Restrictions on resident registration 
in the areas of displacement based on the ground of being displaced which have 
the effect of impairing the enjoyment of rights in particular of socio economic 
rights by IDPs on an equal footing with others, are therefore discriminatory. In 
such instances, requiring IDPs to obtain documents from the areas from which 
they have displaced is a method of denying registration in the current areas of 
displacement. The principle of equality requires in such instances affirmative 
actions to be taken to 'diminish or eliminate' such requirements that render the 
continuation of discrimination on the basis of being displaced. 
' 7 The enjoyment of 
socio-economic rights by IDPs on equal terms with other non-displaced civilians 
does not depend on identity documents or registration because these documents 
cannot create those rights but merely affirm the rights of IDPs as citizens of a 
state. 18 
" See similarly, Article 11 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948 'any 
other factor'; Art. 24 of the ACHR; Art. 3(2) of the ACHPR. 
14 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: 'Non-Discrimination', (10/ 11/89) para. 12. 
" Similarly, Art. 29(a) of the ACHR. 
16 Human Rights Committee, 'Non-Discnmination, ' para. 7. 
17jbid., para. 10. 
18 committee on ICESCR, Concluding observations on Russian Federation, E/C. 121/1/Add. 94 
(12 December 2003) para. 40, requested the government to ensure that 'the lack of residence 
registration and other personal documents 
do not become an obstacle to the enjoyment of 
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Moreover, common Article 3 and Article 2(l) of Additional Protocol 11 
do not contain displaced status as a ground of discrimination in their non- 
discrimination clause but contain a residual clause. For example, Protocol 11 
provides for humane treatment without any distinction on the basis of 'race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, or belief, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria. ' 19 Therefore 
there is a possibility to include the ground of displacement within the 
residual clause, in the light of the prohibition against forced displacement in 
Additional Protocol 11. 
B. Movement Related Needs 
1. Right to Move to a Safe Part of the Country 
In situations where IDPs have to leave or flee from a combat zone to a relatively 
safer part of the country, the right to freedom of movement and residence become 
important as they implicitly contain such aspect . 
20 Freedom of movement is 
important to the initial movement to become IDPs from their places of habitual 
residence, as well as for those in IDP camps and settlements. 21 In the latter 
instance, such freedom is important, in particular, to seek employment or 
cultivate paddy lands, or to leave to a safer part of the state when exposed to the 
risks of indiscriminate attacks on IDP camps or being used as human shields. It is 
equally applicable even for those within the safe areas or safety zones created by 
the UN or the ICRC. 
There is no explicit provision in this regard in human rights law, but such a 
right can be derived from the right to freedom of movement and residence. The 
right to move freely in Article 12(l) of the ICCPR relates 'to the whole territory 
of a State, including all parts of Federal States. 22 The right to reside in a place of 
one's choice 'precludes preventing the entry' of IDPs to a part of the country. 23 
The right to remain in safety and dignity, subject to the restrictions stated in 
Article 12(3) of the ICCPR, implies that in the event of lack of safety in a place, 
economic, social and cultural rights. ' 
" M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 636. 
20 W. Kalin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations, at p. 36. 
21 See for the former instance, above, Ch. 3, Section B. 
22 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 2 7, 'Freedom of Movement (Art. 12)' 
CCpR/C/2 I /Rev. I/Add. 9 (02/11/99) para. 7. 
23 Ibid. 
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there should be freedom to move to a safer place within the country. Freedom of 
movement of IDPs to any part of the country does not depend on the 'particular 
purpose or reason for the person wanting to move or stay in a place. ' 24ThUS, IDPs 
cannot be arbitrarily forced to remain in an area or part of the territory. This means 
that IDPs can move to any part of the country for the reason of safety without any 
obstruction on the part of the state, except for the restrictions in Article 12(3). 
Again, these restrictions imposed for purposes of national security or public order 
should be in 'consistent with the other rights' recognised in the ICCPR, including 
the right to life and prohibition of inhuman treatment and principle of 
proportionality. 25 
Some countries impose an internal permit system on those wishing to 
move to another part of the country, which unduly obstructs free movement of 
IDPs in internal armed conflict situations. However such restrictive measures must 
meet the 'test of necessity and the requirements of proportionality. 26 Therefore, 
the existence of permit system for internal movement would violate Article 12(l) 
27 
of the ICCPR . The requirement of documents which are not necessary for 
travelling internally, but required for finding residence in other safe areas of a 
state would also virtually suspend the freedom of movement and residence in that 
part of the State. For instance, the policy of the Russian Federation that denies 
internal passes or passports and residence registration to IDPs who are registered 
as pennanent residents in Chechnya, in an area of displacement outside Chechnya, 
was implemented to contain the Chechens within Chechnya, 'to suppress and 
internalize evidence of the war. 28 This resulted in denial of socio- economic rights 
and exposure to dangers of violations of civil and political rights in the area of 
displacement. It constitutes a general suspension of right to freedom of movement 
and residence outside Chechnya . 
29 This fact is underscored by the UNHCR 
24 Ibid., para. 5; see above, Ch. 3, Section, B. 25 Art. 12(3). 
26 Human Rights Committee, 'Freedom of Movement', para. 16. 
21 Ibid, - Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Kyrgyzstan CCPR/Co/69/kgz (24 
July, 2000) para. 17 with regard to propiska system. ( the requirement to obtain permit for internal 
movement) and the recommendation of to its abolition; Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations : Russian Federation, CCPR/C/79/Add. 54 (26 July 1995), para. 20, in para. 37 
Committee recommended for the abolition of such internal pass system in practice (which 
constitutes defacto discrimination ) at regional and at local levels despite its forinal abolition by 
the Federal Law. 
28 K. Desormeau, The Outside Inside. - Chechen IDPs at p. 11. 
29jbid., at pp. 9-1 0 and 19. 
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statement that there is no internal flight alternative for ethnic Chechen asylum - 
seekers from Chechnya. 30 
Often, those civilians who got caught in the combat zone are in a 
much more dangerous position than those who are able to move to other 
areas. 31 In such life threatening situations, preventing the free movement of IDPs 
to a safe part of the country may be considered as a violation of right to life of 
IDPs, as non-admission to a part of the country is analogous to the situation of 
closure of national borders to prevent civilians fleeing life threatening situations to 
seek asylum. The latter situation concerning external displacement is considered as 
prohibited at all times due to its incompatibility with the right to life. 32 Similarly, 
there is no reason to deny such protection to IDPs moving internally, as 
becoming an IDP is often the first phase before going through the phase of external 
displacement. Derogation of Article 12(l) must not violate the right to life, as it 
is not in compliance with the principle of non- derogability in Article 4 of the 
ICCPR. Such a derogation would affect the legality of the derogation measure 
prohibiting movement of IDPs to safe parts of the State. 
Another dimension of freedom of movement is concerned with the IDPs 
relocated in open camps and settlements. 33 On the basis of freedom of movement, 
IDPs have the right to move freely in and out of the camp. The restriction of free 
movement in and out of the camps would leave the IDPs with insufficient time to 
spend out of the camp, to search for or involve in income generating activities or 
cultivate their land, thereby affecting the right to an adequate standard of living 
and continuous improvement of living conditions of IDPs and also the right to 
education of the children. 34 For instance, due to the restrictions on the movement 
in and out of regroupment camps in Burundi, IDPs were left without sufficient 
30 UNHCR, 'Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation, ' paras. 83-85 
31 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees 1997-98: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford, 1997) at 
p. 103. 
32 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
E/CN. 4/2002/74 (9 January 2002) para. 8(g). 
33 Confinement of IDPs in closed camp is a violation of right to liberty and security of person as 
protected in Article 9 of the ICCPR; also see Principle 12 of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal 
Displacement. 
34 Articles I1 (1) and 13 of the ICESCR; Article 28 on the right to education of the 1989 CRC is 
non-derogable; State party has an affirmative obligation to provide education to children 
in terms of 
Article 4 (3)(a) of Additional Protocol 11; Article 28 on the right to education of the 1989 CRC is 
non-derogable. 
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35 time to cultivate their land . Therefore free movement of IDPs in and out of their 
camps or settlement is important by virtue of theIr right to freedom of movement 
and to exercise their other human rights. 36 
The other important outcome of protection with this freedom of movement 
is that when attacks are launched at the camps or other human rights violations 
take place, IDPs would be able to move away from the vicinity of the camps to 
other parts of the country. This is relevant to safe areas established by the United 
Nations or the ICRC. 
As far as humanitarian law is concerned, no guarantee is provided for 
the free movement of civilians to a safe part of the country from the effects of 
hostilities. Such a right of civilians to move to a safe area is explicitly 
provided in international armed conflict; if protected persons 'reside in an area 
particularly exposed to the dangers of war, they shall be authorised to move from 
that area to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned. 137 Without an 
explicit protection of freedom of movement in the dangers of anned conflict, the 
non-prohibition in Article 17 (1) of Additional Protocol 11 voluntary movement to 
other places, 38 cannot be considered as ensuring the free movement of civilians. 
Movement related restrictions are, however, inconceivable unless such 
a measure is imperative. Thus, the protection of IDPs necessitates an explicit 
right to seek refuge internally in areas of relative safety within the country. 39 
2. Right to Leave One's Own State and the Right to seek Asylum 
Emphasizing the right of IDPs to move to a safe area within the country 
if there is an 'internal flight alternative, ' should not minimize the importance 
or opportunities of seeking asylum in a foreign country, because, either a civilian 
can become an internally displaced person before becoming a refugee or he can 
straight away seek asylum if it is a more feasible and safer way than moving 
internally. 40 Asylum is a status that provides a real and unique international 
protection to IDPs that cannot be substituted by the internal flight alternative. 
If IDPs move to an area within the control of government which is one of the 
35 Report of the Representative, Profiles in Displacement: Burundi, para. 24 
36 Principle 14 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
37 Article 38(4) of the IV Geneva Convention of 1949. 
38 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol Il, ' at p. 1472. 
39 Principle 15(a) UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
40 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees] 99 7-98, at p. 108. 
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parties to the conflict fought on ethnic lines, such movement cannot often be 
regarded as providing effective internal protection alternative to such IDPs. It 
might provide protection against indiscriminate bombing to IDPs who would 
no longer in their homes which are exposed to such attacks, but would not 
always provide protection against other human rights violations by the 
govemment security forces. 
In the light of the absence of a right to seek asylum in the ICCPR, the 
right to leave one's country is significant to the protection of IDPs. The right to 
leave 'any country, including his own' in Article 12(2) of the ICCPR 'may not be 
made dependent on any specific purpose or on the period of time the individual 
chooses to stay outside the country. 
A1 Thus the derogable nature of this right 
during internal armed conflicts may not affect the departure of IDPs for 
permanent emigration, as such derogation is subject to the principle of 
proportionality. However, the effective enjoyment of this right of IDPs who wish 
to emigrate permanently due to unsafe conditions of internal armed conflicts 
can be affected by derogations or restrictions on the freedom of movement to a 
safe area within the country. For this particular purpose, the safe area would be the 
capital of the country, where only the foreign diplomatic missions are generally 
situated. Restrictions on movement by imposing internal permit systems, 
delays in the issuing of such permits and restrictions on the duration of stay 
in the capital would severely affect the emigration process and in turn the 
right to leave the country. 42 Thus, for the effective exercise of the right to leave, 
the right to move freely within the country must be protected. Moreover, the 
right to leave one' s own country includes the right to obtain the necessary travel 
documents and therefore unreasonable delay or refusal in issuing a passport 
may not be proportionate to the exigencies of the situation. 
43 
As the enjoyment of the right to leave one's own country is not 
dependant only on the country of nationality but on the State of residence as 
well, 44 IDPs who wish to leave the country to seek asylum can be 
protected by this right. As noted by the Human Rights Committee in its 
concluding observations, not allowing asylum seekers to disembark 
from ships at 
4' Human Rights Committee, 'Freedom of Movement, ' para. 8. 
42 See above, Section, B. 1. 
43 Human Rights Committee, 'Freedom of Movement, ' paras. 9,17. 
44jbid., paras. 8,9. 
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ports to give them a chance to assert their individual claims5 imposing 
sanctions on passenger carriers and other 'pre-frontier arrangements, would 
involve issues of compatibility with the right of any person to leave their own 
country under Article 12(2) of the ICCPR. 45 This can be interpreted as 
imposing an obligation on the state of destination to 'allow a foreigner to enter 
space within the jurisdiction of that state as a part of the right to leave, even if the 
right of the person to enter the territory of that state has not yet been determined 
and might entail issues not governed by Article 12 of the ICCPR. 46 In the 
absence of the right to seek asylum in the ICCPR, the limited guarantee of 
disembarkation at the port of entry which facilitates the assertion of asylum 
seekers" claims, is significant to those who seek asylum from persecution. 47 
Though such an opportunity does not necessarily result in the granting of asylum, 
at least it would extend protection from rejection at the frontier and sending 
back to their country of origin or to any country where they would be 
likely to be in danger of persecution or torture or execution or enforced 
disappearance. 
Though right to seek and enjoy asylum provided in Article 14(l) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is non-binding, such right in Article 
XXVII of the 1948 American Declaration, Article 22(7) of ACHR and Article 
12(3) of ACHPR involves at least a right to advance a claim of asylum and a 
guarantee of security from refoulement. 48 Such a right to make a claim would 
become illusory if the State of asylum had the discretion to send the asylum 
seeker back to his or any other country without identifying him as subjected to 
persecution with a determination procedure. 49The right to seek and enjoy asylum 
in that sense is thus implicit in the refugee definitions of Articles I and 33 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol and in Articles 1 (2) and 
11 of the OAU Convention of 1969, and Article 111(3) and 111(4), (5) of the 
45 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: France, CCPR/C/79/Add. 80, (4 August 
1997), para. 20; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Austria, 
. CCPR/C/79/Add. 
103 (19 November 1998) para. 11. 
46 M. Scheinin, 'Forced Displacement and the Covenant', at p. 68. 
47 Human Rights Committee, General Comment, No. 15, 'The Position of Aliens Under the 
Covenant' (11/04/86) para. 5. 
48 R. Plender, 'The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English -Speaking Section of the 
Centre for Studies and Research' in The Right qfAsylum, Centre For Studies and Research in 
International Law and International Relations , 1989, p. 63, at pp. 
82,88 and 96. 
49 See generally, ibid., at pp. 82-88. 
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Cartagena Declaration of 1984, as claims of refugee status depend on such 
definitions. Moreover, the right to seek and enjoy asylum is supported by the 
principle of non-refoulement in customary international law including non- 
rejection at the frontier and by the prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment and the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life in 
international human rights law. 50 
International recognition of the right to seek and enjoy asylum which 
necessitates as a pre-condition the right to leave for such purposes, would impose 
obligations on the receiving state not to obstruct such civilians seeking asylum by 
defeating the exercise of these rights 'with the view to ensuring that potential 
refugees remain in their own country and do not find protection. ' 51 However 
such an obligation on the receiving state cannot be expected to mean that visas 
should be granted to those IDP applicants who are subject to danger in their own 
country, as this is 'far from being accepted in the practice of States. ' 52 The right to 
seek asylum is therefore important as the in-country protection is temporary in 
nature and cannot be an alternative to the protection of asylum which is an 
effective protection where asylum seekers are 'physically and legally outside the 
country of their nationality and unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the 
protection of that country and whose return to that country can only be 
voluntary. ' 53 
In humanitarian law, as with Article 17(l), Article 17(2) of Additional 
Protocol 11 does not prohibit voluntary external displacement of civilians. 
However, such provision cannot be regarded as granting protection to leave or seek 
asylum in other countries. 
50 See above, Ch. 1, for the customary nature of the principle of non- refoulement ; Articles 3 CAT 
1984; 22(8) of the ACHR; 13(4) of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 
1985; see below, Section, B. 3 for cases decided by the European Court under Article 3 of the 
ECHR; Human Rights Committee, 'The Position of Alien' para. 5 states that even in the absence of 
the right of aliens in the ICCPR, to enter or reside in the host state, an alien (in this context asylum 
seeker) may enjoy this right in certain situations by the prohibition of inhuman treatment; Principle 
5 of the 1989 UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, 
Arbitrary and Summary Execution and Article 8(l) of 1992 UN Declaration on the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, however both are not legally-binding instruments; 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action A/CONF. 157/23 (12 July 1993), para. 23; Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, E/CN. 4/2002/74 ( Wanuary 2002) para. 8(g) 
51G. Goodwin-Gill, 'Right to Leave', at p. 99; also see above, Ch. 3, Section, B for in-country 
protection as a method of containment. 
52 G. S. Goodwin- Gill, ' Right to Leave, ' at p. 100. 
53 L. Franco, 'Examination of Safety Zones', at p. 883. 
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3. Right to be Protected Against Forcible Return or Resettlement 
IDPs are often forcibly returned to their homes or habitual places of residence, or 
forcibly resettled in areas where their life, safety, liberty or health would be at 
risk. The IDPs are often reluctant to return to their places of habitual 
residence due to destruction and confiscation of property; absence of assistance 
in the reconstruction or restitution and compensation of property; implantation of 
settlements consisting of civilians belonging to the opposite party; appropriation 
or occupation by government armed forces or armed opposition groups of the 
property of IDPs for establishment of military camps; prevailing insecurity 
due to human rights abuses and the possibility of further outbreak of 
54 hostilities; and the enduring effects of landmines and unexploded ordnances . 
Thus, without any protection or relief for their abject poverty and safety, 
IDPs are unlikely to return to their places of habitual residence. 
States can force the return of IDPs in camps and settlements to active 
combat zones such as by threatening to arrest them on false charges, 
withdrawing food allowances; cutting off gas and electricity supplies to the 
camp which affects the IDPs during winter seasons, and closing down IDP 
camps without providing any alternative shelter. 55 For instance, IDPs from 
Chechnya, who fled the effects of hostilities, were forced to return to the 
Chechen Republic by the authorities of Moscow. 56 Moreover, IDPs are 
reluctant to be resettled in areas other than their habitual places of 
residence, for instance, where they have to live with civilians belonging to 
opposition ethnic group or in remote areas where their survival is not feasible 
due to lack of opportunities for work, education and other needs. In such 
situations they cannot be subjected to forced return without regard for their 
safety and dignity. Thus there is a need for the protection of IDPs against forced 
return resettlement. 
Protection as such against forced return or resettlement of IDPs does not 
exist in human rights law or humanitarian law as corresponding to the principle 
of non- refoulement with regard to refugees in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
54 See below, Ch. 6, Section B. 
55 See Human Rights Watch, 'Into Hann's Way: Forced Return of Displaced People to Chechnya, ' 
January 2003, Vol. 15, No. 1. http: //wkNw. hrw. org . 
5'jbid, - Amnesty International, 'Russian Federation: Chechnya for the Motherland' (December 
1999) Al index: EUR46/46/99, http: //www. reliefweb. int/library/documents/chechfull. htm. 
131 
57 Convention and in certain human rights instruments. Explicit prohibition 
against return of asylum seekers is provided in the CAT which states that 
'[n]o State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture. 958 ECHR and ICCPR have adopted such an 
interpretation in terms of Articles 3 and 7 respectively to include a positive 
obligation of non- refoulement with regard to asylum seekers . 
59 The main 
difference between the protection of non-refoulement provided by CAT on 
the one hand and by the ECHR and ICCPR on the other is that the foriner is 
restricted to the risk of torture and the latter is extended to torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In addition, the ICCPR 
provides protection against forced return to the country of origin under 
Article 6 on the right to life and Article 9 on the right to liberty and 
security. 60 
The factual situation of an IDP who is subjected to forced return to 
any place within a country is by analogy similar to the situation of a 
refugee who is subjected to forced return to his country of origin or any 
country which would send him back to his country of origin where he is 
exposed to danger to life or freedom or torture. If such an external 
return of refugees can be regarded as torture or inhuman treatment, 
violation of the right to life, and violation of the right to liberty and 
security, there is every conceptual justification to extend it to the internal 
return of IDPs by analogy. An extension of internal non-refoulement on the 
basis of the right to life is consistent with the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions as it includes a 
57 Human Rights Committee, 'Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture, ' 
para. 9 interprets Art. 7 as including the non-refoulement of refugees; Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding observations : Dominican Republic, A/5 6/40 vol. 1 (200 1) at para. 78 (16). 
58Art. 3(l) of the 1984 CAT; Article 22(8) of the ACHR. 
59 Chahal v. UK, No. 00022414/93 (15/11/1996) para. 80; Human Rights Committee, 'Replaces 
General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture, ' para. 9. 
60 Human Rights Committee, 'Nature of the General Obligation' para. 12 states the non-refoulement 
obligations concerning risks contemplated by Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR; G. T v. Australia, 
No. 706/1996, CCPR/C/61/D/706/1996 (4 December 1997) paras. 8-1-9 ; Principle 5 of the 1989 UN 
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary 
Executions ; Art. 8(2) of the 1992 UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances . 
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situation of '[e]xpulsion, refoulement or return of persons to a country or a 
ý61 place where their lives are in danger. --. 
As far as the asylum seekers are concerned, contracting states have an 
obligation to protect asylum seekers within their country of origin not only from 
ill-treatment but also from exposure to the risks of ill-treatment, even in a 
third country which is not a contracting state. Such protection of human 
rights is applicable not only against return to the country of origin, but may 
cover the removal of an asylum seeker to a third country where he/she 
has already sought protection and where there are substantial reasons to 
believe that such country would return the asylum seeker to the country of 
origin without considering the case properly or applying a restrictive 
interpretation of the 1951 Convention. 62 In such a situation, the country of 
refuge engages responsibility for inhuman treatment as it exposes the asylum 
seeker indirectly to inhuman treatment. By analogy, foreseeable risk to 
IDPs by forcible return should be avoided, including forcible resettlement 
in other parts of the state. 
A further difference lies in the issue of the source of torture. As 
far as asylum seekers are concerned, in terms of CAT torture is 
limited to acts of the agents of State. 63 CAT does not provide protection 
from non-refoulement for risk of torture posed by non-state actors, unless 
such risk of torture is posed with the consent or acquiescence of the State. 
64 Therefore, torture by armed opposition groups in an internal armed conflicts 
would not be covered by the protection of non-refoulement. However, if 
non-state actors have established quasi-governmental institutions which provide 
some public services, the danger of being subjected to torture if 
61 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, (9 January 2002) para. 8(g) 
(emphasis added) ; Committee on CERD, General Recommendation. No. 22, 'Article 5 and 
Refugees and Displaced Persons' (24/08/96) para. 2(b). 
62 Tj V. UK, Application No. 43844/98, Decision, 7 March of 2000,2000-111 RE CHR 437. 
63 Article 1 (1) of the CAT defines torture as intentional acts that cause severe pain or 
suffering for certain purposes, ' inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. ' 
64 VXN and H. N v. Sweden, Communication Nos. 130 and 131 /1999, CAT/C/24/D/I 30 
&131/1999 (2September 200)para. 13.8. 
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returned to the country of origin would be considered by the Committee on 
65 Torture as falling within the scope of Article 3 of the CAT . 
In contrast, the Human Rights Committee considers that Article 7 of 
the ICCPR on the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment includes acts 
inflicted in an official capacity, outside official capacity as well as in a 
private capacity by virtue of the positive obligation of the State to protect 
through legislative and other measures. 66 Similarly, Article 3 on the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment under the ECHR covers acts 
of physical or mental suffering caused by State or non-state actors. 67 In 
H. L. R v. France the European Court of Human Rights stated that '[o]wing to the 
absolute character of the right guaranteed, the Court does not rule out the 
possibility that Article 3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger 
emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. 
However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that the authorities of 
the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate 
protection. ' 68 Therefore, States of asylum have an obligation to protect 
asylum seekers from non-refoulement if they have a real risk of 
torture or inhuman treatment in the country of origin by non-state actors. 
Moreover, ECHR may protect the immigrants not only against the 
acts of inhuman treatment by State authorities or non-state actors but also to 
the exposure of risks, the source of which cannot engage direct or indirect 
responsibility of the public authorities of the home state but due to conditions of 
internal armed conflicts, where basic subsistence needs for survival, such as 
69 
shelter, food, and medication, are scarce causing risks to life or health . 
However, such situations had been considered as a violation of Article 3 of 
65 Elmi v. Australia CAT, (120/1998), A/54/44(14 May 1999) paras. 6.7-7. 
66 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, 'Replaces general Comment 7 Concerning 
Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (A-rt. 7)' (10/03/92) para. 2; Human 
Rights Committee, 'Nature of the General Obligation', para. 8. 
67 Bensaid v. UK No. 44599/98 (6 February 200 1) para. 34; Ahmed v. Austria, No. 0025964/94 
(17/12/1996) para-44. 
68 H. L. R. v. France, application No. 00024573/94 (29/04/1997) Reports 1997-111, para. 40. 
69 In D v. UK, Judgment of 2 May 1997, Report 1997-111,792, para. 52 the European Court held that 
a forcible return of an AIDS patient in his terminal stages to 
his home island of St Kitts is a 
violation of Article 3 of the ECHR by referring as to the 
lack of general medical facilities and 
family support; Bensaid v. UK, para. 34. 
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the ECHR only in extreme situations . 
70 Such a strict requirement of 
compelling circumstances to result in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR 
is perhaps for the reason that, aliens who are subject to expulsion are not in 
principle entitled to remain in the territory of the sending state to benefit 
from the medical and social assistance of the same despite the difficulties 
for such services in their home states. 
However, the approach as to the source of torture or the 
requirement of extreme situations of lack of basic survival needs with 
regard to asylum seekers is insignificant in the context of the right against 
forced return of IDPs. The State is bound to protect IDPs as nationals, 
regardless of the source of harm and conditions, as IDPs are still within the 
area controlled by the government and have the right to remain in safety 
and dignity anywhere of their choice within the territory. Government 
cannot exercise due diligence in the protection of IDPs against acts of armed 
opposition groups by sending them to areas controlled by armed opposition 
groups. Therefore, governments by virtue of their positive obligations are 
required to ensure respect for human rights at stake and should not forcibly 
return or resettle IDPs to places where they are exposed to risks including 
torture or inhuman treatment by non-state actors including paramilitary and 
armed opposition groups. In addition, the government cannot send IDPs 
back to life threatening situations such as to an area where conduct of 
hostilities are taking place. Moreover, governments cannot forcibly return or 
resettle IDPs in places which in internal armed conflicts lack basic 
subsistence needs such as medical facilities that affect the health of 
IDPs. 
Moreover, the scope of protection against non-refoulement provided by 
all these human rights instruments except Article 22(8) of the ACHR is wider 
than that provided in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, as the latter is only 
applicable in situations of threats to life or freedom on discriminatory grounds. 
The position the of UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement reflects the 
70 In the following cases return to the country of origin was not considered as in violation of Article 
3 of the ECHR: Bensaid v. UK, paras. 40-4 I; Meho v. 
The Netherlands, Application no. 76749/0 1, 
Decision of 20 January 2004 ;S CC v. Sweden, Application no. 46553/99, Decision of 15 February 
2000. 
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broader approach of human rights instruments, as they do not limit the 
protection of non-refoulement, to dangers arising from persecution. 
71 Such an 
approach is beneficial for protection of IDPs who have been compelled to 
flee by the effects of anned conflict. 
The application of Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention is not 
absolute as it is restricted on the ground that there should not be a danger to the 
security of the country of refuge. 72 However, the protection of non-refoulement 
based on the grounds of the provisions on torture or inhuman treatment under 
CAT, ICCPR and ECHR is broader than Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, 
as it is absolute and cannot be derogable in any circumstances. 
As stated by the Committee on Torture in Tapia Paez v. Sweden, due to 
the absolute nature of Article 3 of the Convention, 'the nature of the activities in 
which the person concerned engaged could not be a material consideration when 
973 making a decision under Article 3. Likewise, it was stated by the European 
Court of Human Rights that, when there are substantial grounds to believe that the 
expulsion of an individual would expose him/her to a real risk of treatment 
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, the activities of the individual subjected to 
expulsion, however 'undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material 
consideration. ' 74 Therefore, asylum seekers cannot be returned to the country of 
origin on the basis that their presence in the country of refuge is not conducive to 
its national security, if that return would expose the asylum seekers to the risk of 
torture or inhuman treatment in the country of origin. Similarly, the governmental 
authorities cannot force IDPs belonging to an adverse party to return to their 
place of habitual residence where they are exposed to torture or inhuman treatment, 
on the ground that their presence in government controlled areas is a 
threat to security. 
As far as humanitarian law is concerned, Additional Protocol 11 does 
not contain an explicit protection against forcible return of those displaced by 
the consequences of conflict. However, Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol 11 
extends a limited protection at least to IDPs who have been displaced initially 
71 Principle 15(d). 
72 Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
73 Communication No. 39/1996, UN Doc. A/52/44 28 April 1997) at para. 14.5. 
74 Chahal v. U-K, para. 80. 
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for reasons of their own safety or for security reasons, from being forcibly 
75 returned to those places, as long as the unsafe situation still exists . The 
obligation to set the camps of IDPs in safe conditions in Article 17 (1) of 
Additional Protocol 11 further implicitly necessitates that they should not be 
sent forcibly to unsafe conditions from which they have initially been 
displaced. 
C. Need for Documentation 
Displacement not only results in loss of property of IDPs but also in the 
loss of necessary documents such as birth, marriage and death certificates, 
passports, personal identification and title deeds to land. Consequently this 
would prevent IDPs enjoying their necessary legal rights, render them 
vulnerable to arbitrary arrest, and exclusion from schools and health services, 
76 and sometimes prevent their returning to their own house or land . Therefore it 
is important to register IDPs and to provide or replace with documents necessary 
for access to food rations, schools and health services. 77 
The right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law in Article 
16 of the ICCPR would render an IDP capable of being a person before the law 
78 to enjoy all other individual rights . 
As this capacity of individuals begins 
with birth, the duty to register every child after birth as stated in Article 24(2) 
of the ICCPR and Article 7 of the CRC is important in their due recognition and 
protection as persons entitled to legal rights (legal personality). 79As this right is 
non-derogable in the ICCPR and ACHR and Article 7 of the CRC, there is no 
difficulty in emphasising the provision to IDPs of documentation of which they 
are in need during displacement in order to exercise their rights as a person 
before law. 80 
75 Human Rights Watch, 'War Without Quarter, ' at pp. 214-15. 
76 N. Kastberg, 'Strengthening the Response to Displaced Children' (2002)15 Forced Migration 
Review 4, at p-6. 
77 Additional Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed 
Conflict, Rights of the Child, E/CN. 4/2000/71 (9 February 2000), para. 27. 
78 Similarly, Article 3 of the ACHR ; and Article 5 of the ACHPR; M. Nowak, UN Covenam, at 
pp. 282-3; the absence of this right in ECHR does not mean that it cannot 
be deduced from other 
provisions of the Convention, M. Nowak, ibid. at p. 282. 79 Ibid., at p. 285. 
80 Also see Article 8 of the CRC. 
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Absence of registration of IDPs at all, or those IDPs who get 
married or the birth of IDP children, renders them incapable of being 
recognised as IDPs or as persons entitled to legal rights. For instance, in Sri 
Lanka, it is difficult to obtain a birth certificate as the original birth registration 
number and date of registration are required and displaced children do not have 
such information to re-establish their identity in legal terms .81 The result is the 
denial of full access to education to IDP children, such as the chance to 
sit exams or in some instances entitlement to free school uniforms or books. 82 
Moreover, in certain situations, the local authorities in the region where the IDPs 
have displaced into, without issuing new, lost or expired documents, 
unreasonably require them to go get back to their places of habitual residence to 
obtain such documents. For instance, IDPs from Chechnya were required to return 
to Chechnya to get their internal passports, without considering the danger of 
travelling without a document which may result in arbitrary arrest and 
detention, and the great expenses incurred. 83 
For these reasons, births of all children in IDP camps or outside have to 
be registered and the documents issued accordingly. This would facilitate the 
education of IDP children and ensure priority in humanitarian assistance, due to 
their vulnerability to displacement during armed conflicts. Moreover, providing 
IDPs with personal identification documents which they have lost during 
displacement in their places of displacement, would reduce arbitrary arrests on 
suspicion and facilitate their freedom of movement and right to residence in a 
safe part of the country, and their access to medical services and other 
assistance. Although both the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
and the ILA Declaration on IDPs recognise this right specifically, the former is 
84 
more elaborative than the latter in this regard . 
81 Save the Children, War Brought Us Here, Protecting Children Within Their O'wn Countries 
By Conflict, UK, 8 May 2000, at p. 120. 
82 Ibid., at pp. 119-120. 
83 Global IDP Survey, 'Chechen IDPs Remain Deprived of Access to Documents and 
Registration'; K. Desormeau, 'The Outside Inside', at p. 8. 
84 See UN Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement, Principle 20 ; ILA Declaration on IDPs, 
Article 6. 
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The international humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflict 
does not contain such an obligation to provide necessary documentation to 
85 IDPs. 
D. Need for Family Reunification 
Separation of families can happen during displacements, due to the effects of 
hostilities, human rights violations such as enforced disappearances, recruitment 
of children to armed groups; or relocation by the parties to the conflict. For 
instance, in Rwanda in 1994, between 80,000 to 100,000 children were 
separated from their families as a result of genocide. 86 In situations of 
separation due to effects of hostilities, disappearances and recruitment to 
armed forces, in order to reunite the dispersed family members it is necessary to 
search for them and to restore contact between them. In the situation of forced 
displacement, family members should not be separated or they should be 
evacuated with necessary arrangements such as registration of particulars of 
identity to facilitate their reunification. 
As discussed above, if the derogation measures are not strictly necessary 
to the exigencies of the situation and the limitations are generally sufficient, there 
is no need for derogation from certain rights. 87 To similar effect, the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights stated that 'the Convention establishes a 
contrary principle, namely, that all rights are to be guaranteed and enforced unless 
very special circumstances justify the suspension of some, ... .' 
88 The right to 
respect for family life is such a right, the derogation of which cannot be 
sufficiently justifiable during public emergency and it is indeed a non-derogable 
right under the ACHR . 
89 An explicit right of children internally displaced by 
armed conflicts to be reunited with their parents is stated in Article 25(2)(b) of 
85 But humanitarian law applicable to international armed conflicts recognize the right to legal 
personality of civilians in particular of children to some extent, see Article 50 of IV Geneva 
Convention of 1948 and Article 78 of the Additional Protocol 1. 
86 C. Petty, 'Family Tracing and Reunification- Safeguarding Rights and Implementing the Law, ' 
(1996) 4, International Journal of Children's Rights 165, at p. 165 and at pp. 170-7 1. 
87 Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency', para. 5. 
88 Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts 27(2), 25(l) and 7(6) ) ACHR Requested by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of 30 January 1987, 
para. 21. 
89 Art. 17(l) and 27(2) of the ACHR; 23(l) of the ICCPR; Art. 8(l) of the ECHR; Art. 18 of AFCHR 
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the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990.90 However, 
Article 23 of the ICCPR or other regional human rights instruments do not 
contain an explicit right to reunification of displaced families or the right to know 
the fate and whereabouts of missing relatives or the right of interned IDPs to 
correspond with or to receive visits from their families. 91 The second right is 
important not only for the reunification of the family but also in respect for the 
emotional ties among the family members. 
Article 23 of the ICCPR only states the general protection of the 
family as a 'natural and fundamental group unit of society' and therefore the State 
and society 'must seek to preserve its [family] bonds, or at least, to mitigate the 
negative impact of their dissolution. ' 92 Article 9(l) of the CRC states the 
obligation not to separate children from their parents against their will. In line 
with this, any derogatory measures adopted from this right under Article 4 of the 
ICCPR must be proportionate and consistent with the other international 
obligations of the state which includes obligations under international humanitarian 
law. As such, Article 23 may be interpreted as including obligations to take 
measures to trace missing family members to learn their fate and for reunification 
of families and provide for correspondence between interned IDPs and their family 
members. 93 
Other than under Article 23 of the ICCPR, States have a general obligation 
to investigate missing persons under Article 2(l) of the ICCPR for violation of the 
right to life for the failure of the state to carry out a 'prompt, adequate or effective' 
94 investigation upon the complaint of the relative . Failure on the part of the state to 
investigate coupled with the suffering and anguish generated by the fact of 
90 Art. I 0(l) of the CRC concerns the obligation for family reunification only in a situation of 
external displacement. 
91 Art. 17 of the ICCPR; Art. 10(l) of the ICESCR; Art. 8 of the ECHR; Art. VI of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948; Arts. 1(2), 17(l) and 27(2) ACHR; Art. 1 8(l)(2) 
of the ACHPR; Arts 15 and 16 ( Art. 16 states that a child of young age should not be separated 
from his mother) of the Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1988; Art. 16 of the CRC. 
92 F. Volio, 'Legal Personality, Privacy, and the Family, ' at p. 201. 
93 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 19, 'Protection of the Family, the Right to 
Marriage and Equality to the Spouses (Art. 23)' 27/07/90, para. 5 states that the right to found a 
family means also the 'possibility to live together; ' this implies the 'adoption of appropriate 
measures, ... to ensure 
the unity or reunification of families, particularly when their members are 
separated for political, economic or similar reasons. 
' 
94 Tas v. Turkey, 24396/94 Judgment of 14 November 2000, paras. 
68,72. 
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disappearance on the next of kin, may make a family member victim of the 
violation of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 95 
In a situation of systematic enforced disappearances, this can include 
cases even without any evidence as to the initial arrest of IDPs. The absence of 
evidence as to the disappearance of an IDP in an internal armed conflict, such as 
in cases of enforced disappearance, effects of hostilities or recruitment into the 
armed groups or paramilitary, does not alter the obligation of the state to 
investigate into the fate and whereabouts of the missing IDP. The family member 
who complains about the alleged disappearance of an IDP can also be 
regarded as a victim of cruel and inhuman treatment, even in such grey cases of 
disappearances. Because in Cakici v. Turkey the European Court emphasised that, 
'the essence of such a violation does not so much lie in the fact of the 
"disappearance" of the family member but rather concerns the authorities' 
reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention. It is 
especially in respect of the latter that a family member may claim directly to be a 
victim of the authorities' conduct. ' 96 Moreover, search for the disappeared and 
for the identities of the abducted children can also be considered a form 
of reparation namely, satisfaction to IDP victims. 97 
Though the international instruments of human rights do not contain an 
express right of reunification of displaced families, since family unit is entitled 
to protection from the State and society in terms of Article 23(l) of the ICCPR, 
it is imperative on the part of the State to take positive measures to protect the 
individual right to have and enjoy the integrity of the family. '98 
An obligation to reunite the families temporarily separated when children 
are involved is provided in Additional Protocol 11 of 1977.99 However, it only 
requires the parties to the conflict to take 'appropriate steps' 'to facilitate' the 
95 Quinteros v. Uruguay No. 10711981, CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981(21 July 1983) 
para. 14; Bamaca Velasquez Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (November 
25 2000) para. 165; Tas v. Turkey, para. 79. 
96 Application no. 23657/94, judgment of 8 July 1999, para. 98; confirmed in Tas v. Turkey para. 79 
97 Principle 22( c) of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Annex to the Human Rights Resolution of the Commission on 
Human Rights 2005/35 (19 April 2005). 
98 F. Volio, 'Legal Personality, Privacy, and the Family, ' at p. 20 1; also see, L. Rao Perma, 'Legal 
Problems Relating to Reunification of Families Dispersed as a Result of Armed Conflicts', 1998, 
Year Book ofInternational Institute ofHumanitarian Law, San Remo, at p. 14 1. 
99 Art. 4(3)(b) of Additional Protocol 11 ; Art. 74 of Additional Protocol I explicitly provides for 
an obligation to reunite families dispersed as a result of anned conflict. 
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reunion of families rather than imposing an absolute obligation. 100 Other than 
that, Article 8 of Additional Protocol 11 covers the search for wounded and sick 
IDPs. Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol II does not provide for non-separation 
of family members during relocation by a party to the conflict. 101 It is only during 
internment or detention that parties are required to accommodate the family 
together and the internees must be allowed to remain in contact with their families 
through correspondence. 102 Moreover, when displaced mothers having young 
children are arrested or detained or interned for reasons related to the conflict, there 
is no provision to decide their case with the 'utmost priority' for the sake of 
physical and mental well being of such children. 103 
Apart from the above discussed specific obligations, Additional Protocol 11 
does not contain either a general obligation to reunite the families dispersed by 
armed conflicts' 04 or a right to know the fate of those displaced civilians 
missing during armed conflicts. 105 However, both these obligations have the 
customary status in internal armed conflict. 106 In addition to the customary status 
of the obligation to reunite families in humanitarian law, it is a rule of customary 
international law that family members shall not be separated in situations of 
relocation carried out in terms of Article 17 (1) of Additional Protocol 11.107 
It is to be noted in this regard that Article 4(3)(e) of Additional Protocol 
II, which provides for temporary removal of children from an area where hostilities 
are taking place to a safer area within the country whenever possible with the 
consent of the parents, is in conflict with the provision in Additional Protocol 11 
which requires reunification of temporarily separated families, as 'children taken 
away from their families but in places of safety may suffer more in psycho-social 
terms than those who remain with their families but at greater risk. ' 108 Such a 
100 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 642. 
101 But see Article 49(3) of the IV Geneva Convention of 1948. 
102 Art. 5(2)(a)(b) of Additional Protocol 11. 
Such an obligation is provided in international armed conflict, Art. 76(2) of Additional Protocol 
104 See Art. 26 of IV Geneva Convention of 1948 and Art. 74 of Additional Protocol I for such 
obligations in international anned conflicts. 
105 See Arts. 32 and 33 of Additional Protocol I for such a right in international armed conflict. 
106 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rules. 105 
and 117, at pp. 3 79-3 83 and 421-427. 107 Ibid., Rule 13 1, at pp. 463-65. 
108 F. J. Hampson, Legal Protection Afforded to Children, at p. 5 5, para. 7.5. 
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measure is not viable and conducive to the best interest of the children concerned, 
or family reunification in a conflict fought on ethnic lines. 
As family reunification and tracing family members and correspondence 
between interned IDPs exists in customary humanitarian law obligations of the 
state can be used to flesh out the corresponding rights of the IDPs under human 
rights law. Due to the crucial nature of family reunification in internal armed 
conflicts, the broad right of IDPs to family-reunification in the UN Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement is warranted. 109 
E. Subsistence and Other Basic Needs and the Humanitarian Assistance 
I. Human Rights Law 
Displacement often causes food crisis to IDPs who are within the relocation 
camps or are in outside, due to destruction of houses and farms, or abandoned 
crops and livestock, and deprivation of other income generating sources. The 
ensuing vulnerability, coupled with overcrowded shelter, poor quality of sanitation 
and safe water and reduced access to healthcare facilities may cause 
epidemics and other physical and mental health hazards. " 0 Protection of IDPs 
is thus meaningless without material assistance such as food, water, clothing, 
shelter and services such as medical care and sanitation essential for the 
survival of IDPs during their displacement. In addition, adequate measures to 
be taken to ensure IDPs of their basic needs such as housing, continuation 
of education for the children and assistance to resettle or return of IDPs to their 
homes with the agreement of the parties to the conflict. III 
In other words, providing assistance to IDPs is part of providing protection 
to them, as it is one of the components of protection which includes physical and 
material protection. Therefore, treating protection and assistance as two different 
109 Principles 17 and 16(l)(2); Article 7 of the ILA Declaration on IDPs merely states that the 
IDPs are entitled to the right to family reunification. 
110 X. Leus et al., Internally Displaced Persons, (2001) 16 Pre hospital and Disaster Medicine, 
p. 75, at p. 76 (http: //www. reliefweb. int); it is in such circumstances, Angola in April 1999 
experienced the largest polio epidemic in Africa, Ibid., at pp. 76-77. 
111 See M. Cottier, 'Attacks on Humanitarian Assistance or Peacekeeping Missions' in 0. Triffierer, 
Commentary on the Rome Statute p. 187, at p. 190 for return and resettlement measures as a form 
of humanitarian assistance; Committee on ICESCR, Concluding Observations: Sudan, 
E/C. 12/l/Add. 48 (I September 2000) para. 37. 
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notions is mis eading. 112 As a derivative of sovereignty, the primary obligation to 
provide survival needs for its nationals in internal armed conflicts, whether in 
the territory within its control or in the control of insurgents, rests with the 
government party to the conflict. ' 13 
Problems of providing survival needs to IDPs can anse generally in 
three situations: the first two situations occur in the context of availability of 
indispensable provisions to a party to the conflict. In such a situation, firstly, a 
party which has control of IDPs can deliberately deny them any supplies. 
Secondly, one of the parties to the conflict may be willing to provide indispensable 
provisions for the survival of IDPs but due to the obstruction of the opposition 
party, be unable to supply them. Thirdly, parties to the conflict may not have 
adequate indispensable provisions. 
The material deprivation of IDPs brings heightened subsistence needs 
and therefore it is important to discuss the scope of the economic and 
social rights to survival needs, as opposed to a discretionary response of the 
state on humanitarian grounds. This is important because it is often held that 
economic and social rights are not 'justiciable' to be invoked in the court of law in 
their violations. 1 14 Here the IDPs concerned are both those who are within the 
state controlled part of the territory, whether within or outside the IDP camps and 
settlements and those within the rebel held areas of the territory. 
This is because, unlike humanitarian law which obliges each party to the 
conflict to provide assistance to certain categories of civilians within its control, 
human rights law more explicitly imposes the obligation primarily on the state to 
provide the core needs of IDPs, regardless of whether they are within the territory 
under its control or not. ' 15 In this regard Article I1 (1) of the ICESCR recognises 
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living including 'adequate food, 
112 Thus an approach which treats assistance and protection as two sides of the same coin by the 
ICRC cannot be Justified as assistance is a form of protection, see ICRC, Assistance: General 
Introduction (htlp: //w-%vw. icrc. org); Speech by Dr. J. Kellenberger, 'The Relevance of International 
Humanitarian Law in Contemporary Armed Conflicts', CAHDI (2004)27,28 th Meeting, Strasbourg, 
13-14 September 2004, Meeting Report, Appendix IV, at p. 35 (hllp: //www. coe. int) 
states, that [flor the ICRC, protection and assistance activities are very closely 
linked. They are in 
fact the two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing each other. ' 
113 Article 2(l) of the ICCPR; Article 2 of the ICESCR. 
114 M. Scheinin, 'Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights' in A. Eide et al. (eds. ), Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights, 2 nd ed., (Netherlands, 2001) at p. 29. 
115 D. Schindler, 'Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Interference and International Law' in 
R. St. j. Macdonald (ed. ), Essays in Honour of Hang Tieya (Hague, 1994) p. 689, at p. 695 
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clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions, ' and 
Article 11(2) the 'fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger. "" Article 
12(l) of the same recognises every one's entitlement to the 'highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health. " 17 Right to education is stated in Articles 
13 and 14 of the ICESCR. 118 The fact that these rights (except for limitations) are 
not subject to derogatory measures during a public emergency does not seem to 
make much difference in the effectiveness of their protective functions in terms of 
Article 2(l) of the ICESCR, as the implementation is not immediate but of a 
progressive nature, depending on the State party's 'available resources. '] 19 As 
such, this seems to allow states to avoid these obligations by recourse to 
the claim of lack of resources as a result of armed conflicts. If so, this would have 
major humanitarian impact on IDPs who have been materially deprived by 
displacement. 
However, by recognising the core content of economic and social 
rights it can be underscored that certain aspects of these rights cannot be 
realized progressively but should be provided in an immediate manner. 120 
Therefore, if any significant number of IDPs is deprived of 'essential foodstuffs, 
of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic 
forms of education' it can be stated that the state party is failing to discharge its 
minimum core obligations under the Covenant. 12 1 The obligation to ensure 
116 Art. 25(l) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article XI of the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man Article 12 of the 1988 Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; Articles 24 and 27 of the CRC; for the implicit recognition of right to food and right 
to housing or shelter in the ACHPR, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the 
Centerfor Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, paras. 58-69. 
117 Similarly, Art. 25(l) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. II of the European 
Social Charter; Art. 16 of the ACHPR; Article XI of the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man; Art. 10 of the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ; Article 5(e)(IV) of the CERD; Arts. 
II (I) (f) and 12 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women; Article 24 of the CRC. 
118 Art. 28 of the CRC; Art. XIl of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the 
Man; Art. 13 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Article 17 of the ACHPR- 
I" Committee on the ICESCR See General Comment No. 14, 'The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health', E/C. 12/2000/4 (11 August 2000) para. 28 with regard to Art. 4 of the 
ICESCR. 
nd 120 B. Toebes, 'The Right to Health' in A. Eide et al. (eds. ), Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 2 
ed., (Netherlands, 2001) p. 169, at p. 176. 
121 committee on ICESCR, General Comment No. 3, 'The Nature of States Parties Obligations' 
(Art. 2.1) (14/12/1990) para. 10. 
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these rights without discrimination is an obligation with immediate effect. 122 
Therefore, IDPs cannot be discriminated against on the basis of their 
displacement or other grounds as stated in the non-discrimination clause 
which contains a non-exhaustive list of grounds. 123 These core obligations 
are non-derogable in any situations or difficulties including armed 
conflicts. 124 A state party that deliberately denies these basic needs to IDPs 
to IDPs would be in violation of its obligations under Article 11,12,13 
and 14 of the ICESCR. 
The international humanitarian law obligations can be resorted to as 
lex specialis with regard to certain aspects of these rights to derive some core 
obligations to be adhered in internal armed conflicts. 125 It should be 
bome in mind that the obligations of a state with regard to socioeconomic 
rights are broader than the humanitarian law obligations concerning treatment 
of IDPs and are not subject to derogation during internal armed conflicts. 
Therefore, limiting the core obligations under the socioeconomic rights to 
provision of emergency relief to IDPs would be inconsistent with the raison 
d'&re of these rights as a medium or long term measure. ' 26 
'Available resources' includes both resources existing in the state and 
those available through the international community and thus any humanitarian 
assistance by international humanitarian organisations. Even if such resources are 
inadequate, 'the obligation remains for a State party to ensure the widest possible 
enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing conditions, ' to use its 
'available resources' as a matter of 'priority' to fulfil those core obligations, over 
other issues. 1 27 Such an approach would enable the IDP to assert a right against 
122 Ibid., para. 1. 123 Art. 2(l) of the ICESCR. 
124 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ' para. 47; 'The 
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (1998)20 HRQ 69 1, 
at p. 695, para. 9. 
125 See for instance, Committee on ICESCR, General Comment No. 15, 'The Right to Water' paras. 
21 and 22 and nn. 20 and 21 the Committee on ICESCR states that the obligation to respect the 
right to water during armed conflicts includes humanitarian law obligations including prohibition 
of destruction of objects indispensable for survival of civilians including drinking water 
installations. 
126 S. Leckie, 'Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (1998)20 HRQ 81, at p. 102. 
127 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Nature of States Parties Obligations' paras. 13,11,10; 'The 
Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights' (1987) 9 HRQ 122, at p. 126, Principles 21-28; 'The Maastricht Guidelines' at p. 
695, paras. 9 and 10. 
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the state. However, recognising the core content does not in any way render the 
implementation of the other elements not covered in the core as 'indefinite' 
obligations, as states should endeavour to 'move as expeditiously and effectively 
as possible towards the goal' for full realization of the rights. 128 Due to the non- 
derogable nature of these rights, the state has to take steps with international 
assistance towards the full realization of these rights for the protection of IDPs 
in a 'protracted' internal armed conflict. 'Failure to utilize the maximum of 
available resources towards the full realization of the Covenant' can 
constitute a violation of the right concerned. 129 
The personal effort within the capacity of the individual is a precondition 
for the realization of adequate standard of living. 130 This depends on the effective 
use of the individual's own property or working capacity. 131 'State obligations are 
intended to supplement personal efforts whenever needed. ' 132 Since IDPs are 
deprived of their income generating resources or work due to displacement or 
restriction of freedom of movement from the IDP camps or settlements to find 
work or to cultivate their farms or to go to sea to carry out their traditional work 
such as fishing, they are not in a position to ensure their right to an adequate 
standard of living. The rationale for providing the basic survival needs for IDPs is 
that IDPs in camps and temporary shelters, or wounded and sick, are not in a 
position to take effective measures on their own to attain 'adequate food, ' or 
shelter or other basic survival needs for reasons beyond their control; States 
therefore have the obligation to provide them directly with the basic survival 
needs to be free from hunger and want of other basic survival needs. This has to 
continue until the conditions in which they can obtain their own entitlements such 
as property are established and /or employment is obtained. 133 
With regard to the right to adequate housing, the state has the core 
obligation to facilitate 'self-help' to IDPs, as an affected group, for basic shelter, 
128 Committee on ICESCR, ibid., para. 9; B. Toebes, Right to Health, at p. 176 
129 'The Maastricht Guidelines', para. 15( e). (emphasis added). 
130 A. Eide, 'The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food' in A. Eide et 
al. (eds. ), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2 nd ed. (Netherlands, 2001)p. 133, atp. 139. 131 Ibid. 
132 A. Eide, ibid., at pp. 139-40, states that, 'State obligations are intended to supplement personal 
efforts whenever needed. ' 
133 Ibid., at p. 145; Principle 18 of the LN Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement affirms the 
right to an adequate standard of living of IDPs and the obligation of the authorities to provide them 
with the basic survival needs; see Dogan and Others v. Turkey, application nos. 8803-8811/02, 
8813/02 and 8815-8819/02, judgment of 29 June 2004, paral 54. 
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which in an internal armed conflict situation often means a temporary one. 134 The 
creation of IDP camps or settlements is also part of this obligation of the state to 
provide basic shelter. However, in the long term, the state has the obligation to 
provide durable housing in fulfilment of the right to adequate housing so as to 
facilitate IDPs' integration, resettlement or return. As discussed above, core 
obligations cannot replace the full realization of the right. it is not only a right to 
an adequate standard of living including adequate housing but also a right to the 
4continuous improvement of living conditions. ' 135 In this context, the observation 
of the Committee on ICESCR on Sri Lanka is pertinent as it urged the 
government to 'seek further international assistance in its efforts to provide 
permanent housing to displaced persons who have been living in "temporary" 
shelters since the war began 15 years ago. ' 136 
As the rights of the ICESCR are based on the 'inherent dignity of human 
person, ' 'housing' should be interpreted in a manner taking into consideration a 
variety of factors, including the homeless situation of IDPs. 137 Such housing, as 
opposed to a basic shelter, contains in itself adequate security, adequate privacy, 
space and adequate ventilation, which is important for the IDPs generally and in 
particularly for the more vulnerable such as female headed IDP families, children, 
elderly and disabled IDPs to live in dignity. 138 This means, the return in safety and 
dignity to their homes or places of habitual residence or resettlement and 
integration elsewhere is necessary in the medium and long term, rather than 
living in mere basic shelter in IDP camps or settlements as short term emergency 
relief 139 
The right to 'adequate food' in Article I1 (1) which is derived from the 
general right to an 'adequate standard of living' goes beyond the provision of 
basic survival needs and has to be realized progressively. 140 The core obligation 
134 Committee on ICESCR, General Comment No. 4, 'The Right to Adequate Housing, Art. I l(l)' 
(13/12/9 1) paras. 10,11. 
135 Article I l(l) of the ICESCR. 
136 Committee on ICESCR, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, E/C. 12/ I /Add. 24 ( 16 June 
1998), para. 22. 
137 Committee on ICES CR, 'The Right to Adequate Housing, ' para. 7. 
138 See ibid, 
139 Ibid., para. 7 states that right to housing 'should not be interpreted in a narrow or restricted 
sense which equates it with, for example, the shelter provided 
by merely a roof over one's head... . 
Rather it should be seen as a right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity. ' 
140 Committee on ICESCR, General Comment No. 12, 'The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11)' 
E/C - 12/1999/5 
(12 May 1999) para. 6. 
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of Article I1 (1) which is stated in Article 11(2) of ICESCR imposes obligations 
on states to take 'immediate and urgent steps' to 'mitigate and alleviate' hunger 
even in times of 'natural or other disasters. 141 Therefore this relates to the basic 
survival needs. As the immediate obligation to ensure freedom from hunger 
is not an end in itself in the realization of the right to food, the state has an 
'immediate and continuous obligation to move as expeditiously as possible 
towards the full realization of the right to food, particularly for the vulnerable 
population groups and individuals' including IDPs in the medium and long 
term. 142 Related to right to food and health is the right to water, which is 
indispensable for survival and to lead a dignified human life. It can also be 
considered as a right since the word 'including' in the right to an adequate standard 
of living indicates that the catalogue of rights stated therein is not exhaustive. 143 
To ensure the right of access to water and water facilities and services to 
disadvantaged or marginalized groups which includes IDPs is a core obligation. 144 
Likewise, where the right to health is concerned, IDPs are, as a minimum, to be 
ensured access to 'basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of 
safe and potable water'; nutritionally adequate safe food; and 'health facilities, 
goods and services' on a non-discriminatory basis. 145 
Hunger or undernourishment 'refer to an insufficient supply or, at 
worst, a complete lack of calories. ' 146 The obligation of the state in this regard 
to IDPs is explicitly stated by the Committee on ICESCR. For instance, the 
Concluding Observations of the Committee with regard to Sri Lanka is 
pertinent: '[t]he results of an independent survey which estimated the incidence of 
undernourishment of women and children living in temporary shelters to be as high 
as 70 per cent, and by reports that in many cases food assistance did not reach the 
intended beneficiaries. ' 147 Therefore the Committee recommended the 
government to ensure that the IDPs 'actually receive the assistance. ' 148 
141 Ibid., paras. 1,6 and 17 ; M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Oxford, 1995) at pp. 3 06-7. 
142 A. Eide, 'The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food' at p. 13 9. 
143 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to Water' para. 3. 
144Ibid., para. 37 (b). 
145committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to Highest Attainable Standard of Health', para. 43. 
146 Report by the Special Rapporteur, Right to Food, E/CN. 4/2001/53 (7 Feb 200 1), para. 16. 
147 E/C - 12/1 
/Add. 24 ( 16 June 1998) at para. 7. 
148jbid., para. 22. 
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There are no explicit provisions in ICESR that protect disabled and older 
IDPs unlike in the international humanitarian law provisions as Article 5(l)(a) and 
(b) of the Protocol 11 of 1977 protect them as wounded and sick and to provide 
them food, drinking water, safeguards as to health and hygiene clothing and shelter 
as protection against rigours of the climate as internees. 149 As displacement 
excessively affects the disabled and older IDPs, this is a serious lapse in their 
protection as one of the most vulnerable categories of IDPs. 150 Although 
protection of basic survival needs to those IDPs whose liberty has been 
restricted or who have been relocated by the order of the state or wounded and 
sick is recognised as a minimum by customary humanitarian law, 151 the 
obligation of the state to provide food as a basic survival need in human rights law 
is much broader, as it obliges the state to provide food even to those IDPs who are 
displaced by the effects of hostilities as opposed to those who have been 
relocated by the state. 
It is pertinent in this regard to consider the issue whether the right of the 
IDPs to be free from hunger includes the right to be free from malnutrition. 
Malnutrition is characterized by the deficiency of vitamins and minerals, of food 
which otherwise contain sufficient calories. 152 The core content of the right to 
food and health recognises that to be free from hunger means that everyone 
should have access to 'sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe' food .1 
53 
According to the Committee on ICESCR, Article 11(2) of the ICESCR 'more 
immediate and urgent steps may be needed to ensure "the fundamental right to 
freedom from hunger and malnutrition. "' 154 This indicates the converging nature 
of health and food concerning the concept of nutrition and the core obligation of 
149Explicit protection is provided in other human rights instruments, Art. 23 CRC; Art. 18(4) of the 
ACHPR; Art. 18 of the Additional Protocol to the ACHR. 
150 But see for the view which requires for high priority in protection for such people within 
the general provisions of the ICESCR, see Committee on ICESCR, General Comment 
No. 5, 'Persons with Disabilities' (09/12/94)General Comment No. 6, 'The Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights of Older Persons' (08/12/95). 
15 1 Arts. 17(l), 5(l)(b)(c), (2)(d), and 7(2) of Additional Protocol II; compare these with Art.. 5(3) 
of Additional Protocol 11; J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Rule 118 at pp. 428-43 1, Rule 131 at pp. 463-465 and Rule I 10 at pp. 400- 
403 respectively. 
152 Report by the Special Rapporteur, Right to Food, E/CN. 4/2001/53 (7 Feb 200 1), para. 16, 
153Committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to Adequate Food' para. 14; Committee on ICESCR, 'The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ' para. 43(b). 
154committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to Adequate Food' para. 1. 
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the state to take measures to alleviate hunger in situations of internal 
displacement by internal armed conflicts. 155 
Instructive in this regard is the humanitarian law obligations of the 
detaining state as to the civilian internees in international armed conflict as it 
requires that the daily food rations provided to them 'shall be sufficient in 
quantity, quality and variety to keep internees in a good state of health and 
prevent the development of nutritional deficiencies. ' 156 If to this extent the 
social rights concerning alien civilian internees are protected in the form of 
obligations of the detaining state, there is every justification to reinforce 
such social rights to the citizens in terms of right to freedom from hunger in 
peace as well as armed conflict situations to include nutritionally adequate 
food in quality and quantity. 157 
However, particular categories of IDPs such as children and women in 
particular expectant and nursing mothers are more vulnerable than others. As 
far as children between birth and their age five are concerned, these vitamins 
and minerals are essential, as deficiency will have an impact on such children as 
a 'hidden hunger' and will cause the children to 'suffer from stunted growth, 
infections and other disabilities. ' 158 As such, it is important to regard malnutrition 
as part of hunger, which however also includes undernourishment, and to provide 
nutritious food in particular to more vulnerable IDPs. This can be illustrated by the 
recommendation of the Committee on ICESCR to the government of Sri Lanka 
which states that, 'the government reassess the food assistance programme already 
in place in affected areas with the view to improving the nutritional standards of 
the food provided, particularly to children and expectant and nursing mothers. ' 159 
Therefore freedom from hunger means not merely the provision of sufficient 
basic food, but adequate in terms of nutrition. 
If so, a priority in supply and accessibility of nutritionally adequate 
food to children is essential, to protect this vulnerable group of IDPs, due to the 
155 Ibid., para. 6. 
156 Article 89 of the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War of 1949. 
157 T. Jasudowicz, 'The Legal Character of Social Rights From the Perspective of International 
Law as a Whole' at p. '19. 
158 Report by the Special Rapporteur, Right to Food, E/CN. 4/2001/53 (7 February 2001), paras. 16, 
47. 
159 EIC - 12/1 
/Add. 24 ( 16 June 1998) para. 22. 
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scarcity and high demand for such food in internal armed conflicts. Providing 
nutritious food at least to reduce malnutrition in children has been regarded as part 
of the positive obligations of the right to life for the reason that in extreme 
situations, even if children have food with sufficient calories, a lack of 
minerals can be life threatening. The Human Rights Committee, in recognising 
the positive obligation of a state with regard to the right to life, considered that it 
'would be desirable for States Parties to take all possible measures to reduce 
infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to 
eliminate malnutrition and epidemics. ' 160 However as it considers these measures 
as 'desirable' rather than obligatory, failure to take such measures does not 
necessarily violate Article 6(l) of the ICCPR to make States internationally 
accountable. This makes such a broad view illusory, especially in internal 
armed conflicts where displaced children are physically and mentally vulnerable. 
Since deaths can be a reasonably foreseeable result in such situations, states 
are legally obliged to take positive measures to prevent malnutrition and 
epidemics to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life. Therefore obligation of the 
state to prevent arbitrary deprivation life arises not only against the acts of 
third parties but also in situations such as internal displacement. 
The view of the Human Rights Committee may have been based on the 
ground that the entitlement for right to life of IDPs is concerned with 
'arbitrary' deprivation of life, and malnutrition and epidemics are not arbitrary 
unless such a result leading to death is deliberately pursued by the policy of 
the state. 16 1 This view starkly differs from the broader one adopted by the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights which explicitly considered that the right to 
life includes, 
not only the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life 
arbitrarily, but also the right that he will not be prevented from having access to the 
conditions that guarantee a dignified existence. States have the obligation to 
guarantee the creation of the conditions required in order that violations of this 
160 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6, 'The Right to Life (Art. 6)' (30/04/82), 
para. 5. 
16 1 Human Rights Committee has considered such measures as socio-economic rights under 
Article 26 of the ICCPR, see below, n. 191 ; Y. Dinstein, 'The Right to Life, Physical 
Integrity, and Liberty' in L. Henkin(ed. ), L. Henkin (ed. ), The International Bill of Rights: The 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( New York, 198 1) p. 114, at pp. 115-116 is of the 
opinion that right to life is strictly a civil right which emphasizes only the arbitrary 
deprivation of life and does not guarantee the survival needs as they are social rights 
recognised in Articles II and 12 of the ICESCR. 
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basic right do not occur and, in particular, the duty to prevent its agents from 
violating it. ' 
62 
In this case the Court stressed the conceptualization of right to life as belonging 
to the domain not only of civil and political rights but also economic, social and 
cultural rights. 163 Therefore, the person may be deprived of the right to life, not 
only by causing death directly by unlawful acts of homicide or deliberate 
deprivation of humanitarian assistance to IDPs but also by not taking 
measures to avoid circumstances that lead to deaths, such as starvation. 164 
Taking positive measures to ensure the right to existence is important with regard 
to 'vulnerable and defenceless persons, in situation of risk. ' 165 As, generally IDPs 
and in particular, IDP children are vulnerable to malnutrition and epidemics due 
to the very nature of displacement and to the scarcity and difficulties of access to 
basic needs in internal armed conflicts, the state party has the obligation to ensure 
the creation of conditions to prevent or to reduce violations of the right to life by 
providing the basic survival needs for IDPs to live in dignity. 
Similarly, the CRC considers the core content of the right to food and 
health as part of the right to life. Taking positive measures as part of the right to 
life of children is recognised in the CRC which obliges the States Parties to 
ensure 'to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the 
child. ý 166 This can be interpreted as including provision of 'medical assistance' and 
'nutritious foods and clean drinking water' to combat disease and malnutrition as 
part of the right to life. 167 Such an approach can be supported due to the extreme 
vulnerability of children, in particular, IDP children to hunger, malnutrition and 
childhood diseases. ' 68 
162 Villagran Morales et al. ( the 'Street Children' Case) Judgment of 19 November 1999, Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 63, para. 144. 
163 Ibid., Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges A. A. Cancado Trindade and A. Abreu-Burelli, para. 4; 
this view can be supported by crimes against humanity of extermination and genocide, see below. 
164 Ibid., see para. 3. 
165 Ibid., para. 4. 
166 Art. 6(2) of the CRC. 
167 Art. 24(2)(b), (c) of the CRC. 
168 , Wherever it occurs, displacement has a profound physical, emotional and developmental 
impact on children and increases their vulnerability. ' Graca Machel, The Impact ofArmed Conflict 
on Children A/51/306. Add. 1 (6 September 1996) http: //www. un. org/special-rep/children-an-ned- 
conflict/KeyDocuments/Pnntable/Report/... ; in Somalia, in 1992, many children under fi%, e died 
due to hunger or diseases resulting from malnutrition, Report by the Special Rapporteur, Right to 
Food, E/CN. 4/2001/53(7 February 200 1) para. 74. 
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As the CRC is applicable even during armed conflict situations, it could 
fill the gap in the protection of IDP children as lex specialis. Moreover the core 
content of the right to health of the CRC gives priority to the health care of 
pregnant women and children; immunization against major infectious diseases; and 
treatment and control of epidemic diseases. Therefore a State party has the legal 
obligation to give priority in access to basic survival needs supply to IDP children 
and pregnant women who are prone to life threatening malnutrition and epidemics 
in armed conflict situations. 169 
Right to receive education of IDP children is affected in internal 
conflicts due to high tuition fees, lack of documentation to access schools and lack 
of schools within the geographical location of IDPs and destruction of schools. 170 
In this regard failure of a state to provide compulsory primary education free to 
all IDPs and failure to take measures to address de facto educational 
discrimination to IDPs can be considered as violations of right to education 
during internal armed conflicts. 171 
With regard to the above discussed core contents of rights to adequate 
food, housing, health and education out of three obligations, namely, to respect, 
fUl f 1,172 protect and I the obligation of the state to fulfil is relevant with regard to 
IDPs as they are for reasons beyond their control unable to enjoy such rights 
and therefore need to be provided with them directly including through 
international assistance. 173 This means that whenever the state is unable to provide 
food and medical assistance due to lack of resources or unable to reach those 
IDPs in rebel held areas, it has an obligation to seek 'international co-operation 
and assistance' such as humanitarian assistance to provide the IDPs with basic 
survival needs. 174 The realization of the core contents of these rights 'to the 
maximum of its available resources' means to cover both resources existing 
169 Also see Art. 19 and Art. 27(l) of the 1ACHR as to protection of children which are non- 
derogable during public emergency. 
170 Report of the Representative, F. M. Deng, Profiles in Displacement: Indonesia, 
E/CN. 4/2002/95/Add. 2 (15 February 2002) para. 24; Committee on CRC, Concluding 
Observations: Burundi, CRC/C/1 5/Add. 133 (16 October 2000) paras. 64,65. 
171 Committee on ICESCR, General Comment 13, 'The right to Education' E/C. 12/1999/10 (8 
December 1999) para. 59. 
172 E. Eide, 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights' in A. Eide et al. (eds. ), 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 2 nd ed., (Netherlands, 2001) p. 9, at p. 23 
173 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Nature of States Parties Obligations' para. 13 
174 Arts. 1 l(l), 2(l), 23 of the ICESCR. 
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within the state and available from the international community. 175 Therefore 
the state need not wait until it receives an offer from an international 
organisation, but has to take initiatives to receive such assistance, which is a much 
broader obligation than the one in humanitarian law. For instance, the Committee 
on ICESCR recommended such a measure with regard to Sri Lanka: 'Mechanisms 
should be established to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance and to 
strictly monitor and ensure that the intended recipients actually receive the 
assistance. In particular, the government should seek further international 
assistance in its efforts to provide permanent housing to displaced persons who 
have been living in "temporary shelters" since the war began 15 years ago-5176 
A state claiming inability to carry out its core obligation due to the lack of 
resources or in accessing the IDPs within the rebel held areas, has the burden of 
proving that international support has been sought unsuccessfully to ensure 
availability and accessibility of food, shelter and other basic necessities. 177 This 
means, any arbitrary refusal to accept such an offer may be regarded as deliberate 
4retrogressive measures' which must be justified by the state, 'by reference to the 
totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use 
of the maximum available resources. ' 178 If a state refuses to accept the offer of 
an international humanitarian organisation to provide the IDPs with basic 
necessities without valid reasons, in extreme circumstances, it may be considered 
as in violation of its obligations to respect under Article 2(l) of the ICESCR with 
regard to the right concerned. 179To the extent of the obligation of the state to 
provide the basic survival needs including by seeking the international assistance, 
the IDPs have a right to request and receive the protection of humanitarian 
assistance from national authorities. 180 
In most instances, the problem is not the unavailability of the resources 
but the deliberate policy of the state to deny them to IDPs within the area under 
its control in IDP camps or settlements or scattered outside or to those displaced 
within the rebel held areas. Where providing internal and international assistance 
175 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Nature of States Parties Obligations' para. 13. 
176 E/C. 12/1 /Add. 24 ( 16 June 1998), para. 22. 
177 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to Adequate Food' para. 17; Committee on ICESCR, 'The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ' para. 45. 
178 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Nature of States Parties Obligations' para. 9. 
179 See, ibid, para. 10. 
180 Principle 3(2) of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
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in this context, the humanitarian law obligations of the state can be used as lex 
specialis to specify the minimum obligations of the state under human rIghts law 
to the extent it overlaps with the core obligations of human rights, as the latter 
does not contain any explicit obligations to respect as to access and supply of 
food and medical assistance to IDPs in armed conflicts. This means the state 
should refrain from: taking measures that would deprive IDPs from access to 
food and health care; ' 81 using starvation as a method of combat on discriminatory 
grounds against IDPs in order to deprive them of such subsistence needs. This 
includes 'the prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in internal conflicts or 
other emergency situations' to particular groups; 182 depriving IDPs from their 
lands and properties which are used as income generating sources by destruction 
or other methods to make them useless or forcible eviction; providing 
discriminatory and delayed medical care to IDPs; and attacking relief and medical 
supplies, transportation and personnel of international humanitarian organisations 
which provide assistance to IDPs. 183 
With regard to the education of IDP children, international humanitarian 
law is relevant to indicate the core obligations of the right to education in the 
ICESCR in internal armed conflict as Article 4(3) (a) of Additional Protocol 11 
obliges the parties to the conflict to provide education to children and customary 
humanitarian law prohibits attack on civilian objects including schools. 
Apart from the context of socio-economic rights, deliberate withholding 
of food and medical assistance to civilians in the IDP camps by the state 
party in areas under its control and in the rebel held areas to cause starvation; 
and refusal to evacuate the wounded and sick from areas of siege can be a 
violation of the right against arbitrary deprivation of life. Furthermore, 
deliberately starving the civilian population inter alia., by destruction of objects 
indispensable for the survival of civilians or deliberate omission to sent 
humanitarian assistance to IDPs, and obstruction of humanitarian assistance to the 
affected civilian population, can also be considered as violations of right against 
arbitrary deprivation of life by the humanitarian law rules as lex specialis. 
181 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ' para. 34; see 
Principles 24-27 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
182 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to Adequate Food, ' para. 19. 
183 A. Eide, 'The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food' at pp. 142- 
143. 
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Inclusion of such deaths within the scope of the right to life can be justified on 
the basis of crimes against humanity of exten-nination, persecution, apartheid and 
184 genocide as they are wider in scope to include killings by less direct means. 
Crimes against humanity of extermination can be committed by killing or 
by subjection to conditions of life such as 'deprivation of access to food and 
medicine calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population' who 
need not necessarily share a common link as in persecution. 185 Therefore mass 
killings of IDPs in camps by deliberate deprivation of basic survival needs would 
constitute extermination. 
Large scale killing of IDPs which constitutes genocide is a specific form 
of violation of their right to life. It can be by a direct act of 'killing' or in a less 
direct way by deliberately inflicting conditions of life such as to physically 
destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group 'with intent to destroy, in 
whole or part. ' 186 The less direct ways can include depriving civilians of 'resources 
indispensable for their survival, such as food or medical services, or systematic 
expulsion from homes. ' 187 However, as genocide differs from simple homicide, 
intent to physically destroy a group of civilians is adequate and the result of 
such acts is not relevant. 188 Therefore, mere infliction of such conditions of life 
on IDPs in rebel held territories or those in IDP camps, such as imposition of 
embargo on food, medicines and other essential items and denying or impeding 
access to IDPs by any humanitarian organisations to provide assistance, with the 
intention to destroy them physically an ethnical, racial or religious group may 
constitute genocide. 
Moreover, deprivation from shelter and livelihood can constitute inhuman 
treatment in internal armed conflicts. 189 Therefore, large number of IDP children 
living in regroupment camps and in extremely difficult conditions in many 
situations, constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 190 The significance 
184 See generally, C. Rottensteiner, 'The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance as a Crime Under 
International Law' (1999) No. 835 IRRC 555. 
185 Art. 7(2)(b) of the Statute of the ICC. 
186 Akayesu, Trial Chamber, para. 505. 
187 Elements of Crimes, at p. 7, n. 4, however, such methods are not exhaustive. 
188 M. Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, at p. 407; to this effect see Elements 
of Crimes, at p. 7. 
189 Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, paras. 79-80; Bilgin v. Turkey, para. 103; 
Dulas v. Turkey, para. 55. 
190 Committee on CRC, Concluding Observations: Burundi, CRC/C/ I 5/Add. 133 (16 October 
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of treating such violations under the civil and political rights, namely, right to life, 
right against inhuman treatment, right to be fee from arbitrary interference with 
family and home, is that they can provide an alternative implementation 
mechanism in the absence of individual communication procedure to the ICESCR. 
In addition, Article 26 of the ICCPR can provide an independent right to non- 
discrimination through which any rights not included in the ICCPR, including 
socio-economic rights, can be implemented through the individual communication 
procedure under Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 191 
2. Humanitarian Law 
a. Medical Assistance 
In international humanitarian law, obligations are imposed on both parties to the 
conflict which would avoid practical difficulties in the implementation of 
humanitarian assistance in the rebel held areas. The obligation of the parties to 
the conflict to provide survival needs to the displaced civilians is not 
explicitly stated in common Article 3 apart from the assistance to wounded and 
sick civilians. 192 As IDPs are vulnerable to sickness and injuries as a result 
of exhaustion by long journeys due to displacement and exposed to effects of 
hostilities during displacement, this obligation is significant for their protection, 
whether they are in a relocation camp or merged into the community. However, 
without an explicit meaning in Additional Protocol 11 its application would be 
limited to those who are wounded and sick in the literal sense. In this regard, 
therefore, Additional Protocol I additional can be 'useful interpretative tool for 
the substantive content of analogous, but less detailed, provisions in Protocol 
119193 because of the adoption of 'single terminology' for both instruments in the 
Diplomatic Conference. ' 94 As such, the definition of wounded and sick in 
2000) para. 38. 
191 Lack of 'socio-economic assistance' granted by the State party to fDPs in particular in 
'education of children and medical care' was considered by the Human Rights Committee, in 
Concluding Observations: Colombia, CCPR/CO/80/COL ( 26 May 2004), para. 19; Human 
Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Serbia and Montenegro, CCPR/CO/8 I /SEMO 
( 12/08/2004) para. 18 considered access to social services, educational facilities, 
unemployment assistance and adequate housing rights. 
192 Common Article 3(2). 
193 R. K. Goldmann, 'International Humanitarian Law: Americas Watch's Experience in Monitoring 
Internal Armed Conflict', (1993) 9 Am. UJInt'l L. & Pol ý 49, at p. 65; S. Junod, 'Commentary on Y, 
Protoco 111', , at p. 13 
93. 
194 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 655-56 state that, '[a]lthough 
Protocols I and 11 constitute two separate legal documents, their interpretation has to take into 
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Article 8 (a) of the Additional Protocol I could be used in Additional Protocol 
11.195 Consequently, the general provision on wounded and sick in Additional 
Protocol 11 could be regarded as including expectant mothers, maternity cases, 
new-born babies, aged, disabled IDPs and others who have become sick or 
wounded due to internal displacement. 
In this context, the treaty and customary obligation to 'collect and care 
for' of the wounded and sick IDPs in common Article 3(2), as elaborated by 
Articles 7 and 8 of Additional Protocol 11 provides guidance on carrying out 
these tasks. 196 Accordingly the wounded and sick 'in all circumstances' shall 
be treated humanely without delay as far as practicable and without any 
distinction except for medical ones. 197 Therefore making distinction between the 
IDPs belonging to the same party and those belonging to an adverse party is 
not permitted. Further it obliges both parties to the conflict to search for 
wounded civilians without delay in possible circumstances, in particular after an 
engagement. 198 The 'general and absolute' nature of these obligations to provide 
medical care is on the party which controls the area within which the IDPs 
have displaced. 199 Such a party to the conflict is obliged to protect the IDPs who 
get wounded in the conduct of hostilities. 
Moreover, wounded and sick IDPs of an adverse party whose liberty 
has been restricted for reasons related to the conflict are protected by 
Articles 5(l) (a) and 5 (3) of Additional Protocol 11 which reiterates the 
protection provided in Article 7 of the Additional Protocol 11.200 Though this 
seems to be redundant in the light of the general obligation, the significance 
of such specific protection cannot be underestimated in the context of internal 
account the fact that they were negotiated together and that the Conference chose a single 
terminology for both the Protocols. ' 
195 In terms of Art. 8(a) of Additional Protocol 1, 'wounded' and 'sick' 'mean persons, whether 
military or civilian, who because of trauma, disease or other physical or mental disorder or 
disability, are in need of medical assistance or care and who refrain from any act of hostility. These 
terms also cover maternity cases, new-bom babies and other persons who may be in need of 
immediate medical assistance or care, such as the infirm or expectant mothers, and who refrain 
from any act of hostility. ' 
196 L. Moir, Law ofInternal Armed Conflict, at pp. 115-16; J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rules. 109-111 at pp. 396-405. 
197 Art. 7(2) of Additional Protocol II. 
198 Art-8 of Additional Protocol 11. 
199 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol IF, at p. 1410. 
200 See below, Section, E. 2. b. for discussion. 
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armed conflicts fought on discriminatory grounds, where movement of IDPs 
in camps and settlements are restricted. 
The protection provided in internal armed conflicts for the matemal 
role of women is not as extensive as that in international armed conflict, 
as in the latter, pregnant women are explicitly treated as wounded and 
sick 120 
1 and during hostilities are required to be released or evacuated without 
delay from internment, 202 or encircled areas; 203 there is a prohibition of 
transfer of maternity cases unless their safety imperatively requires it; and 
there are to be given priority in food, clothing and medicines. 204 Such 
'maternity-oriented provisions of humanitarian law' have been criticised 'for 
reflecting rather Victorian views of women as being the equivalent of 
children in their weakness and need for special care. ' 205 This view cannot be 
substantiated from a medical or humanitarian point of view generally in internal 
armed conflict situations, where special care is necessary for pregnant women 
due to the inherent risks in conflicts. 206 As far as IDP women are concerned,, the 
need for special medical care is further heightened in view of their vulnerable 
physical position due to displacement. 
Because of the absolute obligation to 'respect and protect' the wounded 
and sick, a party to the conflict which is unable to or unwilling to provide such 
medical assistance with its own authorities, is obliged to take measures to 
provide it with the assistance of relief societies in the territory, such as National 
Red Cross Societies in its area or in the area of the adverse party in terms of 
Article 18(j). 207 In such situations, Articles 9,10 and II of Additional Protocol 11 
provide protection for the medical personnel, medical units and transport from 
attack and such protection is not limited to the attacks by a party which is in 
control of the territory in which these are located but also include attacks 
20 1 Art. 8(l) of Additional Protocol 1. 
202 Art. 132 of IV Geneva Convention of 1949. 
203 Art. 17 of IV Geneva Convention of 1949. 
204 Arts. 16,23,89 and 91 of IV Geneva Convention of 1949. 
205 J. Fitzpatrick, 'The Use of International Human Rights Norms to Combat Violence Against 
Women, ' in R. J. Cook (ed. ), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives, 
( Philadelphia, 1994) p. 532, at p. 548. 
206 See generally, M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary at p. 96. 
207 To 'Protect' the wounded and sick means to take positive measures with regard to them, 
S. Junod, Commentary on Protocol II, at p. 1408; M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, ibid., at 
pp. 695-96. 
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from the air or land by another party to the confliCt. 208 This has an added 
significance to the protection of IDPs, as by protecting such personnel and their 
units and transport, the medical protection of wounded and sick IDPs in an 
entire state would be ensured. 
b. Other Needs of Subsistence 
With regard to the obligation of the parties to the conflict to provide 
supplies essential to the survival of IDPs, there is no explicit provision in 
common Article 3 or Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11. An obligation to 
provide survival needs can be implied in common Article 3 at least with regard 
to interned IDPs and relocated civilians in the light of the express provision 
in Article 5(l) (b) and Article 17 (1) of Additional Protocol 11 of 1977 to prevent 
such outcomes. 209 However, a prohibition against deliberate deprival of such 
supplies to civilians within the control of a party to the conflict can be 
implied in the fundamental guarantees of Article 3(l) (a) and Article 4(2)(a) of 
Additional Protocol 11, in particular, absolute prohibitions against violence to life 
and person and cruel treatment as starvation of civilians is prohibited in Article 14 
of Additional Protocol 11.210 Moreover the protection of these provisions extends 
to all IDPs within the control of a party to the conflict, as opposed to certain 
categories of IDPs, as discussed below. 
Additional Protocol 11 does not impose an explicit general obligation 
on the parties to the conflict to grant survival needs including medical care 
to civilians displaced as a consequence of armed conflict, unless they are 
interned in camps or have become wounded and sick or subjected to enforced 
displacement under Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol 11.211 In terms of 
Article 5(l) (b) of Protocol 11, internees must be provided with food, drinking 
water and other safeguards concerning health and hygiene, protection from 
climate such as clothing and shelter and dangers of armed conflict to the 
208 See below, Section, E. 2. d. ii. for detailed discussion. 
209 Monika Sandvik- Nylund, Caught in Conflicts: Civilian Victims, Humanitarian Assistance and 
International Law, ( Turku, 1998) at p. 22. 
2 10 Article 3(l) (a) of IV Geneva Convention of 1949 states that, 
'Persons taking no active part in hostilities ... shall in all circumstances 
be treated humanely'... 
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and In any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,... cruel treatment... 
211 Arts. 5(l)(a), (b) and 7 of Additional Protocol 11 
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same extent as the local population. In the light of such positive obligation to 
provide, withholding or reducing the food rations to civilian internees in a 
camp to the extent of deficiency which results in death or severe health 
problems would also be an infringement of Article 4(2) (a) concerning the 
absolute prohibition on violence to life and health of civilians. 212 
The relative standard connected with the conditions of the local 
civilian population which includes IDPs does not always seem to be 
reasonable given the situation of internal displacement in armed conflict and 
the absence of positive obligation to provide them with survival needs, 
because when the IDPs tend to suffer, the internees are also compelled to 
suffer. 213 As far as human rights are concerned, since the core obligations of 
Article 11 of the ICESCR do not require such a relative standard but 
require the state party to provide basic survival needs to all civilian 
population who are not in a position to provide themselves in situations 
including armed conflicts, in practice, there cannot be any actual difference 
of treatment between local IDPs and interned IDPs. 
However in terms of Article 5(3) of Additional Protocol 11, those IDPs 
caught in an isolated locality situated in the middle of combat zones, are 
protected in a limited manner, confined to receiving medical care and 
attention. 214 Article 5(3) fails to impose an obligation on the party in 
control, to provide such IDPs with survival needs as in Article 5(l) (b) of 
Additional Protocol 11, as shortage of these is common in such a situations. 
Therefore parties to the conflict are expressly obliged to provide subsistence needs 
only to those displaced civilians who are within their physical control, though 
with regard to other IDPs they are prevented from deliberately depriving of 
survival needs including relief actions by humanitarian organisations under 
Article 18(2) to cause starvation in terms of Article 14 of Additional 
Protocol 11. 
However, all the above discussed positive obligations to Provide 
subsistence needs to certain categories or the negative obligations to refrain from 
212 L. Moir, Law ofInternal Armed Conflict, at p. 229; also see J. S. Pictet, Commentary IV, , at 
p. 597- 
213 See L. Moir, ibid., at p. 113 ). 
214 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentarv at p. 645 state that, the restriction of liberty of 
factual situations as well. movement for reasons related to the conflict would II 
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deliberately depriving IDPs of such needs, resulting in violence to life and cruel 
treatment, are limited to the protection of IDPs within the control of the parties to 
the confl iCt. 215 Such an obligation is narrower than that imposed on the State 
party under human rights law given the primary obligation on the state to provide 
subsistence needs to all IDPs within the whole territory of such state. To the 
extent of such obligations of states, IDPs have a right to seek and receive 
assistance for their protection from national authorities. 216 
c. Starvation of IDPs 
Starvation has increasingly become a method of combat that adversely affect 
the survival of IDPs who become impoverished due to displacement and also 
leads to secondary displacement. 217 Intentional starvation can be carried out by 
destruction of objects indispensable for the survival of civilians of the 
adverse party; depriving civilians of the adverse party of supplies from 
outside by siege, contraband measures or blockade; a scorched earth tactics 
resorted to by a party to the conflict in defence of its territory. 218 
Article 14 of Additional Protocol 11 absolutely prohibits starvation as 
a method of combat, by deliberately attacking or destroying or removing or 
rendering useless civilian objects indispensable for the survival of civilian 
population anywhere in the country. 219 Moreover, imposing intentional embargoes 
on objects indispensable for the survival of IDPs within the rebel held areas or 
depriving IDPs of an adverse party of supplies from outside by siege, 
deliberately impeding access of humanitarian aid to IDPs including by looting 
for the use of one of the parties to the conflict or causing impediments to 
humanitarian personnel in delivering relief supplies to IDPs and the restriction of 
freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel may constitute starvation as 
"' However, the prohibition of starvation is broader in its application, see below. 
216 D. Schindler, 'Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Interference and International Law', at 
p. 695. 
217 Also see Art. 54 of Additional Protocol 1. 
2 18 E. Rosenblad, International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Some Aspects of the 
Principle of Distinction and Related Problems (Geneva, 1979) at p. 103. 
2 19 The removal of foodstuff and livestock intended for the usage of civilians by the armed 
forces for their own use. Additionally this is strengthened by Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11 on 
prohibition of pillage; civilian objects can be rendered useless for example, by laying of anti- 
personnel landmines in agricultural lands, so as to render it inaccessible to civilians to 
cultivate crops ; polluting water installations, contaminating 
food stuffs by adding chemical 
agents; these verbs 'are used to cover all eventualities', S. Junod, 'Commentary on 
Protocol 11', 
at p. 1458; see ibid., at p. 1459. 
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removing includes depriving IDPs of objects indispensable for their survival. 
Starvation of civilians is prohibited in customary law as well. "O Article 14 of 
Additional Protocol 11 absolutely prohibits starvation as a method of combat, 
and any exception on the ground of military reasons such as the assistance 
221 would benefit the armed opposition group, is therefore not permitted. 
Starvation has a general meaning apart from killings caused by hunger to 
include 'deprivation or insufficient supply of some essential commodity, of 
something necessary to live. 222 As far as objects indispensable to IDPs are 
concerned,, the list of objects enumerated in Article 14 is not exhaustive, as 
indicated by the words 'such as' and includes apart from food and water and 
medicines, basic shelter and clothing indispensable for the survival of IDPs as a 
result of 'climates or other circumstances. ' 223 As such this provision can be 
significant for the protection of IDPs who are materially deprived of such 
necessities due to displacement. 
However, Article 14 does not make any distinction between the 
objects intended solely for civilians and armed forces and for mixed usage. 
Bothe et al, state that although the literal construction of this provision limits 
the scope of its prohibition to attacks against objects indispensable 
exclusively for the survival of civilians, it can be inferred by the application 
of principle of proportionality as incorporated into Additional Protocol 11 
through the Martens clause, that attack against objects which are intended 
for sustenance value for both civilians and armed forces is also prohibited if 
it causes excessive effects on civilians, disproportionate to the military 
advantage anticipated. 224 This view regarding the objects of mixed usage cannot 
be justifiable in the light of the absolute prohibition on starvation, without a 
military necessity exception in Additional Protocol 11. As a simplified version 
of Article 54 of Additional Protocol 1, the application of Article 14 is 
220 C. Rottensteiner, 'The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance' at pp. 568-69; J. M. Henckaerts and L. 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at pp 186-188; the non-prohibition in 
the Statute of ICC of starvation as a war crime in internal conflicts should be seen in the light of 
Art. 10 of the same. 
221 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 1456. 
222 M. Cottier, 'Starvation of Civilians as a Method of Warfare' in 0. Tniffierer (ed. ), Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1999) p. 254, at p. 256. 
223 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 655; these objects 'must be understood 
in the broadest sense to cover the infinite variety of needs of the populations of different 
geographical areas throughout the world. ' S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 145 8. 
224 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, ibid., at p. 680. 
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subject to the rules stated in the former . 
225 Even 'a fair reading' of Article 
54 of Protocol I suggests that the absolute prohibition of starvation of 
civilians remains without any restriction. 
226 The absolute prohibition on 
starvation in Ariclel. 4 of Additional Protocol 11 would simply apply to attack 
on such objects of mixed usage 
227 because in such a situation, combatants are 
the last and the civilians are the first to starve . 
228 MUS, it can be stated that 
it is prohibited to attack objects for mixed usage by both civilians and 
combatants, even if the latter use these objects for their subsistence along 
with civilians. 
229 
The fact that resort to starvation as a method of combat against 
military personnel is not prohibited in Article 14 of Additional Protocol 11, is a 
drawback in the law applicable to internal armed conflicts and can cause 
adverse effects on IDPs. 230 This is because the destruction of objects solely 
used by armed forces or used for military purpose may provoke the affected 
armed forces to attack objects indispensable for the survival of civilians and 
thereby cause the food supplies of IDPs to be subject to attack or pillage, 
rendering protection from starvation practically difficult. 231 
A party could use starvation as a method of combat in internal 
armed conflicts by destruction of civilian objects within the territory under its 
control, to further displace the IDPs of an adverse party or as a collective 
punishment against IDPs for their perceived support for rebels. Additional 
Protocol I permits derogation from the prohibition of destruction of objects 
225 P. Macalister- Smith, 'Protection of the Civilian Population and the Prohibition of Starvation as a 
method of Warfare: Draft Texts on International Humanitarian Assistance, ' (1991) No. 284 JRRC, 
440, at pp. 443-45; M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, ibid., at p. 680. i6 P. Macalister- Smith., Ibid, at p. 444; the prohibition against destruction in Article 54(2) of 
Additional Protocol I is not applicable when the objects indispensable for the survival of civilians 
are used as sustenance solely by the military; however, even if they are used not as sustenance but 
in 'direct support of military action, ' such measures against these objects shall not be taken if it 
'may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequatefood or water as to cause its 
starvation orforce its movement. ' ( emphasis added) Article 54 (3) of Additional Protocol 1. 
227 Especially in non-international urban conflicts, civilians and combatants both rely for 
water on supplies from drinking water installations. 
228 H. Blix, 'Modernizing the Laws of Armed Conflicts: Present Issues and Approaches, ' in 
M. K. Nawaz (ed. ), Essays in International Law, in Honour ofKrishna Rao (Leiden, 1976) p. 266, 
at p. 273. 
229 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol IF, at pp. 1458-59; Article 54 (3) (a) of Additional Protocol 
I provides to this effect. 
230 p. Macali ster- Smith, 'Protection of the Civilian Population and the Prohibition of Starvation' at 
p. 443; S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol IF, at pp. 1458-59; see Art 54 (3)(a) of Additional 
rotocol I. 
31 A. Mourey, 'Famine and War' (1994) No. 285 JRRC, 549, at p. 553. 
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indispensable for the survival of civilians within the territory of a party for 
imperative military necesSity. 
232 
Additional Protocol 11 is absolute and it 
does not contain such an exception of military necessity for prohibition of 
starvation. Since rules of humanitarian law have been formulated with 
consideration for military necessity, it is not generally a defence for acts 
prohibited by humanitarian law treaties unless there is express limitation to 
ff Ct. 
233 that ee This construction can be used in the context of the changing 
nature of territorial controls in internal armed conflict, as otherwise the absolute 
prohibition of starvation would become meaningless. This conclusion is further 
strengthened by specific prohibitions of Additional Protocol 11 concerning 
collective punishment and pillage of civilians within the control of a 
party. 234 Thus, objects indispensable for the survival of civilians located 
within the area under the control of a party to the confliCtS235 are absolutely 
protected by Additional Protocol 11 and consequently it is not permitted for 
a party to use starvation as a method of combat against IDPs of an adverse 
party within the area under its control. 
Indispensable objects necessary for the survival of civilians are 
protected only against direct attack. Therefore incidental destruction of such 
objects and thereby the starvation caused by such acts are not protected by Article 
14. The prohibition of the ( indiscriminate) use of remotely delivered anti- 
personnel mines is significant in the protection of agricultural lands as Article 14 
only protects such lands against being rendered useless by direct acts or attacks. 236 
Such use of anti-personnel mines in agricultural lands would affect agricultural 
activities which indirectly cause deaths by malnutrition and starvation. 
Despite an explicit prohibition on starvation in Protocol 11 and the 
existing customary prohibition on starvation as a method of combat, 237 the 
absence of a prohibition in the Statute of the ICC as a war crime is a serious gap 
232 Art 54(5) of Additional Protocol 1. 
233 nd 
234 
A. Roberts & R. Guelff, (ed. ) Documents on the Laws of War, 2 ed, (Oxford, 1989) at pp. 5-6 
S. Junod, Commentary on Protocol II, at p. 1459, para. 481 1. 
235 Ibid., at p. 1459. 
236 Articles 3(8 ) and 6 of the 1996 Amended Protocol 11 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices to the 1980 CCW; Article I of the 1997 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- 
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. 
237 C. Rottensteiner, 'The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance' , at pp. 
568-69; J. M. Henckaerts and 
L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rules. 53-54 at pp. 186-93. 
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in the protection of IDI's in internal armed conflict. Invoking protection under 
crimes against humanity and genocide is difficult due to the rigorous requirement 
238 of a policy or an intention to destroy the ethnic, racial or religious group. 
However, it is possible to get protection through individual communication 
procedure under ICCPR or other regional human rights instruments for such 
humanitarian law violations as a violation of the right to life, or inhuman treatment. 
d. External Assistance 
The significance of international protection in the form of relief activities to 
IDPs must be seen from the perspective that, except for interned or 
relocated IDPs, there is no general positive obligation on the parties in control of 
respective territories to provide internal assistance to IDPs displaced as a 
consequence of hostilities. 239 Such a limited obligation would render the latter 
category of IDPs dependent on the mercy of parties to the conflict for essential 
supplies. Thus the external assistance provided in common Article 3(2) and in 
Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol 11 which address the suffering of all civilians 
including IDPs in a territory of a High Contracting Party, regardless of whether the 
liberty of the IDPs are restricted or not, is favourable for the protection of 
IDPs. 240 
For the admittance of an international humanitarian organisation into a 
state, the consent of the state concerned is necessary. As common Article 3(2) 
states that intemational organisations 'may offer' services to the parties to the 
conflict, it seems that the parties do not have a legal obligation to accept the 
o Be r. 241 In contrast, Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol 11 seems more 
obligatory242 as it states relief actions 'shall be undertaken' even though the 
provision of assistance by an international organisation is subject to the consent 
of the High Contracting Party concerned. This means the party concerned 
238 See above Ch. 3, Section, C. l. a. 
239 Arts 5 and 17 of Additional Protocol 11. 
240 Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol II is much explicit as it states, 'civilian population is 
suffering. ' 
241p. Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster ReliefActions in 
International Law and Organization ( Dordrecht, 1985), at p. 3 1; L. Moir, Law ofInternal Armed 
Conflict, at pp. 63 and 118; but D. Schindler, 'Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian 
Interference' at p. 696. 
242 M. Bothe, 'Relief Actions: The Position of the Recipient State' in F. Kalshoven (ed. ), Assisting 
the Victims of Armed Conflict and Other Disasters (Dordrecht, 1989) p. 91, at p. 92; D. Schindler, 
'Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Interference' at p. 696. 
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does not have discretion in refusing consent but can do so only for 'valid reasons, 
not for arbitrary and capricious ones. 243 The positive aspect of Articles 3(2) and 
18(2) is that, an offer by international organisations can no longer be treated as 
244 interference in the internal affairs of a state during internal armed conflicts . 
Though there is no legal obligation on the parties to the conflict to accept the 
international assistance in terms of Article 3(2), if it is interpreted in the context 
of Article 3 as a whole, in extreme situations, the practical effect may be 
different. As such, even though a party can refuse some offers of humanitarian 
organisations, if a party is not in a position to fulfil the absolute obligations 
imposed on it with regard to IDPs under Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions as elaborated by Articles 5(l) (3) and 17 (1) of Additional Protocol 
11, it cannot then refuse to accept the services offered to it under common 
Article 3(2) without valid reasons. 245 Similarly, in an extreme situation of 
shortage of food and other survival needs, similar to that referred to in 
Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol 11, if a state party deliberately denies external 
assistance to IDPs belonging to an adverse party within its power and this leads 
to starvation, it may become a violation of common Article 3(1)(a) which 
246 prohibits violence to life or cruel treatment . 
In other words, an obligation to accept external relief as a subsidiary 
measure would arise, in an extreme situation where a party is unable or unwilling 
to meet these mandatory obligations on its own. 
The state party to the conflict simultaneously becomes liable for failure to 
ensure the right to life and right against inhumane treatment of the ICCPR, right 
to an adequate standard of living and right to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health of the ICESCR 247 of IDPs in the 
whole territory of the state regardless of the power by the same. As humanitarian 
law and human rights obligations of a state are not mutually exclusive but 
243 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 696. 
244 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, para. 242; though ICRC is given 
a legal basis in common Article 3, it does not have monopoly in offering assistance in non- 
international armed conflict, M. Torrelli, 'From Humanitarian Assistance to 'Intervention on 
Humanitarian Grounds'T (1992) No. 288 IRRC 228, at p. 23 1. 
245 See J. S. Pictet, Commentary IV at p. 4 1; D. Schindler, 'Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian 
Interference' at p. 696 states Common Article 3 provides a duty to accept the offer of external 
relief and 'consent may not be refused without valid reasons. ' 
246 See S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 1456 states starvation a specific application 
of humane treatment in common Article 3 and in particular the prohibition on violence to life. 
247 See L. Moir, Law ofInternal Armed Conflict, at pp. 228-229. 
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complementary and concurrent, in the context of common Article 3 as a whole and 
human rights obligations it is not possible for a state party to refuse an offer under 
Article 3(2) under extreme situations that cause suffering or undue hardship for 
IDPs. 
The general situation of widespread internal displacement can be precisely 
explained in terms of Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol 11, as the condition for 
the undertaking of relief actions is the suffering of 'undue hardship, ' by civilians 
due to lack of supplies essential for survival, which is often the general 
consequence of internal displacement. 'Undue hardship' of IDPs includes lack of 
adequate food supplies and 'medical requirements, ' such as the services of 
medical personnel, resulting from hostilities. 248 With regard to medical 
requirements, a state party can justify the rejection of international assistance 
in the light of the acceptance of the services of National Red Cross Societies. 
However, the efficiency, accessibility and impartiality of such services, and the 
availability of resources to meet the diverse needs of wounded and sick IDPs 
such as those with land mine injuries or evacuation of wounded and sick IDPs 
from combat zone by negotiating temporary cease-fire, is questionable, 
particularly in the context of ideologically based armed conflicts and widespread 
internal displacement 
. 
249Further, inadequacy of medical supplies in its strict sense, 
would necessitate external assistance. Therefore legitimate refusal of such relief 
actions by a state party concerned would often be limited in an internal 
displacement by the explicit terms in Article 18(2) itself and by other related 
provisions of Additional Protocol 11.250 
Thus, if a state is no longer able to provide survival supplies to its 
civilians, it has no discretion in refusing the offer of services by an 
international organisation, because refusals should always be regarded as an 
exception to the rule of acceptance of relief services . 
251 ' Invocations of 
sovereignty to justify the obstruction or denial of relief assistance to 
248 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 1479. 
249 Especially the National Red Cross services in the government- held territory occupied by 
adverse ethnic groups may not be accepted by the insurgents due to their apparent lack of 
impartiality. 
250 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Comnientary, at p. 434; ex. Arts. 4,7,5(l)(a)(c), 5(3) and 
Art. 14 on starvation.; also see above, Section, E. 2. D. i. 
25 1 The state no longer has the exclusive power of consent, M. Torreli, 'From Humanitarian 
Assistance' at p. 233. 
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252 displaced persons no longer command over the needs of persons at risk. 
Refusal to accept relief for the benefit of IDPs in rebel-held areas or in 
government controlled areas, is in stark contrast to the objective of the state party 
which is engaged in combat in defence of its national unity and territorial 
integrity as expressed in Article 3 of Additional Protocol 11. 
The 'core obligation' of the state with regard to the right to be free from 
hunger in human rights law which obliges it to seek and obtain international 
assistance even in internal armed conflict situations indicates the existence of a 
broader obligation beyond the acceptance of the assistance offered by 
international humanitarian organisations. 253 The declaration made by the 
European Union on 23 January 1995 concerning the internal anned conflict 
situation in Chechnya reflects this attitude of the international community: 
'freedom of access to Chechnya and the proper convoying of humanitarian 
aid to the population be guaranteed. 9254 Therefore a refusal by the legal 
government cannot be legitimised solely on security reasons, 255 such as, that 
the aid would reach the hands of rebels. 
The state can, however, legitimately deny admittance to a humanitarian 
organisation based on its attributes. Common Article 3 focuses on the nature 
of the organisation, indicating that it should be both impartial and humanitarian, 
such as the ICRC. 256 Here, an international organisation that speaks out about 
human rights and humanitarian law violations may be considered as partial and 
its offer could be refused. However, speaking out about undeniable publicised 
violations cannot be considered as such. Additional Protocol 11 concentrates more 
on the nature of the relief action, by stating 'humanitarian and impartial' and 
'without any adverse distinction. 257 As the approach adopted by common Article 3 
emphasises a preconceived view regarding an organisation, Additional Protocol 11 
252 F. M. Deng, 'Frontiers of Sovereignty' at p. 279; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua, para-242. 
253 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to adequate food', paras. 6 and 17. 
254 Council of European Union-General Secretariat, Press Release 4385/95 (press 24) at 1(23 
January 1995) as cited in Tadic (Jurisdiction) para. 115. 
255 See M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 434. 
256 p. Macalister- Smith, 'Rights and Duties of the Agencies Involved in Providing Humanitarian 
Assistance and Their Personnel in Armed Conflict' in F. Kalshoven (ed. ), Assisting the Victims, 
p. 99, at p. 103. 
257 Jbid'. M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 435 state that, the requirement 
without adverse distinction' is 'less a condition of admission than a rule of conduct 
for 
the action. ' 
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approach can be regarded as more flexible and conducive to the admission of 
humanitarian organisations. Therefore this ground can hardly be raised in 
most cases as an excuse for denial of admission, as it is difficult to predict at 
the stage of admission of a humanitarian organisation that a relief action will 
be carried out with 'adverse distinction. 5258 Furthermore, when IDPs of an 
adverse party are in extreme hardship, such a refusal intended to deprive them of 
indispensable survival needs will be in violation of Article 14 of Additional 
Protocol 11 which prohibits starvation as a method of combat and human 
rights standards namely, Articles 2 and 6 of the ICCPR and Articles 11(2) and 12 
of the ICESCR. 259 
Therefore it can be stated that Principle 25(2) of the UN Guiding Principle 
on IDPs correctly emphasizes the right of international humanitarian organizations 
and other actors to offer their services in support of the lDPs and the 
obligation of the state to not to withhold consent arbitrarily, in particular, if the 
authorities of the state concerned are unable or unwilling to provide necessary 
humanitarian assistance . 
260 To the extent of the obligation of the States to accept 
humanitarian assistance, the IDPs have the corresponding right to receive it, if 
offered by humanitarian organizations. 261 
L Access to Rebel Held Areas 
Even after admittance within a country, access to rebel-held areas can be denied to 
humanitarian organisations by state parties, which would deprive the IDPs in 
those areas of relief aid. This is perhaps due to the fear that it would strengthen 
the rebels and weaken the government's capacity; or would expose their 
policies which contributed to the conflict and eventual displacement. 262 
258 However later providing special protection and assistance to IDPs of a minority community 
over the displaced civilians of majority community, if the former are in a vulnerable position 
due to discriminatory treatment against them, cannot be regarded as adverse distinction. 
259 M. Bothe, , 'Relief Actions' at p. 94; M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and 
W. A. Solf, Commentary, at pp. 
434-3 5; S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol II, ' at p. 1458; see above, Sections, E. 1. and E. 2. c. 
260 See for the development of such a right in practice, M. E. O' Connell, 'Humanitarian 
Assistance in Non-international Armed Conflict: The Fourth Wave of Rights, Duties and 
Remedies' (2001) 31 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 183. 
26 1 D. Schindler, 'Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Interference' at p. 696 
262 R. Cohen and F. M. Deng, Masses in Flight, at pp. 6-7; M. Ellen O'Connell, 'Humanitarian 
Assistance in Non-International Armed Conflict' at p. 198. 
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As the plain meaning of Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol 11 refers only 
to the consent of the state concerned, the state can refuse its consent to such 
organisations to carry out relief actions in areas controlled by rebelS, 263 whereas 
common Article 3(2) maintains the practical reality by offering the external 
assistance to each of the 'parties to the conflict. ý264 In terms of common 
Article 3. if a humanitarian organisation wishes to carry out its relief 
activities in a rebel controlled area, only the consent of the rebels concerned 
is sufficient, provided it is possible to have access to the rebel territory 
265 without passing through the territory controlled by the government . Such 
assistance provided in rebel-held areas, in spite of an arbitrary refusal by a 
state, does not taint the character of an impartial offer of relief . 
266 Such 
assistance, can be provided in situations when part of the territory held by 
insurgents forms the border of another state. For instance, a cross-border relief 
operation against the wishes of Ethiopian central government was carried out by 
the ICRC in 1976 from Sudan to render assistance to Tigray and Eritrea, which 
were then in rebellion. Similarly, relief was given to Iraqi Kurds from Iran 
before the end of the regime of the Shah. 267 
However the word 'concerned' in Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol 
11 could be interpreted similarly to the corresponding Article 70 of Additional 
Protocol I to mean that a state party is 'concerned' only when it receives 
relief, or grants transit to the rebel-controlled areas. 268 It follows that in other 
situations, consent of the state party is not necessary. 269 This is not only 
consistent with Article 3(2), which imposes obligations on both parties to the 
263 A. Eide, 'New Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflict' in A. Cassese. The New 
Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict (Napoli, 1979) p. 277, at p. 294. 
264 M. Torrelli, 'From Humanitarian Assistance' at pp. 233-34. 
265M Torrelli, ibid ; D. Schindler, 'Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Interference' at p. 700 
266 D. Plattner, 'ICRC Neutrality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance, ' (1996) No. 31 1, IRRC 
16 1, at p. 176. 
267 D. P. Forsythe, 'The International Committee of the Red Cross and Humanitarian Assistance: A 
Policy Analysis, ' (1996) No. 314 IRRC 512, at pp. 517-18. 
268 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary at p. 696; M. A. Meyer, 'Developments of 
the Law Governing Relief Operations, ' in M. A. Meyer (ed. ) Armed Conflict and the New Law: 
Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Convention, (London: 1989) p. 209, at 
p. 22 1. 
269 As C. Sommaruga, 'Assistance to Victims of War in International Humanitarian Law and 
Humanitarian Practice', (1992) 289 IRRC p. 373, at p. 376 stresses, ' ... it is not the formal consent 
of the government that we seek to go somewhere in the country where it is not in control. In such 
cases we require the consent of those exerting effective power in the specific region where there are 
humanitarian needs. ' 
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conflict to provide humanitarian assistance but also generally with the nature of 
obligations of humanitarian law which imposes equal obligations on both 
parties to the conflict. 270 Another way to overcome the state consent is to 
interpret this provision in the light of Article 14 of the Additional Protocol 
11.271 In addition, the state has a primary obligation in human rights law to protect 
IDPs, and therefore the prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in internal 
conflicts or other emergency situations to particular groups might render the state 
in violation of the right to freedom from hunger. 272 
In such a situation, the role of the neighbouring state is important to 
give meaning to such interpretation in allowing and facilitating the rapid and 
unimpeded passage of relief consignments and personnel to a rebel-held areas. 273 
Although an assistance 'exclusively' humanitarian nature to civilians suffering 
'undue hardship' cannot be regarded as an unfriendly act, the absence of an 
obligation to allow free passage to the neighbouring state can place the viable 
outcome of such a flexible interpretation at the mercy of neighbouring states. 
However Security Council Resolution 1296 of 2000 addresses the role of 
neighbouring states in providing access to relief activities by UN agencies on 
the basis that denial of such access may constitute a threat to international 
peace and security. 274 This resolution does not distinguish between international 
and internal armed conflicts, and is in accordance with the broader interpretation 
of Article 18(2) regarding access. 
The insurgents are equally obliged to receive such relief services with 
regard to IDPs under their control in terms of the explicit obligation on them to 
270 Resolutions of the Security Council, 1261 (30 August 1999) para. 11; 1296 (19 April 2000) 
paras. 10,12. 
271 P. Macalister-. Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster ReliefActions, at p. 3 1; 
D. Plattner, 'Assistance to the Civilian Population: the Development and the Present State of 
International Humanitarian Law' (I 992)No. 288, IRRC 249, at p. 260. 
272 A. Eide, The Right to Adequate Food and to be Free From Hunger, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1999/ 1-, (28 
June 1999) para. 57. 
273 Art. 70(2) of Additional Protocol I provides such an obligation on neighbouring state to a 
territory under the control of the party to the conflict. 
274 Resolution of the Security Council 1296 (2000) 'calls upon' all parties including neighbouring 
states to cooperate in access to unimpeded humanitarian assistance by UN agencies; if a denial of 
access by such state 'may constitute a threat to international peace and security' which can be 
committed by 'deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons and the 
committing of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of 
international humanitarian and 
human rights law in situations of armed conflict. ' 
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275 provide the basic needs of civilians in undue hardship . Such obligation also 
means not deliberately impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies or 
diverting them for their own use. 276 
Common Article 3 is not wide enough to imply an obligation to grant 
277 free passage to relief consignments destined to the adverse party. In 
international armed conflicts, a general obligation exists to 'allow and 
facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment 
and personnel ... even if such assistance is destined for the civilian 
population of the adverse Party. 278 Even though humanitarian personnel and 
their property can be sub ected to the checks and controls of the parties to 
the conflict, 279having such an explicit provision to internal armed conflicts will 
effectively prohibit delays, blockades and unjustified formalities imposed by 
customs and police officials of a transit party to the relief convoys destined 
to the IDPs of the adverse party. 280 However, a limited prohibition on 
deliberate deprival by attacking relief convoys destined to IDPs under a 
party's control to endanger their lives and health can be implied from common 
Article 3. The absence of such a general obligation to free passage in Article 
18(2) of Additional Protocol 11 can be resolved by the explicit prohibition of 
attack on objects indispensable for the survival of civilians in Article 14 of 
the Additional Protocol 11, as it has a strengthening effect on the 
shortcomings in the provisions concerning relief activities. 281 Even though 
certain ways of bringing starvation are emphasised in Article 14 by using the 
word 'therefore, ' and these explicitly cover attacks on relief convoys, the 
listed ways are not exhaustive. 282 This makes it possible to include other ways 
such as wilful impediment of relief to cause starvation. 
275 See Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflicts, S/2001/331 ( 30 March 2001) para. 7. 
276 This was the situation in 1992 in Somalia, Report of the Secretary General to the Security 
Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/1999/957 (8 September 1999) 
para. 19. 
277 E. Rosenblad, International Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict, at pp. I 14-15, n. 326. 
278 Art. 70(2) of Additional Protocol 1. 
279Art. 59(4) of IV Geneva Convention of 1949; Arts. 15(4), 70(3) a, b of Additional Protocol 1. 
280 y. Sandoz, 'Article 70- Relief Actions' in Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, C., and B. Zimmermann, 
(eds. ), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 
August 1949, (ICRC, Geneva 1987) p. 815, at p. 823. 
281 p. Macalister-smith, International Humanitarian Assistance, at p. 3 1; see above, Section, E. 2. c. 
282S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol IF, at p. 1458. 
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Acceptance of external relief activities by the parties to the conflict 
amounts to acceptance of the situation of 'undue hardship' of civilians. Therefore 
impediment caused thereafter by unjustified denial, diversion or undue delay of 
relief activities caused by either party to the conflict to cause starvation, is 
prohibited. The war crimes applicable to international armed conflicts in the 
Statute of the ICC, which prohibits starvation as a method of warfare including 
'wilfully impeding relief supplies, ' can offer an authoritative guidance for such 
interpretation. 283 Therefore invoking military reasons as an excuse for the 
impediment of relief to the suffering civilians of an adverse party can amount 
to a violation of Article 14 of Additional Protocol 11.284 Rapid and 
unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief is now considered as forming part 
of the customary humanitarianlaw applicable tointernal armedconfliCtS. 285 
ii. Protection of Humanitarian Personnel 
Admittance of humanitarian organisations into a country concerned is not in itself 
an end to the problems of hunger, malnutrition and epidemics experienced by 
IDPs. Difficulties in accessing the IDPs would cause problems in distribution of 
food, medical supplies and services and render humanitarian assistance 
unproductive. Effective humanitarian assistance to IDPs in such difficult 
conditions, therefore, depend on the safety of humanitarian workers and their 
relief activities, as attacks on them would render them unable to perform such 
relief activities. 286 Such a consequence is detrimental to the IDPs affected by 
conflicts fought on discriminatory grounds, where the government is often 
unwilling to provide goods and services essential for survival. 
283 Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Statute of the ICC. 
284 Perhaps on this legal basis, Security Council resolutions 794 of 3 December 1992 and 814 of 
26 March 1993 adopted with regard to Somalia condemned the 'deliberate impeding of the 
delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population. ' 
285 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald- Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Rule 55 at pp. 194-196; also see Principle 25(3) of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement. 
286 In Sudan and Somalia relief workers were killed or kidnapped and they and their 
vehicles and buildings were often attacked by rebels and militiamen. U. S. Committee for 
Refugees, World Refiigee Survey 2000, at pp. 116,120; ICRC delegates and staff were killed in 
Chechnya, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo, F. Bugnion, '17 December 1996: Six 
ICRC Delegates Assassinated in Chechnya, ' (1997) No. 317 IRRC 140; 'Three ICRC Delegates 
Killed in Burundi' (1996) No. 312 IRRC 323: 'Six ICRC Staff Killed in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo' (200 1) No. 842 IRRC 489. 
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Except for Article 3(2) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which 
encourages parties to enter into special agreements to bring all or part Geneva 
Conventions to protect assistance activities, common Article 3 is brief with 
regard to relief actions, as it does not contain details concerning access to 
the area of need in the conflict zone, protection of humanitarian personnel, 
protection of installations and their vehicles fTom attack and protective 
emblems. 
287 
Additional Protocol 11 deals only with one category of personnel and 
their transportation namely, the respect and protection of medical and 
religious personnel involved in assistance activitieS288 their medical units and 
tranSport289 and respect for the Red Cross emblem, 290 as opposed to personnel 
participating in relief activities. 29 1 As in internal armed conflicts, 'the area of 
confrontation is not well-defined, or shifts frequently, 292 to make the 
protection feasible, medical units which shelter wounded and sick civilians 
and the vehicles that provide transport are protected against violent acts by 
parties in control and from attack in hostilities and by the distinctive 
emblems of the Red Cross or Red Crescent. 293 In order to ensure the 
practical application of such protection, Additional Protocol 11 prohibits the 
improper use of the Red Cross emblem. 294 
287 Most special agreements have been by the initiative of the ICRC. See M. Veuthey, 
'Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non- 
International Armed Conflicts: The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, ' 
(1983)33 Am. ULRev 83, at p. 92; protection of humanitarian personnel will however fall within the 
protection guaranteed for civilians in common Article 3; M. Torrelli, 'From Humanitarian 
Assistance' at p. 233 states that'[t]he exact scope of that provision[common article 3] with respect 
to assistance is all too often unknown. '; however, J. E. Bond, The Rules of Riot: Internal Conflict 
and the Law of War ( Princeton, 1974), at p. 131 states that, acceptance of an offer by the ICRC 
implicitly requires the party to respect Red Cross emblem, hospital and their personnel. 288 Arts. 9 and 10 of Additional Protocol 11. 
289Art. II of Additional Protocol 11; see for the meaning of medical units and transports, Art. 8 (e) 
and (g) of Additional Protocol I; A-rt. 8(2)(e)(ii), (iv) of the Statute of the ICC. 290 Art. 12 of Additional Protocol 11. 
29 1 But see Art. 71(3), 70(4) of Additional Protocol I ; they fall within the general protection of 
civilians in Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11; Article 33(l) of the draft Protocol 11 submitted to 
plenary contained such a protection that stated that '... no one shall be harassed, prosecuted, 
convicted or punished for such [relief] activities' (CDDH/402) was not adopted in the final text. See 
D. P. Forsythe, 'Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, ' (1978)72 AJIL 272, at p. 282-83. 
292 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 1440. 
293 In terms of Art. 8(l) of Additional Protocol I this means the protective ftmction of the emblem 
in time of armed conflicts as opposed to the indicatory ftmction that only designates the personnel 
and objects to the red cross institution without rendering protection. 294 Art. 12 of Additional Protocol 11. 
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Humanitarian assistance in internal armed confliCtS295 and prohibition 
of both the intentional direction of attacks and other violence against medical 
and relief personnel, their materials, transport and hospitals and places where 
wounded and sick are collected have emerged as norms of customary law to 
strengthen the protection of IDPs. 296 The prohibition of attacks against relief 
personnel and their materials and vehicles in the Statute of the ICC is 
significant in the absence of such protection in Protocol 11 for the provision of 
effective humanitarian assistance. 297 The ICRC study indicates a much broader 
customary protection of relief personnel and their objects as it provides for 
both 'respect and protection., 298 
The protection of medical personnel in customary law as stated in the 
Statute of the ICC partly differs from Article 9 of Additional Protocol 11, as 
the former covers only the prohibition of attack in conduct of hostilities and the 
299 latter deals with both protection from abuse of power and attack in hostilities . In 
the absence of a definition for medical personnel in Additional Protocol 11, a 
definition that can be derived from Protocol I and the one developed for 
Additional Protocol 11 during the Diplomatic conference that led to the adoption of 
Protocols includes: medical personnel of a party to the conflict, whether military 
or civilian; medical personnel of Red Cross and Red Crescent Organisations 
recognised and authorised by parties to the conflict; and medical personnel of other 
aid societies recognised and authorised by the parties to the conflict and located 
295 General Assembly Resolution 2675 of 1970, 'Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian 
Population in Anned Conflicts, ' para. 8; Tadic Jurisdiction, paras. 114-15; Gasser states that there 
has been a practice by states and insurgents to accept relief operations for civilian 
population by the ICRC, M. D. Dupuis et al., 'The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington 
College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary 
International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions' (1987)2 
Am. U. JInt'lL. &Polýv 415, atp. 481. Y, 
296 Article 8(2)(e)(ii)(iii)(iv)of theStatute of the ICC; J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald -Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, with regard to medical personnel and their objects, 
Rules. 25,26,28,29 and 30 atpp. 79-104 and regarding relief personnel and their objects-Rules 
31,32 and 33 at pp. 105-114. 
297 Art. 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Statute of the ICC; to similar effect Resolution of Security Council 
1286 on Burundi, S/RES/1286,19 January 2000. 
298 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 31 and 
32. 
299 'Respect and protection' for the medical personnel in Article 9 implies a duty not to attack' and 
therefore the scope of protection of Articles II (on medical units) and 9 of Additional Protocol 11 
are identical, S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 142 1; such an interpretation is consistent 
with the definition of medical personnel in Art. 8 (c ) of Additional Protocol I as only 'those 
persons assigned, by a Party to the conflict, exclusively to the medical purposes' are entitled for 
such protection. 
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within the territory of the state where the armed conflict is taking place; or by an 
impartial international humanitarian organisation including the ICRC . 
300 However, 
such medical personnel should be assigned exclusively for medical purposes and 
their status is determined according to their functions and not by their 
qualifications. 30 1 The latter aspect broadens the scope of medical personnel, which 
is significant for the protection of IDPs in internal armed conflicts. 
The protection of medical personnel and their units and transport does not 
depend on their identification by a distinctive emblem, as the use of such an 
emblem is optional in Additional Protocol 11 and in customary international law, 302 
whereas in the Statute of the ICC the prohibition involves attack against 'buildings, 
material, medical units and transport, and personnel using distinctive emblems of 
the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law. 303 Thus the 
Protection provided by Additional Protocol 11 seems to be broader than the one 
provided in the Statute of the ICC in principle, although in practice such an 
effect is not feasible. In order to ensure the protection of medical personnel and 
their objects it is essential to use the distinctive emblems of the Red Cross or Red 
Crescent. This means that even though impartial international organisations such as 
CARE and Medicines Sans Frontiers which have their own recognisable symbols 
are respected and protected under Articles 9 and II of Additional Protocol 11, 
their symbols do not benefit from international protection under Geneva 
Conventions. 304 The prohibition of the Statute of the ICC which is restricted to 
attacks on medical personnel and their objects that use the distinctive Red Cross 
and Red Crescent emblems. The protection from direct attack of relief personnel 
other than those who use the Red Cross and Red Crescent would then fall either 
within the prohibition of direct attacks, on civilians in Article 8(2) (e) (i)305 or on 
personnel involved in humanitarian assistance in Article 8 (2)( e) (iii) of the 
300 Article 8( c) of Additional Protocol I on 'medical personnel; ' J. M. Henckaerts and L. 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at pp. 81-82. 
301 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 1420. 
302 Ibid., at p. 1440; J. M. Flenckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Rules. 25,26,28,29 and at p. 104 it states that the 'display of the emblems is merely the 
visible manifestation of that ftinction [medical] but does not confer protection as such. ' 
303 Art. 8(2)(e)(ii) of the Statute of the ICC. 
304 See J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
at P. 82. 
305 Robinson and Von Habel, War Crimes in Internal Conflicts, at pp. 201-202. 
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Statute of the ICC and to some extent by the protection of 'hospitals and 
places where the sick and wounded are collected' in Article 8(2)(e) (, V). 
306 
The absolute and general protection attached to wounded and sick 
civilians is further reflected in the protection of medical units and transports in 
treaty and customary law stated in the Statute of the ICC, as their immunity from 
attack does not cease immediately if they are used to commit hostile act 'outside 
their humanitarian function. ' but goes beyond that. As stated in Article 11(2) of 
Additional Protocol 11 such 'protection may, however, cease only after a warning, 
whenever appropriate, a reasonable time-limit, and after such warning has 
remained unheeded. 5307 The rationale for such a provision which likely to 
provide time for evacuation is, again, the utmost protection provided for 
wounded and sick. In such a situation, time is provided for evacuation of wounded 
and sick from such units or transports. However, customary humanitarian law does 
not require to extension of a reasonable time limit but only an advance warning 
308 as a general precaution in attack . 
Apart from the protection of civilian medical personnel, protection of their 
activities is important in a highly sensitive situation of internal armed conflict 
if they are to render their services effectively in practice for the protection of 
IDPs. For this purpose, they are protected from punishment by the party in 
control of the area for having carried out medical activities 'regardless of the 
person benefiting, ' whether a wounded combatant or a displaced civilian of an 
adverse party. 309 The protection of the professional obligation of confidentiality 
of medical personnel regarding the victims under their care and protection 
from sanction for failing to give such information is important to ensure the 
protection of wounded and sick IDPs. However, subjecting this protection to 
national law leads to the possibility of restricting medical personnel from 
performing their duties in freedom . 
31 0 This makes the practical value of 
306 The supplies of humanitarian assistance include medical supplies and their transport and 
personnel such as doctors and nurses, M. Cottier, 'Attacks on Humanitarian Assistance or 
Peacekeeping Missions' at p. 190. 
307 See below, Section, F. 2. b. 
308 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 20 at 
p. 62. 309 Art. 100) of Additional Protocol 11. 
3 10 However, a medical personnel is protected at least by the prohibition against retrospectn, -e 
legislation in Art. 6(2)( c) of Additional Protocol 11. 
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protection of medical functions, particularly of national medical personnel, 
questionable. 
A further drawback in Additional Protocol 11 is the absence of a 
provision for free movement of civilian medical personnel and relief personnel 
which is important for access to and identification of IDPs in need in rebel-held 
areas, to provide assistance. 311 In terms of the 1996 Amended Land Mines 
Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW, both parties to an internal armed conflict have 
obligations. The obligation to receive involves taking active measures to remove 
any obstacles; taking measures to protect the personnel of the ICRC or any other 
impartial humanitarian organization in their humanitarian mission from the 
effects of mines in any area under their control; and providing them with 
safe passage to or through any place under its control for access to 
victims. 312 As the implantation of anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines 
obstruct and delay access to IDPs and the location of such mines is only 
known to the party concerned, taking active measures to facilitate free passage is 
important for access to IDPs. Otherwise, there could be harmful consequences 
to IDPs. For instance, difficulties of vaccination teams in gaining access to the 
areas due to mines would increase infectious diseases among IDP children. 
However, the ICRC study on customary law acknowledges the existence of 
a customary humanitarian law norm applicable to internal armed conflicts in 
this regard which is beneficial for the protection of IDPs and such freedom of 
movement can only be restricted for imperative military necessity, which is 
only temporary. 313 
3. The Right to Humanitarian Assistance 
The above discussed rights of IDPs to request and receive internal humanitarian 
assistance from national authorities raise another important question: whether 
IDPs have the right to humanitarian assistance in internal armed conflicts, which 
would empower the IDPs to demand and receive humanitarian assistance from 
international humanitarian organisations instead of depending on the mercy of 
31 1 But see Art. 15(4) and 71 (3) of Additional Protocol 1. 
312 Art. 12(5). 
313 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 56 at 
pp. 200-202. 
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their own states. 314 The Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian 
Assistance adopted by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law recognises 
such a right which would enable IDPs in destitution in an internal armed conflict 
to request such assistance from 'competent national or international organizations 
and other potential donors. 015 There does not exist a clearly defined right to 
humanitarian assistance in natural disasters, 316 despite the existence of a 
corresponding right to receive humanitarian assistance ( but not to request ) 
from international humanitarian organisations in internal armed conflicts, in 
terms of common Article 3(2) and Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol 11 . 
317 
Therefore without its peacetime applicability, the existence of such a right 
318 cannot be asserted . 
The right to humanitarian assistance is still in the emerging form in the 
customary international law and an uncertainty exists with regard to the rights and 
obligations related to this right .3 
19 This emerging position of such a right is 
explicitly stated by the Inter-American Court as follows: 
[t]he measures adopted by this Court, in the present case of the Communities of 
the Jiguamiando and of the Curbarado, as well as in the previous cases of the 
Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado (2000-2002 and of the Haitians and 
Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (2000-2002), are 
directed to the sense of the gradual formation of a true right to humanitarian 
assistance. ... In our days, one ought to concentrate attention on the contents and 
juridical effects of the emerging right to humanitarian assistance, in the framework 
of the treaties on human rights, Humanitarian Law, and Refugee Law, so as to 
refine its elaboration, to the benefit of the titulaires of that right. 320 
314 B. Jakovljevic, 'International Disaster Relief Law' (2004)34 Israel Year Book on Human Rights 
25 1, at p. 257 states that the right to humanitarian assistance contains two elements: to demand for 
assistance and to receive assistance whether demanded or offered without demand. 
315 Principles I and 2 of the Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance, 
reproduced in (1993) No. 297 IRRC, 519; ILA Declaration on Internally Displaced Persons, Article 
3 states that the IDPs have the right to seek and receive humanitarian assistance and protection from 
'duly authorized international organizations. ' 
316y Dinstem, 'The Right to Humanitarian Assistance' (2000) LIII Naval War College Review. 
(available in http: //www. nwc. mil). 
317 See above, Section E. 2. d. 
318 Principle 3 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement also states such right 
only with regard to national authorities. 
3 19 R. J. Hardcastle and A. T. L. Chua, 'Humanitarian Assistance: Towards a right of Access to 
Victims of Natural Disasters', (1998) No. 325 IRRC p. 589, 
320 Concurring opinion of Judge A. A. Cancado Tridade, in Communities of the Jiguamiando and of 
the Curbarado, Order of the Inter-Amencan Court of Human Rights of 6 March, 2003, Provisional 
Measures requested by the tnter-American Commission on Human Rights in the matter of the 
Republic of Colombia, para. 6 ( emphasis added in the original) ; according to B. Jakov1jevic, 
'International Disaster Relief La,. N-' at p. 258, 'the right to humanitarian assistance is still in the 
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F. Direct and Indiscriminate Attacks, Acts of Violence on IDPs and Their Camps, or Settlements, or Objects used by Them 
1. Protection Under Human Rights Law 
The right to life of IDPs is increasingly threatened by acts of violence on IDP 
camps and settlements within the control of the parties to the conflict, "' direct and 
indiscriminate attack in conduct of hostilities on IDPs and their camps or 
settlements or any other civilian objects where they have sought shelter or objects 
used by them during displacement. 322 The right to life is non- derogable even in 
internal armed conflicts. Such a right is 'inherent' and derived from the very 
existence of human beings and therefore it is fundamental to all other rights. In 
this sense, this right is regarded as a peremptory norm which binds even non- 
parties to the ICCPR. 
323 However, the right to life is not absolute in Article 6 of 
the lCCPR or in any other regional human rights Conventions, as they permit 
killings by lawful acts of airmed conflicts. 
324 
Where killings in combat are concerned, despite the continued 
applicability of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life during internal 
armed conflict, the general nature of the right to life in the ICCPR does not give 
any guidance as to the extent of its applicability in such situations. 325 Article 
15 (2) of the ECHR contains an express provision to the effect that derogation 
from the right to life can only be made in respect of 'deaths resulting from lawful 
acts of war. ' Since, during an armed conflict, the rules of international 
humanitarian law become applicable to prevent the abusive practices of a state, the 
phase of development, but it is difficult to deny its existence as a human right, or subsidiary human 
right, invoked in order to ensure the protection of some other recognized basic rights. ' 
32 ' For instance, an fDP camp in Western Darfur in Sudan was attacked and 80 makeshift 
shelters were burned by the armed Arab militants causing many killed and others to flee 
from the camp, UNHCR, '29 Killed in Attack on Darfur Camp: UNHCR Gravely Concerned, ' 
29 September 2005. (http: //www. unhcr. ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/chad? page=news&id=433c23744). 
322 Indiscriminate aerial strikes on IDP camps and relief sites had taken place in Equatoria, Upper 
Nile, Bahr al Ghazal in Sudan during 2001, 'Indiscriminate Aerial Bombing on IDP Camps, Relief 
Sites and People Fleeing', Global IDP Survey, (hl! p: //www. idpproject. org; in February 2004, the 
Lord Resistant Army (LRA) which fights against the government's Ugandan Peoples' Defence 
Forces (UPDF) attacked Barlonyo IDP camp in Lira District, Uganda which resulted in 337 deaths. 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005: Uganda 
(hiip: //hr,, v. org/english/docs/2005/01/13/Uganda9862. htm): Amnesty International, Annual Report 
2005. - Uganda, (hllp: Hamnesiyusa. org/countries/uganda/document. do? id=ar&ýT---2005). 
323 Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency' para. 11; the effect of such norm is its non- 
derogabilitY in all circumstances, however all the non-derogable rights are not peremptory norms, 
for example, the non-derogable rights in Arts. 11,18 of the ICCPR. 
324 Arts. 6(l) and 4 of the ICCPR; Arts. 2(2) and 15 ECHR; Arts. 4 and 27; Art. 4 of the ACHPR. 
325 See above, Ch. " 
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meaning of arbitrary deprivation of right to life in armed conflict situations of the 
ICCPR can be derived by resort to the former . 
326 The ICJ in its Advisory opinion 
in the Legality of the threat or Use offuclear Weapons made such a clarification 
as follows: 
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in anned 
conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a 
particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be 
considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, 
can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and 
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. 327 
A similar view was expressed by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights when it informed itself by recourse to humanitarian law as an 
'authoritative guidance' to determine the alleged violations of the right to life 
328 
under Art. 4 of the ACHR. It follows that what is regarded as unlawful in 
humanitarian law can be regarded as a violation of the right to life in human 
rights law. As human rights law does not contain any of the details of the 
definitional standards or rules to be applied during armed conflict situations, 
customary international humanitarian law becomes pertinent as lex specialis with 
all of its details as authoritative guidance to evaluate the question of what 
constitutes arbitrary deprivation of life during internal armed conflicts. 329 
However, as discussed earlier, if a state opts not to derogate from human rights 
during an internal armed conflict, the legality of the killings of lDPs would not be 
determined in terms of humanitarian law but as in peacetime conditions. 330 
Therefore, incidental killings of IDPs are not permitted for any reason in 
peacetime situations. 
The obligation of the state to 'respect' the right to life of all civilians within 
its territory, including rebel- held ones, from the conduct of hostilities, can be 
justified by its obligation in Art. 2(l) of the ICCPR. It obliges the state 'to 
respect and to ensure respect to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
326 Human Rights Committee, 'States of Emergency' para. 3. 
327 Para. 25. 
328 Abella v. Argentina, para. 16 1. 
329 Tadic, Jurisdiction, paras. 110,111,112. 
330 See Article 15 (2) of the ECHR, for the express requirement as to derogation from right to life 
during armed conflicts. 
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jurisdiction' the rights recognised in the ICCPR. Jurisdiction can be 
interpreted to mean within the 'power or effective control' of the state party. 331 it 
is construed in a disjunctive manner to respect the rights either on the basis of 
those present within the territory or if not within the jurisdiction of the state. 332 
Such a construction can be supported by Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, ECHR 
and ACHR, all of which refer to the requirement ofjurisdiction. Therefore a state 
may not be obliged to take positive measures to protect acts of killings 
against IDPs by the armed opposition groups in areas under their control 
for the reason that state is not able in practice to exert its power in such 
areas. 
333 However, it has an obligation to respect and to ensure respect with 
regard to the right to life of IDPs within its territory as a whole to the 
extent it can exercise its power or effective control by its acts over such 
rebel-held areas such as, by air strikes or shelling. 
The scope of the right to life is concerned, the state has the obligation 
to refrain from certain killings of IDPs in military operations. The criteria to 
decide the unlawfulness of such killings are: the legality of the target; the 
disproportionate nature of the attack on the legal target, due to the nature of the 
attack itself, the use of an unlawful weapon or using the weapon in an unlawful 
manner. 334 Therefore, direct attack on relocation camps and other places which 
shelter the IDPs; 335 and disproportionate killings of IDPs and destruction of IDP 
camps and other shelters in a legitimate attack on a military objective, are 
violations of their right to life indeed. 
336 
In this regard the right to life of IDPs who often take shelter in religious 
places is protected not only by the right to life but also indirectly by the right 
to cultural identity as well. 337 The destruction of such 'non-renewable cultural 
resources' can be a part of ethnic cleansing policy as happened in the fonner 
Yugoslavia, which erases not only the identity of the minority civilians but also the 
33 1 Human Rights Committee, 'Nature of the General Legal Obligation, ' para. 10. 
332 T. Buergenthal, 'To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, ' at 
p. 74; Human Rights Committee, ibid; Provost, International Human Rights, at pp. 19-20. 333 See above, Ch. 2. 
334 See for detailed discussion of this aspect, F. Hampson, 'Using International Human Rights 
Machinery' atp. 128. 
335 Special Rapporteur, Extrajudicial Executions, E/CNA/2000/3 (25 January 2000) paras. 43-44. 
336 Third Report on Colombia, Ch. lVc, para. 189. 
337 j. Symonides, 'Cultural Property' in J. Symonides (ed. ), Human Rights: Concept and Standards 
(Ashgate, 2000) p. 175, at pp. 193-94. 
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IDPs themselves sheltered therein. 338 Even if civilian deaths can be attributable 
to a military mistake, such as to negligent failure to verify that an object is a 
339 military object, it can still be a violation of the right to life. 
If the usage of a specific weapon is not prohibited in internal armed 
conflict, whether by treaty or customary law, despite its prohibition in international 
armed conflicts, deaths of civilians resulting from its usage in itself do not 
constitute arbitrary deprivation of life in internal an-ned conflicts, unless the 
manner of its usage violates the principle of distinction and principle of 
proportionality. This undesirable distinction concerning the deprivation of life by 
use of weapons, between international and internal armed conflict, is the reality 
of the application of international humanitarian law as lex specialis. 340 
However, under the customary norm that prohibits the choice and use of means 
of combat, this effect can be very much reduced. For instance, the use of anti- 
personnel landmines which affect IDPs during displacement is prohibited by 
treaty law as an indiscriminate weapon in itself. Therefore, death of IDPs 
occurring as a result of their usage by state parties to the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention would be arbitrary deprivation of life. 
Acts of violence against IDPs, such as murder, genocide, extermination, 
summary or arbitrary executions and enforced disappearances that threaten or 
result in death, are violations of the right to life regardless of whether they are 
committed during peace or conflict situations. Therefore killing a group of IDPs 
with the intent to destroy by recourse to weapons of an indiscriminate nature 
such as chemical weapons can also be regarded as constituting genocide and 
violation of the right to life. 341 Murder and extermination of IDPs as crimes 
against humanity have a wider scope in internal armed conflicts to include 
killings occur in violation of conduct of hostilities. 342 As Fenrick observes, '[i]f 
the object of a policy is to kill or injure civilians, that policy can be implemented 
by rounding up and killing civilians in occupied territory or by bombing or shelling 
338 See generally, H. Abtahi, 'The protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The 
Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia', (2001) 14 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, 1. 
339 D. Weissbrodt & B. Andrus, 'The Right to Life During Armed Conflict: Disabled Peoples' 
International V. United States'(1 988) 29 Harvard International Lam, Journal, p. 59, at pp. 80-8 1. 
340 See below, for further discussion on the use of weapons. 
341 See Legality of the threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, para. 26. 
342 Akayesu, Trial Chamber, para. 589. 
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a city still under the control of the opposing side. 043 Therefore murder or 
extermination constituting crimes against humanity committed during internal 
armed conflicts may require the application of the international humanitarian law 
rules of hostilities to determine the legitimacy of the alleged incidental killings of 
civilians. 344 As such, proportionate incidental civilian casualties occurring in an 
attack directed against a legitimate military objective do not constitute crimes 
against humanity, as such an attack cannot be regarded as directed against civilian 
population . 
345 If the international humanitarian law rules are not applied, 
it would undermine the credibility of humanitarian law as a system by rendering 
proportionate incidental civilian killings in armed conflicts as illegitimate in 
terms of crimes against humanity. 
Therefore, international criminal law is useful in determining the scope of 
the right to life of IDPs. In internal armed conflict situations however, common 
Article 3(l)(a) and Art. 4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol 11 can be resorted to in 
order to strengthen the non-derogable nature of the right to life in particular of 
IDPs as they 'are very similar to the norms of international human rights law 
in terms of both content and the problems they deal with. 346 
A qualification can be added, however, to their scope of application. The 
prohibition of violence to life in humanitarian law is more limited than the 
right to life in human rights law in its scope of application, since the former 
only deals with the prohibition of violence to life of IDPs within the control of 
the party to the conflict, directly or indirectly such as by starvation, as 
opposed to killings. As the state is obliged to respect the rights of all individuals 
within its 'territory and subject to its jurisdiction, ' this fundamental right to life is 
undoubtedly of a wider scope of application, extending even to IDPs within the 
rebel- held areas, to the extent that the state can exercise control over such 
parts of the territory. A state is responsible for an internationally wrongful act, 
when an action or omission of a state: 
'(a) Is attributable to the State under international law: and 
343 W. J. Fenrick, 'Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes, ' at p. 780. 
344 See W. J. Fenrick, ibid. at p. 782. 
345 Ibid., at p. 785. 
346 D. Plattner, 'The Protection of Displaced Persons in Non-International Armed Conflicts' 
(1992), No. 291, IRRC 567, at pp. 571-572. 
186 
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. 347 
Attribution of responsibility on states for the acts of insurgents is only possible if 
the state fails to exercise due diligence with regard to harmful acts of insurgents. 
In this regard the operational constraints of the state authorities should be taken 
into account and therefore the obligation to protect the human rights of IDPs in 
rebel -held area does not impose a disproportionate burden on the state. 348 
However, a state could exercise its power by land or air attacks. As 
such, the right to life is broader in its scope to protect the massacres of 
IDPs within the area in its control and from direct and indiscriminate killings of 
IDPs by air or land attacks by the government armed forces in areas under the 
control of rebels. However the lack of effective control over rebel 
held areas does not absolve the state from taking other positive measures 
wherever possible to protect the right to life of IDPs, such as sending 
humanitarian assistance to IDPs. The non-responsibility of state for the acts of 
insurgents in rebel held areas in human rights law, however, underscores the 
specificity of humanitarian law as a lex specialis, as it precisely provides 
protection to IDPs in such situations by imposing obligations on insurgents for 
their acts of violence. 
The obligation to ensure respect for the right to life requires the states to 
take positive measures to protect the IDPs, such as precautions in attack as an 
attacking party which includes early warning, and declaration of safe areas or 
places to take shelter. As a defending party against attacks by opposition armed 
forces, precautions would include evacuating IDPs in besieged areas, and not 
keeping military objectives within the vicinity of the IDP camps or 
settlements. In this regard, the customary international humanitarian law 
obligations can be used as interpretative guides to determine the scope of 
right to life in internal armed conflicts. 349 
347 Art. 2 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful Acts, 
International Law Commission, adopted by at its 53d Session (2001), General Assembly, 56 th 
Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/5 6/10). 
348 Osman v. UK, para. 116. 
349 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customarv International Humanitarian Lait', Rule 
20 at pp. 62-65; Rules. 22-24, at pp. 68-76; see below, Section F. 2. 
b. 
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2. Protection Under International Humanitarian Law 
As discussed above, Article 3(l)(a) prohibits 'murder of all kinds' against IDPs 
within the control of a party to the conflict, and therefore it does not 
protect IDPs against attacks in hostilities. 350 However, attack on civilians during 
hostilities has been considered as covered by the absolute prohibition in Article 
3 (1)(a) regarding 'violence to life and person' against those taking no active 
part in the hostilities. In Prosecutor v. Blaskic the ICTY Trial Chamber also 
mentioned in passing that unlawful attacks upon civilians as provided by 
Additional Protocols I and 11 [those that occur in combat situations] are 
4 351 satisfactorily' covered by the specific provisions of common Article 3. 
Such an interpretation is not feasible in terms of common Article 3. 
Although it does protect civilians in all circumstances, it covers only out of 
combat situations and prohibits murder or arbitrary or summary execution as 
opposed to unlawful attacks on civilians. The prohibition of common Article 
3(l)(a) of any acts of violence to life, by its nature, does not necessitate a 
distinction to be made between military necessity and the protection of IDPs and 
their camps and other shelters as civilians and civilian objects. 352 Article 3(l) (a) 
6was largely intended to protect individual civilians in the power of an enemy 
party, rather than the civilian population as a whole. In contrast, the provisions of 
Additional Protocol 11 appear to be addressed not simply to the party in control of 
the civilians, but to all parties involved in the conflict, perhaps especially those 
not in control of the civilians. ' 353 
Such an approach can be derived further from common Article 3 which 
deals with the humane 'treatment' of civilians which presupposes those within 
the control of a party. 354 In contrast, an 'attack' in terms of Article 13(2) of 
350 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 667; S. Junod, 'Commentary on 
Protocol 11', at p. 1326. 
351 Para. 170; in Martic the ICTY with regard to reprisals in conduct of hostilities based its decision 
not only on Article 13(l) of Additional Protocol 11 but also on Art. 4 of the same concerning 
humane treatment. 
352 The Geneva rules are based on humanitarian ideals rather than the Hague rules which is more a 
compromise of military necessity and humanity. Y. Dinstein, 'Human Rights in Armed Conflict: 
International Humanitarian Law' in T. Meron (ed. ), Human Rights in International Law. - Legal and 
Policy Issues (Oxford, 1984) p. 345, at p 346. 
353 L. Moir, Law ofInternal Armed Conflict, at p. 117 (emphasis by the author ); G. Abi- Saab, 'Non- 
International Armed Conflicts' at p. 23 5; L. Moir, Law of Internal Armed Conflict, at p. 117; L. 
Zegveld, Accountability ofArmed Opposition Groups, at pp. 82-84. 
354 L. Zegveld, Accountability ofArmed Opposition Groups, at p. 83 states that the notion of 
'treatment' in common Art. 3 'presupposes a degree of control over the person in question. ' 
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Additional Protocol 11 in conduct of hostilities, is prohibited on IDPs as 
civilians in the territory under the control of an adverse party and requires a 
distinction between those who do not 'take a direct part in hostilities' as civilians 
355 and those who take an active part in hostilities as combatants . This can 
be 
further explained by the distinction between the absolute nature of common 
Article 3(l)(a) which prohibits violence to life and the non-absolute prohibition of 
the right against 'arbitrary' deprivation of life in the ICCPR. Therefore the 
absolute prohibition in common Article 3 cannot accommodate the incidental 
loss of lives of civilians, whereas the arbitrary deprivation of right to life is 
broad enough to include such loss of lives, in terms of the law of armed 
conflicts as lex specialis. 
The direct attack on IDPs as such often results in the course of a direct 
attack on IDP camps or settlements to cause collective harm or if the camp is 
suspected to be used as a military base or during the displacement of IDPs. Article 
13(2) of Additional Protocol 11 protects individual civilian and civilian 
population from being a target of attack by all means, namely, aerial 
356 bombardment, artillery and missile attacks and other attacks on the ground . 
However, Article 13 of Additional Protocol 11 does not explicitly refer to the 
principle of distinction, or the detailed rules to implement the protection of 
357 
civilians stated therein from direct attack . The principle that requires 
for a 
distinction between civilians and combatants, namely, that an attack must not 
be directed against civilians but may be directed against combatants, has become a 
355 Art. 49(l) (2) of Additional Protocol I on attack and its scope of application can be used to 
understand 'attack' in Additional Protocol 11 ; according to Article 49(2) of Additional Protocol 
1, the provisions of the Protocol 'with respect to attacks apply to all attacks in whatever territory 
conducted, ... .' 356 L. Doswald-Beck, 'The Value of the 1977 Geneva Protocols for the Protection of Civilians, ' in 
M. A. Meyer (ed. ) Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 
1981 Weapons Convention (London, 1989) p. 13 7, at p. 154. 
357 In terms of the principle of distinction as stated in Art. 48 of Additional Protocol 1, 'the Parties 
to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives. ' However, principle of distinction is implicitly stated 
in Art. 13(3) of the 
Additional Protocol I, J. G. Gardam, Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International 
Humanitarian Law( Dordrecht, 1993) at p. 7; E. Rosenblad, International Humanitarian Law of 
Armed Conflict, at p. 10 1. 
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customary humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts . 
358 Therefore 
IDPs cannot be the object of direct attacks. 
Customary humanitarian law, by requiring attacks to be confined to the 
combatants, by implication requires also that attacks be limited to 
legitimate military objectives. 359 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Incendiary weapons ( Protocol III ) to the 1980 UN CCW is now 
applicable to common Article 3 armed conflicts. It prohibits 'in all circumstances 
to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the 
object of attack by incendiary weapons' by each party to the conflict . 
360 The rule 
which requires a distinction between civilian objects and military objectives and 
prohibits direct attack on civilian objects has the customary status applicable to 
internal armed conflicts . 
36 1 As such, IDP camps, settlements and other shelters 
are immune from direct attack. Nevertheless, it is important to define the 
scope of civilian objects to ensure such protection to the same. 
Additional Protocol 11 does not explicitly provide for a general prohibition 
from attack against civilian objects as in Article 52(l) of Additional Protocol 1 
362 except for the protection afforded to special objects from attack . However, a 
prohibition of direct attack on civilian population cannot be meaningfully 
exercised without inferring that such protection includes a prohibition of direct 
attack on objects which are primarily used by civilians, such as houses, schools 
and IDP camps, unless they are used as military objectives. 363 The absence of a 
definition of 'civilian objects' on the one hand and 'military objective' 364 on the 
other in Additional Protocol 11, necessitates the usage of authoritative 
358 Tadic, Jurisdiction, paras. I 11,112,125,127; Article 8(2)(e)(i) of the Statute of the ICC ; J. M. 
Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 1, at pp. 3 and 
5-8. 
359Third Report on Colombia 1999, Ch. lVa, para. 40; Tadic, Jurisdiction, paras. III and 112. 
360 Articles 1(2), 2(l), 1(3) of the Amended UN CCW , 21 December 200 1; The Second Review 
Conference of the 1980 UN CCW held in Geneva from II to 21 December 200 1, extended the 
scope of the 1980 UN CCW to common Article 3 armed conflicts. 
361 M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at pp. 25 and 
26-29. 
362 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 676; Article I1 (1) -medical units 
which includes hospitals and transport; Article 14-objects indispensable for the protection of 
civilians; Article 16-cultural property. 
363 See M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 670. 
364 Reference to military objectives in Article 15 of Additional Protocol 11 would also a basis for 
the consideration of Additional Protocol I definition of military objective. 
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definitions, to avoid the subjective interpretations by the parties 365 of these terms 
to attack shelters of IDPs. The diplomatic conference when negotiating together 
366 Additional Protocols I and 11 chose the 'single terminology' for both Protocols . 
The definition of 'military objective' in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol 1, 
has been followed as authoritative guidance by international judicial bodies, in 
multilateral conventions and by scholars, in relation to internal armed conflict 
situations. 367 Moreover, this definition is considered as having attained the status 
of customary intemational law applicable to intemal armed confliCtS. 
368 
Additional Protocol I defines military objectives as: ' ... those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture 
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage. ' 369 Civilian objects are defined negatively by excluding the 
objects which constitute military objectives . 
370 This implies that apart from 
military objectives in its strict sense, all other objects are civilian objects unless 
they meet the dual criteria in the definitionof military objective. This negative 
definition of civilian object, according to the ICRC Study, is a customary norm 
applicable in internal armed conflict. 371 
Though the dual cumulative criterion is useful to some extent in 
limiting the leeway provided in its application due to the abstract nature 
of the definition, an explicit non-exhaustive list of military objectives may be 
added to this definition. 372 For instance, the Cultural Property Convention specifies 
365 S. Oeter, 'Methods and Means of Combat' in D. Fleck (ed. ) The Handbook ofHumanitarian Law 
in Armed Conflicts, (Oxford, 1995) p. 105, at p. 155. 
366 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 655-56. 
367 Third Report on Colombia, 1999, Chapter IVa para. 67; Art. 2(6) of the 1996 Amended Mines 
Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW; Art 1(3)of the 2001 Amended 1980 UN CCW; and Art. I (f) 
of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict 1999, reprinted in (1999)38 ILM, 769; See R. K. Goldman, 
International Humanitarian Law and the Armed Conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua, ' (1987)2 
Am. UJInt'l L. & Pol' p. 539, at p. 559,561; see M. Sassoli, & A. A. Bouvier, How Does Law Y 
Protect in War? (Geneva, 1999) at p. 208 . 368 j. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at pp. 29- 
32. 
369Art. 52(2) of Additional Protocol 1. 
370 Art. 52(l) of Additional Protocol I; this definition is adopted in: Article 2(7) of the 1996 
Amended Mine protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW ; Art. 1(4) of the Protocol III to the 1980 UN 
CCW (1980 UN CCW as amended by Art. 1(4) of the 200 1). 
371 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at pp. 32-34 
372 E. Rosenblad, 'Area Bombing and Military Law' (1976) XV The military Law and Law of 
Review, p. 54, at p. 90. 
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as examples 'an aerodrome, broadcasting station, ... a port or railway station of 
relative importance or a mainline of communication as military 
objectives. "' It is to be noted that those IDPs leaving an area due to 
a threat of or actual intensive hostilities are likely to use various means of 
transport. A list like the above mentioned is not conducive to the protection of 
IDPs, as it includes certain objectives that have 'dual use' by civilians and 
military, such as transport and communications facilities. 
To be attacked lawfully, these 'dual use' objects should be justified by 
the dual criteria in the military objective definition in order to protect 
IDPs who are in these objectives. 374 Once such objectives are justified as 
military objective, the protection of IDPs therein would depend on the faithful 
application of the principle of proportionality and precautions. 
However the risk involved here is that even a civilian ob ect 'may j 
become a military objective and thereby lose its immunity from direct attack 
through use even if it is indirectly related to combat action' but effectively 
contributes to the overall war effort or fighting. 
375 Attacks on such civilian 
objects can be, however, justified by a party to the conflict in internal armed 
conflicts, which are often fought on discriminatory grounds to suppress the 
claims of minorities, by claiming that they effectively contribute to the 
overall fighting. 376 
This harsh reality of the transformation of civilian objects into military 
objectives is to some extent reduced by the requirements of 'warning' and if 
appropriate a 'reasonable time limit' with regard to medical units and 
transports in Article 11 (2) of Additional Protocol 11 and by the presumption 
concerning civilian objects dedicated normally to civilian purposes, in case of 
doubt as to their use in Article 52(3) of Additional Protocol 1.377 This would at 
least avoid attacks 'without having verified whether they were, at the time, 
making an effective contribution to military action, thereby losing their 
protection against attack. 378 
373 Art. 8 (1)(a) of 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural property in the Event of 
Artned Conflicts; M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 324. 
374 A. P. V. Rogers, The Law on the Battlefield (Manchester, 1996) at pp. 36-37. 
375 m. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 324. 
376 See ibid, at p. 326. 
377 ibid. 
378 Third Report on Colombia, Ch. IV c, para. 139. 
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Consequently, IDPs are either protected from unjustifiable attack or at 
least provided with warning and opportunity to leave those civilian objects 
suspected to be of military usage. Such civilian objects in the front line are 
often used in combat activities. In particular, where the combatants are 
confronted with direct fire from the ground, it is unlikely that the combatants 
would have any doubt as to these objects and consequently they would apply 
the presumption concerning such civilian objects. 379 
This presumption is used in the 1996 Amended Protocol 11 to the 1980 
380 UN CCW which is applicable to common Article 3 armed conflicts as well . 
Further, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has used this 
presumption in applying the customary protection of civilian objects in internal 
armed conflicts. However, since the customary nature of such a presumption in 
international armed conflicts is doubtful, 381 it cannot be asserted as having 
attained customary status in internal armed confliCt. 
382 A similar result can be 
achieved, in doubtful cases, under the customary rules of precautions, which 
require verification of the use of the target, before launching an attack. 
In certain circumstances, houses or shelters or camps of IDI's are 
protected from direct attack if such attack would result in starvation of 
IDPs. Since the word 'such as' in Article 14 makes the enumerated list of 
survival objects non-exhaustive, even shelter becomes an indispensable objective 
for survival of IDPs in certain climatic conditions. 383 Therefore, despite the 
permission to attack such houses for the reason of their military use, they 
should not be attacked if doing so risks the survival of IDPs. 384 As Junod 
states, the significance of this rule should be seen in the light of the absence of 
379 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at pp-326-327. 
380 Art. 3(8)(a) 1996 Amended Mines Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW- 
381 C. Greenwood, 'Customary International Law and the First Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf 
Conflict, ' at p. 75. 
382 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at pp. 35- 
36. 
383 C. Pilloud and J. Pictet, 'Article 54-Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of 
Civilian Population' in Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C., and B. Zimmermann, B., (eds. ), Commentary 
on the Additional Protocols, p. 65 1, at p. 655- 
384 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', p. 1459; J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, at p. 192, state, that [i]t is doubtful, however, whether 
this exception [two exceptions in corresponding Article 54 of Protocol flalso applies to non- 
international armed conflicts, because Article 14 of Additional Protocol Il does not provide for it 
and there is no practice supporting it. ' See above, Section, E. 2. c. 
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a general protection of civilian objects in Additional Protocol 11 as in Additional 
Protocol 1.385 
It is therefore necessary to identify civilian objects in a strict sense, to 
protect them from attack. In terms of Additional Protocol 1, objects which are 
predominantly of civilian character, such as, 'a place of worship, a house or other 
dwelling or a school' can be regarded as civilian objects. 386 Customary 
humanitarian law prohibiting attacks on civilian objects provides guidance in this 
regard: dwellings and other objects solely designated for the protection of 
civilians; cultural property; and places and areas such as hospital zones assigned 
for the sole protection of civilians should not be the object of military 
operations. 387 In the Tadic case the Appeals Chamber also cited the declaration by 
the Member States of the European Community with regard to internal armed 
conflicts in Liberia which states to 'safeguard from violence ... places of refuge 
such as churches, hospitals, etc., where defenceless civilians have sought 
shelter. ' 388 Though such protection for civilian objects is not, provided for in the 
Statute of the ICC as war crimes applicable to internal armed conflicts, 389 this 
Statute cannot be 'interpreted as limiting or prejudicing' the existing rules of 
customary international law 'for purposes other than' the Statute. 390 
Security Council Resolution 1261 of 1999 condemns the attack on 'places 
that usually have a significant presence of children such as schools and hospitals, ' 
'in situations of armed conflict, ' regardless of the nature of conflict. 39 1 The Inter- 
American Commission on Human Rights considers 'cars, buses, stores and 
residences' to be civilian in nature. 392 The significance of transport can be seen, 
for instance, in the cases against the Russian Federation where the vehicles and 
civilian convoys of IDPs escaping from the fighting were bombed. 393 Therefore 
385 Ibid., at p. 1456. 
386 Art. 52(3) of Additional Protocol 1. 
387 Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 127; Art 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute of ICC prohibits attack on 
'hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military 
obj ectives. ' 
388 Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 113 
389 But in international armed conflicts it is prohibited to: intentionally directing attack on civilian 
objects, Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Statute of the ICC; and to attack or bombard 'by whatever means, 
towns, villages dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives, ' 
Art 8(2)(b)(v) of the Statute of the ICC. 
390 Art. 10 of the Statute of the ICC. 
391 S/RES/ 1261(1990), 30 August 1999. 
392 Third Report on Colombia, 1999, Ch. IVc, para. 139 
393 Isayeva v. Russia; Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia. 
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the transitory shelters of IDPs during displacement such as schools and 
places of worship, and the relocation or resettlement camps assigned for the sole 
protection of IDPs can be considered as protected from direct attack in 
customary international law applicable to internal armed conflicts. 
The specific prohibition of attack on cultural property, in particular places 
of worship, in Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Time of Armed Conflicts can be related to 
displacement in internal armed conflicts, as objects that provides transitory 
shelter to IDPs. 394 IDPs who flee either to escape from the dangers of attacks 
during hostilities or on request by the attacking party prior to an attack, 
often take refuge in places of worship which are generally considered as places 
providing refuge to IDPs in internal armed conflicts. 395 But in humanitarian law 
cultural objects are primarily protected for their cultural value and any protection 
for IDPs by such objects is secondary. 
Places of worship are absolutely protected against direct attack in Article 
16 of Additional Protocol 11.396 The 1954 Convention on Cultural Property 
supplemented by the Second Protocol to the Convention although allows 
derogation on the basis of 'imperative military necessity' this criterion is stricter 
than that provided for ordinary civilian objects in humanitarian law based on a 
limited definition of military objective. According to the former, attack is only 
possible that the cultural property by its function been made into a military 
objective and as long as there is no feasible alternative to obtain similar military 
advantage except by directing such an attack against that objective. 397 The rule on 
advance warning before attack would give the attacking party an opportunity 
394 Art. 16 of the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
Art. 4(l); Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention Art. 6, explicitly prohibits attack on 
cultural objects in common article 3 situations. 
395 The ICTR considered the fact of massacre of tutsi IDPs who had sought shelter in churches 
which are 'universally recognised to be a sanctuary' an aggravating factor in sentencing for 
genocide and crimes against humanity, Prosecutor v. Kumuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, (22 
January 2004) para. 764. 
396 S. Junod states that this is because Additional Protocol 11 extends special protection similar to 
that offered to a limited number of cultural property in Chapter 11 of the 1954 Hague Convention on 
the Protection of Cultural Property, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 1470; but K. J. Partsch, 
'Protection of Cultural property' in D. Fleck (ed. ), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflicts (Oxford, 1995) p. 377, at p. 381 states that such an interpretation would considerably 
reduce the field of application of Article 16 of Additional Protocol 11 of 1977. 
397 Art. 6(a) (b) of Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property. 
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and time to verify the nature of the object before launching an attack and 
also enable the civilians to leave or to be evacuated from the places before 
being attacked. 398 
Providing greater scope of protection against attack, places of worship 
are referred to as cultural objects in Article 16 of Additional Protocol 11 if they 
reflect 'the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. ' This means 'those 
objects of which the importance transcends national borders and which are 
unique due to their relation to the history and culture of a people. '399The 
1954 Cultural Property Convention which is applicable to common Article 3 
an-ned conflict situations similarly defines cultural property as 'of great 
importance to the cultural heritage of every people 5400 These two provisions do 
not differ greatly but for the inclusion of a spiritual element . 
40 1 But such 
spiritual element does make an important difference in the protection of 
religious places and thereby the protection of IDPs as it broadens the 
application of Article 16 of Additional Protocol 11 to a larger number of places 
of worship. Therefore under Additional Protocol 11 places of worship can be 
protected for their spiritual significance whereas under 1954 Cultural Property 
Convention they can only be protected for their great importance to cultural 
heritage. 402 
Notwithstanding the enhanced protection from direct attack of cultural 
property, their limitation to places of worship with great importance, would not 
provide effective protection to IDPs who take shelter in places of worship that 
do not fall within the definition of either Protocol 11 of Additional 1977 or 1954 
Cultural Property Convention. In such situations, IDPs would be protected 
against direct attack by the protection accorded to civilian objects. 
The Tadic case recognised the protection of cultural property as a 
customary principle and does not state any details of the nature of such 
398 Art. 6(d) of the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural 
Property. 
399 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 1469. 
400 Art. I (a) of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property; however, it does 
not explicitly refer to 'places of worship. ' 
401 J. Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict: Commentary on 
the Conventionfor the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict and its 
protocol Signed on 14 May 1954 in the Hague and on Other Instruments ofInternational Law 
Concerning Such Protection, (U. K, 1996) at p. 388. 
4"2 K. J. Partsch, 'Protection of Cultural property, ' at pp. 382-383. 
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property. 403 The ICRC Study on customary humanitarian law indicates that the 
customary protection is confined to highly important cultural property namely, 
4 property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people. 404 The 
Statute of the ICC, although contain a customary rule on the protection of 
cultural property, such as 'buildings dedicated to religion, ' does not refer to its 
4great importance' or 'heritage of people. 9405 Therefore the scope of special 
protection to 'places of worship' not of 'great importance to the heritage of people' 
against attack in hostilities are extended by the war crime and this in turn 
would provide enhanced protection to IDPs who take shelter therein. 406 The 
added significance of this provision of the Statute of the ICC is to be 
considered given the absence of a specific protection against direct attacks on 
civilian objects in internal armed conflicts in the Statute of the ICC as 
similar to that in the international armed conflicts. 407 
There are other possibilities of attack on IDPs and their objects: by 
the presence of combatants in these objects; and by incidental effects during an 
attack on a legitimate military objective. The presence of individual combatants 
within such civilian population does not change the civilian character of such 
population. 408 The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I cites as an 
example 'soldiers on leave visiting their families, ' to support the unchanged 
character of civilian population, on the basis that they are not 'regular units with 
fairly large numbers. 409 The Inter-America-Commission on Human Rights states 
that, 'the Army may not attack a house ... that, on the given occasion, armed 
dissidents have entered the house to eat or sleep. ' 410 It follows that the presence of 
a few individuals whether 'off-duty combatants' or who have some link with the 
armed forces or groups among the population of displaced civilians would not 
411 
deprive them of their character as civilians to make them vulnerable to attack . 
403 Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 217. 
404 j. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rules 
38 and 39, at pp. 127-135. 
405 Article 8 (2) ((e) (iv) of the Statute of the ICC. 
406 See, J. Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property, at p. 50. 
40' Article 8(2)(b) (ii) of the Statute of the ICC. 
408 An expression to this effect see Art. 50 (3) of Additional Protocol 1. 
409 C. Pilloud and J. Pictet, 'Article 50-Definition of Civilians and Civilian Population' in Sandoz, 
Y., Swinarski, C., and B. Zimmerniann, B., (eds. ), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p. 
609, at p. 612. 
410 Third Report on Colombia, Ch. IV c, para. 18 1. 
411 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 296. 
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However 'a fairly' large number of combatants on duty among the civilian 
population in civilian objects such as IDP camps would blur the 'lines between the 
civilian and military character of camps and so expose civilians inside to the risk 
of attack by opposing forces, where camps are perceived to serve as launching 
pads for renewed fighting. 012 
Attack on legitimate military objective can cause collateral damage to 
IDPs or to their camps or transport in its vicinity. Collateral or incidental 
damage is a grim 'reality of warfare rendered inevitable by the practical 
impossibility of an absolute separation of civilian and military areas and 
activities, AD and is not prohibited in international humanitarian law. Therefore 
this raises the question whether there are any restrictions in humanitarian law 
to protect IDPs in such situations. 
414 
Rules that restrict such collateral damage to civilians namely, obligation 
to take precautions in attack; prohibition against indiscriminate attack; and the 
principle of proportionality, are not provided in Article 13 of Additional Protocol 
11 as in Additional Protocol 1.415 
a. Protection Against Indiscriminate Attack 
Additional Protocol 11 does not contain a prohibition against indiscriminate 
attack, which is a necessary derivative of the application of principle of distinction, 
as these details were deleted at the Committee level to adopt a simplified text. 416 
However, it can be argued that the reference to the 'general protection against 
dangers arising from military operations' to civilians in Article 13(l) of 
Additional Protocol 11 is wide enough to cover certain prohibitions against 
indiscriminate attacks. 417 Accordingly, indiscriminate attacks which necessarily 
412 Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflicts (S/2001/331) 30 March 2001, para. 30; Third Report on Colombia 1999, Ch. IV c, para. 180. 
413 H. McCoubrey, 'Yugoslavia at War, ' at p. 915. 
414 Collateral damage is different from indiscriminate attack as the latter violates the principle of 
distinction and proportionality. 
415 Articles 51(4), (5); 51(5)(b); and 57,58 respectively of Additional Protocol 1; J. G. Gardam, 
Non-Combatant Immunity, at p. 128. 
416 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 677. 
417 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, ibid. ; S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 1449; 
L. Moir, Law of Internal Armed Conflict, at p. 117; F. Kalshoven states that 'general protection 
should be distinguished from special protection; while the latter term ... is used to 
indicate the fullest 
protection, verging on immunity, the former term implies that only a certain measure of protection 
is provided without there being an attempt to remove all the risks to xvhich the category of persons 
or objects concerned is exposed. Thus, general protection of the civilian population and civilian 
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amount to a direct attack on civilians, namely, attacks not directed against or which 
cannot be directed against military objectives and area bombardments as prohibited 
in 51(4)(a)(b) and (5)(a) of Additional Protocol 1, can be inferred within general 
protection. 418 
According to the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic case, rules 
of customary international law applicable in internal armed conflict 'cover 
such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities in particular from 
indiscriminate attacks, ... as well as prohibition of means of warfare 
proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of 
conducting hostilities. 019 However it stated that these rules of conduct of 
hostilities applicable in internal armed conflicts are not the same as those 
applicable to international an-ned conflict. 420 This attitude is later reflected in 
the Statute of the ICC which maintains a clear distinction between internal and 
international armed conflicts. 
However, the subsequent decisions by the ICTY and other international 
judicial bodies seem to implement these abstract principles by referring to the 
corresponding rules of Additional Protocol 1. The Trial Chamber in Kupreskic et 
al 42 1 elaborated that attacks even directed against military objectives would be 
illegal if 'conducted using indiscriminate means or methods of warfare, or in 
such a way as to cause indiscriminate damage to civilians. 022 The Trial 
Chamber seems to have implemented the 'general essence' extension of 
customary international law of the Appeal Chamber in Tadic case by resorting to 
those specific rules in Additional Protocol I as part of customary international 
law. 423 
objects basically implies two things: a prohibition on making them the object of direct attack, and a 
requirement to avoid unacceptable collateral loss or damage as a result of attacks on military 
objectives. ' F. Kalshoven, 'Reaff=ation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977, Part 11' (1978)IX 
NYIL 107, at p. 113; S. Junod, ibid., at p. 1449 states that, the general protection is broader as it 
refers dangers ansing from 'military operations' rather than an 'attack. ' Military operations 
means, 'movements of attack or defence by armed forces in action. ' 
418 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at pp. 677. 
'19 Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 217. 
420 Ibid., paras. 126,127; C. Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic 
Case, '(1996)7 EJIL 265, at p. 278; W. J. Fennck, 'The development of the Law of Armed Conflict 
Through the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia', 
(1998) 3 Journal ofArmed Conflict Law, 197, at p. 211. 
421 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al, para. 524. 
422 ibid. 
423jbid., paras. 524-5. 
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights opined that Ji]n as 
much as certain provisions of Additional Protocol I codify for the first time 
customary law rules designed to protect civilians and civilian objects from 
indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, these provisions provide authoritative 
guidance for interpreting the extent of similar protection for these persons and 
objects during all internal armed conflicts. 424 It cited the first two paragraphs of 
Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I as an example of the implementation of the 
customary prohibition against indiscriminate attack. However, the ICRC study on 
customary international law states that Article 51(4) (c ) the third paragraph is 
also a norm of customary international law applicable in internal armed 
conflicts. 425 
Thus, indiscriminate attack means attacks: which are not directed at a 
military objective; 426 which resort to methods or means of combat that cannot 
be directed at a specific military objective; 427 and which employ methods or means 
of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by international 
humanitarian law. 428 Further, carpet or area bombardments against heavily 
populated placeS429 can also be included in this extension. 430 
The prohibition against indiscriminate attack by weapons means the 
prohibition of any use of weapons which are inherently indiscriminate; and 
prohibition of using weapons in an indiscriminate manner in spite of their 
inherent ability to discriminate. 431 Such prohibition of choice and us e of 
indiscriminate weapons is important as they are often used in areas of IDP 
concentration. For example, a village to which IDPs from other areas mov e for 
424 Third Report on Colombia, 1999, Ch. lVa, para. 75. 
425 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at pp. 40-43 
426 Art 51(4) (a) of Additional Protocol L 
427 Art. 51(4)(b) of Additional Protocol 1; 1996 Amended Mines Protocol Il to the 1980 UN 
CCW refers to these two instances as indiscriminate use of weapons. 
428 M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at p. 40 
429Art. 51(5) (a )of Additional Protocol 1; Art. 9 of the 1996 Revised Mines Protocol to the 1980 
CCW also prohibits carpet bombardment. 
430 Article 51(5) (a) of Additional Protocol I; J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, at pp. 43-45; Cassese specifies four such rules which have 
attained general acceptance with regard to civil wars since 1930's irrespective of recognition 
of belligerency : the prohibition against deliberate bombing of civilians; the prohibition against 
attacking civilian objectives; precautionary rules when attacking military objects; and the rule 
concerning reprisals against civilians. A. Cassese, 'The Spanish Civil War and the Development 
of Customary Law Concerning Internal Anned Conflicts' in A. Cassese (ed. ), Current Problems of 
International Law, Essays on U. S. and the Law of Armed Conflict, (Milan, 1975) p. 287, at p. 292 
431 See M. N. Schmitt, 'Future War and Principle of Discrimination, ' (1998)28 Israel Yearbook on 
Human Rights 5 1, at p. 5 5; Art. 5 1(4)(a) of Additional Protocol 1. 
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safety reasons may be attacked by indiscriminate weapons on the ground of 
restricting infiltration of armed opposition groups. In 1sayeva v. Russia, the 
military used 'indiscriminate weapons' i. e., bombs which had a damage radius 
exceeding 1000 metres and non-guided heavy combat weapons, within a 
'populated area' in Chechnya which was declared as a 'safety zone' and contained 
IDPs from other areas as well. 432 Here, the European Court of Human Rights ruled 
that this attack, which resulted in loss of lives was a violation of the right to 
life, not on the basis of the duty to refrain from arbitrary deprivation of lives but 
because the state had failed in its 'obligation to protect' by not taking positive 
measures to plan and execute with the necessary care for the lives of civilians inter 
alia., by using this kind of weapon. However, it did not resort to humanitarian law 
in which the rules against using indiscriminate weapons are stated as negative 
obligations. 433 
These norms were applied by the ICTY in the Martic case where it 
stated that though there is no formal proscription of cluster bombs in armed 
conflicts, 'even if an attack is directed against a legitimate military target, the 
choice of weapon and its use are clearly delimited by the rules of international 
humanitarian law' and applied Article 51(4)(b) of Additional Protocol I as a 
derivative of the customary principle of distinction. 434 Regarding the inaccurate 
targeting nature and low striking force of Orkan rockets which delivered cluster 
bombs which are wide-area munitions, 435 the ICTY in the Martic case considered 
that the employment of that weapon in that case was not designed to attack the 
military targets but to terrorize civilians and therefore constituted an indiscriminate 
436 attack . This 
implies that the restriction on the choice and use of such weapons 
in a given situation due to their indiscriminate effect on civilians, does not 
prohibit their use in all situations; rather, their legitimate use is permitted where a 
military objective is clearly separated from civilian concentration. In other words, 
prohibition of the use of a weapon as inherently indiscriminate per se at all 
circumstances cannot be realised by the application of this rule alone. 
432 Para. 190. 
433 Russia had not declared the state of public emergency in Chechnya at the time of this violation, 
Isayeva v. Russia, paras. 189,200,20 1. 
434 Prosecutor v. Martic, para. 18. 
435 See generally, V. Wiebe, 'Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons Under 
International Humanitarian Law' (2000)22 Michigan Journal ofInternational Lait, 85. 
436 Para. 30- 
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The absolute prohibition of weapons of an indiscriminate nature is not a 
likely event, even in multilateral treaties, as long as there is a chance of their 
being used in a discriminate manner in some circumstances. For instance, the 
Third Protocol on incendiary weapons to the 1980 UN CCW supplements these 
rules by prohibiting in all circumstances indiscriminate attack on military 
objectives located within a concentration of civilians, such as inhabited parts of 
towns or villages or camps for displaced civilians by air-delivered incendiary 
weapons . 
437 However, the non-prohibition of use of incendiary weapons other 
than air-delivered ones on a military objective clearly separated from the 
concentration of civilians, indicates the vulnerability of displaced civilians to 
incidental damage as an inevitable reality of the combat activities. 438 Because 
the same harm can result if long-range multiple rockets that cannot be accurate in 
targeting are used to release incendiary bombs and given the nature of such 
weapons which set fire and cause bum injuries to civilians, the protective value of 
such provision is uncertain. 
It has, however been stated by the International Court of Justice with 
regard to international armed conflict in its advisory opinion that, 'states must 
never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use 
weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military 
targets. 439Existence of such a customary prohibition means that weapons of an 
inherently indiscriminate nature must be prohibited from use even in the 
absence of treaty prohibition in this regard . 
440 Though this specific rule is not 
stated explicitly in the Tadic case, at least the Appeals Chamber recognised 
the customary nature of the principle of distinction in internal armed 
conflicts. However, it should be noted 'that the principle of distinction is more 
often applied to the manner of deployment of particular weapons rather than 
437 See the definition of 'concentration of civilians' in Art. 1(2) of Protocol III to the 1980 UN 
CCW and Art. 2(2) of the same; also see Article 3 (7), (8) and (9) of the 1996 Amended Mines 
Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW concerning the prohibition on direction of mines including 
anti-vehicle mines, booby-traps and other devices against civilians and any indiscriminate use 
of the same. 
438 Article 2(3) of the Protocol III to the 1980 UN CCW. 
439Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear weapons, ICJ, para. 78. 
440 L. Doswald-Beck, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons' (1997) 
No. 316 IRRC p. 35, at p. 38; R. J. Mathews & L. H. McCormack, 'The Relationship Between 
International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control' in H. Durham and L. H. McCormack (eds. ) 
The Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International Humanitarian Law (Hague, 1999) 
p. 65, at p. 73. 
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to the weapons themselves. ... To the extent that any particular weapon type can 
be deployed in a discriminatory manner, it ought not to be illegal by reason solely 
of the application of this general principle. 944 1 Even blind weapons such as land 
mines were regarded by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as 
discriminatory and therefore legal to use provided they are recorded, marked and 
contain the capability to self-destruct within a reasonable time. Therefore unless 
such inherently indiscriminate weapons types are prohibited in international 
armed conflicts they cannot be regarded as illegal in themselves. 
However, with regard to weapons usage in internal armed conflicts, the 
Appeals Chamber, based on the general principle that the means of injuring the 
enemy is not unlimited, stated the more general principle that '[w]eapons or other 
material or other methods prohibited in international armed conflicts must not 
be employed in any circumstances' which it regarded as extended to internal 
armed conflicts. 442 Accordingly, regardless of the specific nature of the weapon 
i. e., either for causing unnecessary suffering or of their inherently indiscriminate 
effect, it stated more generally that those weapons which are prohibited in 
international armed conflicts cannot be used in internal armed conflicts. 443 At least 
such an extension of customary law is significant since Additional Protocol 11 or 
the war crimes provisions in the Statute of the ICC applicable to internal armed 
conflict do not prohibit the use of any weapons. 
To prohibit weapons which cause unnecessary suffering by the 
customary principle without a prohibition of the same by treaty law, 444 a 
445 
general assessment of their lawfulness is required . The lack of a decisive 
44 1 R. J.. Mathews && LH. McCormack, ibid., at p. 73. 
442 Tadic, Jurisdiction, paras. 110,119. 
443 Ibid., para. 119 by citing the general principle in Art. 5 (3) of the Turku Declaration of 
Minimum Humanitarian Standards of 1990 revised in 1994. 
444 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear weapons, para. 78; though originally this principle 
focused on the suffering to combatants, technological developments and the resultant impact of 
weapons on civilians made it necessary to extend this to civilians, R. J. Mathews & 
T. L. H. McCormack, 'Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control', at 
p. 72; see for such an extended application of the principle, H. Meyrowitz, 'The Principle of 
Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering' (I 994)299, IRRC 98, at p. 105; 11 thPreambular para 
to Ottawa Treaty on Land mines; Art. 3(3) of the Amended Protocol 11 on the Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, May 3 1996 to the 1980 UN 
CCW; see dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons case, ICJ, 8 July 1996, reprinted in (1996) 17 HRLJ 253 -400, at 
pp. 356-357 and 374 and Judge Koroma, ibid., at p. 383. 
445 L. Doswald-Beck, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice' at p. 45, n. 29. 
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criterion regarding the assessment makes the application of this rule difficult, 
even in international armed conflicts. The International Court of Justice 
interprets unnecessary suffering as 'harm 'greater than that unavoidable to 
achieve legitimate military objectives. 9446 The relevant factors to be considered 
to determine whether a weapon would cause unnecessary suffering are 
inevitability of serious permanent disabilities or inevitable deaths caused by such 
weapon. 447 Unlike the difficulty involved in the assessment of unnecessary 
suffering of weapons, determining the inherent indiscriminate nature of a 
weapon is not so complicated. However, the reluctance of states to accept 
the evolution of such a customary law to prohibit the weapons per se, due to 
their unnecessary suffering or indiscriminate effect, even in international armed 
conflicts, is reflected in the Statute of ICC concerning war crimes. 448 In terms of 
the ICC, to prohibit the employment of weapons, projectiles and materials which 
cause unnecessary suffering or which are of an inherently indiscriminate nature, an 
additional comprehensive prohibition whether in customary international law or 
conventional law is necessary. 449 Such limitation in the war crimes of international 
armed conflicts and the absence of any prohibition of at least poisoned weapons in 
the Statute of the ICC with regard to internal armed conflicts indicate the 
restrictive tendency. 450 Therefore the customary prohibition of weapons per se in 
internal armed conflict is subjected to its comprehensive prohibition in 
international armed conflicts. As indicated by Appeals Chamber in Tadic, '[w]hat 
is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be 
inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife. 9451 
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic considered that there is a general consensus 
in the international community that the use of chemical weapons is prohibited in 
446 Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear weapons, para. 78. 
447 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. 24 1. 
448 According to Article 8(2)(b)(xx) of the Statute of ICC, superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering alone will not make an employment of a weapon of such nature subject to war crime, 
rather in addition, such weapon should be comprehensibly prohibited by a multilateral treaty. 
449Art. 8(2)(b)(xx) of the statute of the ICC; see M. Cottier, ' Preliminary Remarks on 
Subparagraphs (xvii)-(xx): Prohibited Weapons: Drafting History' in O. Triffierer (ed. ), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, p. 239, at p. 243. 
450 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Lail, state 
that, the in customary humanitarian law use of poison or poisoned weapons is prohibited 
in 
internal anned conflict, Rule 72, at pp. 251-254. 
451 Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 119. 
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internal armed conflicts. 
452 As weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons 
are inherently indiscriminate in nature and would cause unnecessary suffering not 
only to IDPs but to their animals and vegetation and by rendering the survival 
453 objects useless and cause starvation to IDPs. The unqualified language used 
in 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention concerning development, production, or 
retention or use of chemical weapons 'never under any circumstances, ' is wide 
454 enough to include internal armed conflicts as well. Despite the treaty law 
prohibition on the use and other purposes of chemical weapons, the customary law 
prohibition of use of the same is valuable as it not only binds those states not 
party to the 1993 Convention but the insurgents as well. 
According to the ICRC study on customary law, the prohibitions on the 
use of means and methods which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering and on the use of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate are 
customary norms applicable in internal armed conflicts. 455 Therefore it could be 
stated that weapons which are widely prohibited in international armed conflicts 
for the above reasons can become prohibited in internal armed conflicts, by the 
application of these rules alone, even without a treaty prohibiting their use in 
internal armed conflict, if there is general consensus to this effect in the 
international community. 456 The advantage of these rules is that an attack can be 
made unlawful for infringing the same rules without the need to assess the 
proportionality of the collateral loss of lives as discussed below. 
Weapons regardless of their discriminate nature can still be used in an 
unlawful manner. This happens when such weapons are not directed at a 
specific military objective; or when directed against a military objective without 
452 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 
74, at pp. 260-63 state that the use of chemical weapons is prohibited in internal armed 
conflict as a rule of customary international law. 
453 See T. Wulff, Barriers Against Weapons: Developments of Weapons and Restrictions on Their 
Use (Lund, 1984) at p. 34. 
454 Art. 1 (1) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, January, 13,1993 (1993)32 ILM, p. 800. 
Arts. 1(5), 2(7) of the Convention specifically states that riot control agents shall not be used as 
a method of warfare because high concentrations of these will be dangerous, AN. W. Thomas & 
A. J. Thomas, Legal Limits on the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Dallas, 1970) at p. 12. 
455 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald -Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Lait', at pp. 23 7- 
250. 
456 In fact there is no difference between the use of weapons that are prohibited or 
restricted in international armed conflicts and in internal armed conflicts in customary 
humanitarian law, J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Rules 72-86, at pp. 251-296. 
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any precautionary measure, resulting in collateral loss of lives of IDPs, injury to 
IDPs and damage to objects of IDPs in excess of the anticipated direct military 
advantage. The customary rules concerning proportionality and precautions are 
relevant with regard to these situations of indiscriminate use of any weapon in 
internal armed conflicts. 
b. Proportionality and Precautions 
Even in an attack against a legitimate military objective, the safety of IDPs or 
IDP objects in the vicinity or IDPs who happen to be within such military 
objective can be endangered. In terms of the principle of proportionality, 
collateral loss or damage to civilians should not be excessive to the anticipated 
direct military advantage . 
457 If the collateral damage 'may be expected to 
cause incidental loss to civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof to civilians that outweighs the anticipated 
military advantage, as a matter of precaution such an attack shall be cancelled 
or suspended. 458 
It has been claimed that as a matter of logic by analogy, the 
disproportionate attacks codified in Article 51(5) and the connected precautionary 
measure in Aricle. 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I can be asserted as a 
necessary derivative of the principle of distinction, and therefore to be applicable 
to internal armed confliCtS. 459 Extending rules by analogy is always preferable 
and not a difficult task with regard to internal armed conflicts. However, the 
difficulty lies at the implementation level, as the state parties do not like to 
extend to internal armed conflicts rules for which they had not shown their 
legal conviction. Especially due to the absence of an explicit principle of 
distinction in Protocol 11 and the elimination of the principle of proportionality and 
precautions with regard to internal armed conflicts at the committee level in the 
Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption of Additional Protocols, 460 it is not 
feasible to extend them to internal armed conflict even through the 'general 
457 The principle of proportionality which provides protection against indiscriminate attack is 
explicitly stated in Art. 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol 1. 
458 Art. 57(2)b of Additional Protocol 1. 
459 M. Sassoli & A. Bouvier state, How Does Lawprotect in War? at p. 207, n. 211 and text. 
460 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at pp. 670 and 678. 
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protection' in Article 13 (1) of Additional Protocol 11.46 1 This is especially with 
regard to attacks that cause disproportionate civilian losses, as 'Committee III has 
rejected that provision before the simplification process had been manifested. , 462 
However, Bothe et al state that the principle of proportionality as provided in 
Article 51(5)(b) 
'463 is 'inherent in the principle of humanity' which is made 
available for application in the fourth clause of the Preamble to Additional 
Protocol 11.464 Therefore, provisions which regulate the conduct of hostilities in 
Additional ProtocolIl should be construed accordingly. 465 
Though the precise nature of the Martens Clause is not clear, 466 this 
contention is justifiable in the light of the principle of humanity stated therein. 
As a reflection of public conscience, the principles of humanity in the Martens 
Clause can be regarded as a' universal reference point and apply independently 
of the Protocol. 9 467 The principle of humanity prohibits any kind of violence 
which is not actually necessary for the purposes of armed conflict. 468 As the 
Martens Clause enhances the demands of humanity and public conscience, it 
should be used as a proper interpretative guide to resolve any ambiguity or 
vagueness concerning the customary or treaty based rules and principles of 
461 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, ibid., state that 'it is more difficult to load the obligation to 
take precautions in attack and the principle of proportionality on the provision for general 
protection. ' Ibid., at p. 670; but see S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol ll, ' at p. 1449 where he 
states that obligation to take precautions is covered by the 'general protection. ' 
462 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, ibid., at pp. 677-78. 
463 Art. 51(5)(b) of the Additional Protocol I states that, 'an attack which may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated' is prohibited. 
464 The preamble to Additional Protocol 11 provides that 'in cases not covered by the law in 
force, the human person remains under the protection' of the principles of humanity and the 
dictates of public conscience. 
465 S. MiyaZaki, 'The Martens Clause and International Humanitarian Law' in C. Swinarski (ed. ), 
Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of 
Jean Pictet, (Geneva, 1984) p. 433, at p. 440 states that the basis for the application of international 
humanitarian law is the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, which are 'jus 
cogens of human society. ' 
466 For various interpretations as to Martens Clause see A. Cassese, 'The Martens Clause : Half a 
Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky? ' (2000)11 EJIL 187. 
467 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 134 1. 
468 In the law of armed conflict principle of humanity has been regarded as prohibiting the means 
and methods of war not necessary to attain the military objective, E. K. Kwakwa, The International 
Law of Armed Conflict: Personal and Material Fields of Application (Doedrecht, 1992) at p. 36; 
principle of humanity referred to in the Martens Clause of the preamble 'inherently prohibits 
the destruction of values which are not relevant and proportionate to the military advantage 
anticipated, ' M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 671. 
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humanitarian law . 
469 
As the principle of humanity 'reinforces the homocentric 
focus of international humanitarian law, ' and reduces 'the traditional 
interstate emphasis of the law of war, 5470 Meron states that, 
No self-respecting state would challenge the applicability of such principles 
in internal an-ned conflict. More specific rules, such as proportionality, the 
prohibition of direct attack on civilians, the prohibition of indiscriminate and 
disproportionate attacks, the prohibition of means and methods of warfare 
that cause unnecessary suffering, can and should be regarded as necessary 
and proper derivations from the principles of humanity. 471 
Such an attitude of states as to the applicability of the principle of 
proportionality stated in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol 1, is evidenced in 
the 1996 Amended Mines Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW which prohibits the 
disproportionate placement of by mines, booby-traps and other devices. 472 The 
Second Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention adopts extensive rules on 
precautions in Article 57 and 58 of Additional Protocol I to attacks on cultural 
property including those connected with the principle of proportionality: to cancel 
or suspend such attacks or to refrain from such attacks that 'may be expected to 
cause incidental damage to cultural property. ' 473 Such enhanced protection with 
regard to cultural property is helpful to affirm and spell-out the application of the 
principle of proportionality and precautions in internal armed conflicts. On the 
other hand, it also reflects the ironic state of international humanitarian treaty law 
which provides enhanced protection to cultural property as opposed to the lives of 
human beings in internal armed conflicts, as the latter are provided with only a 
basic protection from direct attack in Article 13 of Additional Protocol 11. 
However, displaced civilians who take shelter in such cultural property which is 
civilian in nature are indirectly protected by the enhanced protection of the Second 
Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention. 
469 A. Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky? ' at p. 212; Kupreskic et 
al., para. 525; Nagendra Singh & E. McWbinney, Nuclear Weapons and Contemporary 
International Law 2 nd Rev. ed. (Dordrecht, 1989) at p. 47. 
470 Meron, 'The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, ' 
(200)94 AJIL 78, at p. 88; Dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry, Legality of the Threat or 
Use ofNuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 reproduced in (1996)17 HRLJ 33 l, at 
p. 3 74, para. 4; Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 119. 
47 1 T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as customary law (Oxford, 1989) at p. 74 
472 Art. 3(8) ( c). 
473 Arts. 6,7(c ), (d)(i)(ii) and 8 of the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 
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The establishment of the customary nature of the general principle 
which protects civilians from indiscriminate attack and the principle which 
requires to take reasonable care in attacking military objectives to avoid the 
bombing of civilians through negligence by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
474 is remarkable in the absence of treaty law in this regard . The Appeals 
Chamber in Tadic however did not relate this in a concrete mannerwiththe 
principle of proportionality. In Kupreskic et al., the Trial Chamber specifically 
stated that this principle of reasonable care or precaution in attacking military 
objectives to avoid unnecessary damage 'has always been applied in conjunction 
with the principle of proportionality. 475 It extends Articles 57 and 58 in Protocol I 
on precautions in attack and precautions against the effects of attacks to internal 
armed conflict for two reasons: that they 'specify and flesh out general pre- 
existing norms' and that they do not appear to be contested by any state. 476 
Therefore it can be stated that the applicability of customary principle of 
proportionality in internal armed conflict limits the attack on a military objective, 
if the foreseeable collateral loss of lives or injuries to civilians or damage to 
civilian objects is 'excessive, ' outweighing the 'concrete and direct' military 
advantage anticipated by such attack. As the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights states, despite 'the presence of some combatants within the hotel, 
the civilians therein did not lose their protection against direct and indiscriminate 
attack. 5477 This is true as long as such presence does not turn the hotel into a 
military objective by its location or use. However, if an attack on such a 
military objective would cause incidental civilian losses excessive to 'concrete and 
direct' military advantage, such an attack would be cancelled or suspended. But if 
such incidental civilian losses can be minimized by choice of means and methods 
of attack, it is legitimate to carry out such attack even with some civilian 
losses. 
If applied in the context of IDPs during displacement or in the camps, the 
infiltration of some members of an armed opposition group within the civilian 
population does not change its character and such attacks should be cancelled or 
474 Tadic, Jurisdiction, paras. 100- 10 1. 
475 Kupreskic et aL, para. 524; the Statute of the ICC does not contain provisions concerning 
principle of proportionality. 
476 ibid. 
477 Third Report on Colombia, Ch. IV b, para. 10 1. 
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suspended. However, if they launch an attack by using it as a base, then the IDPs 
would be at risk as the IDP camp would be considered as a military objective 
which may subject the IDPs to incidental losses. 
However, the principle of proportionality is easier to state than to apply 
in practice and gives rise to conflicting interpretations. Even though it is stated 
that 'very high, civilian losses and damages' are contrary to the fundamental rules 
in Articles 48(l)(2) and 5 1, as they do not justify attacks that cause 'extensive' 
collateral civilian losses, 478 the principle of proportionality does not suggest any 
upper limit of the acceptable civilian losses to outweigh the anticipated military 
advantage . 
479Specification of the term 'excessive' civilian losses suggests that the 
assessment of expected civilian losses is relative and to be determined with regard 
to the anticipated military advantage . 
480 Therefore Je]ven extensive civilian 
casualties may be acceptable, if they are not excessive in light of the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated. 948 1 For instance, in internal armed conflict, 
an attack on a military camp in the vicinity of IDP camps may be justified on the 
ground of a 'concrete and direct' military advantage, despite the high civilian 
casualties. Because of these inherent risks in the application of principle of 
proportionality it is therefore important to stress the obligation of the defending 
party who is in control of such IDPs, not to place the military objectives in the 
vicinity of the IDP camps. 482 
In evaluating the foreseeable collateral injuries to civilians and damage 
to their objects, the impact of such attacks on civilians generally is taken into 
account. The collateral impact of an attack on a vulnerable group of civilians in 
particular on IDPs does not therefore fon-n part of the principle of 
proportionality. 483 As Hampson points out, '[i]f the balance is between the 
military advantage and the impact on civilians generally, that will yield one result. 
If, however, as part of the equation, particularly severe consequences for one group 
478 C. Pilloud and J. Pictet, 'Article 51 -Protection of the Civilian Population, ' at p. 626, para. 1980. 
479 C. Greenwood, 'A Critique of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949' at 
p. I l, n. 29. 480 C. Greenwood, ibid. 
481 C. Greenwood, ibid; in contrary to this view C. Pilloud and J. Pictet, 'Article 51 -Protection of 
the Civilian Population' at p. 626, para. 1980 state that, the 'Protocol does not provide any 
justification for attacks which cause extensive civilian losses and damages. Incidental losses and 
damages should never be extensive. ' 
482 See above, Section F. I for precautionary measures imposed by customary humanitarian 
law on the parties to the conflict against the effects of attacks on IDPs. 
483 F. J. Hampson, Legalprotection Afforded to Children, at p. 25. 
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of civilians were to be taken into account, that might yield a different result. A 
course of action would be more likely to be found to be disproportionate. 9484 
Based on this reasoning, it is foreseeable that the impact of an attack generally 
on civilians is different from the specific impact that it causes on IDPs and in 
particular of wounded and sick, disabled, elderly IDPs and on children. The latter 
category of IDPs are vulnerable to such attacks as they are not in a position due 
to their physical condition to flee from an IDP camp or any other shelter to avoid 
485 deaths and injuries . 
c. Prohibition of Land Mines 
Widespread and often indiscriminate use of land mines in internal armed 
conflicts such as Sudan, Colombia, Russian Federation and Sri Lanka, cause 
physical injuries as well as death of civilians during the internal displacement or 
return to a mined area. 486 It also obstructs and endangers the return of IDPs and in 
certain situations, returning IDPs are the most affected category, rather than those 
who fled the mined areas. Mining poses a threat to IDPs during conflict 
situations if a party to the conflict uses it in an area of civilian concentration and 
continues to be a danger even after the military purpose has ceased to exist if the 
removal of mines is not undertaken or if the mines do not have the capability 
of self-destruction. 487 Such indiscriminate weapons would pose dangers to IDPs 
in movement to such areas or if relocated by a party to the conflict or on return to 
such areas. In addition to the physical danger, it prevents access to effective 
humanitarian assistance to IDPs by posing danger to the operations of 
humanitarian organisations. 
The restrictions in the 1996 Amended Mines Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN 
CCW regarding the direct and indiscriminate use of mines including anti-vehicle 
mines, booby-traps and other devices by government armed forces and insurgents 
in common Article 3 armed conflict situations is largely based on the 
indiscriminate usage of land mines as opposed to their inherently indiscriminate 
484 Ibid., at p. 25. 
485 See General Assembly Resolution 3318 (Y-XIX) 'Declaration on the Protection of Women and 
Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict. ' (14 December 1974) UN GAOR, 29 th 
Sess. Supp. No. 31 (A/9631)(1975). 
486 See generally, Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (http: //www. icbl. org/Im/2004). 
487 W. Kalin, Guiding Principles: Annotations, at p. 12 1, para. 109. 
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nature. 488 These restrictions rather than prohibitions on the use of anti-personnel 
mines, which are no more than the restatement of customary rules which would 
regulate the use of anti-personnel mines by all parties to the conflict, are 
inadequate to deal with the immense civilian casualties caused during displacement 
of civilians. 489 
The comprehensive ban on anti-personnel land mines by the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-personnel Mines and On their Destruction (hereafter 1997 Ottawa 
Convention) which results from a combination of disarmament and 
international humanitarian law treaty approaches, is more effective for the 
protection of IDPs as it not only prohibits the use of such weapons but also 
the production, stockpiling, or transfer of anti-personnel mines, to eradicate 
them from the arsenals of the State parties . 
490 The basis for the absolute 
prohibition of anti-personnel landmines as opposed to anti-vehicle mines, can 
be stated as qualitative, as the former causes enormous suffering to civilians 
compared with the latter . 
49 1 The Convention obliges each state party to destroy 
or ensure the destruction of all existing anti-personnel mines in the 'mined 
areas ' under its jurisdiction or control, and to take precautions upon 
identification of mined areas and until the clearance of all the mines emplaced 
therein, to mark, to fence and to monitor the mined area to 'ensure effective 
exclusion' of civilians. 492 The markings shall comply the minimum standards 
provided in 1996 Amended Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW to ensure their 
distinctive and durable nature, because of the danger posed to IDPs who return or 
pass through such areas by the destruction or removal or non-visibility of 
markings. These measures would at least attenuate the imminent threat posed 
to the IDPs in internal armed conflicts from the effects of anti-personnel 
488Article 3(l), (7) and ( 8) of the 1996 Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW. 
489 See Third Report on Colombia, Ch. IV a, para. 76 and Ch. IV b, para. 82. 
490 'Never under any circumstances, ' in Article l(l) 1997 Ottawa Convention includes common 
Article 3 and internal strife; the benefit of such approach is that the state parties cannot 
resort to the defence of non-existence of a non-international armed conflict especially in 
6grey areas, ' to avoid the application of their obligations. 
49 1 The Preamble to the 1997 Ottawa Convention, para. 1 explicitly states impediment in the return 
of IDPs and the casualties by killing and maiming of civilians which can include IDPs during 
displacement as one of the purposes to totally ban the anti-personnel mines; P. Herby & A. R. 
Nuiten, 'Explosive Remnants of War: Protecting Civilians Through an Additional Protocol to the 
1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons' (2001)83 No. 84 1, IRRC 195, at p. 196; for the 
impact of anti-tank mines on civilians ibid., pp. 196-97. 
492 Article 5 of the 1997 Ottawa Convention. 
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mines. However, even these measures cannot change the reality of the danger 
posed to IDPs by still unidentified and therefore unexploded mines, such as 
remotely-delivered mines in the ground. 493 For instance, an estimate made in 
2003 indicated that in the Russian Federation, the clearance of mine and 
unexploded ordnances would take 15-20 years if 'all means and resources are 
utilized. 5494 
As the use of anti-personnel landmines is not prohibited at this stage in 
customary humanitarian law, the customary principles of distinction, 
proportionality and precautions are relevant and important to restrict their use 
in internal armed conflicts by states not yet become parties to the 1997 Ottawa 
Convention and armed opposition groups. 495 Rule 81 of the ICRC Study on 
Customary Humanitarian Law which states that, '[w]hen landmines are used, 
particular care must be taken to minimise their indiscriminate effects, ' has become 
a customary norm applicable to internal armed confliCt. 496 Moreover, that '[a]t the 
end of active hostilities, a party to the conflict which has used landmines must 
remove or otherwise render them harmless to civilians, or facilitate their removal' 
is also a customary norm applicable to internal armed confliCt. 497 
G. Reprisals Against IDPs 
Prohibition of causing deaths of IDPs by reprisal attacks for an illegal act of the 
adversary is crucial as otherwise a spiral of similar attacks could be created. 
In a way, such reprisals would resemble collective punishment of IDPs for 
the illegal acts of an opposing party to the conflict. Civilians subjected to 
reprisals are 'individuals or groups who may not even have any degree of 
49' Remotely delivered mine means, 'a mine not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, 
missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. ' Art. 2(2) of the 1996 
Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW; J. Mathews & T. L. H. McCormack, ' The Relationship 
Between International Humanitarian Law and Anus Control', at p. 92. 
494 Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (http: //www. icbl. orR/lm/2004/russia); as far as the 
Unexploded Ordnance are concerned ( excluding landmines) clearance, removal or destruction of 
which after the cessation of active hostilities ( does not mean after the adoption of a forinal 
peace agreement ) by both parties to the conflict in internal armed conflict is provided in the 
Protocol on the Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 UN CCW), which is adopted 
on 28 November 2003 but yet not in force, see Arts. 3,4 and 5; 'Explosive remnants of war' is 
defined in this Protocol in Article 2(4) to mean, unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive 
ordnance; see Article 6 of the same Protocol for the protection of humanitarian organisations. 
495 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald -Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at 
p. 282. 496 Ibid., at pp. 280-83. 
497 Ibid., Rule 83, at pp. 285-86. 
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solidarity with the presumed authors of the initial violation: they may share 
with them only the links of nationality and allegiance to the same rulers. 498 
Whether a reprisal attack is an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life in internal 
armed conflict can only be detennined by discussing the position under 
humanitarian law. However, a rationale for prohibiting reprisal attacks on IDPs can 
be found in the human rights law itself by the very fundamental principle, 
according to which human rights are granted to the 'human being as an 
individual, as distinct from his position as a member of the collectivity. 499 
Therefore reprisal killings by the state party, of IDPs who are not responsible 
for the breach, 'more or less chosen at random, without any requirement of guilt or 
any form of trial' as collective punishment, violates the individualised protection 
offered by the fundamental principles of human rights, cannot be justified for 
whatever reason and is a violation of their right to life. 500 
Reprisals against IDPs within the power of a party to the conflict is 
prohibited only in international armed conflicts and neither common Article 3 
nor Additional Protocol 11 explicitly prohibit reprisals against IDPs as 
civilians. 50 'However, the absolute prohibition of certain acts in common 
Article 3 would not permit their violation contrary to the 'humane 
treatment5 as required therein. 502 Therefore, it can be asserted that the 
protection of humane treatment offered to civilians in common Article 3 in 
their individual capacity as human beings excludes reprisals against the same 
persons on the basis of the idea of solidarity. 503 Given the fact that Article 
4 (1) and (2) of Additional Protocol 11, particularly Article 4(2)(b) on collective 
punishment, develop and supplement the common Article 3 which is a customary 
norin of international law, absolutely prohibiting such acts, it can be considered 
that acts of reprisals against IDPs within the power of the party to the control are 
498 Kupreskic et al, para. 528. 
499F. Kalshoven, ' Human Rights, The Law of Armed Conflict, and Reprisals, ' (1971) No. 121 
IRRC p. 183, at p. 186. 
500 Kupreskic et al., Trial Chamber, paras. 528-29. 
50' H. P. Gasser, 'Protection of the Civilian Population' in D. Fleck (ed. ), in The Handbook of 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, (Oxford, 1995) p. 209, at p. 220; for the prohibition in 
international armed conflicts, see Art. 33(3) of IV Geneva Convention of 1949. 
502 j. Pictet, Commentary IV, pp. 39-40. 
503 F. Kalshoven, 'Human Rights, The Law of Armed Conflict, and Reprisals, ' at p. 191 
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prohibited in customary international law. 504 This view was supported by the 
ICTY in Martic and Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et aL, and confirmed by the ICRC 
Study on customary humanitarian law. 505 
Attacks against civilians or civilian objects are not prohibited in 
Additional Protocol 11.506 However, the ICTY in supporting the view that 
reprisals against civilians in conduct of hostilities are prohibited in internal 
armed conflicts, in its Rule 61 decision in the Martic case, referred to the 
General Assembly Resolutions 2444 and 2675 as declaratory of customary 
international law and the customary prohibition on attacks against civilians as 
supported by incorporation in Article 13 of Additional Protocol 11, and common 
Article 3 and Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11, in particular, Article 4(2)(b) on 
'collective punishments' and stated that: 
[t]herefore, the rule which states that reprisals against the civilian 
population as such, or individual civilians, are prohibited in all 
circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful behaviour of the other 
party, is an integral part of customary international law and must be 
respected in all armed conflicts. 507 
Again in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et aL, the Trial Chamber concluded 
that reprisals not only against those within the power of the party to the 
conflict but against 'civilians in the combat zone are also prohibited' in customary 
law. 508 In support of this the Trial Chamber referred to the widespread opinio 
necessitatis as confirmed by the General Assembly Resolution in 1970 that 
specifically prohibits reprisals against civilians, ratification of Additional Protocol 
I which explicitly prohibits civilian reprisals by a high number of states, view of 
the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Martic and the absence of any claim of 
reprisals against civilians by states engaged in internal and international armed 
conflicts in the last fifty years. It finally referred to the Comments of International 
Law Commission on Article 14 (d) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
504 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 637; L. Moir, Law of Internal Armed 
Conflict, at p. 171; S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol IF, at p. 1373; Final Report of the 
Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780(1992), 
S/1994/674-27 May 1994. 
505 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at pp. 526- 
529. 
506 Reprisal against civilians and their objects is prohibited in international armed conflict, Arts. 
51(6), 52 of Additional Protocol 1. 
507 Martic, at p. 47, para. 17; Kupreskic et al., paras. 528-536. 
... Kupreskic et al., para. 534. 
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which relies on common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the 
prohibition of reprisals in internal armed conflicts against civilians including 
those in the combat zone, as authoritative confirmation of the existence of the 
customary rule. 509 According to the Trial Chamber in Kupreskic et al., this 
view of the International Law Commission is correct. 
510 
The logical consequences arising from the prohibited nature of reprisals 
against IDPs during hostilities or who are within the control of the parties to the 
conflict is that, attacks on IDPs cannot be justified either on the tu quoque 
principle or on the principle of reprisals based on the fact that similar acts 
were committed by the other party. 5 11 Consequently, for instance, shelling of 
IDPs as such is absolutely prohibited even if the reprisal act against civilians 
is a proportionate response to a similar violation by the other party. 512 
The ICTY in Martic and Kupreskic et aL, by referring to the provisions 
of humane treatment of IDPs within the power of the parties to the conflict in 
common Article 3 and Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11 to justify the prohibition 
of reprisal against civilians in conduct of hostilities as stated in Article 13 of 
Additional Protocol 11, ( reprisals under discussion in these cases concern such 
reprisals) seems to blur the distinction of application between the two, which 
cannot be warranted. Considering common Article 3 or Article 4, in particular 
collective punishment in Article 4(2)(b) of the Additional Protocol 11 as broad 
enough to cover the reprisals in conduct of hostilities is simply an incorrect 
interpretation of existing law. 513 This is an ironic situation as the ICTY in 
Kupreskic et al explicitly recognised the different situations in which reprisals can 
be committed and therefore, obviously, the limited application of common Article 
3 in internal armed conflicts. 514 However, due to this incorrect interpretation, 
these two cases 'lack persuasive authority' in particular, on the issue of 
509 Kupreskic et al., para. 534. 
510 ibid. 
51 1 Kupreskic et al., para. 765. 512 Martic, para. 15. 
513 See F. Kalshoven, 'Reprisals and the Protection of Civilians: Two Recent Decisions of the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal' in L. C. Vohrah et al (eds. ), Man's Inhumanity to Man: Essays on 
International Law in Honour ofAntonio Cassese (Hague, 2003) p. 48 1, pp. 488-492 nn. 21,26,504, 
508. 
514 'As for reprisals against civilians, under customary international law they are prohibited as long 
as civilians find themselves in the hands of adversary. With regard to civilians in combat zones, 
reprisals against them are prohibited by Article 51(6) of the First Additional Protocol of 1977, 
Kupreskic et al., para-527. 
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reprisals against IDPs who are not within the control of the parties to the 
confl, Ct. 
515 It can be derived also from the ICRC study on customary law that such 
a prohibition on reprisal attacks of IDPs who are not within the control of the 
parties to the conflict has not attained the status of a customary norm applicable 
to internal armed conflict, as it only deals with the reprisals of civilians within the 
control of the parties to the conflict on the basis of common Article 3 and Article 
4(2) of Additional Protocol 11.516 
However, given the prohibition of attack against civilians in Article 13 of 
Additional Protocol 11, such a prohibition on reprisal can be applied through the 
Martens Clause for the protection of IDPs. Even if the prohibitions on 
reprisal attacks on civilians in conduct of hostilities were not declaratory of the 
customary international law as claimed in the ICRC study, they could have 
transformed into general rules or principles of international humanitarian law. 
Even though the 'principles of humanity' or 'dictates of public conscience' in the 
Martens clause may not be considered as independent sources of international 
law, as a minimum, reference to those principles and dictates whenever a rule 
of international humanitarian law is not sufficiently precise is possible, to 
define the scope of and objective of such a rule. 517 
Cassese considers that the rule concerning reprisals against civilians has 
had general acceptance with regard to civil wars since the 193 0, S. 
518 In the light 
of the development of human rights it is an abhorrent practice to attack IDPs as 
such even for the compliance of humanitarian law. 
Moreover, the 1996 Revised Mines Protocol to the 1980 CCW which is 
applicable to internal armed conflicts prohibits the direction of mines, booby- traps 
and other devises by way of reprisals against civilians or civilian objects. 519 
Such multilateral treaty provisions can be regarded as indicative of the 
evolution of legal conviction among states as to the unlawful nature of the 
515 F. Kalshoven, 'Reprisals and the Protection of Civilians', at p. 508. 
516 j. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at pp. 526- 
29; but in international armed conflict such norms are customary, ibid., at pp. 519-523 
517 Kupreskic et al., para. 525. 
5 18 A. Cassese, 'The Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning 
Internal Armed Conflicts' at p. 292. 
5 19 Arts. 1(2), 3(7) 1996 Amended Protocol 11 to the 1980 UN CCW. 
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targeting of civilians and their objects in internal armed conflicts independent of 
treaty obligations. 520 
Despite the misinterpretation of the existing law derived from the 
Commentary of the International Law Commission, Kupreskic et al refers to 
instances which can point to the existence of widespread opinio necessitates with 
regard to reprisals against civilians within the combat zone. Thus, opinio 
necessitates emerged as a result of principles of humanity or dictates of 
public conscience may indicate emergence of a general rule or principle of 
humanitarian law that prohibits reprisals against civilians in combat zones. 521 
H. Protection of IDPs from Being Used as Human Shields 
Armed forces of both parties to the conflict often use the presence or movements 
of IDP as human shields to reduce or impede the attacks on military objectives. 
Such acts by armed forces to keep the IDPs for their own safety would obstruct 
the movement of the IDPs for safety to other areas of the country and expose 
them to death. Human rights law does not explicitly prohibit such a practice, 
although it is a violation of the right to life. However, such a protection can be 
derived from the obligation to take positive measures to protect the right to life of 
IDPs. 522 In a claim by the applicant in Demiray v. Turkey that her husband was 
used as a human shield, the European Court of Human Rights stated that Article 2 
on the right to life should be interpreted in such a way as to make its safeguards 
'practical and effective. ' 523 Therefore, 'in certain well-defined circumstances 
there is a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational 
measures to protect an individual for whom they are responsible. ' 524 
520 See A. Cassese, 'The Geneva Protocols of 1977 and Customary International Law' (1984) 3 
UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 55, at p. 85. 
521 See Kupreskic et al., para. 527. 
522 Human Rights Committee, ' The Right to Life' para. 3; also from the general obligation with 
regard to all rights stated in respective treaties, Art. 2(l) of the ICCPR, as Human Rights 
Committee, 'Nature of General Legal Obligation' paras. 3 and 6 states that, Ja] general obligation 
is imposed on States parties to respect the Covenant rights and to ensure them to all individuals in 
their territory and subject to its jurisdiction' and this includes both negative and positive 
obligations; similarly, with regard to 1 (1) of the ACHR in Velasquez Rodriguez case, Judgment of 
July 29 1988, para. 162, the inter-American Commission on Human Rights Stated that, '[t]his article 
specifies the obligation assumed by the States Parties in relation to each rights protected' and such 
obligations include both negative and positive aspects. 523 Application no. 27308/95, Judgment of 21 November 2000, para. 40. 
524 Ibid., para. 41. 
218 
Using the movement or presence of IDPs within or outside a relocation 
camp as human shields in hostilities or intentionally placing military objectives 
within the concentration of IDPs to use them as human shields, to protect 
military objectives from attack or to impede military operations is not 
prohibited in Additional Protocol 11.525 Protection against such acts can be 
extended by the party in control over the area in which the IDPs are in movement 
or IDP camps are located. As already noted, although the 'general protection' of 
civilians in Article 13 cannot be considered as broad enough to include the 
obligations of defending party to take precautions, it is certainly 'broad enough to 
include a prohibition against the use of civilians as a shield for military 
objectives. ' 526 This means deliberately using IDPs itself as human shields as well 
as placing military camps within the concentration of IDPs which makes the 
principle of distinction ineffective are covered within the 'general protection'. 
Such an interpretation is a necessary consequence of the prohibition of making 
IDPs the object of attack in Article 13 of Additional Protocol 11. 
As only the IDPs within the power of the party can be made as human 
shields, such practice can also be prohibited by virtue of common Article 3 and 
Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11 that prohibits violence to life, cruel or 
inhuman treatment, and taking of hostages. 527 The practice of placing a military 
camp in the vicinity of a relocation camp for displaced civilians is also contrary to 
such protection, as it can often result in civilians being used as human shields, or 
attacked incidentally in an indiscriminate combat activity. Articles 17(l) and 
5(2) (c) of Additional Protocol 11 explicitly require that IDP camps should not 
be placed close to combat zones. 528 Moreover, using civilian detainees or for 
the purposes of this study IDPs in camps, as human shields can constitute 
cruel treatment or an outrage upon personal dignity prohibited by common Article 
3 as customary law. 529 
525 See Art. 28 of IV Geneva Convention of 1948 and Art. 51(7) of Additional Protocol I for such 
prohibitions in international armed conflicts; Principle 10(2)( c) of UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement prohibits such activities with regard to IDPs. 
526 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 678 ; but see S. Junod, 'Commentary 
on Protocol IF, at p. 1449. 
527 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, Commentary, at p. 678. 
528 S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol IF, at p. 1449. 
529 Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Judgment, Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, (26 
February 2001) para. 264; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgement, Trial Chamber, IT-95-14/1-T (25 
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The prohibition of the use of human shields is a 
530 internal armed conflicts. 
norm of customary law in 
June 1999), para. 229; such an Interpretation can be used in the application of the right to be free 
from inhuman treatment in human rights law. 
530 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Dosv,, ald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at p. 337. 
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6. Protection Relating to Return or Resettlement 
A. The Necessity to Return or Resettlement and its Impact on the 
Protection of IDPs 
Internal displacement gravely affects IDPs in many ways. In particular, older 
people and disabled find it difficult to move from place to place in conflict 
situations. Their already vulnerable physical conditions deteriorate and 
furthermore their mental health is affected by sense of alienation due to the 
changed circumstances of displacement. Children often miss a proper education in 
a secure environment, as displaced families are not able to provide even the 
smallest cost of books and school uniforms. This has a profound impact on their 
development and prospects, as they grow up uneducated and unemployable. The 
overcrowded conditions of IDP camps are not suitable for the education and 
development of children, or provide privacy for women and family life. Lack of 
nutritious food, quality health care, and essential drugs also gravely affects 
children, as they are prone to illnesses such as diarrhoea, cholera and malaria. 
Failure to immunise IDP children often result in childhood deceases. 
Lack of suitable employment for adolescent IDPs to lead a sustainable 
living with other consequences of displacement, has an adverse impact on their 
mental health as well. For instance, a medical survey conducted in Turkey in 1998 
on a group of IDPs indicate that 66 percent were suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder, and 29.3 percent had severe depression. ' Moreover, IDPs from 
rural areas who depend for their livelihood on their land, livestock and other 
natural resources are disproportionately affected by displacement as they are 
mostly uneducated to do other work in their displaced areas. Protection of 
livelihood as opposed to survival of such IDPs means, as a first step, taking 
measures to facilitate access to their lands. 
Living in IDP camps and temporary shelters, and in overcrowded urban 
areas on basic humanitarian assistance is not consistent with the right to an 
adequate standard of living of an IDP and his family and to the continuous 
1 Dr. Aytekin Sir, Dr. Yener Bayram and Dr. Mustafa Ozkan, 'A Preliminary Study on PTSD After 
Forced Migration, ' 1998 Turkish Journal of Psychiatry, pp. 173-180 as cited in Displaced and 
Disregarded. Turkey's Failing Village Return Programme, Human Rights Watch, October 2002, 
vol. 14, No. 7(D), at p. 22, n. 64; Global IDP Project, 'High Levels of Traumatic Stress and Suicide 
Among Displaced' in Profile ofInternal Displacement: Sri Lanka (as at I September, 2005) at p. 75. 
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improvement of living conditions in its full realisation, in its medium and long- 
term implementation. For instance, in Sri Lanka, a large number of IDPs have 
lived in welfare centres for well over 15 years. 2 The shelters are buildings or 
thatched roofed shelters or tents provided by international organisations, which 
lack space and have unhygienic conditions, leading to health problems among 
IDPs. 3 In Colombia, many IDPs are forced to live in urban slums in unsuitable 
conditions or homeless as they are not able to return safely to their places 
of habitual residence. 4 
Thus, short-term emergency survival needs are not consistent with the 
right to adequate standard of living of IDPs who live in IDP camps for a long 
time depending on humanitarian assistance. In such situations, the core 
obligations of the state varies from mere provision of basic survival needs 
to provision of assistance to live in relatively sustained and improved 
conditions. The medium and long term protection needs are, safe and dignified 
voluntary return to their homes and reintegration or resettlement and integration in 
other areas within a country. Safe return can be an ideal solution for 'displaced' 
civilians as it restores them to their previous undisplaced position. However 
return is not always the ideal. If the IDPs cannot be voluntarily returned for a 
long time to their homes due to, for example, occupation of their property by 
security forces or unsafe conditions, they can be voluntarily resettled in other 
places within the country. 
Therefore the state has the responsibility to establish conditions that 
facilitate the return and resettlement and reintegration of IDPs, such as clearance 
of land mines and unexploded ordnances; establishing independent judiciary and 
other human rights mechanisms for the protection of returnees and provision of 
survival needs through humanitarian assistance; restitution or compensation for 
lost or destroyed property, assistance in recovery or reconstruction of property 
damaged as a consequence of armed conflict; and reconstruction of damaged 
infrastructure, schools, water systems and so on. In other words such fulfilment 
of protection needs to be made on individual and community bases. 
2 The Refugee Council, 'Sri Lanka: Internally Displaced Persons and Safe Returns, Sri Lanka 
Project, ' ( London, 2003) at p. 25. 
3 bid 
4 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an 
Adequate standard of Living, E/CN. 4/2005/48 (3 March 2005) para. 38. 
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As such, a question arises in this regard is whether, the protection of 
IDPs comes to an end with the return or resettlement of IDPs. The UN 
Guiding Principles do not state the cessation of protection of IDPs as it is not a 
binding legal instrument to provide protection to IDPs as a specific category 
and therefore do not contain a legal definition of IDPs, but a descriptive term for 
operational guidance on the ground. This raises another question whether it is 
desirable to have a legal definition of IDPs. It is desirable to specify when special 
protection of IDP ends, as it is often terminated prematurely before a durable 
solution, once the IDP is returned or resettled elsewhere in the country, 
on the basis of the description of IDPs which necessitates movement from 
home to become an IDP. For instance, the law concerning IDPs in Croatia 
considers the return of IDPs to their original residence as an adequate condition 
for ending the special status of IDPs. 5 
In order to provide effective protection by treaty law, it is necessary 
to have a legal definition or description to delineate the scope of protection 
of IDPs. The fact that when the special status comes to an end in its eventual 
course, returnees are protected by the broader human rights law and humanitarian 
law is a conducive factor in the special protection of IDPs as they would 
ensure a continuous protection to avoid any concerns involved in the 
cessation of protection. 
The return of IDPs to their homes or their being resettled elsewhere 
in the country, thereby reversing their physical movement, cannot meaningfully 
end the protection of IDPs. Although the description of IDPs does not 
explicitly state lack of 'protection' as the reason for the displacement, it may be 
implicitly derived from the protection provided from forced and otherwise 
involuntarily displacement. Mere reversal of displacement by return or return 
would not necessarily provide a durable protection; for instance, many IDPs in 
Sri Lanka return to their homes only to displace several times. 6 Moreover, returned 
or resettled IDPs can face numerable protection needs due to their displaced 
situation, such as lack of documentation, in particular, title deeds to lands and 
5 Similar, premature ending can be found in the national laws concerning IDPs in Georgia, 
Colombia, Russian Federation and Bosnia and Herzigovina, see C. Beau, 'National Legislation' 
(2003)17 Forced Migration Review p. 16, at pp. 16-17 
6 The Refugee Council, 'Sri Lanka: Internally Displaced Persons and Safe Returns', at p. 21 
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personal identification, threat to life by landmines, lack of shelter, restitution of 
property or compensation, and assistance with other basic needs. 
The specific protection needs of the IDPs due to displacement cannot 
abruptly come to an end. Such a situation can arise if the issue of ending IDP 
protection is not separated from the mandate of an organisation to provide 
assistance and protection. For instance, despite the end of the mandate of the 
ICRC at the end of conflict, IDP specific protection needs can persist as a 
post-conflict issue .7 Moreover, for instance, IDPs resettled in a non-conflict 
areas are not the primary targets of the protection activities of the ICRC as they 
are not the most vulnerable and in immediate protection needs. 8 In such 
situations, considering the protection of IDPs has come to an end is not the 
correct approach. Therefore, even when IDPs are returned or resettled, as 
long as their IDP specific protection needs remain, they can be covered by such 
specific protection and later on by the general international human rights and 
humanitarian law ( if the conflict exists). 9 
B. Right to return 
Protection of IDPs from forced or otherwise involuntary displacement 
presupposes the right to return voluntarily to their homes or place of habitual 
residence in safety and dignity. IDPs who have been forcibly displaced and 
resettled in safer areas may not like to return. However, this is a significant and 
a preferable solution for the IDPs who stay in camps and settlements without 
any arrangements for resettlement in other part of the state and to those 
IDPs who have particular attachment and dependency to their land such as 
indigenous persons. ' 0 
Apart from the 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention which 
explicitly provides for a right to return of relocated indigenous IDPs to their 
traditional lands as soon as the grounds for such relocation cease to exist, the right 
to return to the places of origin or habitual residence of IDPs within the 
7 W. Kalin, 'The Legal Dimension' (203)17 FMR p. 15, at p. 16 
8 See below, Ch. 7, Section, C. 
9 There is an emerging consensus for such an integrated approach based on the criteria of 
solution (return or resettlement ) and needs, see E. Mooney, 'Bringing the end into Sight for 
Internally Displaced Persons' (2003)17 FMR p. 4, at p. 6 
" C. Meindersma, 'Legal Issues Surrounding Population Transfers in Conflict Situations', at p. 62; 
Principle 9 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
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country is not recognised explicitly in Article 12 of the ICCPR. 11 According to 
Walter Kalin, though 'there is no general rule in present international law that 
affirms the right of internally displaced persons to return to their original place of 
residence, ' there is Ja]t least a duty of the competent authorities to allow for the 
return of internally displaced persons can, however, be based on freedom of 
movement and right to choose one's residence. ' 12 Thus, civilians who have been 
forced to displace as well as those who have been obliged to displace as a 
consequence of armed conflicts have the right to return on the basis of their right 
to choose their residence. 13 Any civilians subjected to transfer on lawful grounds, 
namely, for military or safety reasons or otherwise displaced should be allowed to 
return once the grounds that caused their displacement ceased to exist. As stated 
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Miskito Indians case, 
the relocated IDPs, if they desire, should be allowed to return to their original 
region, once the emergency is over. 14 
There are many resolutions by the Security Council and General Assembly 
which have consistently reaffirmed the right to return of displaced persons in safety 
regardless of the cause of displacement, whether forced or not. 15 The General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 14 December 
1995, Annex 7 explicitly provides for the right of voluntary return of refugees and 
displaced persons to their homes. ' 6 Principles on Housing and Property Restitution 
for Refugees and Displaced Persons, recognises the right of all displaced persons to 
return voluntarily to their former homes, lands or places of habitual residence, in 
1 Article 16(3). 
12 W. Kalin, Guiding Principles: Annotations, p. 69; In Maria Mejia v. Guatemala, para. 65. 
13 N. Geissler, 'The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, ' at p. 465; 
Resolution of the Sub-Commission 'The Right to Freedom of Movement' 1995/13 (18August 
1995) affirms that, 'the right of refugees and displaced persons to return, in safety and 
dignity, to their country of origin and /or within it to their place of origin or choice. ' 
14 Miskitos, part 11, para. 2 1. 
15 The right to remain in their homes and right to voluntary return of refuges and 
displaced persons 
is repeatedly acknowledged by various UN Organs, without making any 
distinction between the 
beneficiaries whether they have been displaced due to avoid the effects of conflicts or those 
subjected to forced movement, see S. R. Roos, 'Right to Live and 
Remain', at pp. 517-18, nn. 4,5; 
Committee on CERD 'Article 5 and Refugees and Displaced Persons, ' para. 2(a). 
16 Reproduced in (1996)3 5 ILM 89,89, at p. 136. 
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safety and dignity. 17 In fact the right of the displaced persons to return to their 
homes is recognised therein as a 'free-standing, autonomous right in and of itself. ' 18 
The meaningful implementation of the right to return imposes an 
obligation on state to 'to make good any damage for which the authorities are 
responsible, including water, sanitation, electricity, gas, roads, and land, where it 
has been damaged or destroyed. '19 Right to hosing and property restitution or 
compensation is also important for the safe and dignified return. Moreover, it 
includes measures to facilitate safe return, in particular, clearing of mine and 
unexploded remnants, assistance to cover basic needs, provision of construction 
tools and materials and agricultural tools and seeds and education. 20 
The right to return in safety emphasises the fact that the return of IDPs 
should be voluntary and not forced. With regard to such a right of displaced 
civilians, the CERD states that 'all such ... refugees and displaced persons have the 
2 right freely to return to their homes of origin under conditions of safety. 1 Thus 
IDPs have a choice to resettle elsewhere rather than to return to their homes. Such 
resettlement would not affect their right to restitution of their house, land and 
property in their places of habitual residence. 22 
As far as humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflicts is 
concerned, Additional Protocol 11 neither provides for the right to return of IDPs 
who left their places due to the effects of hostilities nor for IDPs relocated 
by a party to the conflict in terms of Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol 11. 
However, the right to return of children is implicit in the 'temporary' nature of 
the evacuation carried out under Article 4(3)(e) of Additional Protocol 11 for 
their safety from the effects of hostilities. Though Article 17 is based on Article 
49 of the IV Geneva Convention of 1949 applicable to international armed 
conflicts, it does not contain a positive obligation, such as that in Article 49, 
to transfer them back to their original places once the grounds for displacement 
17 Principle 10 of the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and 
Displaced Persons, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2005/17 (28 June 2005). 
18 Explanatory Notes on the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and 
Displaced Persons, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2005/17/Add. 1 (8 July 2005), para. 42. 
19 Resolution of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights, 2002/30, 'Right to Return of Refugees and 
Internally Displaced Persons', para. 8. 
20 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, at p. 47 1. 
2' Committee on CERD, 'Article 5 and Refugees and Displaced Persons' para. 2(a). 
22 Principle 10.3 of the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Reftigees and Displaced 
Persons. 
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cease to exist. 23 However, from the rationale on which Article 17 (1) of 
Additional Protocol 11 is based, namely, the general principle against displacement, 
it can be implied that relocation is only justified as long as a need exists, 
for the safety of IDPs or military necessary. Therefore once the grounds which 
prompted the relocation cease to exist, even though there is no explicit obligation 
on the state to transfer the relocated IDPs back to their original places, at 
least IDPs should be allowed to return to their habitual places of residence. 
Otherwise such continued displacement would become an unlawful one in 
terms of Article 17(l) due to denial of return. 24 
Even the imposition of an obligation in Article 17(l) of Additional 
Protocol 11 to provide survival needs as long as the displaced are kept under 
enforced displacement, is not adequate to alleviate the long- term needs of IDPs, 
such as education of children, employment, and cultivation of such as paddy 
lands. Similar problems are common in situations other than enforced 
displacement, where civilians are displaced as a consequence of hostilities - in 
Sri Lanka and Burundi, IDPs' access to their land is limited, causing them 
to depend on food assistance. 25 Moreover, IDPs relocated for reasons other 
than that stated in Article 17(l) should be allowed to return as such return is the 
only just remedy for the violation of the rule against arbitrary displacement, as 
protected in Article 17(l) of Additional Protocol 11. The right to return is thus 
important to address the long-term needs of displaced civilians in protracted armed 
conflicts where there is little chance of peace. 
It is pertinent in this regard is the finding of the ICRC study on 
customary international humanitarian law, as according to which those who 
have been displaced on account of armed conflict have a right to voluntary return 
in safety to their homes or habitual places of residence as soon as the reasons 
for their displacement cease to exist. 26 
23 Article 49(2) of the IV Geneva Convention of 1949 explicitly requires that displaced civilians 
be returned back to their homes as soon as hostilities in such areas have ceased. 
24 See above, Chapter 3, Section, C. l. b. 
25 R. Cohen, F. Deng, Masses in Flight, at p. 28. 
26 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 132, 
at pp. 468-72. 
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C. Protection of Property 
As far as IDPs are concerned, protection of their property during displacement 
and property left behind in their habitual place of residence is important. As safe 
return of IDPs is necessary in order to ameliorate the displaced situation of 
IDPs, protection of property left behind from arbitrary deprivation or interference, 
is a form of protection need of IDPs. Thus, the property of IDPs such as homes, 
crops and livestock should be protected against arbitrary and unlawful 
appropriation, occupation and use by military and civilians belonging to the 
opposition party to the conflict, bombing or burning and theft or destruction. 
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is legally 
non-binding, guarantees the right to own property and prohibits arbitrary 
deprivation of property. 27 Notwithstanding the absence of a right to property 
in the ICEPR , 
Article 26 of the lCCPR which provides an independent right to 
equality before the law and equal protection by the law without discrimination in 
28 the enjoyment of all rights can protect the right to property as well . 
As observed 
by the Human Rights Committee, 'a confiscation of private property or failure by 
a State party to pay compensation for such confiscation could still entail a breach 
of the Covenant if the relevant act or omission was based on discriminatory 
grounds in violation of Article 26 of the Covenant. ' 29 Though this independent 
right to equal protection of law is derogable during a public emergency, the 
essence of the right and certain elements of the right to non-discrimination 
cannot be derogable under Article 4(l) in resorting to derogatory measure from 
30 Article 26 . 
Moreover, the immovable property of IDPs is protected during 
displacement in the ICCPR and ICESCR in the form of homes and houses. 31 
It is to be noted that home in Article 17 of the ICCPR is broader as it is not 
confined to a dwelling but includes 'a place where a person resides or carries 
out his usual occupation. ' 32 Thus home includes residential house and other 
27 Similarly, property is protected in, Article 5(d)(v) of the CERD; Article 14 of the 1989 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention ; and Art. 16(l) ( h) of the CEDAW. 
28 C. Krause, 'The Right to Property' in A. Eide et al. (eds. ), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
2 nd edition., p. 19 1, at p. 197. 
29 Simunek et al., v. The Czech Republic (516/1992) A/50/40 (19 July 1995) at para. 11.3 
30 See Art. 5 of the ICCPR. 
31 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, paras. 304,318. 
32 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 16, 'The Right to Respect of Privacy, 
Family, Home and Correspondence' para. 5. 
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property such as shops and plot of land . 
33 Destruction of houses as a 
34 punitive measure is not consistent with Art. I1 (1) of the ICESCR . Therefore, 
homes are protected against destruction or other measures by Article 11(1) of the 
35 ICESCR 
. Destruction of and arbitrary occupation and use of houses which 
prevent the IDPs from return to their homes to rebuild their lives in peace 
36 
and security is not consistent with their right to home and adequate housing. 
Moreover, The obligation of the state to protect the housing rights means to 
prevent the violations by individuals and other non-state actors. 
In order to consider that the right to home under Article 17 of the 
lCCPR is being continuously violated, the previous situation of IDPs before 
displacement, namely, they had grown up and had their roots therein is 
adequate even if they no longer live there due to acts of state authorities. 37 
Thus, prevention by state authorities from having accessto use and enjoyment 
of home and property of IDPs without lawful justification could constitute a 
continuing violation of right to home. 38 Such measures do not also comply with 
the 'continuous improvement of living conditions' as required in Article I1 (1) of 
the ICESCR. 
The legality of the derogatory measures under arbitrary interference 
with the right to home in Article 17 of the ICCPR during internal armed 
conflict be derived from international humanitarian law prohibitions on direct 
and indiscriminate attack on civilian objects, wanton destruction of civilian 
property and pillage as lex specialis. Article I1 (1) of the ICESCR on right to 
adequate housing cannot be however derogable and therefore any core 
obligations to respect can be derived from such humanitarian law 
prohibitions. 39 
Articles I of the Protocol I to the ECHR, 21 of the ACHR and 14 of the 
ACHPR contain explicit protection of the right to peaceful enjoyment of property 
33 See Xenides -Arestis v. Turkey, Application no. 46347/99, Judgment of 22 December 2005. 34 Committee on ICESCR, 'The Right to Adequate Housing, ' para 12 
35 For similar protection see, Art. 8 of the ECHR; Art. LX and Article XI of the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man ; Art. 3 I of the European Social Charter(l 996). 
36 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centrefor Economic and Social 
Rights vNigeria, p. 41, para-61. 
37 Xenides -Arestis v. Turkey, Application no. 46347/99, Judgment of 22 December 
2005, 
para. 19. 
38 Ibid., paras. 20.22. 
39 Committee on ICESCR, General Comment No. 7: 'The Right to Adequate Housing 
(Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions' (20/05/97) para. II 
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and protection against deprivation of possessions which is wider in scope than 
the right to home since the former can involve a property where a person does 
not live . 
40 As interpreted and applied by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, in the case of the Community Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 
the protection provided by Article 21 of the ACHR not only concerns the 
right to private property but also communal or collective forms of property in 
which ownership of the land is bestowed not on individuals but on the community 
of indigenous peoples .41 As for indigenous communities, their land is the 
fundamental basis of their culture, spiritual life and economic survival, protection 
of their property and land and perhaps their return to such land is important. 42 
These rights are, however, derogable during internal armed conflicts 
and deprivation of possessions is possible in the public interest and subject to 
conditions provided by general principles of international law. 43 Derogatory 
measures cannot be inconsistent with the humanitarian law obligations against 
destruction of civilians houses and other property indispensable for their 
survival, such as food stuffs, crops and livestock in terms of Articles 15(l) of the 
44 ECHR and 27 (1) of the ACHR . 
Destruction of houses and possessions of 
civilians was considered by the European Court in series of cases against Turkey 
as grave and unjustified interference and therefore an outright violation of rights to 
respect for home and peaceful enjoyment of possessions. 45 These were decided 
in the absence of derogation from Article I of Protocol I and Article 8 of 
ECHR by Turkey, so that the Court did not consider the compatibility of these 
acts under other international obligations of Turkey including common Article 3 
and Protocol 11.46 
40 The European Court of Human Rights in Loizidou v. Turkey, Application no. 00015318/89, 
Judgment of 18 December 1996, para. 66, observed that the notion of 'home' cannot be extended to 
4comprise property on which it is planned to build a house for residential purposes. Nor can that 
term be interpreted to cover an area of a state where one has gown up and where the family has its 
roots but where no longer lives. ' 41 Judgment of 31 August 200 1, para. 149 
42 See ibid. 
43 Art. I of Protocol I to the ECHR. 
44See above, Ch. 5, Section, E. 2. c. 
45 Mentes and Others v. Turkey (58/1996/677/867) 28 November 1997, para. 73; Selcuk and Asker v. 
Turkey, paras. 86-87; Orhan v. Turkey, paras. 379-80; Bilgin v. Turkey, paras. 108-9; Altun v. Turkey, 
paras. 62-3. 
46 A. Reidy, 'The Approach of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights to 
International Humanitarian Law' (1998) No. 324 IRRC 513, at p. 52 1, n. 34. 
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In Dogan and Others v. Turkey the question was whether the interference 
of the right to enjoyment of property by refusing access to their village which 
forced the IDPs to live in other parts of the country in poor conditions due to lack 
of employment, housing and health care for almost ten years was disproportionate 
to the aim pursued, namely, of maintaining security. 47 The European Court of 
Human Rights held that the right balance between the general interest and the 
right to peaceful enjoyment of property had not been struck as the IDPs had to bear 
an excessive burden for the following reasons: the government had not taken 
effective and adequate measures to facilitate the return of IDPs, for example, it had 
not reconstructed the infrastructure; and had not provided the IDPs during their 
displaced situation with any alternative shelter or employment or funds to ensure 
an adequate standard of living. 48 
According to the ICRC Study on Customary Humanitarian Law, the rule 
that requires respect for the property rights of IDPs is a norm of customary 
international law applicable in internal armed confliCt. 49Destruction of or seizure 
of property of an adverse party imperatively demanded by the necessities of the 
conflict is possible in conduct of hostilities as it is a customary rule of 
humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflicts . 
50 Here the property of 
an adversary includes the property of civilians or IDPs belonging to the adverse 
party. 5 1 This gives latitude to states to destroy the property of IDPs on the 
pretext that members of armed opposition groups are taking shelter in some 
homes left by the IDPs. It would not justify the destruction of houses in 
the entire village. The property of IDPs is further protected in conduct of 
hostilities as civilian objects from direct and indiscriminate attacks and by the 
prohibition of attack or destruction of property indispensable for the survival of 
civilians in Protocol 11 and by customary humanitarian law. 
52 
Additional Protocol 11 and customary humanitarian law absolutely prohibit 
destruction or confiscation of civilian property as a collective punitive measure. 
53 
47 Paras. 150-154. 
48 Paras. 154-156. 
49 J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule. 13' 3, at 
pp. 472-74. 
50 Art. 8(2)(e) (xii) of the Statute of the ICC; ibid., Rule 50, at pp. 175-177. 
51 See, A. Zimmermann, 'Prohibited Destruction' in O. Triffterer (ed. ), O. Triffterer (ed. ), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, p. 283, at p. 284. 
52 Art 14 of Additional Protocol 11 ; Arts. 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute of the ICC. 
53 Article 4(2)(b) of Additional Protocol 11. 
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Customary humanitarian law and Additional Protocol 11 impose an absolute 
prohibition as a protective measure on the pillage of real and personal 
property 54 of IDPs from 'both organized pillage and pillage resulting from 
isolated acts of indiscipline. ' 55 In customary law, it is prohibited to deprive the 
owner of the property and appropriate it for 'private or personal use. 56 In terms 
of this provision, therefore an organised pillage of property belonging to an 
ethnic or religious group in order to prevent their returning, is prohibited. 'The 
property left by IDPs in their homes when they have displaced or what 
they have with them in IDP camps is also protected by this provision. 57 
'Private or personal use' thus excludes appropriation of property for military 
necessity and thus as constituting the crime of pillage. 58 
D. Restitution or Compensation to Returned or Resettled IDPs 
IDPs who leave their property at home when they displace or have been 
displaced often later find their property stolen, destroyed, appropriated, 
occupied or used by other IDPs, or members of the armed forces or 
opposition armed groups for military use. 59 For instance, in Darfur, Sudan, Arab 
tribes had started to settle in areas previously inhabited by displaced civilians, thus 
preventing their eventual return. 60 This undue interference with the enjoyment of 
the right to property is an impediment to return of IDPs. Therefore restitution of 
property or, in case of the impossibility of compensation in lieu should be 
provided to IDPs to facilitate return to their home or habitual place of residence as 
part of their protection from displacement. However, the right to housing and 
property restitution or in case of impossibility of restitution, to compensation, is a 
remedy for anyone arbitrarily or unlawfully displaced and it is not affected by 
54 Commentary to the IV Geneva Convention of 1949, at p. 226; it covers state -owned property as 
well. 
55 Art. 4(2) (g) of Additional Protocol 11 ; S. Junod, 'Commentary on Protocol 11', at p. 13 76 
56 Elements of Crimes, at p. 43. 
57 Civilians of opposition party to the conflict who perpetrate pillage against the property of 
IDPs can be made individually responsible for war crimes, see below, Ch. 7, Section, A. Lb. 
58 Elements of Crimes, n. 61. 
59 
... military operations and security considerations prohibit return 
to village of origin and result in 
the loss of property and assets over time; the taking of property, specifically agricultural land and 
houses for military use (airports, bases and security zones)... .' World Food Programme, 
WFP 
Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, Country Case Study on Internal Displacement, Sri 
Lanka: Displacement in the North and East July 1999, p. 21. ( reproduced in Global IDP Survey, 
Norwegian Reftigee Council). 
60 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, para. 329. 
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the actual return or non-retum of IDPs .61 
Therefore IDPs who have resettled in 
some other place within a state have the right to restitution or compensation 
in lieu. 
A general right to an effective remedy for victims of violations of 
international human rights can be found in Articles 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR and in 
regional human rights instruments. 62 Although Article 2(3) (a) of the ICCPR does 
not specifically provide for reparation, the Human Rights Committee considers 
that an effective remedy cannot be provided without reparation to individuals 
whose rights under the ICCPR have been violated. 63 Moreover, in addition to 
explicit provision for compensation under Articles 9(5) and 14 (6) of the ICCPR, 
the Committee considered that the right to reparation includes compensation as 
well . 
64 The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989 explicitly provides 
for the right to resettlement or compensation where return is impossible, and 
compensation for loss or injury resulting from relocation. 65 CERD and CAT 
provide for a specific right to compensation whereas Article 39 of the CRC does 
not provide for such a right but provides measures for physical and psychological 
recovery and reintegration. 66 
Restitution or compensation is simply a protective measure as to the 
enjoyment of the right to property which in turn would facilitate return of IDPs 
to their original place of residence. 67 Here the facilitation of return of 
IDPs may also be a form of restitution not only for forced displacement 
61 Victims ' right to a remedy/reparation for harm suffered includes restitution by return of property 
and / compensation, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Right to 
Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations ofHuman Rights and 
Freedoms, E/CN. 4/2000/62 (18 January 2000) paras. 11,22,23. 
62 Art. 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. 13 of the ECHR; Art. 25 of the 
ACHR; and Arts. 7 and 21(2) of the ACHPR. 63 Human Rights Committee, 'The Nature of the General Legal Obligation' para. 16. 
64 ibid. 
65 Article 16(4)(5). 
66 Article 6 of the CERD; 14 of the CAT; 39 of the CRC ; for cases where compensation was 
granted for victims of gross human rights violations under the ICCPR, regional human rights 
instruments and Article XI (1) of Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by the Human Rights Chamber, see M. Nowak, 'The Right of Victims of Gross 
Human Rights violations to Reparation' p. 203. 
67 Right to housing and property restitution is an 'essential element of the right to return' for IDPs, 
Working paper submitted by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro to the Sub-Commission, The Return of 
Refugees'or Displaced Persons'Property, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2002/17 (12 June 2002) para. 29; in 
Miskitos Indians case the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated that reftisal to 
provide compensation to relocated Miskitos is a serious obstacle for their return to the Coco River 
region and inconsistent with the government declaration to allow them to return at the end of 
emergency, ibid., Part 11, para. 23. 
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but also for the peaceful enjoyment of the right to property. However, the right 
to restitution of housing, land and property or compensation is not affected by 
resettlement of IDPs and therefore realisation of it would even facilitate 
the sustained resettlement of IDPs elsewhere within the state. 68 
There is an emerging trend to grant compensation for the breach of 
the right to home and property. As far as the appropriation of property is 
concerned, compensation for such property is not explicitly provided for in any 
regional human rights instruments except by the ACHR. 69 In terms of the ECHR, 
such a deprivation is subject to conditions provided by the general principles of 
international law on the right to private property, i. e., 'the State must in all 
cases compensate nationals or foreigners when it expropriates their property. ' 70 
Therefore if the property of IDPs is subjected to expropriation, the state 
is bound to pay compensation. In Akdivar and Others v. Turkey the European 
Court of Human Rights refused a claim for loss of land due to displacement, as 
there was no expropriation of property and the applicants continued to remain the 
owners of their land. 71 
However, in the same case, the European Court granted compensation 
for loss of other property of Kurds as a result of destruction by Turkish security 
72 forces which violated Article 8 and Article I of the Protocol I to the ECHR . The 
Court granted compensation for loss of houses by destruction, loss of income from 
the cultivated land due to displacement and the inability to exploit it, loss of 
household property, livestock and the cost of alternative accommodation incurred 
in the place of displacement, which has a direct link with the violation of the right 
to home and property. 73 Similarly, compensation with regard to destruction of the 
homes, crops, livestock and other possessions of returning Miskito IDPs, which 
68 Principle 10.3 of the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced 
Persons. 
69Art. 21(2) of the ACHR. 
70 (emphasis added) Luis Valencia Rodriguez, independent expert of the UN Human Rights 
Commission, E/CN. 4/1993/15,18 December 1992,, pp. 69 and 89, quoted in Annual Report of the 
Inter American Commission ofHuman Rights, 1993, OEA/ Ser. LN/11.85, doc. 9, rev., February 11 
1994, P. 465, at p. 467, n. 60. 
71 1 April 1998,1998-11 EHRR 71 1, para. 23 
72 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 16 September 1996; compensation was granted in 
Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, I April 1998,1998-11 EHRR 711; compensation was granted in; 
Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, Judgment of 24 April 1998; Mentes and Others v. Turkey, Judgment of 
28 November 1998; Bilgin i% Turkey, Judgment of 16 November 2000; Altun i% Turkey, Judgment 
of I June 2004. 
73 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, I April 1998,1998-11 EHRR 711. 
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occurred at the time of relocation, was ordered by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights as well. 74 
In Akdivar and Others v. Turkey,, in addition to the compensation for 
destruction of property, restitution by bearing the costs of repairs in the village and 
removal of any obstacles to return to the village from which the applicant IDPs 
had been obliged to leave were requested as a necessary remedy to prevent 
future and continuing violation of the rights, in particular, regarding property. 75 
The government of Turkey's position was that return was not feasible due to 
the prevailing conditions of emergency. Even though the European Court 
recognised the legal obligation of a state to 'put an end to such breach and make 
reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the 
situation existing before the breach (restitutio in intergrum), ' it accepted the 
freedom of states to choose the means to comply with the judgment, if 
restitution is in practice impossible. 76 
This is mainly due to the fact that the procedural right to enforce the 
remedy in the ECHR is restricted to just satisfaction to victims, which the Court 
interpreted as confined to monetary compensation. 77 Since the court left the 
restitution by facilitating return, to the discretion of the state concerned and if it 
was not apparently going to happen in the near future according to the reply of the 
government, it could have granted compensation with regard to the cost of 
accommodation and loss of income from the land until the restitution of property. 
Instead, limiting the compensation to the cost of rented accommodation from the 
destruction until judgment would render the IDPs exposed to continuous violation 
of the Convention. 
If the property of IDPs is lawfully used for military necessity, such as 
being used as military bases, it is imperative to provide such IDPs with 
remedies, namely, restoration of property or, in case of impossibility of 
restoration, with compensation, or for the loss of income from property until 
74 Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito 
Origin, OEA/Ser. LN. II. 62, doc. 10 rev. 3 (29 November 1983) Section, Right to Property, para. 7 
75Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, I April 1998,1998-11 EHRR 711, para. 45; Committee on CERD, 
'Article 5 and Refugees and Displaced Persons, ' para. 2(d). 
76 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, ibid., para. 47. 
77 According to the Court it had 'neither the power nor the practical possibility of doing so 
itself' of the restitution. Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece, (Just Satisfaction 
A 330-13, Judgment (31/10/1995) para. 34; see below, Ch. 8, Section B. 1. 
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restitution or other alternative arrangements such as resettlement or alternative 
sources of income are provided. Denial of return to place of residence of 
IDPs would make the interference with the respect for home, adequate housing 
and property a disproportionate measure unless alternative housing, funds or 
employment are provided. 78 
For instance, in the northern part of Sri Lanka, a substantial part of the 
land belonging to IDPs is occupied by the Sri Lankan Army and Police. 79 Some 
areas are designated by the occupying security forces as High Security 
Zones ( hereafter HSZ). These include many houses, schools, roads, industries and 
cultivable land . 
80 Therefore, in 2003,94 % of the IDPs from homes within 
HSZs living in welfare centres ( IDP camps ) were not able to return to pursue 
any economic activity such as agriculture or fishing within those areas or near 
such areas. 81 Since the issues of HSZs are linked to the national security 
issues and thereby a final settlement, the HSZs will continue to remain for an 
indefinite period to the detriment of return of nearly 100,000 IDPs. 82 
Such interference with the right to home and property of IDPs raises 
the issue of proportionality, i. e., whether such derogation measure is 
reasonable and necessary to the aim to be achieved. 83 Moreover, in 
determining the proportionality of such interference, the obligation of the state 
to protect the physical, cultural and economic existence of a national 
minority as stated in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, or Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 1992 should 
also be taken into account. 84 Such military zones cover a substantial part of 
a region and thereby unduly affect the return of large number of IDPs, their 
enjoyment of property and income earning resources over the long term. 85 Until 
settlement of the ethnic problem is reached, IDPs have to bear and continue to 
bear an excessive burden which is a violation of their right to home, housing, 
78 Dogan v. Turkey, paras. 154 and 159. 
79The Refugee Council, 'Sri Lanka: Internally Displaced Persons and Safe Returns', at p. 35. 
80 The Refugee Council, 'Sri Lanka: Internally Displaced Persons and Safe Returns', at pp. 35-36 
81 Ibid., at pp. 28-29. 
82 Ibid., at p. 36. 
83 See above, Ch-3, Section C for a discussion of proportionality. 
84 Article 1; see above, Ch. 3, Section, D; Article 27 of the ICCPR may be relevant with regard 
to cultural identity related to the territory by engaging in traditional economic activities. 
85 30% of the Jaffna Peninsula in Northern Sri Lanka is occupied by the security forces 
which impedes return of IDPs and economic activity, Global IDP Survey, 'Sri Lanka: High 
Security Zones Prevent IDPs from Regaining Their Property' (February 2005). 
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property and their freedom of movement, in particular the right to return. 
Regardless of the legitimacy of the aim, such an interference with the right to 
housing and property would not be proportionate to these rights of IDPs, 
unless any assistance during their displacement is provided. 
Therefore IDPs must be provided with compensation for loss or 
destruction of houses, property, loss of income from property and from other 
income generating resources and for the cost of alternative accommodation or 
any arrangements for alternative accommodation, and their return should 
be facilitated by restitution of houses and property as soon as the 
exigencies of the situation is reduced. 
International humanitarian law protects IDPs displaced by internal 
armed conflict as victims but is silent as to their right to reparation in national or 
international law. 86 The remedy of restitution or compensation is granted in the 
Statutes of ICTY and ICTR for humanitarian law violations. 87 The compensation 
for victims of violations of humanitarian law stated in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence in the ICTY and ICTR merely facilitates the claim of victims through 
national courts rather than providing a direct right to remedy by the order of the 
Court. However, the tribunals can directly make orders for restitution of property 
or other appropriate measures if the unlawful taking of the property is associated 
with a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunals and the property is concerned 
with the specific finding of the judgment. The first individual right to 
compensation for violations of humanitarian law is provided in Article 75 of the 
Statute of the ICC. 88 This right however cannot be exercised against the state 
but against the perpetrator of the crime. 
The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
86 L. Zegveld, 'Remedies for Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law', (2003) 85, 
No. 851 JRRC at p. 497; but the right to compensation is provided in international armed conflicts, 
Article 91 of Additional Protocol 1; R. Provost, International Human Rights, at p. 48, however 
opines that, Article 91 of Additional Protocol I merely states a right to compensation of the parties 
to the conflict and not individual victims, as the latter are requested to provide a petition through 
their own government to press an international claim; J. de Preux, 'Article 91 -Responsibility' in 
Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C., and B. Zimmermann, B., (eds. ), Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 p. 1053, pp. 1056-57. 
87 See below for detailed discussion, Ch. 7, Section, A. 2. 
88 Art. 75(l), (2) of the Statute of the ICC; but here the victims cannot institute claims directly but 
only through the prosecutor. But they can participate at the proceedings; see 
for detailed discussion, 
below, Chapter 7, ibid. 
237 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law do recognise the 
general right to remedies of victims of both human rights and humanitarian law 
violations, and in particular their right to reparation including restitution of 
property and return to one's place of residence and compensation. 89 However, it 
does not establish any new substantive right to remedy under international law or 
domestic law but only identifies 'mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods 
for the existing legal obligations. '" This is reflected in the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy, which are stated using the term 'should, ' 
and therefore not stated as a norm that exists de lege lata. 
Moreover, the right to restitution of property of IDPs which they were 
deprived during hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated in case of 
impossibility of restitution, is recognised in the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzigovina, Annex 7 on the Agreement on Refugees and 
Displaced Persons and enforced by the Human Rights Chamber established under 
the same. 91 A specific right of restitution to IDPs in respect of housing and 
property of which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived, or in the event of 
impossibility of restoration, a right to be compensated, is provided in the UN 
Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced 
Persons. 92 It further notes that, '[s]tates shall demonstrably prioritize the right to 
restitution as the preferred remedy for displacement and the key element of 
restorative justice. According to this, the right to restitution exists as a 'distinct 
right, and is prejudiced neither by the actual return nor of non-return of refugees 
and displaced persons entitled to housing, land and property restitution. 93 This is 
a significant development since the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, as its Principle 29 (2) does not state restitution or 
89 Principles 11,19 and 20, Annex to the Human Rights Resolution of the Commission on Human 
Rights 2005/35 (19 April 2005). 
90 C. Tomuschat, 'Darfur- Compensation for the Victims' (2005)3 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 579, at p-585 states that these Principles are 'now clearly of an aspirational nature 
only. ' 
91 Article VII, Annex 6 (1996)3 5 ILM 89, at p. 13 0; see for an outline of several cases 
decided by the Human Rights Chamber established under Dayton Peace Agreement for 
Bosnis and Herzigovina in this regard, M. Novak, 'Right of Victims of Gross Human Rights 
Violations to Reparation', at pp. 218-220. 
92 Principle 2.1. 
93 Principle 2.2 of the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Reftigees and Displaced 
Persons (28 June 2005); ILA Declaration on Internally Displaced Persons, Article 9. 
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compens ion as a right of lDPs but as a responsibility of the authorities to 
assist them in this regard. 94 
As opposed to human rights law, in humanitarian law a derivative right 
to restitution for violations of humanitarian law is not available as de lege lata 
but only in an emerging forin. 95 However, the complementary nature of 
human rights and humanitarian law in internal armed conflicts would enable 
reparation to be obtained for violations of the protection of property in 
humanitarian law to the extent it overlaps with the substantive norms of the 
right to property. 
94 See generally for the view that the right to housing and property restitution is in existence, S. 
Leckie, 'Housing and Property Issues for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Context 
of Return: Key Considerations for UNHCHR Policy and Practice' (2000) 19 Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 5, at pp. 38-39; contrary view, see C. Phuong, The International Protection of]nternalýy 
Displaced Persons, at p-64. 
95 See R. Provost, International Human Rights, at p. 54, n. 124. 
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Conclusion to Part III 
The right to non-discrimination on the basis of displaced status of IDP, right to 
family reunification and right to humanitarian assistance for subsistence needs 
and other needs are protected by both human rights and customary humanitarian 
law applicable in internal armed conflict. Although the right to humanitarian 
assistance for subsistence needs can be derived from both laws, human rights 
law is broader than the humanitarian law obligations of the state in providing 
basic needs to all the IDPs in the territory. However, since international 
humanitarian law alone specifies the obligations of the parties to the conflict to 
refrain from certain acts that cause starvation and to respect and protect 
humanitarian personnel and their vehicles and goods, it can be considered as 
lex specialis in this regard. 
Movement related rights as such are mainly protected by human rights 
law, and an obligation to refrain from obstruction of the exercise of these 
rights as a life saving measure during hostilities can be interpreted by resorting 
to non-derogable human rights norms. The right to obtain documentation, right 
to return and right to a remedy in the form of restitution or compensation for 
loss or destruction of property are only protected in human rights law. 
International humanitarian law can be considered as lex specialis as to 
protection from direct, indiscriminate attacks, protection from using IDPs as 
human shields and reprisal attacks against IDPs. 
Furthermore it is important to provide the protection of return or 
resettlement and reintegration to IDPs in the medium and long term and to 
address their existing needs in that stage. 
The above discussed incoherent state of international law concerning 
IDPs explains the importance of both human rights and humanitarian law in 
formulating the rights specific to the protection needs of IDPs during 
displacement and return in order to provide comprehensive and consistent 
protection to IDPs in internal armed conflicts. For that purpose, firstly, that 
protection needs have to be accommodated within the existing human 
rights law; secondly, to find an overlapping protection need in customary 
international humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflicts. Although 
the second aspect is helpful in strengthening a specific human right norm, in 
particular, of certain derogable rights during internal armed conflict, absence of 
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or a rudimentary protection of a need of an IDP in international 
humanitarian law does not necessarily lead to the opposite conclusion, that such 
rights would be derogable to the detriment of IDPs during internal armed 
conflicts. Because, derogation of human rights law is subjected to 
necessary substantive safeguards. 
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Part IV 
Implementation and Enforcement of International Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law Pertaining to the Protection of IDPs 
Introduction 
The mere existence of the international normative framework which was discussed 
in the previous two Parts is not sufficient for the protection of persons displaced 
by internal armed conflict unless such laws are actually applied. Application of the 
laws requires effective implementation and enforcement mechanisms. Without 
such effective international implementation and enforcement of human rights and 
humanitarian law, no meaningful protection can be extended to IDPs from past, 
existing or future violations of such laws by the state or armed groups. 
The protective functions of such international mechanisms can generally be 
triggered: by virtue of legal obligations of the state concerned under a relevant 
convention to provide information on compliance; by the initiatives attached to the 
mechanisms themselves; and by the victims through the avenues provided in 
international Conventions to reach such mechanisms. This Part, therefore, 
examines the extent and effectiveness of such mechanisms, specifically in the 
protection of IDPs in securing reparations, imposing sanctions and ensuring 
compliance with laws by means other than the above mentioned, on the basis of 
their composition, mandate, procedures and evolving jurisprudence. 
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7. Implementation and Enforcement of International 
Humanitarian Law 
A. International Criminal Tribunals 
1. Sanctions 
Imposing criminal sanctions on individuals responsible for crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes is an effective measure of enforcement as it 
ensures the enhancement of the rule of law. Enforcement, by imposition of 
individual criminal liability, is a reactive measure to past violations in an armed 
conflict that may discourage future violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law. As far as IDPs are concerned, they themselves may have been victims of 
violations such as destruction of property, pillage and so on, or/and their family 
members or relatives could have been killed, tortured or subjected to 
disappearances. Imposition of sanctions by individual criminal responsibility is one 
way of creating a viable climate that would encourage safe and dignified return of 
IDPs to their places of origin. 
As far as IDPs at large are concerned, beneficial aspects of protection by 
prosecution and punishment of individuals responsible for international crimes are 
different from the protection by individual remedies available under the individual 
communication procedures of the human rights mechanisms. Conviction of 
perpetrators provides protection to IDPs against large scale violations as opposed 
to an individual remedy granted under the human rights mechanisms; and IDPs can 
be protected against violations committed by both state and non-state perpetrators. 
The latter aspect is of significance to the protection of IDPs against human rights 
violations because of the fact that unless such violations amount to crimes against 
humanity or genocide, in principle insurgents are not bound to adhere to human 
rights standards. Above all, since such crimes are committed by individuals, such 
as by armed forces, insurgents and military commanders of either party to the 
conflict and by political leaders and civilian superiors who are not abstract entities, 
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of such crimes would provide justice to 
those displaced by armed conflicts and enhance the chances of reconciliation and 
ultimate peace, more effectively than by making the state responsible through the 
international human rights mechanisms. 
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However, this does not mean that remedies of both avenues cannot be 
sought in the same case, as imposition of individual criminal responsibility would 
not affect the responsibility of the states under international human rights 
Conventions. ' However, judicial activity may not always be the best way to ensure 
ultimate peace and therefore other activities such as national truth and 
reconciliation commissions, which are beyond the scope of this study, should be 
resorted to in this regard. 2 
In order to assess the effectiveness of prosecution of perpetrators, not only 
the composition, mandate and procedures of the international Criminal Courts but 
also the status and the scope of the concept of individual criminal responsibility 
over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in internal 
armed conflicts are important. 
Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals have been established by Security 
Council resolutions as a result of serious violations of humanitarian law that 
resulted in large scale displacement of civilians and extermination of IDPs in 
3 former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR). In contrast, the permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC) was established by a multilateral Convention. 4 
Their independent and impartial nature is confirmed by the appointment of 
international judges and prosecutors, unlike the mixed or intemationalised Courts 
in Kosovo, Cambodia and Sierra Leone to which, in addition,, national judges and 
5 prosecutors have been appointed . In internal armed conflicts based on 
discriminatory grounds such as ethnic, linguistic and religious ones, the human 
rights and humanitarian law violations are often committed by persons with 
1 Article 25(4) Statute of ICC states that, '[n]o provision in this Statute relating to individual 
criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international law. ' 
2 However, such Commissions can be international in scope, for instance, the Truth Commission of 
El Salvador was headed by foreign nationals appointed by UN and mainly finided by international 
donors; see generally, L. Olson, 'Mechanisms Complementing Prosecution' (2002) 84 IRRC 
No. 845, p. 173. 
3 UN DOC. S/RES/808 (25 May 1993); UN Doc. S/RES/955 (8 November 1994) 
4 Statute of the ICC(I 7 July 1998), UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, (1998)3 7 ILM 999, entered into force 
on I July 2002; for a detailed study on the ICC, see generally, 0. Triffterer (ed. ), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
5 The judges of the ICTR would be elected by the General Assembly by vote from the list of 
candidates transmitted by the Security Council from the nominations by the UN member states and 
non-member states maintaining permanent observer missions at UN headquarters, Arts. 13 bis and 
12 bis; but for a view that the election of judges by the Assembly of States Parties would infuse a 
political element into the appointment system, see S. D. Bertodano, 'Judicial Independence in the 
International Criminal Court' (2002)15 LJIL 409; see generally C. P. R. Romano, A. Nollkaemper, 
and J. K. Kleffner, (eds. ), Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East 
Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia ( Oxford, 2004) 
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government authority. If those perpetrators still have control over state apparatus, 
then the ICC is preferable to mixed Courts consisting of national judges along with 
international judges, as having national judges would not serve the rendering of 
impartial and independent justice to eradicate impunity for international crimes 
apparently committed by such governmental leaders. 6 
The ICTY and ICTR have concurrent jurisdiction with national courts in 
the prosecution of perpetrators for international crimes. 7 However, the they have 
primacy over national courts and therefore they can request national courts to defer 
cases to their competence '[a]t any stage of the procedure. ' 8 This primacy of the 
tribunals is broad in scope because it provides for a subsequent trial of accused in 
these ad hoc international tribunals, even if the accused has already been tried by 
the national court for serious violations of humanitarian law if. '(a) the act for 
which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; or (b) the 
national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to 
shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not 
diligently prosecuted. '9 Therefore, such primacy of ad hoc criminal tribunals is 
useful in the effective prosecution and punishment of perpetrators for international 
crimes. 
In contrast, the jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to the national 
courts and it can have competence over international crimes only when the national 
courts are genuinely 'unwilling' or 'unable' to investigate and prosecute the 
perpetrators and also with regard to state parties which have territorial or personal 
nexus with such crimes or the accused. 10 Although the Security Council can make 
referral to the ICC of a situation involving a non-state party based on Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the jurisdiction of the ICC is still complementary to 
national courts and therefore Article 17 of the Statute of the ICC on 
admissibility has to be complied with. 11 For instance, when a referral was made by 
the Security Council by resolution 1593 (31 March 2005) with regard to the 
6 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, at para. 579 (in the context of 
Darfur crisis). 
7 Art. 9 of the Statue of the ICTY; Art. 8 of the Statute of the ICTR (1994)3 3 ILM 1602. 
8 Ibid 
9 Art. 10 of the Statute of the ICTY; Art. 9 of the Statute of the ICTR. 
10 Para. 10 to the preamble and Arts. 1,12(2), 17 of the Statute of the ICC. 
1 S. A. Williams, 'Article 13: Exercise of Jurisdiction' in 0. Triffterer (ed. ), Commentarj, on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, p. 343, at p. 350; Art. 13(b) of the Statute of the 
ICC. 
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situation in Darfur, Sudan, a non-State party to the Statute of the ICC, the 
prosecutor in deciding whether to initiate an investigation, assessed the situation 
in accordance with Article 53 inter alia., of the issues of admissibility under 
Article 17 of the Statute of the ICC as to the genuine 'willingness' or 'ability' 
of the Sudanese authorities to carry out their own investigations. 12 
This subsidiary nature of the ICC is, in a way, a setback in the 
prosecution of grave international crimes. Of course the states where such 
international crimes have been committed might be in a better position than the 
ICC with regard to evidence and the presence of accused, which are essential to 
render justice. However, with regard to international crimes committed in 
ethnicity based internal conflicts, justice is unlikely to be rendered by the national 
courts. This is because such large scale violations against IDPs are generally 
carried out either by state agents or by individuals in a private capacity but with 
the support of state authorities. 
As far as enforcement is concerned, the two tribunals and the Court do not 
have their own police force and, thereby, coercive powers. Therefore, to 
investigate crimes, collect evidence and to arrest and surrender accused, the courts 
rely on the cooperation of states. 13 In the event of non-compliance by the states, 
the courts have the power to report that to the Security Council. 14 Despite the lack 
of coercive powers and certain difficulties experienced in the pre-trial arrests of 
12 As the Sudanese authorities have begun investigations, the prosecutor has an obligation to 
evaluate these national proceedings, Press release, Prosecutor receives list prepared by the 
Commission of Inquiry Darfur, Statement of the ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo 5 April 
2005 ; accordingly, Prosecutor determined that 'there is a reasonable basis to initiate an 
investigation into the situation in Darftir, The Sudan, ' Letter to the Presiding Judge, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I by the Prosecutor, I June 2005(www. icc-MLint); Art. 53(l) states, '[t]he prosecutor shall, 
having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or 
she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether 
to initiate an investigation, the prosecutor shall consider whether: 
(a)The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; 
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and 
(c)Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. ' 
( emphasis added). 
13 Art. 29 of the Statute of ICTY; Art. 28 of the Statute ICTR ; Arts. 89 and 93 of the Statute of the 
ICC. 
14 Art. 87(7) of the Statute of the ICC; the court can make a judicial finding and refer the matter to 
the Assembly of States Parties or to the security council if the matter was referred to by the same. 
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indictees particularly with regard to ICTY, the functioning of these two tribunals 
has been in line with the expectation in combating impunity-' 5 
a. Individual Criminal Responsibility 
The Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC impose individual criminal 
responsibility over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in internal 
armed conflicts. ' 6 However, the ICTY in the Tadic case was required to prove 
the existence of customary international law imposing individual criminal 
responsibility for serious violations of common Article 3 and customary rules 
regarding means and methods of combat in internal armed conflicts at the time of 
the commission of breaches, to exercise jurisdiction over war crimes committed in 
internal armed conflicts in compliance with the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege. 17 As neither common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol 11 contain the terms 
4 grave breaches' or war crimes, ' it was considered that there is no criminal 
responsibility for such violations in international Law. 18 However, there have been 
opinions to the effect that criminal responsibility for the obligations of common 
Article 3 and other principles applicable in internal armed conflicts are implicit in 
those obligations. As grave breaches in international law merely obliges the State 
parties to prosecute the perpetrators of grave breaches in their territory or to 
extradite them to a relevant state, the outcome of the absence of the term 'grave 
breaches' in common Article 3 or Additional Protocol 11 is that the perpetrators 
would not be subjected to the mandatory jurisdiction attached to those breaches 
15 State cooperation is tremendous in particular with the ICTR as most of the perpetrators from 
Rwanda were arrested in various countries and transferred to the ICTF, see A. McDonald, 'The 
Year in Review' (2001) 4 YIHL 255, at pp. 292-3 and for arrests and surrender of accused to the 
ICTY including former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic ibid, at pp. 267-270; with regard to 
the ICTR the 'number of accused in completed cases and on-going cases is now fifty. They 
include one Prime Minister, eleven Government Ministers, four prefects, seven bourgmestres and 
many other high ranking officials. ' ICTR Newsletter June 2005, at p. 1. 
16 Articles 7,6 and 25 respectively of the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. 
17 In Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 128, the appellant argued that customary principles applicable to 
internal armed conflicts do not entail individual criminal liability; individual criminal responsibility 
with regard to crimes against humanity applicable in internal armed conflict was generally not 
contested, L. C. Green, 'War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Command Responsibility' 
(1997) L Naval War College Review, sequence 358, at pp. 23-24 
(hqp: //www. nwc. nayy. mil/press/review/1997/sl2ring/ rtocsp97. htm); Final Report of the 
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) 
S/I 994/674 (27 May 1994) Annex, para. 75. 
18 D. Plattner, 'The Penal Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law Applicable 
in Non-International Armed Conflicts'(1 990) 278 JRRC 409, at p. 414; L. C. Green, ibid., at pp. 22- 
23; Final Report of the Commission of Experts, ibid., paras. 52 and 54 
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'but cannot abjure the criminality of the norms in question. '19 Non- attachment of 
individual criminal responsibility to common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 
11 obligations would tend to confuse criminality with jurisdiction and 
penalities. 
20 As far as criminality is concerned, there is no legal rationale for 
treating the perpetrators of humanitarian law violations in internal armed conflict 
more moderately than those who commit such violations in international armed 
conflicts. 
21 
Therefore to find the individual criminal responsibility in customary law, 
the ICTY in the Tadic case based its decision on the conclusion of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that 'finding of individual criminal 
responsibility is not barred by the absence of treaty provisions on punishment of 
breaches. 22 It applied the principle that since international crimes are committed 
by natural persons and not by abstract entities, enforcement of international law is 
only feasible by punishing such individuals for such crimes and determined that 
customary international law imposes individual criminal responsibility in internal 
armed conflicts. 23 The customary status of individual criminal liability in internal 
armed conflict determined in the Tadic case was reiterated by the ICTR with 
regard to common Article 3 and Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11.24 Due to 
the confirmation of the customary status of the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes committed in internal armed conflicts by the ICTY 
and ICTR jurisprudence and by its inclusion in the Statute of the ICC, 
prosecution and punishment of war crimes have become a reality in the 
protection of IDPs. 
19 C. Meindersma, 'Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as Violations of 
the Laws and Customs of War Under Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia' (1995)XLII, NILR 375, at p. 396 
20 T. Meron, 'International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities' (1995) 89 AJIL 554, at p. 561 
2 libid. 
22 Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 128. 
23 Ibid.; the Appeals Chamber stated in ibid., para. 134'... customary international law imposes 
criminal liability for serious violations of common article 3, as supplemented by other general 
principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for 
breaching certain fundamental principles and rules regarding means and methods of combat 
in civil strife ; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzýa, IT-95-17/1,10 December 1998, Trial Chamber 11, 
para. 140 ; for a detailed discussion on individual criminal responsibility asserted by the Appeals 
Chamber in Tadic, Jurisdiction, see L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, at pp. 156-160; 
Akayesu, Trial Chamber, para. 617. 
24 Akayesu, ibid; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, para. 90; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. lCTR-96- 
13-T, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para. 242; Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 
Case no. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment and sentence, 21 May 1999, paras. 15 6-15 7. 
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The scope of individual criminal responsibility is important to the 
effectiveness of the protection of IDPS. Articles 7(l) and 6(l) of the 
Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR respectively provide individual criminal 
responsibility for planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise assisting 
in the commission of such international crimes. These provisions predominantly 
impose individual criminal responsibility on the perpetrator for 'physical 
perpetration' of a crime personally committed by himself or for the 'culpable 
omission' when he has a duty to act under criminal law. 25 
To achieve the objectives of effective retribution and deterrence, in 
addition to those who actually committed the crimes, the superiors who planned 
and ordered such crimes must be punished. In addition to military commanders, 
the term 'superiors' includes 'political leaders and other civilian superiors in 
positions of authority. 26 Their official capacity would in no way relieve them 
from criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment. 27 Moreover, the incumbent 
superiors in high ranking positions cannot claim personal or substantive 
immunities concerning their unlawful activities committed in their official 
capacity under international law, to avoid the exercise of jurisdiction by 
international criminal courts. 28 Thus, two types of responsibility can be imposed on 
the superiors for the purpose of prosecution for international crimes, namely, joint 
criminal enterprise and command responsibility. 
25 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. lT-94-lA (15 July 1999) Appeals Chamber, Judgment, para. 188; 
also see Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki and imanishimwe case No. ICTR-99-46-T (25 
February 2004) Trial Chamber, para. 659 for the situations in which such culpable omissions occur 
in terms of criminal law as a principal perpetrator; however those who have actually committed 
such crimes can reduce their responsibility on the defence of superior orders; but, Article 33 of the 
Statute of ICC absolves the subordinate from responsibility with regard to war crimes, by departing 
from Arts. 7(4) and 6(4) of the Statutes of ICTY and ICTR, see L. Moir, The Law of Internal 
Armed Conflict, at pp. 183-88. 
26 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 
Judgment of 20 February 2001 ( hereafter Celebici, Appeals Chamber ) para. 195, (in terms of 
Article 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY), ( thus the term superior is used hereafter neutrally and 
whenever specification is needed civilian superior or military commander is used). 
27 Arts. 7 (2), 6 (2) and 27(l) respectively of the Statutes of ICTY, ICTR and ICC. 
28 Art. 27(2) of the Statute of the ICC; the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium ) 14 February 2002, para. 61 (hereafter Arrest 
Warrant Case) stated that incumbent or former foreign ministers may not enjoy immunity from 
criminal prosecution before international criminal tribunals. 
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i. Joint Criminal Enterprise 
Due to the very nature of the internal conflicts, the crimes committed therein 
often do not result 'from the criminal propensity of single individuals but 
constitute manifestations of collective criminality. '29Even though widespread or 
systematic violations such as murder, destruction of houses, property and forcible 
transfer are committed by some members of a group in pursuance of common 
criminal plan, the role of other members (often superiors) in the contribution and 
participation in the accomplishment of the commission of such crimes cannot be 
30 underestimated . 
The 'moral gravity' involved in their participation is not less or 
different from that of who have actually committed such crimes .31 
Therefore, 
it is crucial to make the superiors criminally responsible as co-perpetrators, rather 
than charging them with for a lessened form of criminal responsibility, as aiders 
and abettors. 32 
The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise or the doctrine of common 
purpose or design which is established in customary international law has been 
33 derived implicitly from its Statute by the ICTY. The Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY in the Tadic case, by resorting to a purposive interpretation of Article 7(1) 
of the Statute of ICTY, stated that, in addition to actual commission, 'the 
commission of one of the crimes envisaged in Articles 2,3,4 or 5 of the Statute 
might also occur through participation in the realisation of a common design or 
purpose. ' 34 Therefore to the extent that a participant shares the purpose of the joint 
criminal enterprise with other participants it can be considered as a form of 
4 commission' as stated in Article 7(l) of the Statute. 35 Accordingly, a superior can 
be charged as a co-perpetrator, for instance, in the commission of expulsion of 
civilians from their places of residence, even though he has not actually 
committed such a crime, on the grounds of his participation in planning, ordering 
or otherwise aiding and abetting in the accomplishment of the crime. 
29 Tadic, (15 July 1999) para. 191 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid 
32 Ibid., para. 192 
33 Ibid., para. 220; 
34 Ibid., para. 188 
35 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic and Ojdanic, Ojdanic, Case ) Case No. IT-99-37-AR72 (21 
May 2003) Decision on DragoIjub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction -Joint criminal 
enterprise, para. 20; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Appeals Chamber, para. 
73. 
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Individual responsibility on the basis of joint criminal enterprise was 
applied in internal armed conflicts in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac by the Trial 
Chamber, and it was applied in the context of an 'armed conflict' in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for violations of Articles 3 and 5 pursuant to Article 7(l) of the ICTY 
Statue. 36 By using the mode of liability of joint criminal enterprise, superiors can 
be made responsible not only for the crimes committed by other participants 
within the common purpose, 37 but also for the crimes committed by them outside 
the common purpose, if they are a natural and foreseeable consequence of 
carrying out such common purpose. 38 
The first form of joint criminal responsibility is related to 'concentration 
camp cases or like situations 39where the crimes have been committed by the 
military or administrative units which runs the camp in pursuance of a common 
design. 40 If the accused is in a 'position of authority' within such situation and has 
the power to take care of the wellbeing of the inmates, he would be 
considered as a co-perpetrator for crimes of inhumane treatment committed 
therein. This form of joint criminal enterprise can be considered relevant in cases 
of IDP camps controlled by the government and run by their administrative units 
under a civilian superior. If the person in authority with other civilians who are 
responsible for the care of IDPs actively participates in the enforcement of the 
system by encouraging or aiding and abetting in the ill-treatment of such IDPs, he 
would be responsible as a co-perpetrator for such ill-treatment .41 Intent to 
further 
such a repressive system against IDPs can be inferred from the position of 
authority of the accused and the functions attached to it . 
42 
36 Case No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Chamber 11, Judgment ( 15 March 2002) paras. 78-87, however, the 
Trial Chamber did not impose responsibility on the basis of Joint criminal enterprise as the shared 
state of mind of the accused in the crime had not been established, ibid., para. 87; in the Ojdanic 
Case, the Appeals Chamber in the context of the existence of an 'armed conflict' in Kosovo in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia held that the elements of joint criminal enterprise are based on 
customary law, paras. 21,33 ; Tadic, Appeals Chamber, (15 July 1999) paras. 222-23. 
37 T diC aý ibid., para. 202 
38 Ibid., para. 204; the Appeals Chamber considered of three forms of Joint criminal enterprise but it 
regarded the first two as similar basic forms, paras. 202-03; the forms described herein are a basic 
and an extended form of Joint criminal enterprise i. e., second and third forms as described by the 
Appeals Chamber respectively. see ibid., para. 220 
39 Prosecutor v. VasiIjevic Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 29 November 2002, 
para. 64 
40 Tadic, Appeals Chamber, (15 July 1999) para. 202 
41 ib id. 
42 Ibid., para. 203 
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As far as the second form of joint criminal enterprise is concerned, the 
following would explain such liability: 
An example of this would be a common, shared intention on the part of a group to forcibly remove members of one ethnicity from their town, village or region (to 
effect "ethnic cleansing" ) with the consequence that, in the course of doing so, one 
or more of the victims is shot and killed. While murder may not have been 
explicitly acknowledged to be part of the common design, it was nevertheless 
foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint might well result in 
the deaths of one or more of those civilians. Criminal responsibility may be 
imputed to all participants within the common enterprise where the risk of death 
occurring was both a predictable consequence of the execution of the common 
design and the accused was either reckless or indifferent to that risk. 43 
In particular, such an extended criminal responsibility can be invoked with 
regard to a superior with defacto or dejure power as he would have significantly 
contributed to such joint criminal enterprise and therefore could have been well 
aware that certain consequences were the most likely outcome of such joint 
criminal enterprise and yet willingly took the risk. 44 
However, such an extended criminal liability is not part of the joint 
criminal enterprise in the Statute of the ICC, as it requires that the contribution to 
the commission of the crime shall be intentional and either be made with the 
aim of furthering the criminal purpose or the participant must have the knowledge 
of the specific crime intended by the group. 45 As the Statute of the ICC does not 
contain any reference to the extended form of liability that requires foresight that 
crimes which are not within the common plan would be committed, but for the 
intended or known crime, extended form of the concept of joint criminal 
enterprise as applied by the ICTY may not be applicable. If such a restrictive 
approach is adopted, this would clearly reduce the scope of individual criminal 
liability to be applied by the ICC and thereby the protection of IDPs. 
ii. Command Responsibility 
Making military commanders or civilian superiors responsible for the acts or 
omissions of their subordinates resulting in international crimes is also another 
43 Ibid., para. 204. 
44 Prosecutor v. Milosevic et al., paras. 16-18. 
45 Art. 25(3)(d) of the Statute of the ICC; see K. Ambos, 'Article 25: Individual Criminal 
Responsibility' in O. Triffterer (ed. ), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International criminal 
Court, p. 475, at pp. 483-86. 
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method of effective deterrence. The superior - subordinate relationship is implicit 
46 in 'ordering' an unlawful act. Superiors who 'order' such unlawful 'acts' to be 
committed by their subordinates incur direct command or superior responsibility 
for commission even without actually inflicting harm on displaced civilians. 47 it 
is a form of commission of a crime by ordering 'through another person' as 
stated in Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute of the ICC. 48 
Indirect command or superior responsibility (command responsibility 
strictu sensu) makes the commanders or superiors further liable for the failure on 
their part to prevent or punish the unlawful acts committed by their subordinates. 
Such indirect or imputed command or superior responsibility arises from the 
relationship between superior and subordinate and not from the direct action of 
ordering the subordinate. Thus, the superior would become liable for not 
preventing the crime from being committed in the first place and then for not 
punishing the perpetrators after being informed of the commission of the 
crime. 
As such, the applicability of such doctrine of command or superior 
responsibility in internal armed conflicts becomes all the more important in the 
deterrence of international crimes. It can be a crucial safeguard in the protection of 
IDPs where there is lack of evidence to prove the direct command or superior 
responsibility. For instance, in cases of the commission of forced displacement and 
destruction of houses, if the evidence with regard to the 'ordering' of such actions 
by the superior is in dispute, the superior can be charged with these crimes on the 
basis of imputed responsibility, if he knew or had reason to know of the 
commission of such crimes by his subordinates but failed to prevent or punish 
them. 
The ICTY recognised that the doctrine of command or civilian superior 
responsibility is applicable to internal armed confliCt. 
49 Moreover, it has been 
confirmed by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY that the following elements of the 
46 K. Ambos, 'Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility' at p. 480. 
47 Arts. 7(l), 6(l) and 25(3)(b) respectively of the Statutes of ICTY, ICTR and ICC. 
48 K. Ambos, 'Article 25: 1ndividual Criminal Responsibility', at p. 480 
49Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic and Others, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Trial Chamber, (12 November 
2002 )( Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction) paras. 173-4 and 179; the Appeals Chamber in 
the same case upheld this point, Case IT-01-47-AR72 (16 July 2003) Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, para. 18; Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Trial Chamber, Judgment, paras. 46,66-81. 
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doctrine of command or superior responsibility contain the same elements as those 
applicable to international armed conflicts: 'the existence of a superior-subordinate 
relationship; the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was 
about to be or had been committed; the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or to punish the perpetrator 
thereof. 550 
Discussion of these elements is important to assess the extent of protection 
afforded to IDPs. The first element concerns a relationship based on a hierarchy 
where the superior has 'effective control' of his subordinates in the sense of 
'material ability' to issue orders to prevent unlawful acts and to sanction the 
perpetrators. 51 It is to be noted that imputed superior responsibility is imposed for 
the failure of the superior to act in the above manner when crimes were being 
committed or about to be committed. The non-restriction of such superior 
responsibility to official authorities and the extension of it to anyone acting as a 
de facto superior would have the effect of broadening the responsibility of 
superiors as perpetrators. 52 On this basis, the decisive criterion for superior 
responsibility is 'the actual possession or non-possession, of powers of control 
over the actions of subordinates. ' 53 
The second element of superior responsibility is concerned with the mens 
rea of the commander or the civilian superior. The mens rea required by the 
criterion of 'had reason to know' means having possession of such information 
that would place him on notice of the risk of such crimes being committed or 
about to be committed, indicating the need for further investigation. 54 However, 
this does not mean that a superior has a 'duty to know' everything that happened 
within the scope of his jurisdiction. It is sufficient to be proven that some 
information is available, to warrant further investigation. 55 Therefore, a superior 
cannot make an excuse that the information available was not sufficient to reach 
the conclusion of existence of crimes and that therefore he has not failed in his 
responsibility. 56 
5OHadzihasanovic and Others, Trial Chamber, para. 174 
51 Celebici, Trial Chamber, para. 378. 
52 Aleksovski, Trial Chamber, para. 76 
53 Celebici, Trial Chamber, para. 370 
54 Ibid., para. 383 
51 Ibid., para. 393 
56 Ibid., para. 393 
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The Trial Chamber of the ICTY consciously avoided a distinction between 
the standard of mens rea required for the responsibility of a commander and a 
superior even though it was aware of the high standard of mens rea for civilian 
57 superiors in Article 28(2) (a) of the ICC Statute. The Statute of the ICC, in 
relation to civilian superiors, requires that '[t]he superior either knew or 
consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated' the commission of 
crimes by subordinates. This can be distinguished from the mens rea - 'owing to 
the circumstances at the time, should have known' required for the responsibility 
of a 'military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander' 
which includes the command responsibility of political leaders such as a president 
who is a commander in chief of the armed forces. 58 
'Consciously disregarded' occurs when the superior 'simply ignores 
information within his actual possession compelling the conclusion that criminal 
offences are being committed or about to be committed. '59 This may be the 
situation of 'wilful blindness' which was considered in the Celebici Case as 
criminally actionable . 
60 This situation can be distinguished from the standard 
required from the ICTY with regard to the responsibility of commanders and 
superiors according to which the liability attaches to the information 'in the 
possession of' as opposed to 'actual possession' and thereby does not require the 
superior to be 'actually acquainted himself with the information. ' 61 Therefore the 
standard of mens rea required in the Statute of the ICC for civilian superior 
responsibility is stricter than the one required by the ICTY, as the former makes 
it difficult to prove the commission of crimes by civilian superiors. The ICTR 
adopted the same standard of mens rea as the Statute of the ICC for civilian 
62 
superiors. Additionally the Statute of the ICC requires in fairness to the civilian 
superiors who do not have control similar to that in the military hierarchy that 
the superior responsibility should be imposed only with regard to 'crimes 
concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the 
57 Ibid., para. 3 93, n. 424 
58 Art. 28(l) of the Statute of the ICC. 
59 Celebici, Trial Chamber, para. 387 
60 ibid. 
61 Celebici, Appeals Chamber, para. 239 
62 Kayishema and Ruzindana, paras. 227-228 
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supervisor. 63 This element tends to restrict the duty of the civilian superior to 
inform himself of the activities of his subordinates only to very narrow activities. 
As to the third element of superior responsibility, what constitutes 
4necessary and reasonable measures, ' to prevent and punish, depends on the 
material ability of the superior and therefore this element has considerable 
connection with the first element. The power to sanction perpetrators which is a 
necessary consequence of the power to order in the military hierarchy cannot be 
expected from civilian superiors. If such standard was expected from a civilian 
superior, it would absolve most of them from their imputed responsibility. The 
Trial Chamber of the ICTY considered that it is sufficient for the defacto or de 
jure civilian superior to have the power to report to the relevant authorities the 
crimescommitted soas to make it possible that those reports would initiate any 
investigation or disciplinary or criminal measure. 64 
The standard of mens rea in the Statute of the ICC with regard to civilian 
superiors which has been applied by the ICTR has the tendency to minimize the 
65 conviction of civilian superiors in the administrative hierarchy of a state . The 
encouraging feature in the Statute of the ICC in the prosecution of perpetrators is 
that the explicit provision of at least the imputed responsibility of a political 
leader 'effectively acting as a military commander' who orders or induces the 
displacement of civilians would be determined by the mens rea standard of the 
military commander. 66 In contrast, the ICTY provides more protection of 
63 Art. 28(2)(b) of the Statute of the ICC. 
64Alecksovski, Trial Chamber, para. 78 
65 G. R. Vetter, 'Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)' (2000) 25 YJIL 89, at pp. 142-3. 
66 M. C. Bassiouni, and P. Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former 
Yugoslavia ( New York, 1996) at p. 368 states that the 'issue of the command responsibility of non- 
military personnel [political leaders]does not rely on whether they are themselves part of the 
military. The proper inquiry is whether they exercised command and control as effective military 
commanders. Thus, a distinction has to be made between the commander-in -chief, who may be a 
civilian, and other civilians who may be in the military chain of command and who have effective 
command and control responsibilities. [such as minister of defence] The difference is essentially of 
an evidentiary nature. Thus, a commander-in-chief, [usually the president] despite the title, may fail 
to exercise the full powers of the office. Conversely, a civilian who occupies a position of military 
command and control actually may make decisions on strategic or tactical matters or both. ' ; Y. 
Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict, (Cambridge, 
2004), at p. 243 states that '[i]t has always been acknowledged that senior politicians taking an 
active part in the direction of military affairs -such as Ministers of Defence-may be 'assimilated to 
a military commander. ' 
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deterrence to IDPs by treating the superior responsibility of civilians and military 
commanders with identical standards of men rea. 67 
b. Limitations With Regard to War Crimes 
Limitations applied by the ICTR with regard to individual criminal responsibility 
including superior responsibility of civilian superiors with regard to war crimes 
which caused massive displacement of civilians and extermination of IDPs who 
sought refuge in sites such as churches, Mosques and schools, have adversely 
affected the conviction for war crimes such as murder, cruel treatment, and rape 
as torture. 68 For instance, in Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, IDPs who had sought 
shelter in the compound of the Gikomero Parish Church, which was considered 
4 69 as a place universally recognised to be a sanctuary, ' were attacked and killed . 
These limitations are: the class of perpetrators, which is concerned with the 
personal jurisdiction of war crimes under common Article 3 and Protocol 11; and 
the nexus required between the crime and the armed conflict, which is concerned 
with the material jurisdiction of such crimes. 70 
Although the ICTR in the Prosecutor v. Akayesu broadly accepted that 
civilian superiors can be made responsible for war crimes, it found that 'the 
application of the principle of individual criminal responsibility, enshrined in 
Article 6(3), to civilians remains contentious. ' 71 Therefore it limited the 
application of individual criminal responsibility to those individuals 'who were 
legitimately mandated and expected, as public officials or agents or persons 
otherwise holding public authority or de facto representing the government, to 
support or fulfil the war efforts. ' 72 In the Akayesu case, the very fact that 
Akayesu was a bourgmestre (mayor) with exclusive control over the communal 
police, responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the commune and with 
67 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Trial Chamber 11, para. 94 
68 See for instance, Kayishema and Ruzindana, paras. 592-93; Musema, Trial Chamber, Judgment 
and Sentence, paras. 360-73 
69 Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T (22 January 2004), para. 764; Kayishema and 
Ruzindana, Sentence, para. 16, where the Trial Chamber, in considering aggravating circumstances, 
stated that his attack was on places 'traditionally regarded as safe heavens, such as Mubuga 
Church. ' 
70 Musema v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, (16 November 2001) Judgment Appeals 
Chamber, paras-244-275 
7 'Prosecutor il. Akayesu, Trial Chamber 1, paras. 631 -634 and para. 491. 
72jbid., para. 63 1; ICTR cited the example of a Tokyo trial in which the former Foreign Minister of 
Japan was convicted for crimes committed during the rape of Nanking, para. 633. 
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considerable de facto powers and remained the 'most important local 
representative of power at the centre' demonstrated his connection with the 
government. 73 However, this stringent requirement that Akayesu should have 
represented the government to 'support or fulfil the war effort' led to his release 
from individual criminal responsibility for war crimes of murder, cruel treatment 
and rape by the Trial Chamber. 74 Similarly, in many cases concerning war 
crimes, this requirement resulted in the acquittal of perpetrators by the 
ICTR. 75 
It seems, therefore, that only those civilian superiors who have some link 
with the government party to the armed conflict and 'supported or fulfilled the 
war effort' of the government can be made responsible for their acts under 
76 international humanitarian law. Restricting the responsibility only to the public 
officials of the state apparatus as parties to the conflict is an unnecessary 
restriction of the scope of humanitarian law, as under humanitarian law, 
insurgents also have obligations to comply with. 77 As a result, IDPs would not 
be protected against violations of humanitarian law by civilian superiors of 
the insurgents. Moreover, superior responsibility for omissions can only be 
imposed on a civilian superior 'where there exists a legal obligation to act' 
does not necessarily mean that a legal obligation can exist on a public 
capacity alone. 78 Civilian superiors of a private business enterprise can also 
commit war crimes. 79 
The position taken by the Trial Chamber of the ICTR with regard to 
civilian superiors in the Akayesu case cannot be considered as authoritative, as 
such a condition had not been required by those cases decided by the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Tribunals. 80 Potential perpetrators should be interpreted widely in 
the context of an internal armed conflict, to enhance the protective purposes of 
73 Akayesu, Trial Chamber, para. 60. 
74 Ibid., paras., 643-44 
75 Musema, Trial Chamber, para. 969-75; Kayishema and Ruzindana, paras. 590-624; Rutaganda, 
Trial Chamber, paras. 442-445. 
76 R. Provost, International Human Rights, at pp. 88-89 
77 Ibid., at p. 89 
78 Celebici, Trial Chamber, para. 334 
79 See R. Provost, International Human Rights, at pp. 79-89 for detailed discussion of such 
cases decided by the International Military Tribunal and subsequent war crimes trials 
concerning civilians. 
80 See Hirota case in Akayesu, Trial Chamber, paras. 490-91; similarly in Musema the ICTR 
examined the cases decided by Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals which have not required such a 
condition andcame to theopposite conclusion, paras. 268-275. 
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humanitarian law norms, as in such circumstances, not only the government 
and insurgents, but the whole nation, including the civilians belonging to each 
party, become enemies. 81 
The additional requirement 'to support or fulfil the war effort' is an 
undue restriction of the scope of individual criminal responsibility of civilian 
superiors as this incorporates the element of crimes against humanity, namely a 
connection between the 'crime and a broader attack against a civilian 
population' as an element of war crime. 82 Such an element is not required in 
the ICTY jurisprudence or in the Elements of Crimes of the statute of the 
ICC. 
The delimitation of civilian perpetrators as 'public agents' was rejected by 
the Appeals Chamber in the Akayesu case, on the basis that neither the Statute of 
the ICTR nor common Article 3 or Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11 explicitly 
states such a requirement. 83 It is true that most crimes are committed by the 
commanders or combatants of either party, thus reflecting the common Article 3 
requirement of close nexus between the violations and the armed conflicts. 84 
However, the Chamber stated that such a 'special relationship' is not required as a 
'separate condition' to invoke the application of common Article 3 and therefore 
Article 4 of the Statute of ICTR. 85 The reason for its decision is that exclusion of 
certain perpetrators who do not fall within the specific category is detrimental to 
the minimum protection provided for victims under common Article 3 which 
'implies necessarily effective punishment' of every perpetrator who violates it 
without discrimination. 86 Therefore, it is not the nexus between the civilian 
superior and a party to the conflict but a nexus between the acts and the 
armed conflict that is necessary to establish responsibility under war crimes. 
However, the requirement that there must be a direct nexus between 
the actions of the perpetrator and the armed conflict further restricts the scope of 
81 R. Provost, International Human Rights, at pp. 98,102; C. Kress, 'War Crimes Committed in 
Non-International Armed Conflict and the Emerging System of International Criminal 
Justice, '(2000)3 0 Israel Yearbook of Human Rights, 103, at p. 123 states, that requiring the 
perpetrators to have a link with either party to the conflict is a 'significant restriction of the 
potential perpetrators of civil war crimes. ' See above, Ch. 2 for the nature of international 
humanitarian law obligations. 
82 R. Provost, International Human Rights, at pp. 100- 10 1. 
83 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, Appeals Chamber (I June 2001) paras. 432-443. 
84 Ibid., para. 444 
85 Ibid 
86 Ibid., para. 443 
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individual criminal responsibility. Certain delimitation is necessary as otherwise, 
crimes committed for reasons not related to the conflict, which could be 
sanctioned under the penal law of the country, would also be covered by 
common Article 3 or Additional Protocol 11, contrary to their objective of 
protecting only the victims of internal armed conflict. 87 The ICTR construes the 
requirement of a nexus between the crime and the armed conflict as meaning 
that the crime should have been committed 'to support or fulfil the war effort, ' 
in the sense of having a 'direct connection. 88 The ICTY, however, applied a 
relatively flexible interpretation of the nexus requirement. According to the 
ICTY, the crime must be 'closely related, ' rather than 'directly connected' to 
hostilities occurring in other part of the territory. 89Therefore it is not necessary 
to show that the crime 'be part of a policy or of a practice officially endorsed or 
tolerated by one of the parties to the conflict, or that act be in actual furtherance 
of a policy associated with the conduct of war or in the actual interest of a party to 
the conflict'. 90 This direct nexus is the exact requirement that was required by the 
ICTR. 
It is to be noted that even the Elements of Crimes of the Statute of the ICC 
require a nexus whereby the crime 'took place in the context of and was associated 
with an armed conflict not of an international character. ' 91 This requirement is 
similar to that of the ICTY and more flexible than the ICTR requirement. 'In 
the context of means the geographical scope of a non-international armed conflict 
which is beyond the narrow geographical context of actual combat zone and 
thereby in the whole territory under the control of a party and until a peaceful 
settlement is reached . 
92 'Associated with' means the nexus between the 
conduct and the armed conflict. 93 The difference in this requirement of the 
Elements of Crimes to the Statute of the ICC and that of the ICTY is that the 
knowledge of the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict, which 
87 Kayishema and Ruzindana, para. 189 
88 Akayesu, Trial Chamber, paras, 640-44, para. 63 1; Kayishema and Ruzindana, para. 604. 
89 Tadic, Jurisdiction, para. 70; Celebici, Trial Chamber, paras. 193 
90 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 573; this 
view was endorsed by Celebici, Trial Chamber, para. 195. 
91 Elements of Crimes, at p- 18. 
92 K. Dormann, Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge, 2002) at pp 19 and 387. 
93 Ibid., at pp. 19-20 and 388. 
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forms one of the four elements that explains the subject matter jurisdiction 
for war crimes, is additionally necessitated by the former. 94 
The requirement of a direct connection and therefore that the act was 
to be in the furtherance of the war effort would restrict the scope of 
application of individual criminal responsibility and thereby the protective 
objective of the tribunals and the Court. Such a strict interpretation of the nexus 
requirement adopted by the ICTR, particularly in offences committed by civilians 
in positions of authority, resulted in their acquittal from conviction for war 
crimes until the decision of the Appeals Chamber in Rutaganda. 95 Since it is one 
of the substantive legal requirements for the applicability of the war crimes, 
failure to establish nexus would go to the merits of the case and consequent 
acquittal of the accused. 
In Rutaganda, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the Kunarac Appeals 
judgment of the ICTY as to its nexus requirement that the acts were 'closely 
related' to the armed conflict, which can be explained as that the perpetrators 
'acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict. 96 It means 
that the armed conflict must, 'at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the 
perpetrator's ability to commit, his decision to commit it, the manner in which it 
was committed or the purpose for which it was committed. 07 The Kunarac 
judgment further explains the factors to be taken into account, inter alia., in 
determining whether an act is in closely or sufficiently related to an armed conflict 
as: 
the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non- 
combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact that 
the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and the fact 
that the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator's official 
98 duties. 
94 The Elements of Crimes, at pp. 38-48 requires that '[t]he perpetrator was aware of factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict. ' This could be proved separately 
or could be derived implicitly from the objective nexus requirement, K. Dormann, 
Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute, at pp. 20-22. 
95 Musema, Trial Chamber, para. 969-75; Kayishema and Ruzindana, paras. 590-624; Rutaganda 
Trial Chamber, paras. 442-445; R. Kolb, 'The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Criminal 
Tribunals on Their Jurisdiction and on International Cnmes'(2000)71 BYIL 259, at pp. 271-721- 
96 Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A , Judgment, Appeals Chamber (26 May 200-3) 
9 aras. 569-70; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Appeals Chamber, para. 58. 
Kunarac, Kovac and I ukovic, ibid. 
Ibid., para. 59. 
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According to the Appeals Chamber in Rutaganda, 'under the guise of the armed 
conflict' does not merely mean 'at the same time as the conflict' or in all 
circumstances created in part by the armed conflict. "' Thus, crimes committed 
by a non-combatant taking advantage of the armed conflict situation to ftilfil 
his personal hatred do not constitute war crimes under Article 4 of the ICTR. 1 00 
On the contrary, for instance, 'were combatants who took advantage of their 
positions of military authority to rape individuals whose displacement was an 
express goal of the military campaign in which they took part, ' it would 
constitute a war crime. 101 To determine a 'close' relationship, several of the 
above stated factors should be present rather than one, and this is even 
more important when a perpetrator is a non-combatant such as a civilian 
superior. 1 02 The reason for application of the 'public agent' requirement by the 
Trial Chamber in the Akayesu case concerning a civilian superior may have been 
due to the difficulties in establishing a nexus between armed conflict and crimes 
committed by civilian superiors, especially in the context of the genocide against 
the Tutsi, which was described by the Trial Chamber as having 'occurred 
concomitantly with the ... conflict', 
but 'fundamentally different from the 
conflict. ' 103 However, as the special relationship of perpetrators is not required for 
the application of common Article 3 or Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11, the 
4nexus' requirement should be distinguished from the issue of 'potential 
perpetrator. " 04 
The flexible nexus requirement adopted by the ICTR in Rutaganda by 
the Appeals Chamber has been followed since then by the ICTR. 105 Such an 
approach is in line with the fact that humanitarian law is applicable to the whole 
territory and not to the combat zone alone. 106 However, ICTR decisions have not 
99 Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, para. 570. 
100 ]bid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 ibid 
103 Akayesu, Trial Chamber, para. 128; Kayeshema and Rizindana, para. 440 
104 H. Spieker, 'The International Criminal Court and Non-International Armed Conflicts' (2000)13 
LIIL 395, at p-416 
105 The Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T Judgment and Sentence(I 5 May 2003) 
para. 516-18. 
106 On the contrary in Kayishema and Ruzindana, at para. 610, it was stated that ' there were no 
military operations in Kibuye Town nor in the area of Bisesero 
in this period of time. There is 
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been consistent in the application of the nexus requirement, due to the uncertainty 
as to the nature of the policy of genocide, whether it was pursued as a 
policy of armed conflict between Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) and Rwandan 
Patriotic Forces (RPF) or as a separate policy not related to such armed 
conflict. 107 In the latter situation, the nexus test would have to be applied 
strictly to find a specific nexus between the crime and the armed conflict to 
establish war crimes. ' 08 In the former situation, a less stringent application of the 
nexus requirement would be sufficient, as RPF was identified with the Tutsi 
ethnic minority, which gave the 'pretext' for such large scale killings and other 
abuses against mostly Tutsi civilians who were displaced by armed conflicts and 
sought refuge at sites of Mosques and churches. 109 The difficulty in determining 
the nature of the genocide policy may also have been exacerbated by the fact that 
almost all the violations involved civilians within the power of the party to the 
conflict (Article 4 of Additional Protocol 11) and not the killings of civilians in 
hostilities. 
The guilty plea made by the accused, the Prime Minister of the interim 
government, in Prosecutor v. Kambanda, concerning the widespread and 
systematic attack on civilians, contained admissions that would be pertinent 
to the relevant facts of the armed conflict in Rwanda. He indicated that high level 
discussions were held between the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of 
Staff of the FAR to discuss FAR's 'support in the fight against the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) and its "accomplices, " understood to be the Tutsi and 
Moderate Hutu' groups that existed within military, militia and political 
structures which had planned and eliminated 'Tutsi and Hutu political 
opponents. "10 These facts clearly indicate that Tutsi and Moderate Hutu civilians 
were identified with RPF as accomplices and political opponents and their 
also no evidence that the civilian population, at the four sites in question, was affected by military 
operations which were under way in other regions of Rwanda. ' 
107 Akayesu, Trial Chamber, paras. 127-8; in Kayishema and Ruzindana, it was stated that atrocities 
though committed during armed conflict, they were committed 'as a part of a distinct policy of 
genocide; they were committed parallel to, and not as a result of, the armed conflict. ' para. 621; 
108 Dissenting Judgment of Judge Ostrovsky, in Prosecutor v. Semanza, (15 May 2003) para. 31-32; 
in Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and Imanishimwe Case No. ICTR-99-46-T (25 February 
2004) paras. 707-8, the Trial Chamber identified two types of crimes that occurred in Cyangugu: 
widespread attacks against Tutsi civilians and 'related systematic attack on political grounds 
against civilians with suspected ties to the RPF. ' 
109 Semanza, (15 May 2003) para. 516-22. 
"'Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (4 September 1998) 
para. 39 
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killings occurred as a result of the armed conflict and not distinct from it. 1 11 
Therefore, a close nexus between the crime and the armed conflict might be 
established without much difficulty. 
It is important that the ICTR settle the nature of the situation in 
Rwanda as a whole, rather than determining it on a case-by-case basis when 
determining the existence of a nexus between the crime and the armed conflict. 112 
The latter approach would lead to inconsistent decisions as to the responsibility 
under war crimes, and perpetrators of war crimes would not be effectively 
punished, even by the flexible application of the nexus requirement. 
2. Reparations 
Where IDPs are concerned, it is axiomatic that retributive justice alone is not 
sufficient for the process of reconciliation but restorative justice in the form of 
restitution, compensation or otherwise is important for the process of 
reconciliation among societies affected by conflict, to encourage safe and 
dignified return of IDPs to their places of residence. In this regard the Statute of 
the ICC is significant as it provides for restorative justice by providing 
reparations along with the imposition of criminal responsibility. 
Granting of reparations under the Statute of the ICC should be 
distinguished from compensation granted in pursuance of state responsibility under 
international human rights Conventions, which is discussed later in this chapter, 
because the international criminal tribunals only deal with the individual criminal 
responsibility of natural persons and not the responsibility of the States. 113 Under 
the Statute of the ICC, victims can file claims for reparations, which can be 
awarded 'directly against a convicted person. ' 114 This is the first international 
111 Similarly, in Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor and in Public Prosecutor v. the 'Butare 
Four' Tribunals of Swiss and Belgium respectively considered that genocide was committed 
as a result of armed conflict instead of considering them as two separate events. See L. 
Reydams, 'Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor' Tribunal Militaire de Cassation (Switzerland) 
April 27,2001, (2002) 96 AM 23 1; L. Reydams, 'Belgium's First Application of Universal 
Jurisdiction: the Butare Four Case' (2003)l Journal ofInternational Criminal Justice 428. 
112 See L.. Van Den Henk and E. Van Sliedregt, 'Ten Years Later, Rwanda Tribunal Still Faces 
Legal Complexities: Some Comments on the Vagueness of Indictment, Complicity in Genocide, 
and the Nexus Requirement for War Crimes' (2004) 17 LJIL 537 at p. 556. 
113 Arts. 6,5 and 25 of the Statutes of ICTY, ICTR and ICC; C. P. J. Muttukumaru, 'Reparations for 
Victims' in F. Lattanzi and W. A. Schabas (eds. ), Essays on the Rome Statute of International 
Criminal Court, vol. l, ( il Sirente, 1999) p. 303, at pp. 307-09. 
114 Art. 75(2) of the Statute of the ICC; See generally, I. Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of 
Crimes Under International Law (Leiden, 2004), at pp. 193-247. 
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Convention that allows a standing to the victim in a court to receive reparations 
from a convicted person, as opposed to the state. ' 15 Accordingly, a victim's request 
for reparation under Article 75 of the Statute of the ICC shall be made in writing 
to the registrar and contain particulars such as the description of the injury or loss 
or harm; location and date of incident and 'to the extent possible' the identity of 
the person responsible for the harm; 'to the extent possible' any relevant 
supporting documentation and the claims. ' 16 
It is to be noted that since IDPs are often not in a position to provide 
documentation, due to their situation, the requirement 'to the extent possible' does 
not necessitate the same from them. Apart from the request of the victim for 
reparations, the ICC can 'on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, 
determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to or in respect of, 
victims. ' 117 Such a power of the ICC to initiate is beneficial to the IDPs who stay 
in areas far from the court, because in such situations 'it seemed improbable that 
any coherent claim would be mounted in an international Tribunal, especially if 
there was evidence of State complicity in the crimes. ' 118 The whole situation is in 
contrast with the position under the Statutes of ICTY and ICTR, since, 
notwithstanding the Tribunals can order for restitution as opposed to compensation 
in addition to imprisonment, victims do not have the locus standi to request the 
restitution of their 'property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct. ' 119 
Under the Statute of the ICC, 'victims' means 'natural persons who have 
suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. ' 120 Since the victims include persons other than those who have directly 
suffered, this definition is broader than the one applied under the Statutes of ICTY 
and ICTR, where victim means '[a] person against whom a crime over which the 
115 Art. 75(l) of the Statute of the ICC; Art. 15(3) of the Statute of the ICC states that'[v]ictims may 
make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence'; also see 19(3) and 68(3) of the Statute of the ICC. 
116 Rule 94 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC (9.9.2002) (hereafter Rules of the 
ICC) . 117 Art. 75(l) of the Statute of the ICC. 
118 C. P. J. Muttukumau, 'Reparations for Victims' at p. 309; in addition wider publicity as to the 
reparation proceedings before the court would be given by the registrar with the assistance of 
relevant state parties and inter governmental organizations, Rule 96 of the Rules of the ICC. 
119 Arts. 24(3) and 23(3) of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR; according to Rule 105(A) of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, IT/32/Rev. 36, Adopted on II February 1994, 
(contains amendment till 21 July 2005), and ICTR Adopted on 29 June 1995, (contains 
amendment till 7 June 2005) either the prosecutor or the court on its own initiative would hold a 
hearing for the restitution of the property or proceeds thereof; see above. Ch. 6, Section, D. 
120 Rule 85(a) of the Rules of the ICC. 
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Tribunal has jurisdiction has allegedly been committed' 121 which is precisely 
limited to 'direct' Victims. 122 However, the definition of the Statute of the ICC is 
not explicit about the collective victims and the indirect victims who would be 
entitled to claim reparation on the basis of the harm suffered. 
The Court may award reparations which include restitution, compensation 
and rehabilitation, 1 23 6 [flaking into account the scope and extent of any damage, 
loss or injury, ... on an individualized basis or, where it deems it appropriate, on a 
collective basis or both. ' 124 It can therefore be stated that a collective form of 
reparation is also possible. Moreover, an award can be made through the Trust 
fund 'where the number of victims and the scope, forms and modalities of 
reparations makes a collective award more appropriate. ' 125 These provisions 
indicate the possibility of granting reparations for collective victims. Thus, 
reparation for expenses incurred by displacement of a community as a direct result 
of a crime might be granted. 126 Moreover, since the definition is not confined to 
direct victims, it would at least involve indirect victims, namely, dependants and/or 
members of immediate family' as stated in the UN Declaration on victims, 1985.127 
Additionally, the definition of victims in the Statute of the ICC includes 
4organisations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their 
property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable 
purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects 
for humanitarian purposes. ' 128 Granting reparation for such organisations identified 
as victims of intentional direction of attack and destruction against their civilian 
and cultural property would help to reconstruct the life of IDPs affected by 
conflicts. 1 29 
12 1 Rule 2(A) of the Rules of ICTY and Rule 2 of the Rules of the ICTR. 
122 D. Donat-Cattin, 'The Role of Victims in ICC Proceedings, ' in F. Lattanzi and W. A. Schabas 
(eds. ), Essays on the Rome Statute ofInternational Criminal Court, vol. 1, ( il Sirente, 1999) at p. 25 1, 
at pp. 260-6 1. 123 Art. 75(l) of the Statute of the ICC. 
124 Rule 97(l) of the Rules of the ICC; see Rule 98 of the Rules of the ICC on Trust Fund. 
125 Rule 98(3) of the Rules of the ICC. 
126 C. Muttukumaru, ' Reparations for Victims, ' at p. 306. 
127 Art. 1 of the UN Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power, UN Doc. GA Res. 40/34 (1985), Annex; D. Donat-Catin, 'The Role of Victims in ICC 
Proceedings, ' at p. 262 
128Rule 85(b) of the Rules of the ICC. 
129Art. 8(2)(e) (iv) of the Statute of the ICC recognises such attacks as a war crime in internal 
armed conflicts. 
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Notwithstanding the seemingly effective protection of reparations for 
victims provided in the Statute, its success depends largely on its enforcement. To 
locate, identify, trace, freeze and seize the property and assets of convicted 
persons, the cooperation of relevant states parties is necessary. 130 This is going to 
be the real challenge for the Court, especially vis-a- vis states which are unwilling 
or unable to cooperate with the ICC. However, the trust fund established for the 
'benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of families of 
such victims' might be used to provide relief for those victims awarded 
reparations when enforcement is not possible due to the insolvency of the 
perpetrator or difficulties in recovering his assets. 131 
B. Prosecution in the National Courts of Third States on the Basis of 
Universal Jurisdiction 
Apart from the above discussed prosecution in the international courts, 
prosecution in the national courts of a third state for international crimes 
committed in the home state of a perpetrator on the basis of universal jurisdiction 
is another way of asserting international criminal jurisdiction. The need to end 
impunity of perpetrators in the protection of persons affected by armed 
conflicts is expressed by the Special Rapporteur in the Report on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, in which the Rapporteur encouraged the 
prosecution of the suspects of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Somalia 
in the 'national courts in countries where such suspects are said to live or 
frequently to travel to, such as Djibouti, Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yernen. ' 132 Universal 
jurisdiction can be defined as 'criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of 
the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the 
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other 
connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction. ' 133 IbUS , asserting universal 
130 Art. 93(l) (a), (k) of the Statute of the ICC; also see Art. 109 of the Statute of the ICC. 
13 1 Article 79(l) of the Statute of the ICC; C. Ferstman, 'The Reparation Regime of the 
International Criminal Court: Practical Considerations' (2002)15 LIM 667, at pp. 684-85. 
132 E/CN. 4/2000/110 ( 26 January 2000) para. 32. 
133 Principle l(l) of the Princeton Principles on Universal junsdiction, 2001 
(http: //www. princeton. edu/-Iapa/principles. html) (these principles were adopted by an assembly of 
scholars and jurists from around the world, in 2001, in Princeton University, New Jersey. M. C. 
Bassiouni was the Chair of the Drafting Committee). 
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jurisdiction means that the alleged crime may have no connection to the 
prosecuting state except for its nature, which transcends territorial restrictions and 
thereby is subject to the common concern of the community of nations. 134 
Such universal jurisdiction can be exercised by a state over one accused of 
international crimes subject to certain conditions. Firstly, the alleged perpetrator 
should be present before the judicial body for trial; 135 according to the Princeton 
Principles, however, absence of the accused in the territory of the prosecuting state 
'does not prevent a state from initiating the criminal process, conducting an 
, 136 investigation, issuing an indictment, or requesting extradition,... This is 
because universal jurisdiction is a manifestation of jurisdiction to prescribe, 
which can be extraterritorial and distinct from jurisdiction to enforce which is 
strictly territorial. 137 Therefore, exercising universal jurisdiction in the preliminary 
stage as opposed to the trial stage in the absence of the perpetrator in criminal 
proceedings is justified in international law in order to initiate an investigation or 
to gather evidence to avoid its loss. ' 38 
Thus, according to this view, universal jurisdiction can be exercised in 
personam or in absentia similar to territorial jurisdiction, nationality 
jurisdiction and passive personality jurisdiction to prescribe in personam or in 
absentia. 139The views against universal jurisdiction to prescription in absentia in 
134 M. C. Bassiouni, 'The History of Universal Jurisdiction and its Place in International Law' in S. 
Macedo (ed. ), Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes 
Under International Law (Philadelphia, 2004) p. 39, at p. 42. 
135 Principle 1(2) of the Princeton Principles; accordingly, the accused cannot be tried in absentia 
before the judicial body of the prosecuting state as it is contrary to Article 14 of the ICCPR; the 
Belgian War Crimes Act of 16 June 1993 amended by the Act of 10ffi February 1999 had granted 
universal jurisdiction to the Courts of Belgium not only to prosecute but also to have trials over war 
crimes of Additional Protocol 11, crimes against humanity and Genocide without the presence of 
the accused in Belgian territory. See for the Act of 16 June 1993 Concerning the Punishment of 
Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law as amended by the Act of 10 February 1999, 
(1999) 38 ILM 92 1; E. David, 'Universal Jurisdiction in Belgium Law' (2002/03) XII PYIL 77. 
136 S. W. Becker, 'Commentary on the Princeton Principles' in The Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction, 200 1, p. 39, at p. 44. 
137 See R. O' Keefe, 'Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept' (2004)2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 753, at p. 740 and et seq., for a detailed discussion of universal 
jurisdiction to prescribe; for various views on universal jurisdiction see S. W. Becker, 'Universal 
Jurisdiction: How Universal is it? A Study of Competing Theories' (2002/2003) XII Palestine 
Yearbook ofInternational law 49. 
138 D. Vandermeersch, 'Prosecuting International Crimes in Belgium' (2005) 3 JICJ 400, at p. 417; 
S. W. Becker, ibid., at p. 52 
139R. 0' Keefe, 'Universal Jurisdiction', at pp. 750,755; Arrest Warrant Case, dissenting opinion of 
Judge Van Den Wyngaert, paras. 52-58; see for contrary views: Separate opinion of Justice 
Gillaume in Arrest Warrant case, para. 9; L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and 
Municipal Legal Perspectives, (Oxford, 2003) at p. 230; A. Cassese, 'Is the Bell Tolling for 
Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction' (2003) 1 Journal of 
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international law to commence investigations to collect evidence and to firame 
charges confuses it with the jurisdiction to enforcement in absentia which can 
be a violation of territorial integrity of a state. 
Universal prescriptive jurisdiction is also in conformity with the extradition 
procedure that has to be resorted to by the prosecuting state later on for the 
surrender of the accused, as for such a request of extradition it has to establish a 
'prima facie case of the person's guilt. ' 140 Moreover, it is not contrary to the 
rights of the perpetrators to be tried in their presence. 14 1 Above all, such an 
approach is conducive to the prosecution of lower-rank officers, whose travel 
abroad is not publicised like that of high-ranking officials of the state and 
therefore to an issue of an arrest warrant and to their subsequent trial in the 
appropriate state. 142 
According to Cassese, the notion of absolute universal jurisdiction that 
does not require the presence of the accused in the prosecuting state is still in the 
emerging process. 143 Therefore despite its non-attainment of the status of lex 
lata, a legal basis to the application of such universal jurisdiction can be 
asserted as finding a legal basis for a notion and establishing its status are 
two different things. 
The second condition for the exercise of universal jurisdiction is that, the 
state where the crime has been committed in internal armed conflicts should not 
have requested his extradition from the prosecuting state where the accused is 
present. 144 However, if the request of such a state is not seemingly in the actual 
interest of effectively prosecuting the alleged perpetrator in its national Courts, 
especially where the state officials who committed crimes along with the alleged 
International Criminal Justice 589, at pp. 592-93; G. Abi-Saab, 'The Proper Role of Universal 
Jurisdiction' (2003)1 Journal ofInternational Criminal Justice 596, at p. 60 1. 
140 Princeton Principle 1(3); see A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, (Oxford, 2003), at pp. 285- 
291 for the discussion of conditional ( in personam ) and absolute ( in absentia) universal 
jurisdiction. 
141 Article 14(3) (d) of the ICCPR. 
142 A. Cassese, 'When May Senior State Officials be Tried' at p. 859 
143 A. Cassese, 'Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? ' at p. 593; for the emerging state practice 
on absolute universal jurisdiction see A. Cassese, 'When May Senior State Officials be Tried 
for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case' (2002) 13 EJIL 
853, at pp. 859-862 
144 Princeton Principle 8(a), (c). 
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perpetrator are still in power, the prosecuting state can initiate proceedings 
against the perpetrator without extraditing him to his own state. 145 
States have asserted universal jurisdiction in accordance with the 
implementing legislation which gives effect to specific Conventions in the national 
sphere, 146 but this does not mean that they cannot assert jurisdiction over non- 
treaty based crimes prohibited under customary international law, namely, war 
crimes committed in internal armed conflicts and crimes against humanity, 
without national legislation. 147 However, assertion of universal jurisdiction over 
such crimes, in order to prosecute the perpetrators, is ultimately a decision that has 
to be made by individual States. Therefore, the success of such enforcement 
measure largely depends on the will of those States. 
Among the treaties which contain universal jurisdiction, the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
1984 and the Statute of the ICC ( through implementing legislation) are relevant 
to the protection of IDPs. The Convention Against Torture is one of the treaties 
which obliges State Parties in cases where the alleged perpetrator is present in the 
territory of those states either to prosecute or to extradite them. ' 48 Consequently, if 
an accused whose alleged crime has no link at all otherwise with a state, is present 
in its territory and no third state require his extradition, then that state where the 
accused is present should in accordance with the treaty obligation prosecute him 
for alleged commission of torture abroad. In this way, the Convention Against 
Torture implicitly provides for universal jurisdiction among States Parties. 
States Parties have provided universal jurisdiction over war crimes 
including those committed in internal armed conflicts, genocide and crimes 
against humanity in their implementing legislation to the Statute of the ICC, even 
though not required to do so by their international treaty obligations or in their 
other national legislation. 149 Since the ICC functions in a complementary manner 
145 Princeton Principle 8(f); Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, para. 614. 
146 M. C. Bassiouni, 'The History of Universal Jurisdiction' at p. 46. 
147 Princeton Principle 3; 1993 War Crimes Act of Belgium amended on 10 February 1999 to 
include crimes against humanity. 
148Art. 5(2) and 7(l) of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. 
149 For example Australia, Canada, United Kingdom; see for the discussion of such Laws 
concerning universal jurisdiction, A. H. Butler, 'The Growing Support for Universal Jurisdiction in 
National Legislation, ' in S. Macedo (ed. ), Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the 
Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law p. 67; with regard to the Law of Belgium, 
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with the national courts, a state party to the ICC can assert universal jurisdiction 
over such crimes committed by the perpetrator, provided it is genuinely willing or 
able to prosecute the alleged perpetrator. 
Such assertion of universal jurisdiction under specific treaties is useful, 
given the limited cases in which the ICC can have jurisdiction. Firstly, it can only 
have jurisdiction over a case which is of sufficient gravity. 150 The Statute of the 
ICC requires that the war crimes should have been 'committed as a part of a plan 
or policy or as part of a large-scale commission, ' it would not have jurisdiction 
over war crimes which are not committed on a large scale, even though they are 
serious in nature. 151 Therefore, only high-ranking perpetrators would be prosecuted 
in the ICC. Secondly, without a Security Council referral under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to crimes committed in the 
territory of a state or the state of nationality of the accused which is a party to the 
Statute or accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. 152 Since, in internal armed 
conflicts, often the territory of the crime and the nationality of the accused is the 
same state, most of the crimes committed against IDPs would not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. Thirdly, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes 
committed before the Statute entered into force, i. e., I't July 2002. Thus, states can 
prosecute and punish the perpetrators of international crimes committed before 
this date on the basis of universal jurisdiction, as such crimes are not subjected to 
any statute of limitations. 153 Therefore prosecution in third states on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction would provide protection to IDP by closing the gaps to 
increase accountability for international crimes, thereby minimizing the impunity 
of perpetrators. 
see S. Smis, and Kim Van Der Borght, 'Introductory Note to Belgium's Amendment to the Law of 
June 16,1993 (As Amended by the Law of February 10,1999) Concerning the Punishment of 
Grave Breaches of Humanitarian Law' (2003) 42 ILM 740 and the Amended Law of Belgium in 
(2003) 42 ILM 749; see Militaýy Prosecutor v. Niyonteze, Tribunal Militaire d'appel I A, Geneva 26 
May 2000 (appeals judgment) and Tribunal Militaire de Cassation, 27 April 2001 (cassation 
Judgment), in L. Reydams, 'Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor' for the upholding of a conviction 
under Switzerland-Military Penal Code for Additional Protocol II war crimes committed in 
Rwanda. 
150 Art. 17(l) (d ) of the Statute of the ICC. 
15 1 Arts. 8(l), 17(l) (d ) and 53(l)( c) of the Statute of the ICC. 
152 Art. 13(b) of the Statute of the ICC, the Court can have jurisdiction over crimes committed in a 
non-state party; Art. 12 of the Statute of the ICC. 
153 ". 29 of the Statute of the ICC. 
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Consequently, externally displaced persons who are victims of international 
crimes committed against them in their home state, can initiate prosecutions 
against perpetrators who visit a state where victims have sought asylum. 
Once the jurisdiction is established, the next obstacle that has to be 
overcome by the prosecuting state is the defence of state immunity from such 
jurisdiction. The position of state immunity under the customary law is important 
with regard to the assertion of universal jurisdiction by a prosecuting state over a 
state official who has allegedly committed international crimes in his home country 
under an enabling legislation giving effect to a treaty or under an enabling 
legislation of the Statute of the ICC. 
The customary international law on state immunity provides an exception 
to functional immunity (immunity ratione materiae) of state officials accused of 
international crimes. 154 Therefore ordinary state officials and former high ranking 
state officials, namely, heads of state or government can be prosecuted in a third 
state for these crimes committed by them. 155 Where incumbent high ranking state 
officials are concerned, such an international crimes exception would take effect 
only after they leave their office. This is because when they are in office, to ensure 
smooth functioning, personal immunity (ratione personae) applies along with 
their functional immunity (ratione materiae) to protect them from criminal 
prosecution until they leave their office. 156 
According to the International Court of Justice ( hereafter ICJ) in the Case 
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of I ]April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium) Ministers of Foreign Affairs perform functions similar to 
Head of State or Government and are recognised under customary international 
law as representatives of the State by virtue of their office and entitled for 
absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability throughout the 
duration of office. 157 In other words, they are protected by personal immunities 
154 S. Wirth, 'Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgment in the Congo v. Belgium Case' 
(2002) 13 EJIL 877, at p. 888; M. C. Bassiouni, 'Universal Jurisdiction Unrevisited: The 
International Court of Justice Decision in Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 
( Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)' (2002/2003) XII Palestine YearBook of 
International Law 27, at pp. 39-40; A. Cassese, 'When May Senior State Officials be Tried for 
International Crimes? ' at p. 870; R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte 
Pinochet (No. 3) (2000) 1 AC 147. 
" S. Wirth, ibid; A. Cassese, ibid., at p. 865; Princeton Principle 5. 
156 For a discussion of these two types of state immunities see A. Cassese, ibid., at pp. 
862-864 
157 14 Feb 2002, paras. 53-54. (www. icj-cij. org). 
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while in office. As such, there does not exist in customary international law 
any form of exception to the rule granting immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
inviolability to incumbent foreign ministers for their alleged commission of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity. 158 This view of course reflects the existing 
customary international in this matter. Moreover, the recognition of the 
International Court Justice as to the personal immunity for foreign ministers 
similar to that of the head of state based on the nature of functions settles an 
obscure issue in international law. 159But it may have the effect of extending such 
immunity to other ministers who represent the government. 160 
Contrary to the customary international law that allows for an international 
crimes exception to the ratione materiae immunity of any state official, 161 the 
Court further stated as obiter dictum that former foreign ministers enjoy ratione 
materiae immunity from criminal prosecution for acts carried out in a public 
capacity during their tenure of office except where the states they belonged to 
waive their immunity or they have committed such crimes in private capacity. 162 
However, the Court did not state whether international crimes are covered by the 
term private acts. Consequently, in order to Prosecute such former officials for 
alleged international crimes committed by them in their official capacity, it must be 
proved that those international crimes have been committed in their private 
capacity. 
However, such a conclusion cannot be supported for certain crimes such as 
genocide, because they cannot be committed without the help of the state apparatus 
and in pursuant of a state policy. 163 As such, they are necessarily official acts. 
158 Ibid., paras. 55-58. 
159 S. Wirth, 'Immunity for Core Crimes? ' at p. 889; A. Cassese, 'When May Senior State 
Officials be Tried' at p. 855; but an analogy with the Heads of State of the foreign 
ministers cannot be based on the similarity between their fiinctions namely, representing the 
state, as foreign ministers do not 'impersonate' the state similar to the Heads of state, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert, see paras. II and 16. 
160 M. C. Bassiouni observes that, 'in present day society, all cabinet members represent their 
countries in various meetings. If foreign ministers need immunity to perform their ftmctions, why 
not grant immunity to other cabinet members as well?... The rationale for treating foreign ministers 
the same as diplomatic agents and heads of state, which lies at the centre of the Court's reasoning, 
could potentially be extended to other ministers who represent the state officially,... . 
Male fide 
governments could abuse such an extension by appointing persons to cabinet posts 
in order to 
shelter them from prosecutions on charges of international crimes. 
' 'Universal Jurisdiction 
Unrevisited' at p. 44 and at p. 45, n. 43. 
16 1 A. Cassese, ' The Belgian Court of Cassation v. the International Court of Justice: the 
Sharon and Others Case' (2003)1 Journal ofInternational Criminal 
Justice p. 437, at p. 451 
162 Arrest Warrant Case, para. 61 third situation. 
163 M. C. Bassiouni, 'UniN, ersal Jurisdiction Unrevisited', at pp. 42-. 43 
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Moreover, if such crimes were considered as committed by such officials in a 
private capacity in order to prosecute them, it would result in non- attribution of 
such crimes to the state and consequently state could not be made responsible for 
human rights violations in international law based on those acts. 164 The ICJ should 
have recognised an exception to the functional immunity of high ranking officials 
with regard to international crimes, rather than relying on the distinction between 
official and private acts. ' 65 
The effect of the non-recognition of an international crimes exception to 
the functional immunity of state officials' 66 would result not only in the non- 
prosecution of former foreign ministers as well as Heads of State and government 
but also to other incumbent senior state officials who are not entitled to personal 
immunity in international law. 167 This could have the effect of providing impunity 
for state officials in foreign national courts, to the detriment of IDPs. Such a 
conclusion cannot be supported in the light of developments that have taken place 
in rendering international criminal justice with regard to perpetrators of heinous 
international crimes. ' 68 
Article 27 of the Statute of the ICC excludes any immunity, whether 
personal or functional, under national or international law of all state officials 
before the ICC. 169AIthough there is no certainty as to the applicability of Article 
27(2) in national courts of the state parties to the ICC, it may be stated on the basis 
of the principle of complementarity of the ICC, that states by becoming parties to 
the Statute of the ICC implicitly agreed not to invoke immunity for their officials 
even before the national courts of other state parties with regard to crimes included 
164 S. Wirth, 'Immunity for Core Crimes?, 'at p. 891. 
165 See J. Brohmer, 'Diplomatic Immunity, Head of State Immunity, State Immunity: 
Misconceptions of a Notorious Human Rights Violator' (1999) 12 LJIL 36 1, at p. 370. 
166 A. Cassese, 'Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case' at p. 865, n. 34. 
167. M. C . Bassiouni, 'Universal 
Jurisdiction Unrevisited', at p. 44; S. Wirth, 'Immunity for Core 
CrimesT at p. 890 observes that, 'to grant immunity ratione materiae in cases of core crimes 
would mean granting it to every state official, as even the lowest-ranking state officials are 
protected by immunity ratione materiae ( ... there 
is no separate category of 'immunity of foriner 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs' in international law) . '[emphasis added by the author] 168 J. Wouters and L. D. Smet, 'The ICJ's Judgment in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II 
April 2000: Some Critical Observations' (2001) 4 YIHL 373, at pp. 380-381. 
169 O. Triffterer, 'Article 27: lrrelevance of Official Capacity' in 0. Triffterer (ed. ), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, p. 501, at p. 512; A. Cassese, 'Comments on 
the Congo v. Belgium Case' at p. 866; M. C. Bassiouni, 'Universal Jurisdiction Unrevisited' at p. 38, 
n. 34. 
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in the Statute of the ICC. 170 However, if the State parties to the Statute of the ICC 
invoke state immunity in the courts of another state party, this may then become 
an issue of inability of the national court to conduct proceedings under Article 
17(l) (a) of the Statute of the ICC, and the case would become admissible within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CC . 
171 
The judgment of the International Court of Justice can cause problems, 
especially when a prosecuting state party asserts jurisdiction over a state official 
from a non-state party to the Statute of the ICC. Even though the decision of the 
International Court of Justice 'has no binding force except between the parties 
and in respect of that particular case, ' it has always been influential, even in other 
cases. 172 Therefore the non- state party to the Statute of the ICC may rely on the 
International Court of Justice judgment to claim functional immunity for a former 
or incumbent ordinary state official or a former high ranking state official for 
alleged international crimes committed by them in their official capacity, before 
the national court of the prosecuting state. 
As reflected in judicial decisions subsequent to Arrest Warrant Case, the 
trend of an adoption of an international crimes exception to the rule of functional 
immunity in contrast to the judgment of the International Court of Justice is 
not consistent. 173 Therefore, the issue of international crimes exception to the 
170 j. Wouters and L. D. Smet, 'The ICJ's Judgment' at p. 381; J. K. Kleffner, 'The Impact of 
Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law' (2003)l 
Journal ofInternational Criminal Justice 86, at p. 106 
171 See O. Triffterer, 'Article 27: Irrelevance of Official Capacity', at p. 514 for the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 17 in the context of a national state's failure to adhere 
Article 27 and not prosecuting its nationals. 
172 Art. 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice; see for the incidental effect of ICJ 
judgment on proceedings before ICC concerning state officials from non-state parties, A. Cassese, 
'When May Senior State Officials be Tried for International Crimes? ', at p. 875. 
173 In Samiha Abbas HUazi and others v. A. Saron and YYaron, on 12 February 2003 the 
Belgian Court of Cassation in contrast to the ICJ decision applied the exception of 
international crimes to the rule of functional immunities of state officials by allowing 
prosecution against Yaron, an incumbent high-ranking state official of the Ministry of 
Defence who does not enjoy personal immunities. see A. Cassese, 'The Belgian Court of 
Cassation'; for various views expressed by European states on the immunities of the Heads of 
States and others to the ICJ judgment in the Arrest Warrant case, see CAHDI (2002) 8,23 rd 
Meeting, Strasbourg, 4-5 March 2002, Meeting Report, paras. 32-55 (hqp: //www. coe. int); with 
regard to the extradition of Chad's exiled former head of State Hissene Habre in pursuant of 
the international arrest warrant issued by the Belgian Court, the Senegalese Court of Appeal 
said on November 25,2005 that it could not rule on the request of extradition due to his 
immunity as a former head of state. Human Rights Watch, 'No Decision on Extradition of Ex- 
Chad Dictator: Court's Ruling that it "has no Jurisdiction" places Justice for Hissene Habre's 
Victims in Hands of Senegal's President. ' 
(hitp: //hrw. org/english/docs/2005/11/25/chadl2O74 txt. htrn) 
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functional immunities in international law remains to be resolved by the ICJ in 
explicit terms in another case concerning immunity of state officials. 
174 
C. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
In internal armed conflicts the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
( hereafter ICRC) as an 'impartial humanitarian body' is important not only for its 
humanitarian services but also for its provision of legal protection to civilians and 
IDPs by the implementation of humanitarian law norms. The ICRC has a right to 
offer its services in internal armed conflicts under common Article 3(2) of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and this offer of the ICRC is not confined to 
actually providing humanitarian services but extends to legal protection as 
well. 175 This latter task of the ICRC is stated explicitly in the Statutes of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement as 'to work for the understanding and 
dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflicts and to prepare any development thereof 'and 'to work for the faithful 
application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts'. 176 
Thus, apart from providing services to IDPs, such as construction of 
IDP camps, providing food relief, medical services and tracing of IDPs who have 
become separated as a result of conflict to reunite them with their families, 
encouraging adherence to international humanitarian law norms is an important 
aspect of its services under common Article 3(2) of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. This protection of the ICRC is applicable to armed conflicts under 
Additional Protocol 11 as well, since it develops and supplements the common 
Article 3. 
As an IDP is not defined as a protected person in humanitarian law, the 
ICRC does not make a distinction between a conflict affected civilian and an IDP, 
to prioritise protection to the latter. Therefore an IDP affected by armed conflict is 
considered by the ICRC as first andforemost a civilian, who as such is protected 
174 In Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v. France) 2003, ICJ 129, 
concerning investigations and prosecutions against the incumbent president of the Republic of 
Congo by France, the International Court of Justice is provided such an opportunity. 
175 See G. 1. A. D. Draper, The Implementation and Enforcement of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and the Two Additional Protocols of 1978', (1979)111 Recued des Cours, p. 9, at p. 27. 
176 Art. 5(2)(g) and ( c) respectively of the Statute, reproduced in (1987) No. 256 JRRC, pp. 25- 
59; this role of the ICRC is accepted by the States party to the Geneva Conventions by 
participating in the adoption of the Statute at the international Conferences of the movement. 
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by international humanitarian law. 177 Protection is, thus, not provided on the 
basis of the pre-defined status of IDPs, but on the basis of their vulnerability as 
civilians affected by conflict. 178 IDPs are considered as civilians who are often 
but not always in a most vulnerable situation and need to be primarily targeted 
by the ICRC protection activities. Sometimes other conflict affected civilians who 
cannot move beyond the area of conflict may be in a more life-threatening situation 
than those who have been displaced from the area. The ICRC strives to protect 
such civilians and IDPs who stay closer to the combat zones and are in need of 
immediate protection. However, due to the vulnerability of displaced civilians in 
unfamiliar areas to violence related to the conflict, such as arbitrary arrests and 
detention, the ICRC extends its protection activities to those IDPs as wel 1.179 In 
such situations the ICRC acts according to the principle of impartiality and targets 
such civilians as the main beneficiaries of its protection work. 180 
The ICRC employs 'bilateral confidential representations' and 'public 
condemnation' as its working methods in the implementation of IFIL. 181 In order to 
prevent violations or to help those affected by violations, it promotes knowledge of 
and respect for the law by disseminating the humanitarian law principles. 
By disseminating the rules of combat among armed forces and armed 
groups, the ICRC encourages them to comply with those rules. The importance of 
giving such training to the armed forces, with possible international assistance, was 
expressed by the Special Rapporteur on Exrajudicial Executions in her report on 
the situation in the Darfur region in Sudan, in the context of forced displacement 
carried out by grave violations to the right to life of civilians. 182 Educating the 
parties to the conflict about the rules of international humanitarian law would 
177 ICRC, 'Internally Displaced Persons : The Mandate and Role of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross' (2000) No. 838 IRRC p. 491, at p. 492. [emphasis added in the original] 
178 F. Maurice, and J. de Courten, 'ICRC Activities for Reftigees and Displaced Civilians', (199 1) 
No. 280, IRRC, p. 9 at p. 10 179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 ICRC, 'Action by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the Event of Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law or of Other Fundamental Rules Protecting Persons in Situations of 
Violence', (2005)87 No. 858 IRRC 393, at pp. 395-398; L. Moir, Law ofInternal Armed Conflict, at 
pp. 250-5 1; see generally P. Bonard, 'Modes of Action Used by Humanitarian Players: Criteria for 
Operational Complementarity', 1999 (available at hl! p: Hww";. icrc. org) ; the other working method 
of substitution which is used to provide actual protection by the ICRC for defaulting authorities in 
armed conflict situations by the ICRC is not relevant for the purposes of legal protection of this 
study. 
182 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial Executions, E/CN. 4/2005/7/Add. 2 (6 August 
2004) para. 59. 
277 
prevent or reduce such violations and there by any large-scale displacements or 
protects the IDPs who have already been displaced against abuses. In such training 
activities, the ICRC would teach the rules of combat applicable as customary 
humanitarian law in any armed conflicts. However, the success of such 
dissemination with armed groups would generally depend on their attitude to 
gaining legitimacy, reciprocal benefits and public image. As far as the government 
is concerned, the ICRC would encourage the State party involved in an internal 
armed conflict to accede to Additional Protocol 11 (as almost all states are parties 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949) and to adopt national legislation, to punish 
war crimes and for the respect and use of the Red Cross, Red Crescent and other 
emblems and to ratify other conventions regulating the use of weapons, such as the 
Ottawa Treaty on land mines. As adoption of such legislation is important for the 
effective implementation of humanitarian law, the unit of the ICRC called the 
Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law provides technical assistance 
and advice in this regard to countries, including those engaged in internal armed 
conflicts. 1 83 
Apart from the parties to the conflict, the dissemination activities of the 
ICRC extend to the public at large, notably to IDPs. 184 This includes educating the 
IDPs on their rights, the obligations owed to them by the parties to the conflict and 
the accountability of the parties for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law and awareness of mines and unexploded ordnance to make them vigilant and 
responsive to situations as much as the conditions permit. 
The monitoring function of the implementation of humanitarian law in the 
field is carried out by the ICRC by its primary working method of confidential 
dialogue with the parties to the conflict in case of violations. For instance, in 
Colombia, '[i]n addition to the hostage cases and complaints registered from 
persons in detention, the ICRC annually registers over 1,500 individual complaints 
from victims of breaches of IHL committed by the various actors of the armed 
conflict. These complaints may concern extrajudicial executions, non restitution of 
bodies, and threats against life and property. In many instances, ICRC delegates 
183 Technical assistance was provided in countries such as Sri Lanka, the Russian federation, and 
Colombia, ICRC Annual Report 1999, at p. 352; see generally, P. Berman, 'The ICRC' s Advisory 
Service on International Humanitarian Law: the Challenge of National Implementation' (1996) 
No. 312 JRRC 338. 
184 ICRC, Annual Report 1999 (Geneva, 1999) at p. 171 
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transmitting such complaints can help to establish authorship of the violations, 
demand and sometimes obtain reparation, clarify the seriousness of threats and at 
times obtain the retraction thereof, identify location of graves, and negotiate the 
restitution of corpses. The ICRC also regularly submits confidential reports on 
such complaints and reminders of prevailing provisions of IHL to the government, 
the insurgents, and the autodefensas [with regard to the latter the AUC - 
paramilitary arm of the armed forces, the ICRC directly contact them instead of the 
government, for pragmatic reasons of implementation of humanitarian law]. ' 185 
Such a working method avoids public debate of the problems and creates 
an environment of trust which enables the ICRC not only to have candid 
dialogues with the authorities to find solutions but also to gain access to detainees 
and to maintain a presence in areas close to the conflict. The success of its working 
method is indicated in its ability to gain access to the detainees in internal armed 
conflicts, even in the absence of a mandate to visit detainees as in international 
armed conflicts. 186 Consequently, it directly supervises the conditions and 
treatment of detainees by visiting all places of detention, asking for the list of 
detainees, speaking to them in private, and repeating such visits and informing the 
detaining parties of its concerns about any violations. ' 87 It also tries to establish a 
4permanent presence on the ground' with close proximity to the conflict affected 
victims, to monitor whether their rights under humanitarian law are being violated 
and reports its observations to the relevant authorities to prevent or to put an end to 
the violations. 188 In all these supervisory tasks, the ICRC would not openly 
criticise the violations but rather reminds the parties by written and oral 
representations of their obligation to respect the physical and moral dignity of 
persons arrested. 189 ICRC provides confidential reports to the parties to the 
conflicts recommending improvements to the prison conditions and the extent to 
which civilians are protected in the conduct of hostilities. 190 
185 P. Gassmann, 'Colombia: Persuading Belligerents to Comply with International Norms' in S. 
Chesterman (ed. ), Civilians in War (London, 200 1) p. 67, at p. 90, n. 16. 
186 For example, Liberia and Sri Lanka. 
187 M. Veuthey, 'Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, ' 
at p. 93. 
188 ICRC, 'Internally Displaced Persons : The Mandate and Role, ' at pp. 491-500. 
189 ICRC, Annual Report 1999, at p. 169. 
190J. Kellenberger, 'Speaking Out or Remaining Silent in Humanitarian Work', (2004) 86, No. 855, 
IRRC 593, at pp. 603-604; ICRC however publishes information of the number of detainees and 
places of detention visited by it in the Annual Report. 
279 
By confidentially persuading the parties to adhere to the rules of 
humanitarian law, rather than publicly criticizing the violations, the ICRC is 
generally able to gain the confidence of both parties to the conflict to work in a 
volatile situation like an internal armed conflict, to gain access to the civilians 
within the control of the parties to the conflict or those who stay closer to the 
combat zone than any other humanitarian Organisation. For instance, in Rwanda in 
1994, the ICRC was able to assist the Tutsi IDPs with aid and shelter in its protest 
against mass killings without referring to them as genocide. 191 On such occasions 
'the field operatives of Medicins Sans Frontieres ( MSF ) had to be incorporated 
into the ICRC delegation in Rwanda to Survive. Far from being able to denounce 
human rights or IHL violations while remaining operative in the field, MSF 
representatives had to don the ICRC emblem and keep a relatively low profile in 
order to avoid being attacked. MSF personnel agreed to the ICRC ten-ns of 
engagement, namely, to exercise public caution in order to be perceived as 
neutral. ' 192 
To meet the situational demands, the ICRC in its capacity as a neutral 
intermediary makes every effort to extend the international humanitarian law 
standards of international armed conflicts to internal conflicts, to enhance the 
protection of civilians. The representatives of the ICRC, through negotiations, 
persuade the government and the rebel sides to enter into agreements by virtue of 
common Article 3 (2) of the Geneva Conventions to ensure compliance of 
humanitarian law to protect civilians. Examples include the purposes of creating 
safety zones or hospital zones to protect them from effects of hostilities, making 
cease fires, evacuating wounded and sick civilians, providing immunisation to 
IDP children and providing humanitarian assistance. 193 For instance, in an 
intensified armed conflict during 1999 in Sri Lanka, when medical and food 
supplies and the movements of civilians to the rebel controlled area of Vanni were 
blocked, the ICRC helped to reach an agreement between the Sri Lanka Armed 
forces and the LTTE to resume the delivery of food and medical supplies and 
medical evacuation to and from the Vanni area. 194 
191 D. P. Forsythe, The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge, 
2005) at p. 122. 
192 Ibid., at pp. 122-3 
'9' Common Art. 3(2). 
19' ICRC, Annual Report 1999, at p. 169. 
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Despite the fact that the parties do not very often agree to enter into such 
agreements, successful agreements bring greater protection to displaced civilians. 
Such an implementation of law has become possible for the ICRC due to its 
working method of confidential persuasion, by which it builds trust among the 
parties to the conflict to perceive it as a neutral intermediary, operating only in the 
protection of the civilians and not to the advantage of one of the parties to the 
conflict. For instance, in Colombia, in order to enable the return of IDPs to the 
village of Bajo Grande in Atlantic coast, the ICRC obtained undertakings from the 
guerrillas and paramilitaries to refrain from military operations near the village in 
future, which could not have been attained without gaining the confidence of the 
parties to the conflict. ' 95 
The policy of confidentiality of the ICRC is not absolute in all 
circumstances. If the confidential approach does not work to put an end to or to 
prevent recurrence of violations, then the ICRC would use its other subsidiary 
modes of action, namely, a discreet humanitarian mobilization through third states 
and public declaration on the quality of its confidential dialogue with a party to the 
conflict. 1 96 It would publicly denounce the violations of international humanitarian 
law, when the following four conditions are met: the violations are grave and 
persistent; such dialogues and confidential approach fail to result in the expected 
outcome; and the ICRC representatives who are present in the field happen to 
witness any violations or otherwise come to know any such violations through 
reliable sources and such a public statement would serve the interests of the 
victims. 1 97 Even in such public statements, the ICRC does not make 'one-sided or 
at least too explicit condemnations of individual parties to the conflict, 
"98 because 
there is a possibility that such public condemnations would hamper the 
humanitarian activities of the ICRC on the ground. Moreover, specific mention of 
y its own violations and violations by one party could be used by the other to justif 
this in turn would weaken the protection of civilians. Therefore the ICRC believes 
that publicizing such details would not often improve the protection of victims. 
199 
195 T. Jenatsch, 'The ICRC as a Humanitarian Mediator in the Colombian Conflict : Possibilities 
and Limits' (1998) No. 323 IRRC 303, at pp. 312-313. 
196 ICRC, 'Action by the International Committee of the Red Cross' at pp. 395-397. 
197 Ibid., at pp. 397-98. 
198 J. Kellenberger, 'Speaking Out' at p. 600 
199 D. P. Forsythe, 'Humanitarian Protection: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees', (2001)83, No. 843 IRRC 675, at p. 687. 
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In its view, 'actual protection' is needed by all the victims of armed conflice0o and 
that requires access to victims. Since access to the victims is for the ICRC a 
'higher priority' than any other considerations except the security of its own staff, 
it adopts a discreet approach in public denunciation of the violations committed by 
a party to the conflict. 201 
Consequently, its public statements or condemnations are of a general 
nature, involving all concerned parties to the conflict. For example, in Somalia the 
ICRC urged 'all forces involved in the conflict to comply with international 
humanitarian law, and in particular to spare the civilian population. )202 In grave 
situations, the ICRC will specify the violations and make public appeals to all 
parties to the conflict to refrain from such violations of armed conflict. For 
instance, in the conflict in Kosovo, the ICRC made such a public statement, first 
outlining the violations and then specifically addressing the parties to the conflict, 
namely, Serbian authorities and the Albanian political representatives and the 
UCK( Kosovo Liberation Army) calling on them to end violations of 
humanitarian law. It stated that, 
[flrom a humanitarian perspective, it has become apparent that civilian casualties 
are not simply what has become known as "collateral damage. " In Kosovo, 
civilians have become the main victims-if not the actual targets-of the fighting. The 
core issue to be addressed immediately is that of the safety of, and hence respect 
for, the civilian population. First and foremost, this means that every civilian is 
entitled to live in a secure environment and to return to his or her home in safe and 
dignified conditions. 203 
However, as a neutral intermediary between parties to the conflict, it would not 
criticise the legality of the policy underlying the conflict, including ethnic 
cleansing. The principle of neutrality as defined in the Preamble to the Statutes of 
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement states that, '[I]n order to 
continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the movement may not take sides in 
hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of apolitical, racial, religious or 
200 J. Kellenberger, 'Speaking Out' at p. 602. 
201 ibid. 
202 ICRC, Press Release No. 1759,7 October 1993. 
203 ICRC, 'Public Statement by the ICRC on the Situation in Kosovo' (1998) no. 325 IRRC 725; 
ICRC, Press release, 13 August 1992 reproduced in (1992)No. 290 IRRC at p. 492-493. 
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ideological nature. ' Based on the principle of neutrality, 204 the ICRC appeals to 
the parties to the conflict to adhere to the rules of international humanitarian law 
including the one that prohibits forced displacement, even though such appeals 
might be viewed by the parties to that conflict, based on the policy of ethnic 
cleansing, as political interference rather than as an implementation of 
international humanitarian law. 205 Though such urging of the parties to cease all 
violations of humanitarian law would not always be effective during an armed 
conflict based on ethnic cleansing, it can still have an impact in moderating the 
effects of ethnic cleansing, i. e., encouraging the forced displacement to be carried 
out at least in a humane manner. 206 
In such grave situations, the ICRC through public appeals tries to draw the 
attention of the international community to their collective responsibility by 
reminding them of their obligation under Article I of the Geneva Conventions not 
only to respect but also to ensure respect for these Conventions by other parties to 
improve the situation. An example is the public appeal made in the conflict of 
former Yugoslavia. 207 Such public appeals are made to mobilise third parties to 
bring pressure on the parties to the conflict to protect the victims. 
The implementation of humanitarian law by the ICRC is effective to the 
extent that it is in a position through the employment of its unique modes of action 
to provide protection to IDPs at least with 'minimum civilized standards under 
difficult conditions. 208 
204 Arts. 5(2)(a) of the Statute of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement states 
that the ICRC would 'maintain and disseminate the Fundamental Principles of the Movement' and 
6(4) states that the International Federation would act within the 'context of the Fundamental 
Principles of the Movement. ' 
205 See Y. Sandoz, Respect for the Law of Armed Conflict: the ICRC'S Observations and 
Experiences, ( ICRC, Geneva, 1996), at p. 6 
206 E. D. Mooney, 'Internal Displacement and the Conflict in Abkhazia: International Responses and 
Their Protective Effect', (1996) 3 International Journal on Group Rights p. 197, at p. 224 
207 ICRC, Press Release, 13 August 1992. 
208 J. Kellenberger, 'Speaking Out' at p. 603; here 'minimum standards' means 'fundamental 
standards' concerning civil and socioeconomic necessary for human dignity, D. P. Forsythe, 
'Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross' (1990)12 HRQ 265, at p. 2 80. 
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8. Implementation and Enforcement of International Human 
Rights Law 
A. The United Nations 
Implementation of human rights under the UN system is through its charter based 
and treaty based human rights bodies. ' The important difference in the supervision 
of human rights between treaty based and Charter based human rights mechanisms 
is that the latter can examine allegations of human rights about any State which is a 
member of the United Nations, whereas under the former examination of human 
rights violations is confined to States which are parties to the treaty concerned. 
As human rights specific to IDPs are not included in a multilateral treaty, 
like the rights of the child or women, there does not exist an exclusive treaty based 
implementing mechanism to monitor the conditions of IDPs in accordance with 
such treaty. The Special representative of the Secretary General on IDPs is the only 
charter based mechanism that exclusively deals with the problems of IDPs. 
Therefore, it is important to discuss the extent of the protective measures taken by 
the general human rights mechanisms concerning IDPs. 
1. Charter Based Mechanisms 
The Commission on Human Rights which is a subsidiary body established by the 
Economic and Social Council, creates the charter based human rights mechanisms 
in response to the needs of people resulting from violations of human rights. For 
this purpose the Commission uses three types of special procedures: confidential 
consideration of a situation under the 1503 procedure; public debate under the 
1235 procedure which leads to the appointment of a Special Rapporteur or any 
other designated individual or group to investigate a situation in a state; and 
appointment of thematic Rapporteurs or working groups to investigate violations 
anywhere in the world concerning a theme. 2 Even though these procedures are 
relatively distinct from each other in their origin, mandate and result, in practice 
1 See for a detailed account of charter based and treaty based human rights mechanisms relevant to 
the IDPs and asylum seekers, J. Fitzpatrick (ed. ), Human Rights Protection for Refugees, Asylum 
Seekers, and Internally Displaced Persons; A Guide to International Mechanisms and Procedure, 
(New York, 2002). 
2 j. Steiner and P. Alston, International Human Rights in Context, at p. 61 1. 
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they overlap substantially. 3 All these special procedures are fon-ned to deal 
basically with gross violations of human rights and accordingly are provided with 
various working methods, namely, analysing the designated theme in its various 
dimensions; seeking and receiving information from a variety of sources, 
communicating individual or general allegations of human rights to the states 
concerned, making visits to countries to find first hand information and making 
recommendations to states in this regard. 
The 1503 procedure has been established for the examinations of 
complaints by the Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights (formerly known as Sub-commission for the Protection and Prevention of 
Discrimination against Minorities) and Commission on Human Rights of 
'situations which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
attested violations of human rights. 4 Despite the fact, that IDPs as victims or 
group of victims or NGOs (on the basis of actio popularis) from any state can 
send communications under this procedure regarding violations of any type of 
human rights whether civil and political rights or socioeconomic rights, they 
cannot obtain any individual remedies. Moreover, the complete confidentiality of 
the 1503 procedure makes it difficult to know what is happening to the allegations 
of human rights sent and the basis for the determination to drop or to consider a 
country under this procedure until the names of such countries are published by the 
Commission. The length of time and the cumbersome three stage procedure, 
involving the working group on communications in the sub-commission and the 
working group on situations and Commission on Human Rights in the 
consideration of allegations against a State, is another serious defect of this 
procedure. Moreover, the outcome of the procedure is not free from political 
considerations due to the fact that Commission on Human Rights is formed by 
representatives of governments and not by independent experts. The time 
consuming aspect of this procedure renders it less suitable to react to situations 
where the lives of IDPs are in imminent danger. 
The 1235 procedure is a public procedure of deliberation and debate, 
resulting in measures such as resolutions, condemnation of situations of grave 
3 Ibid, as states under 1503 can be transferred to 1235 procedure and under 1235 procedure Special 
Rapporteurs can be appointed; moreover, different issues of the same situation can be considered 
under all three procedures. 
4 ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) May 27 1970. 
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violations of human rights ranging from lenient to strong language9 
appointment of Special Rapporteurs to a state to make on-sIte investigation 
and submission of report and call upon the Secretary-General to appoint a 
special representative for the same. 5 The public discussion of a state can have 
the effect of 'shaming" the state and influence its attitude towards the 
treatment of IDPs. Compared to the 1503 procedure, the 1235 procedure is 
more responsive to an urgent situation of grave violations of human rights as it 
does not involve any complex procedures. The Commission on Human Rights 
and its sub-commission can directly deal with the situations of massive 
violations of human rights once they receive information from any reliable 
source. However, the selection of a state depends 'more on its [the state's ] 
own might or the influence of its allies than its human rights record proper. " 6 
Such preliminary political interference in the selection of a state may affect its 
effective response in a situation of grave violations of human rights. 
Because of the lack of effectiveness of Human Rights Commission, it is 
7 about to be replaced by a Human Rights Council . 
Problems related to internal displacement such as forced displacement and 
rape during displacement were discussed by the Country Rapporteurs for instance, 
by the Special Rapporteur to Somalia. 8 The noteworthy feature of such reporting 
was the discussion of common Article 3 along with the human rights norms as 
applicable legal framework to the situation in Somalia. ' Such an approach would 
strengthen the protection of IDPs in internal armed conflicts. 10 
5 ECOSOC Resolution 1235(XLII) 1967; see generally, J. Steiner and P. Alston, International 
Human Rights in Context, at p. 621; resolutions were adopted by the Commission on Human Rights 
on states involved in internal conflicts such as Burundi, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Sudan and Russia. 
6 C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford, 2003) at p. 120. 
7 2005 World Summit, Fact Sheet, High-Level Plenary Meeting, 14-16 September 2005; 
Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 60/1,2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 
October 2005, paras. 157-160; Draft Resolution of by the President of the General Assembly, 
recommended for the abolishment of Human Rights Commission on 16 June 2006 and to 
convene the first meeting of the Human Rights Council on 19 June 2006. (23.02.06) 
8 Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of human Rights in Somalia, 
E/CN. 4/1996/14 (22 February 1996) para. 17(f); Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mona 
Rishmawi, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, E/CN. 4/1999/103 (18 February 1999), 
ara. 48. 
Report of the Special Rapporteur, ibid., paras. 33-40; see generally, D. O'Donnell, 'Trends in the 
Application of International Humanitarian Law by United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms' 
( 1998) No. 324 JRRC p. 48 1. 
10 Present country mandates covering internal armed conflict situations includes: Burundi, Liberia, 
Haiti, Somalia and Sudan (hLtp: //www. ohchr. org). 
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There are also thematic mechanisms relevant to the protection of human 
rights of IDPs. " The very specific one is the Representative of the Secretary 
General on IDPs, Other than that, among the thematic mechanisms, the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions), and other Special Rapporteurs on the 
protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, can be considered as important 
for the protection of IDPs. The extent of protection provided to IDPs by those 
thematic Rapporteurs depends on their mandate and the focus given by them in 
their work to issues related to IDPs. 
The mandate of the present Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the Human Rights of IDPs is different from that of the former representative of the 
Secretary General on IDPs as the present representative has to focus more on the 
protection of human rights of IDPs. This is because the mandate of the previous 
Representative was concerned with the development of a normative framework for 
the protection of IDPs and that task was completed by the formulation of 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Formulation of such guiding 
principles, of course, can be considered as providing a legal basis for protection 
of IDPs. to be used in human rights cases relating to IDPs as authentic 
interpretative guidance of human rights. 12 
The country visits undertaken by the previous representative had been an 
important aspect in obtaining accurate information on the situation as a whole of 
IDPs in a given country and apart from bringing the IDP problems in a given 
country to the forefront of the international community, were widely used in 
studying the general pattern of violations and needs of IDPs, in order to formulate 
and to strengthen the standards specific to IDPs-1 3 Moreover, legal obligation of 
state parties to adhere to international humanitarian law norms was also mentioned 
in the reports produced as result of such country visits. For instance, with regard 
11 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Working group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, Working Group on Minorities, Special Rapporteur on Torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and Special Rapporteur on the right to education; 
the other Special Rapporteurs not mentioned herein are discussed in the text below. 
12 See below, Sections, B. 1. and 2. 
13 27 country missions have been undertaken as at 2004, Report of the Representative of the 
Secretary General on IDPs, Francis Deng, E/CN. 4/2004/77, (4 March 2004), para. 43 
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to internal conflicts in the Russian Federation and in Indonesia in particular, 
with regard to IDPs in the provinces of Aceh and Papua. 14 
The present mandate of the representative focuses rather on activities in the 
protection needs of IDPs. 15 In this respect, to prevent the initial displacement and 
violations of the rights of IDPs after displacement, the representative promotes 
dissemination and acceptance of human rights and humanitarian law that underlie 
the Guiding Principles on Displacement in his dialogues with national authorities; 
in order to stop developing patterns of violations of IDP rights, the representative 
would intervene with national authorities, undertake country missions and issue 
public statements. For instance, the representative on the human rights of IDPs 
deplored the Darfur crisis in Sudan in his public statement as: 'the forcible 
relocation of persons, whether from their homes or places of refuge, is a violation 
of international humanitarian and human rights law, particularly when their safety 
or well-being is compromised by the move. ... As the representative of a sovereign 
state, it is the Government of Sudan that bears the primary responsibility to ensure 
the protection of its own people. ' 16 In this regard he called the 'government to 
immediately halt forced relocations and other serious violations of the rights of the 
displaced persons by its own officials and act to prevent such actions perpetrated 
by Janjaweed militia and others. ' 17 
With regard to preventing recurrence of violations of IDP rights, the 
Representative identifies the patterns of recurring violations and have dialogue 
with national authorities and offers technical assistance in designing solutions. 
Finally to ensure remedies for the violations of IDPs, the representative 
emphasizes the need to avoid prolonged displacement without permanent 
solutions and to ensure safe return or resettlement as such a measure is 
essential in protracted armed conflicts for durable protection of IDPs. 
' 8 This 
emphasizes the temporary and proportionate nature of state of emergencies 
14 1 th For instance, Report of the Representative, F. M. Deng, Profiles in Displacement: e 
Russian Federation, E/CN. 4/2004/77/Add. 2 (24 February 2004) para. 14 ; Report of the 
Representative, F. M. Deng, Profiles in Displacement: Indonesia, E/CN. 4/2002/95/Add. 2 (15 
February 2002) paras. 53,64 and 67. 
15 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally 
displaced persons, Walter Kalin, E/CN. 4/2005/84 (31 December 2004), para. 8 1. 
16 UN Human Rights Expert Deplores Ongoing Displacement in Darfiir, Press Release, II 
November, 2004. 
17 ibid. 
18 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally 
displaced persons, Walter Kalin, (31 December 2004), paras. 82-89. 
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and the continued enjoyment of human rights of IDPs even during internal 
armed conflicts. However, the effectiveness of on-site visits depends on the 
follow-up visits to such countries and publicising the findings as a report. 
The significance of the protection activities of the Representative as a 
human rights mechanism is the consideration of humanitarian law norms in 
determining the violations of the human rights of the IDPs. Such an approach 
enhances the protection of the IDPs in a conflict situation by the application of 
the normative content of customary humanitarian law to internal armed conflict 
situations. Moreover, it strengthens the complementary nature of human rights 
and humanitarian law norms during conflict situations. 
The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions can be considered as 
a crucial mechanism, as it deals with the most important human right which is 
often at stake during internal armed conflicts. The Special Rapporteur's work is 
guided by the international legal standards, including those in the ICCPR, the CRC 
and the Statute of the ICC. 19 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur includes 
monitoring by engaging in communications in response to credible allegations; 
examining situations and submitting findings together with its conclusions and 
recommendations; and engaging in constructive dialogue with governments in 
country visits and the follow-up of recommendations. 20 As a response measure 
to credible allegations, the Special Rapporteur would send urgent appeals in 
emergency cases and in other cases of individual communications respond by 
communicating the details to the government and request clarification. 
The crises faced by IDPs, such as attack against IDP camps and settlements 
and acts of violence intended to spread terror and cause further displacement, are 
21 
specifically considered in the analytical reports as general pattern of violations . 
Moreover, reports on country visits also consider the issues relating to IDPs. For 
instance, in the report on the mission to Sudan made in May 2004 to verify the 
actual situation particularly in the Darfur region in Western Sudan, the Special 
Rapporteur expressed her concern over the situation of large numbers of IDPs. 
their extreme need for humanitarian assistance and protection and the existence 
19 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston on Extrajudicial Executions, E/CN. 4/2005/7 
(22 December 2004), paras. 9- 10 
20 Ibid., para. 7 
2 'Report of the Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, on Extrajudicial Executions, E/CN. 4/2002/74 
(9 January 2002) paras. 53-54. 
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of continued serious threat to the right to life of people even after displacement. 22 
Such concentration emphasizes the possibility of dealing with the vulnerable 
situation of the IDPs which necessitates heightened protection for their lives in 
internal armed conflicts within the general normative fTamework of the right to 
life. 
Transmission of complaints on behalf of individuals or groups whose 
human rights have been violated or threatened to be violated or allegations 
concerning general pattern in a state is another important aspect of the mandate 
of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, which has the effect of 
exposing the activities of the government to the international scene. A substantial 
proportion of the cases concerning IDPs were communicated to the protection of 
this special procedure: it is reported that in the course of 2004 out of 
communications concerning 1799 individuals, 500 concerned IDPs. 23 For 
instance, in an urgent appeal made in May 2000, the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial Executions expressed her concern over physical protection of 
thousands of displaced civilians as a result of armed activity in the northern part of 
Sri Lanka and urged the government of Sri Lanka to 'take all possible steps to 
protect the safety and security of civilians ... when conducting their operations in 
the Jafffia peninsula, in accordance with international human rights and 
humanitarian law standards. 24 This type of urgent appeal, which requests the 
government to adhere to the rules of international humanitarian law, not only has 
a preventive effect on the violations of right to life and thereby helps to avoid or 
reduce the potential for further displacement, but also contains implications 
concerning the complementary nature of the humanitarian law standards in the 
application of right to life in military operations. 25 
However, not all governments make an effort to reply to such 
communications. According to the report of Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 
Executions, in the course of 2004, replies had been received from only 54 percent 
22 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, on Extrajudicial Executions: Mission to the 
Sudan, E/CN. 4/2005/7/Add. 2 (6 August 2004), para. 46 
23 Report of the Special Rapporteur, on Extrajudicial Executions (22 December 2004) para. 18 
24 Report of the Special Rapporteur. Asma Jahanhir, submitted pursuant to Commission Resolution 
2000131, Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, 
E/CN. 4/2001/9/Add. 1 (17 January 2001), para. 359. 
25 Also see, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston on Extrajudicial Executions, 
E/CN. 4/2005/7 (22 December 2004) para 78 for the concluding observation of Special Rapporteur 
on complementary nature of International humanitarian law and human rights law. 
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of governments and this response rate is problematic in a long-establ i shed 
, if 
. 
26 procedure which mostly addresses grave issues concerning right to e 
Moreover, there is no guarantee as to the accuracy of the government response 
unless such information is verified in a subsequent fact-finding mission to that 
country, or reported by NGOs. 27 
The only driving force behind compliance with human rights nonns as 
recommended by Special Rapporteurs would be the pressure created by the 
publicity in the submission of annual report by Special Rapporteurs to the 
Commission on Human Rights containing all communications sent and received, 
along with the recommendations. The state concerned would try to comply with 
the recommendations of Special Raporteurs to avoid being scrutinized in a public 
debate of the Commission on Human Rights. If the communication does not 
receive a response, at all or satisfactorily, and the state provides an environment 
of impunity to the perpetrators and there is substantial increase in human rights 
violations in the country concerned, it would prompt an on-site visit by the 
Rapporteur to such a country. 
Thematic mechanisms have dealt with economic, social and cultural rights 
of IDPs as well. For instance, the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a 
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, observed that systematic 
destruction of private homes and crops and water sources resulted in 
displacement and homelessness in Darfur, Sudan. He further observed that as far 
as the return of the IDPs is concerned, the security and protection of these people 
must be ensured and 'addressing security considerations must be matched with 
efforts to ensure the realization of the right to adequate housing, through 
compensation and reconstruction schemes. '28 
26 Ibid., paras. 21 and 22. 
27 The government of Sri Lanka asserted to the concern expressed by the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women over allegations of gang rape and murder that 'every case of alleged 
criminal conduct committed by the armed forces and police has been investigated and the 
perpetrators prosecuted, although there may have been unavoidable long delays. ' Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Communications to and ftom Governments, 
/CN. 4/2001/73/Add. I( 13 February 200 1) paras. 51-57; Amnesty International however pointed out 
that '[c]ontrary to the goveniment's assertion, to the Amnesty International's knowledge, not a 
single member of the security forces has been brought to trial in connection to incidents of rape in 
custody although one successful prosecution has been brought in a case where the victim of rape 
was also murdered. ' 'Sri Lanka: Rape in Custody', Al Index: ASA 37/001/2002 (January 2002) at 
p. 4. 
28 Report of the Special Rapporteur, on the Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living, E/CN. 4/2005/48 (3 March 2005) para. 37 
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Communications were transmitted to the government of Sudan by the 
Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, and by the Special Rapporteur on 
IDPs and others, expressing concern about the dangerous living conditions of 
IDPs, as diarrhoea and fever were common, leading to increasing numbers of 
deaths every day, and the lack of access to medical assistance. 29 Similarly, with 
regard to the Darfur region in Sudan, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food 
stated that the 'destruction of resources essential to survival and forced 
displacement are prohibited under international human rights and humanitarian law 
and amount to a violation of the right to food, particularly when people are 
displaced from their means of subsistence. 30 He urged the government to stop 
such activities of militias and to ensure protection and assistance to displaced 
persons to rebuild their farms and livelihoods. None of those activities however 
had been that helpful in reducing violence towards IDPs in Darfur. They 
have been effective only to the extent they revealed the seriousness of on-going 
problems of massive deliberate displacement and abuses against IDPs and the 
failure by the governmental authorities to adopt measures to combat impunity and 
for the attempts to resolve the conflict through negotiations. 31 
Even though the Special Rapporteurs have dealt with the problems of 
IDPs that fall within their thematic or country mandates, the constraints in the 
system itself affect the efficiency of such measures. One such constraint is that 
there is 'very little follow-up, however, to these reports and communications, and 
the Special Rapporteurs themselves (who serve in a volunteer, part-time capacity) 
are not in a position to followup, especially on individual cases. 32 
On-site visits are important in the effective performance of the mandate of 
Special Rapporteurs, as they provide not only first-hand information on the actual 
situation but also the opportunity to make recommendations to the governments 
29Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt: Summary of cases transmitted to 
fovernments and replies received, E/CNA/2005/5 I /Add. 1 (2 February 2005) para. 66. 
0 Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, in accordance to 
General Assembly Resolution 5 8/186,27 September 2004, para. 18. 
31 An international Commission of Inquiry established under the Security Council resolution 1564 
of 18 September 2004, strongly recommended for the immediate reference by the Security Council 
of the situation of Darfur to the ICC, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 
at p. 5 
32 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The OHCHR Plan of Action. - 
Protection and Empowerment, Geneva, May 2005, para. 103 
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'that may actually lead to system-wide improvements. 933 Since, without the 
consent of states concerned, country visits cannot be made, states with bad 
records of human rights can avoid close inspection. 34 
Above all, any recommendations or conclusions reached by the Special 
Rapporteurs have no binding force on the states. However, the publicity of the 
findings in the Annual report or in other reports would exert pressure on the state 
to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur. Depending on the political will among 
the members of Commission on Human Rights a resolution can be adopted to 
condemn the human rights record of a state that generates internally displaced 
persons. 
In sum, the special procedures are effective in revealing a problematic 
situation of IDPs within a country or an issue of human rights concerning internal 
displacement, and bringing it to the forefront of the international community in 
its various dimensions. Thereafter, the states concerned can no longer act as if 
nothing of importance to the concern of international community is occurring 
within its territory. To some extent, the outcome of the reports, public statements, 
discussions, and urgent or general communications to the states of reported 
violations by the Special Rapporteurs or Representatives would exert pressure on 
the states concerned. 
2. Treaty Based Mechanisms 
Under the treaty based mechanisms, the Committees concerning general treaties 
that contain all the important human rights 35 namely, committees of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR); the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 
(ICESCR ); and the Committees that deal with specific issues of human rights 
namely, Committees of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 (CERD); Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CAT); 
33 C. Giffard and M. Hrle, 'The United Nations Charter Based Mechanisms' in J. Fitzpatrick (ed. ), A 
Guide to International Mechanisms and Procedure, p. 13 7, at p. 223. 
34 ibid. 
35 See generally, for a critical evaluation of UN treaty bodies, P. Alston and J. Crawford, 
(eds. ), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge, 2000); A, F. 
Bayefsky (ed. ), The UN Human Rights Treaty System in the 21" Century, Hague, 2000) 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC); and Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979 (CEDAW), 
have often dealt with the issues of internal displacement. 36 
The role of the committee on CERD in the protection of IDPs by way of 
reporting procedure is important as it has the highest number of ratifications out of 
all treaties and it specifically deals with the theme of racial discrimination, which 
is at the heart of internal displacement in the conflicts of many states such as the 
former Yugoslavia. A quite broad definition of 'racial discrimination' has been 
utilized by the Committee to include measures adopted by the state parties in the 
protection of national and ethnic minorities while examining reports of states. 37 
However the reporting procedure under CERD is also affected by overdue reports, 
similar to other treaty bodies. 38 Even though the individual communication 
procedure of the CERD can be resorted to by individuals and groups of 
individuals, this has rarely been used since its establishment due to the low number 
of states that recognised the individual communication procedure under Article 14 
of the CERD. As at 20 August 2004 only 45 States out of 169 States parties to the 
CERD had recognised the competence of the individual communication 
procedure under Article 14 and so far only 25 communications have been 
received since its functioning in 1984 . 
39 Out of those 41 States parties, those 
who are involved in internal armed conflicts are very few in number, which 
limits the value of the individual communication procedure under the CERD for 
the protection of IDPs. 
The Committees of CERD, CAT and CEDAW contain procedures 
which can be invoked by the respective Committees on their own instead of 
waiting until the state party to submit reports or an individual victim to file 
36 Article 28 of the ICCPR; Economic and Social Council Resolution 1985/17 para(a) UN 
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) at 15, UN Doc. E/1985/85 (1985); Article 8 of the CERD; Article 17 
of the CAT; Article 43 of the CRC; Article 17 of the CEDAW. 
37 Art. 1(1) of the CERD; Committee on CERD, Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, A/56/18 
(14/09/2001) paras. 333,336-337; Committee on the CERD, Concluding Observations : Russian 
Federation, CERD/C62/CO/7 (21 March 2003) para. 18. 
38 Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia and Bosnia Herzegovina are overdue by 10 years and El 
Salvador, Democratic Republic of Congo and Serbia and Montenegro are overdue by 5 years, 
Report of the Committee on the CERD, Supplement No. 18. (A/59/18), 2004, paras. 426-27. 
39Report of the CERD, supplement No. 18 (A/59/18) 2004, paras. 2; Report of the CERD, 
supplement No. 18 (A/57/18) 2002, paras. 479-483 and Report of the 
CERD, supplement No. 18 
(A/58/18) 2003, para. 571. 
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communications. 40 The early warning and urgent action procedures of the CERD 
aim to address prevention and limitation of serious violations of the Convention by 
closely monitoring such emergency situations. 41 One of the criteria for early 
warning is 'significant flows of refugees or displaced persons resulting from a 
pattern of racial discrimination or encroachment on the lands of minority 
communities. 42 So far the committee has adopted decisions and further action with 
regard to countries such as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Russian Federation, 
Burundi, Rwanda and Sudan and referred to the situation of displaced persons as 
well. 
If there is reliable information that torture is being systematically 
practised in the territory of a state party, then the Committee on CAT can start an 
43 urgent action in the form of confidential inquiry on the state concerned . 
However, the protection of such a procedure is limited to systematic torture 
and therefore 'other cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment' practised with 
regard to IDPs in camps would escape scrutiny. 
Despite the contribution of many treaty bodies in the protection of 
supervision and implementation of human rights of IDPs, the role of the Human 
Rights Committee can be considered as important since both of its monitoring 
functions namely, reporting and individual communication procedures are 
subjected to greater public awareness. This is Partly due to the increasing number 
of State Parties to the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol. As at 26 th July 2002, out of 
149 States Parties to the ICCPR, 102 States were Parties to the first Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant on individual complaint procedure. 44 This means two 
thirds of the members of the ICCPR have become parties to the Optional 
Protocol, including many of those states involved in intemal armed confliCt. 45 
According to the Human Rights Committee, this trend has led to an increase in the 
number of individual communications under the Optional Protocol . 
46 The inter- 
40 Report of the Committee on the CERD, Supplement No. 18 (A/53/18) 1998, para. 18; Article 
20 of the CAT; Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW. 
41 Report of the Committee on the CERD, Supplement No. 18 (A/53/18) 1998, para. 18. 
42 ibid. 
43 Art. 20 of the CAT; Art. 8 of the 1999 Optional Protocol to the CEDAW provides for similar 
procedure with regard to 'grave or systematic violations' of the rights in CEDAW, reprinted in 
I. Brownlie and G. S. Goodwin-Gill, Basic Documents, at p. 224. 
44 Report of the Human Rights Committee, A/5 7/40(vol. 1) 2002, para. 1 
45 As at 26 July 2002, Report of the Human Rights Committee, ibid., para. l. 
46 Ibid, para. 95. 
295 
state complaint mechanism has attracted only a low number of States Parties 
and is rarely used. 
The significance of the Human Rights Committee in the implementation of 
the civil and political rights of the lCCPR lies in the fact of its non-political nature, 
since it consists of independent experts who act in their personal capacity. 47 This 
means the members of the Human rights committee function as members of a 
treaty organ and not as a subordinate of the United Nations even though the 
Covenant is a creation of the United Nations . 
48The mandate of the Human Rights 
Committee is derived from the ICCPR which provides an independent legal basis 
from the UN Charter. Therefore it is not a 'United Nations Committee' like the 
Commission on Human Rights, where the commission members serve as 
representatives of states. 49 
According to the reporting procedure, which is mandatory for the States 
Parties, reports are to be submitted on the 'measures they have adopted which give 
effect to the rights recognized herein [in the ICCPR] and on the progress made in 
the enjoyment of those rights' and the 'factors and difficulties, if any affecting the 
implementation of the present Covenant. ' 50 The 'constructive dialogue' that takes 
place between the Representatives of the State parties and the Human Rights 
Committee enables the latter to study the state report and to make concluding 
observations with regard to state parties. 51 The reporting procedure under other 
treaty bodies is similar to that of the Human Rights Committee. 
As far as the protection of IDPs is concerned, the reporting procedure 
can play an important role because the Human Rights Committee monitors the 
implementation of the lCCPR, which contains wide array of important civil and 
political rights, violations of which cause displacement. Due to the mandatory 
nature of the reporting procedure, all State parties are obliged to adhere to it and 
'when fully activated is able to provide a more comprehensive picture, generate 
more useful public documentation, and attract more publicity' than the individual 
47 Art. 28 (2) (3) of the lCCPR. 
48 T. Opsahl, 'The Human Rights Committee' in P. Alston (ed. ), The United Nations and Human 
Rights: A Critical Appraisal, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) p. 369, at p. 384. 
49 See ibid., at p. 385; Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/')/Rev. 7 (4 
August 2004), Rule 71 (4). 
50 Art. 40(l), (2) of the ICCPR. 
51 Art. 40(4) of the lCCPR. 
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52 communication procedure of the Human Rights Committee. Since the Human 
Rights Committee is in a position to cover the general human rights situation in a 
state, it can address the large scale violations of human rights and the resulting 
massive displacement occurring in states engaged in internal conflicts. Therefore, 
the Human Rights Committee is in a position to address the causes of 
displacement as well as the consequences of displacement in its concluding 
observations and make recommendations to the State Party concerned of the 
deficiencies to be rectified in the protection of IDPs. 53 
Moreover the submission of reports is in principle a continuing process 
based on the progress of the implementation of human rights of a given State, 
rather than a process which requires an isolated report that is not related at all to 
the context in which earlier reports have been submitted. Therefore, it can 
function as a preventive as well as a reactive mechanism to situations of human 
rights violations that have the potential to cause displacement or that have caused 
displacement. Besides, concluding observations made in the assessment of a 
country situation can clarify an individual situation under the individual 
communication procedure and therefore can be relied on by the authors of such 
communications. For example, if in a case concerning enforced disappearance, 
there is no clue as to what happened to an IDP, the concluding observations of the 
Human Rights Committee on the country situation as to enforced disappearance 
can give insights in deciding the case. 
The Human Rights Committee has dealt with the problems of torture, 
enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests which are the causes of initial or 
secondary displacement. 54 However, there exists a noticeable failure on the part 
of the Human Rights Committee to identify those human rights violations as 
causes of internal or external displacement in an explicit manner. Emphasizing in 
its concluding observations of the fact that the prevention of such human rights 
violations would reduce displacement of civilians is imperative in the protection 
of IDPs. 
For instance, the concluding observations of Human Rights Committee 
made during Sri Lanka's internal armed conflicts since 1995, failed to mention 
52 T. Opsahl, 'The Human Rights Committee, ' at p. 397. 
53 See generally V. Dimitrijevic, 'State Reports' in G. Alfredsson et al., (eds. ), International Human 
Rights Monitoring Mechanisms ((Hague, 200 1) pp. 185 -200. 
54 See Concluding Observations: Sri Lanka, CCPR/C0/79/LKA (I December 2003) paras. 9,10,13. 
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the vulnerability of IDPs to arbitrary arrests or enforced disappearances, even 
55 though they dealt with such problems in general. However, the CERD as early 
in 1995 dealt with such issues relating to IDPs in Sri Lanka. 56 In addition, the 1999 
Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances on Sri 
Lanka, when reporting that such disappearances have primarily occurred since 
1990 in the northern and eastern provinces of the country during the internal 
armed conflict, further observed that: 
In the north-east, the persons most often reported detained and missing were young Tamil men accused or suspected of belonging to, collaborating with, aiding or 
sympathizing with LTTE. Tamil persons internally displaced owing to the conflict 
and staying in informal shelters such as church or school centres were particularly 
at risk of detention and disappearance. 57 
Similarly, even in the context of significant displacement in Sudan, the 
Human Rights Committee in 1997 only noted the 'efforts made to resettle such 
58 persons and to assist them to return to their places of origin' as a positive factor. 
However, the Committee on the ICESCR 'urged the State party to address the root 
causes of the problems of internally displaced persons and in the short and medium 
term, to cooperate fully with international and non-govemmental organizations in 
the field, in order to provide for adequate (interim) measures ensuring the basic 
needs of this group, such as adequate basic shelter, employment, food, and health 
care, and the continuation of education for the children. ý59 
55 CCPR A/50/40(1995); CCPR/CO/79/LKA (2003); even though there has been an internal armed 
conflict since 1983 in Sri Lanka, the appointment of the Special Rapporteur on IDPs was appointed 
in 1992 and the problems of IDPs have only been brought to the forefront of the international 
community by 1995; therefore the absence of IDP issues in previous concluding observations on 
Sri Lanka by the Human Rights Committee in CCPR A/39/40(1984) and CCPR A46/40(1991) 
cannot be taken into consideration; however, in the Summary Record of the 1438"' Meeting: Sri 
Lanka, CCPR/C/SR. 1438 (28 July 1995) para. 68 the issues of IDP children was mentioned by the 
government delegation but not as a response to a specific question by the members of the Human 
Rights Committee. 
56 Summary Record of the 1079hMeeting: Sri Lanka CERD/C/SR. 1079 (9 March 1995) para. 16 
and in particular para. 17. 
57 E/CN. 4/2000/64/Add. 1 (21 Dec 1999) para. 2 (emphasis added). 
58Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations : Sudan, CCPR/C/79/Add. 85 (19 November 
1997) para. 7 
59 Committee on ICESCR, Concluding Observations : Sudan , E/C. 12/l/Add. 48 (I September 
2000) para. 37; likewise, Committee on CERD, Concluding Observations : Sudan, 
CERD/C/304/add- 116 (27 April 200 1) at paras. 13-14, expressed deep concern about the forced 
relocation of civilians in the upper Nile region and the fact of large number of IDPs within Sudan 
and recommended to give effect to UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
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The Committee on ICESCR can request the State party to respond to 'any 
pressing issue identified in the concluding observations' prior to the date the next 
report is due to be submitted . 
60 Despite the committee on ICESCR's explicit 
reference to the problems of IDPs, it did not however specifically request Sudan 
to provide the steps taken with regard to implementation of its recommendations 
prior to the date that the next report was due to be submitted. Sudan's second 
61 periodic report was due on 30 June 2003 . Until that time, which was about three 
years from the adoption of the above concluding observations, there would not be 
any follow-up as to Sudan's implementation of the recommendations as to the 
conditions of IDPs, which were mostly immediate rather than progressive. This is 
a very unsatisfactory approach in the context of Sudan's extensive IDP problems 
and in the absence of an individual communication system for the ICESCR. 
The already discussed trends in the concluding observations of the Human 
Rights Committee indicate the lack of attention on the part of to the crisis of 
internal displacement. Moreover, widespread occurrence of rape and sexual assault 
on IDP women was not at all considered in the concluding observations of the 
Human Rights Committee made in 2003 pursuant to the fourth and fifth reports 
of Sri Lanka covering the period until 2002, despite concerns expressed during 
this period in this regard by non-governmental organisations. Amnesty 
International,, noted in its report of 'a marked rise in allegations of rape by 
police, army and navy personnel' during 2001 and stated that ja]mong the 
victims of rape by the security forces are many internally displaced women. ' 
62 it 
highlighted the failure of prosecution by the authorities in such cases and 
reports additional cases of rape that are not reported in the 2002 report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions. 63 
This is understandable, because for various reasons during a conflict 
situation it is not possible to communicate every incident to the thematic 
procedures of the United Nations. In such situations, NGOs which have their own 
system of fact-finding are in a better position to get information on the occurrence 
60 Draft Report of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights to the Economic and 
Social Council in Accordance with Economic and Social Council Resolution 1985/17, 
E/C. 12/2003/CRP. 1 (20 August 2003) para. 38. 
61 Committee on ICESR, Concluding Observations: Sudan, 48 (1 September 2000), para. 41 
62 Amnesty International 'Sri Lanka: Rape in Custody', Al Index: ASA 37/001/2002 (January 
2002) at p-3- 
63 Ibid., at p. 4 and Appendix 1, at pp. 12-15. 
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of violations. Failure by the Human Rights Committee to deal with the problems of 
rape during the internal armed conflict situation of Sri Lanka in its concluding 
observations, when there is a general pattern of such crimes, particularly with 
regard to IDPs (although torture of detainees has been observed) is an indication of 
the functional defect of the Human Rights Committee. This happens as a result 
of failure or inadequacy in informing itself from other to independent sources of 
information in considering a State party's report, more than to Human Rights 
Committee's insensitivity to the issue of internal displacement. 64 Therefore, 
reaction to the problems of IDPs needs a considered approach on the part of the 
Human Rights Committee to the problems of IDPs and recourse to inforination 
available from the thematic procedures of the United Nations and NGOs- 
The Committee on ICESCR makes relatively consistent observations with 
regard to issues relating to IDPs. One of the reasons for this might be the 
information received from the NGOs by the Committee on States concerned 
during pre-sessional working groups and at the beginning of each session. 65 The 
Human Rights Committee has not provided such an official standing to NGOs- 66 
In considering the initial report on Sri Lanka, the Committee expressed its grave 
concern over the 'situation of an estimated 800,000 persons displaced because of 
the armed conflict, many of whom have been living in temporary shelters for the 
past 15 years' and mentioned the fact that 'Tamilfamilies who wereforced by the 
military to leave their ancestral villages in the Welioya region are among the 
displaced. ý67 [emphasis added] 
Though displacement incidental to the armed conflict has nothing to do 
with an IDP's right to freedom of movement, the fact of forced displacement 
definitely falls within the scope of Articles 12 (freedom of movement and 
residence), 27 (right of minorities) and probably 17 (right to home) of the ICCPR 
and therefore within the competence of the Human Rights Committee for 
assessment. Therefore, specifically drawing the attention of the state party to the 
fact of forced displacement of civilians and making recommendations so as to 
64 For reported cases of rape and killings of women in Sri Lanka see Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, E/CN. 4/2002/74 (9 January 2002) para. 48 
65 M. O'Flaherty, Human Rights and the UN Practice Before the Treaty Bodies, 2 nd ed., ( Hague, 
2002) at pp. 62-65 ; C. Tomuschat, Human Rights, at p. 151 
66 M. O' Flaherty, ibid., at p. 33 
67 Committee on ICESCR: Concluding Observations : Sri Lanka E/C. 12/l/Add. 24 (16 June 1998) 
para. 7 
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ameliorate such violations by drawing attention to the responsibility of the state 
to facilitate their return to their places of origin or make arrangements to resettle 
them in any part of the country and provide restitution or compensation for loss 
of property is imperative for the effective protection of human rights of IDPs. 
Consequences of incidental displacement by armed conflict can be 
subjected to the evaluation of the Human Rights Committee when they result in 
violation or risk of violation of human rights. For instance, the infant mortality, 
epidemics and malnutrition which are common in IDP camps in conflict 
situations, are issues relating to the right to life under Article 6 or right to be free 
from inhuman treatment under Article 7 in particular with regard to children 
and pregnant women. 68 There is a marked omission in this regard in the 
concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee. For example, none of 
the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on Sri Lanka dealt 
with these issues. In contrast, the Committee on ICESCR was alarmed by the fact 
that the 'incidence of under nourishment of women and children living in 
temporary shelters to be as high 70 per cent, and by reports that in many cases food 
assistance did not reach the intended beneficieries 69 and made strong 
recommendations to improve the nutritional standards and to ensure the free 
flow of humanitarian assistance . 
70 Similarly, the Committee on CERD expressed 
concern about the 'situation of civilians living in the north and east of the country, 
and particularly about those persons internally displaced by the conflict' and 
recommended that the State party continue to provide assistance to such civilians 
71 
and to cooperate with humanitarian agencies. In addition, the Committee on CRC 
expressed its serious concern over the 'large number of children affected by the 
armed conflict and especially those who have been displaced' and the 'hazardous 
provision of health services in areas affected by the armed conflict. ' 
72 Though 
these observations of the Committees were made at different stages of the internal 
armed conflict of Sri Lanka, they emphasize the needs of the IDPs and the 
68 CRC can be considered as lex specialis and non-derogable. 
69 ibid. 
70 Ibid., Para. 22 
71 Committee on CERD, Concluding Observations : Sri Lanka, A/56/18 (14/09/2001) paras. 
321- 
342. 
72 Committee on CRC: Concluding Observations : Sri Lanka CRC/C/15/Add. 40 (21 June 1995) 
para. 24 
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positive measures that would have to be taken on the part of the State party in 
observance of right to life under the ICCPR. 
The above examples do not mean to indicate that the Human Rights 
Committee has not dealt with the issue of displacement at all. It has mentioned 
issues of internal displacement in several instances. With regard to the Russian 
Federation it made the following recommendation as to the forced displacement of 
civilians: 
The State party should ensure that Internally displaced persons in Ingushetia are 
not coerced into returning to Chechnya, including by ensuring the provision of 
73 
alternative shelter in case of closure of camps (article 12) . 
Moreover in its concluding observations to the special report concerning 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to Articles 6 and 12 of the ICCPR, the Human 
Rights Committee recommended that 'measures already taken by the Republic 
should be further intensified and systematically monitored so as to ensure that 
"ethnic cleansing" does not take place, whether as a matter of revenge or 
otherwise. 74 However, such concluding observations or recommendations of the 
Committee has not been consistent or comprehensive enough to issues of internal 
displacement. It is even more disappointing to note, in the light of its General 
Comments on Article 4 of the ICCPR concerning state of emergency. It is 
possible for the Human Rights Committee to use these General Comments to 
make objective and consistent assessment of States with regard to their crises of 
internal displacement without being objected to by the States concerned . 
75 
73 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations : Russian Federation, CCPR/CO/79/RUS (6 
November 2003) para. 16; also see Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on Russian 
Federation CCPR/C/79/Add. 54 (26 July 1999) paras. 28,45; Committee requested state party to 
stop forced resettlement of Tajiks, citizens of Uzbekistan, from homes in violation of Articles 12, 
17 and in certain situations Article 27 of the ICPR, Concluding Observations: Uzbekistan, CCPR 
/CO/7l/UZB (26 April 2001) at para. (16); Committee recommended to ensure protection of 
civilians affected by displacement and evacuation , Concluding 
Observations: Phillippines 
CCPR/CO/79/PHL (I December 2003) at para. (15). 
74 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 14 (28 December 1992) para. 7. 
75 Although the State parties to the lCCPR are not bound to follow the General Comments, since the 
Human Rights Committee is guided by these General Comments in considering state reports and 
individual communications, States Parties 'have the greatest interest in carefully reviewing the 
general comments, voicing their opposition in cases of disagreement about the proper 
understanding of the CCPR. ' C. Tomuschat, Human Rights, at p. 157 and at p. 36; 1. 
Boerefijn, The 
Reporting Procedure Under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Practice and Procedures 
of the Human Rights Committee, (Antwerpen, 1999) at p. 300; Considering the 
fact that the 
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The observations by the Human Rights Committee in the above instances 
of Russian Federation and Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to IDPs are not 
surprising, due to the magnitude of the problems of IDPs in these states. 76 A 
consistent reaction to the problems of IDPs in internal armed conflict is important 
in situations of small scale and subtle forms of forced displacement as well, apart 
from large scale displacement. Only then would it be able to prevent or reduce the 
escalation of the crisis of internal displacement by concluding observations and 
their effective follow-up. 
The General Comment on Article 12 of the ICCPR concerning the 
freedom of movement by the Human Rights Committee is not helpful as it does not 
deal with the situations of armed conflict or the use of humanitarian law in the 
determination of derogation of the right during such conflict situations. However, 
in the General Comment No. 29 on Article 4 of the ICCPR concerning States of 
Emergency, the Human Rights Committee has specifically stated that crimes 
against humanity and international humanitarian law can be considered as relevant 
criteria in the application of human rights provisions of the Covenant during 
internal armed conflicts. 77 The General Comment on Article 4 explicitly states that 
the forced transfer of civilians by expulsion or other coercive means from the area 
in which they are lawfully present and which constitutes crimes against humanity 
cannot be justified as a legitimate measure to derogate from Article 12 of the 
Covenant. 78 
However it fails to mention explicitly the international humanitarian law 
prohibition on forced displacement in Additional Protocol 11 to define the lawful 
limits of derogatory power of the State under Article 12 of the ICCPR in internal 
armed confliCtS. 79 Although the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the 
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards and the study of the ICRC 
on customary rules of international humanitarian law applicable in international 
difficulty in obtaining consensus from 18 members of the Committee who are independent experts 
from different geographical parts and legal background to adopt General Comments addressed to 
all state parties, makes it authoritative, depending on the quality of their content. 
76 See generally for such a trend in, Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Colombia, CCPR/CO/80/COL ( 26 May 2004), para. 19; Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Serbia and Montenegro, CCPR/CO/8 I /SEMO (12/08/2004) 
para. 18. 
77 Human Rights Committee, 'State of Emergency, ' paras. 3,9,11,12,13 
71 Ibid., para. 13 (d). 
79 However it refers to fair trial guarantees of international humanitarian law, ibid., para. 16 
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and non-international armed conflicts are mentioned by the Human Rights 
Committee in a footnote as developments of human rights standards applicable in 
emergency situations, specifically stating them as evidence of the customary nature 
of the humanitarian law prohibition on forced displacement applicable in internal 
armed conflict would have reinforced the protection of IDPs. 80 Reference to the 
standards of humanitarian law is very beneficial and appropriate since, in armed 
conflict situations, they can readily be invoked to assess whether a State's act is in 
violation of right to freedom of movement of an individual, rather than resorting to 
the constitutive elements of crimes against humanity, because the human rights 
violations would have to become gross or systematic in order to constitute 
crimes against humanity. 
Apart from the inadequate focus on IDPs in concluding observations, 
ineffective implementation of human rights in the ICCPR by the Human Rights 
Committee is due to the inherent defects in the treaty system and its manipulation 
by state parties, namely, submission of reports which are not self-critical and 
delaying reports or not submitting them at all. Such inherent functional defects in 
the treaty monitoring system affect general implementation of human rights of 
civilians and IDPs as well. 
Although the mandatory nature of the reporting procedure can be 
conducive to protection in theory, during an internal armed conflict, it is not so in 
practice because of the necessity to indicate the measures adopted by state parties 
during such conflict to protect the rights of the civilians and IDPs belonging to 
the opposite party and the difficulties encountered in such implementation. It 
cannot be expected that State Parties which violate human rights during an internal 
armed conflict fought on ethnic, linguistic or religious grounds would be self- 
critical about their treaty commitments. Rather they would try to paint a 
favourable picture of the country's situation or to circumvent the issues at stake, 
by presenting unnecessary details. This trend was indicated in the Human Rights 
Committee's concluding observations made with regard to the fourth and fifth 
reports of Sri Lanka, where the Human Rights Committee noted that, 'the report 
contains detailed information on domestic legislation and relevant national case 
80 Ibid., para. 10, n. 6; the completed study on the customary international humanitarian 
law of the 
ICRC suggests Article 17 of Additional Protocol 11 against forced displacement 
in its entirety has 
become a rule of customary international law. See J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, at pp. 459-67. 
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law in the field of civil and political rights, but regrets that it does not provide full 
information on the follow-up to the Committee's concluding observations on Sri 
Lanka's previous report. ' 81 
Since the system of reporting is based on self-criticism by the States parties 
which are often violators of human rights in internal conflicts, the accuracy of the 
information on the extent of implementation cannot be guaranteed without the 
Human Rights Committee familiarising itself with information derived from 
independent sources such as NGOs and special procedures of the UN. 
Moreover, submission of a report long after the due date would seriously 
undermine the monitoring function of the Human Rights Committee. If there were 
an internal armed conflict during the required period of submission and if a state 
party failed to submit by then, the human rights violations would not be effectively 
dealt with by the Human Rights Committee. According to the Human Rights 
Committee's annual report, as at 31 July 2004, none of the countries involved in 
armed conflicts namely Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Burundi 
and Rwanda had submitted their initial or periodic report for more than five 
years. 82 Such a situation would have the effect of placing the IDPs affected by 
those ongoing conflicts beyond the legal protection of the reporting system 
provided by the Human Rights Committee. In such situations the remaining hope 
for the IDPs under the human rights system of the ICCPR may be its individual 
communication procedure. 
The amended Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee tries to 
rectify the situation of non-submission of state reports. Accordingly, in cases of 
non-submission of initial or periodic reports, after sending reminders to the State 
party concerned, the Human Rights Committee may at its discretion examine the 
measures of implementation taken by such State party to give effect to the ICCPR 
in a private session and would adopt provisional concluding observations. It can 
later change this into final concluding observations and would make them public. 
83 
Since this strategy is new, its success in practice remains to be seen. 
81 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations : Sri Lanka, (2003) para. 2. 
82 Report of the Human Rights Committee, A/59/40 (vol. I) (31/10/2002) para. 57. 
83 Rule 70(l), (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/3/Rev. 7 (4 
August 2004); see Human Rights Committee, General Comment 30, 'Reporting Obligations of 
State Parties Under article 40 of the Covenant, ' CCPR/C/Rev. 2/Add. 12 (18 September 2002). 
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Effective implementation of human rights requires that reports on the 
human rights situation during an armed conflict must be submitted for 
consideration at the time of occurrence and not on the normal due date. Based on 
Article 40 of the ICCPR, the rules of procedure provide that the Human Rights 
Committee can request reports 'at any other time the Committee deems 
appropriate, ' which can include armed conflict situations. 84 In exceptional 
situations like internal armed conflicts, the Committee can request such urgent 
reports even when it is not in session. 85 Thus, the Committee is enabled to request 
urgent reports from State Parties involved in armed conflicts well before the due 
date of their next periodic report. 
Requests for such urgent reports were made with regard to countries 
involved in internal conflicts such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Croatia. 86 Such reports were requested from Bosnia and 
Herzigovina and from Croatia before their initial report and from Yugoslavia some 
time after the submission of the third periodic report. However, the exercise of 
this special reporting procedure has not been consistently followed by the Human 
Rights Committee, despite the fact that these armed conflict were in progress. Even 
though in all these cases the State Parties complied with the request and submitted 
their reports, this does not guarantee that every State involved in armed conflicts 
would submit such reports. In such situations, whether it is a periodic report or a 
special report, non-submission of a report by a state concerned would place the 
IDPs out of the international scrutiny provided by the Human Rights Committee. 
Concluding observations have no binding force on State parties. The 
Human Rights Committee publishes the concluding observations, the names of 
states parties that are overdue in their reports and the follow-up to concluding 
observations in the annual report to the General Assembly to induce the state 
parties to comply. Due to the impartiality and objectivity of the Human Rights 
Committee, concluding observations can be an authoritative source in providing a 
general critical evaluation of a country's human rights situation to the international 
community. As a consequence, these can be used by international NGOs and other 
84 Rule 66(2) of the Rules of Procedure of Human Rights Committee (2004). 
85 ibid. 
86 See M. 0' Flaherty, Human Rights and the UN Practice, at p. 39 n. 62; 1. Boerefijn, 'The 
Reporting Procedure' at pp. 266-283; Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted special report on 30/10/92 
(CCPR/C/89); Croatia submitted in 30/10/92 (CCPR/C/87). 
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institutions to pressurise the State party concerned to implement the 
recommendations of the Human Rights Committee, a body that monitors the 
compliance with important set of international human rights. 87 
The optional Protocol to the ICCPR of 1966 (hereafter OP ICCPR) 
allows 'individuals' who claim to be 'victims' of a violation in the Covenant to 
bring communication to the Human Rights Committee 88 and therefore IDPs in a 
camp or in a village as a whole can bring communications on their own before the 
Committee, against their home state which is a party to the OP-lCCPR to get 
redress for the violations of human rights committed by their state . 
89The main 
obstacle to this procedure is that the state concerned should be a party to the OP- 
ICCPR. 
As far as IDPs are concerned, additional obstacles exist to recourse to such 
procedure in conflict situations. Due to the deprivation of belongings and 
impoverishment during displacement, internment in IDP camps or living close to 
conflict zones, IDPs are generally not in an economical or physical position to 
submit communications personally to the Human Rights Committee. Moreover, 
in addition to displacement related factors, widespread ignorance of IDPs in third 
world countries would necessitate assistance to file petitions, such as through 
NGOs. For the purposes of the ICCPR, IDPs would be considered as victims if 
the act or omission of the state has adversely affected the exercise or enjoyment 
of their rights or such an adverse effect is imminent, for instance, by the existing 
law or an administrative practice. 90 The Rules of Procedure of the Human 
Rights Committee provide that if the individual concerned is unable to submit the 
communication personally, the communication can be submitted by a 
representative 'on behalf of an alleged victim. '91 Thus, imprisonment of an alleged 
87 See C. Tomuschat, Human Rights, at p. 155. 
88 Art. I of the OP-ICCPR; Rule 96(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, 
(4 August 2004) provides that the communication should emanate from an individual or 
individuals. 
89 In E. WEt al. V. The Netherlands, Communication No. 429/1990, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/429/1990 (29 April 1993) Decision on Admissibility, para. 6.3, the Human 
Rights Committee observed that, 'provided each of the authors is a victim within the meaning of 
article I of Protocol I of the Optional Protocol, nothing precludes large numbers of persons from 
bringing a case under the Optional Protocol. The mere fact of large numbers of petitioners does not 
render their communication an actio popularis, 
9' E. W. et al., v. The Netherlands, para. 6.4 
91 Rule 96(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee (2004). 
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victim at the time of the communication can be considered as warranting 
submissionof a communication by the victim's representative. 92 
Therefore IDPs who stay in IDP camps under traumatic conditions such 
as torture, arrests, enforced disappearances, refusal of identity documents and birth 
certificates, infant mortality, malnutrition and epidemics may submit a 
communication through an NGO to the Human Rights Committee regarding the 
same, provided the NGO justifies its authority to submit the communication on 
behalf of such IDPs. 93 This can cause impediment in getting justice to IDPs, whose 
freedom of movement beyond the camp is restricted or whose access to NGOs is 
otherwise restricted. The ideal solution would be the actio popularis, similar to that 
in the Inter American Convention on Human Rights and African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights, which permits NGOs to engage freely in the 
communication procedure without the authorisation of the victims. 
The other obstacle to the invocation of this remedy is the pre-requisite that 
the petitioner must have exhausted 'all available domestic remedies. 94 This 
requirement is burdensome to IDPs in conflict situations. During forced 
displacement in internal armed conflicts, generally the structure of judicial or 
administrative procedures may become affected or become difficult to access from 
a combat zone or even available remedies can be ineffective. However, since there 
is no need to exhaust all local remedies if such local remedies are inaccessible, 
ineffective or unduly prolonged, IDPs can have recourse to the Human Rights 
Committee if they can provide evidence of inaccessibility of local 
mechanisms. 
In a way, recourse to the Human Rights Committee may not be effective 
to protect the human rights of the IDPs who are exposed to real risks, because of 
the considerable length of time involved in the procedure to take the final views. 
95 
However, IDPs can seek provisional protection by interim measures prior to the 
reaching of a final view by the Committee, 'to avoid irreparable damage to the 
92 Singarasa v. Sri Lanka CCPR/C/8 I /D/1 033/2001 (23 August 2004) para. 6.2. 
93 X (a non-governmental organization) v. Uruguay, communication No. 137/1983, 
CCPR/C/19/D/137/1983 (25 July 1983) para. 3; J. Fitzpatrick, 'A Guide to International 
Mechanisms and Procedures' at p. 28. 
94 Art. 5(2)(b) of the OP ICCPR. 
95 It takes between two to five years, A. Bayefsky, S. Farrior, K. Hanrahan and A. Langham, 
'Protection Under the Complaint Procedures of the United Nations Treaty Bodies', in J. Fitzpatrick 
(ed. ), Human Rights Protection For Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Internally Displaced Persons: 
A Guide to International Mechanisms and Procedure, (New York, 2002 ) p. 23, at p. 122. 
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victim of the alleged violation, 96 in case of violations of the lCCPR such as right 
to life and torture. 97 This is viable in situations where dangers that adversely 
affect the rights are imminent. As non-compliance of interim measure by State 
parties by taking 'irreversible measures' would weaken the protection of the 
Covenant as a whole through the individual communication procedure, it is 
considered by the Committee as a violation of the obligations of a State Party 
concerned under the OP-ICCPR. 98 The Human Rights Committee has made 
interim measure requests mostly to suspend the execution of persons who claim 
that they were not granted a fair trial, and to provide urgent medical examinations. 
IDPs who are in camps under appalling conditions can seek the benefit of these 
interim measures if and only they can prove that the harm is 'irreparable. ' Due to 
the requirement of exposure to a real risk situation, only a limited number of 
IDPs would benefit from such interim measures. 
In spite of the existence of such protective measures, unlike those of the 
European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
the Human Rights Committee's views on violations of human rights, including its 
interim measure requests, are not legally binding on the state parties. 99 Since this 
procedure does not have an enforcement mechanism, it merely relies on the Special 
Rapporteur on follow-up of the Human Rights Committee's views and the 
publicity given by the inclusion of the follow-up activities in the annual report of 
the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly in the hope ensuring 
compliance. 100 Due to the weak implementation system, not many of the State 
Parties to the OP-ICCPR comply with interim measure requests, especially when 
non-compliance serves their own interests during armed conflict situations. In 
Mansara et al., v. Sierra Leone and Saidov v. Tajikkistan, the state parties 
executed the alleged victims despite the request by the Human Rights Committee 
for a stay of execution prior to its final views. 
' 01 
96 Rule 92 of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee. 
97 Human Rights Committee, 'Nature of the General Legal Obligation' para. 12. 
98 Piandiong et al v. the Philippines, Case No. 869/1999, CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999 (19 October 
2000 
pýras. 5.1-5.4. 
" D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ( Oxford, 199 1) at p. 15 1; C. Tomuschat, Human Rights, at 
p. 180. 
100 Rule 10 1 (4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee. 
101 No. 839-841/1998, CCPR/C/72/D/841/1998 (30 July 2001); No. 964/2001, 
CcpR/C/8 I /D/964/2001 ( 20 August 2004) respectively. 
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According to the Human Rights Committee, States which fail to implement 
the committee's final views or to inform the Committee of the measures taken 
within the requested period of 90 days have been on the increase. 102 In the 
Committee's view, only 30 percent of the responses from States on the 
implementation of human rights are satisfactory. 
103 
The individual communication procedure under the Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR may be a useful mechanism in the protection of human rights for at 
least to some IDPs. Especially where IDPs in Asia are concerned, the Human 
Rights Committee serves as an important avenue to expose the violations 
perpetrated by a State to the international community in the absence of a regional 
human rights mechanism similar to that in Europe, America and AfTica. 104 
B. Regional Human Rights Bodies 
1. The European System 
The European Court of Human Rights has the jurisdiction to entertain inter-state 
and individual communications in terms of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 105 The extensive 
investigative powers of the Court to clarify the facts of the case including to 
carry out on-site investigation can be initiated at the request of the party or of its 
own motion. 106 
Unlike the individual communication which can be used only to the 
rights violated with regard to an individual or individuals, inter-state 
communications can be resorted to by a state or states regarding 'any alleged 
breach' of the ECHR. 107 Thus, such communications can be useful in addressing 
large scale violations of human rights taking place within the territory of a another 
state, as states have a common interest in the protection against violations of 
102 Report of the Human Rights Committee A/57/40 (vol. 1) 2002, para. 255. 
103 ibid 
104 c. Tomuschat, Human Rights, at pp. 33-34 opines that the vast cultural differences among the 
Asian countries, the prospect of having a Asian Convention on human rights is too remote. 
105 Arts. 33,34 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 1950. 
106 Rule AI of the Annex to the Rules of Court, Strasbourg, (March 2005). 
107 Art. 33 of the ECHR. 
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human rights and to preserve the European public order. 108 On this basis, this 
procedure has been used twice in the common interest to protect human rights 
under the European Convention with regard to massive violations of human rights, 
which has not happened yet in the UN or other regional systems of human 
rights. 1 09 However, the reluctance to resort to this method is evident from the fact 
that so far none of the state parties to the European Convention has lodged any 
communication against the Russian Federation or Turkey with regard to large scale 
human rights violations occurring respectively in Chechnya and South east Turkey, 
which have caused massive internal displacement. ' 10 
There does not exist a proprio motu procedure under the ECHR to 
investigate large scale or systematic violations of human rights. "' Thus, until 
complaints have been filed under the individual or inter-state communications, 
states are able to keep derogatory measures under Article 15 of the ECHR for a 
long time. 1 12 However, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe has the 
power to request a state party which is allegedly committing human rights 
violations within its territory to provide explanations as to the extent that its 
108 See generally, S. C. Prebensen, 'Inter-State Complaints Under Treaty Provisions-The Experience 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights' in Alfredsson et al., (eds. ), International 
Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms, (Hague, 200 1) p. 533. 
109 Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands, v. Greece, Application Nos. 3321/67,3322/67, 
3323/67,3344/67, (1968) 7 ILM 818; France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Netherlands v. 
Turkey. Application Nos. 9940- 44/ 82, (friendly Settlement) 7 December 1985, (1986) 25 ILM 
308. 
110 See the Recommendation 1456 (2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, Strasbourg, 'Urgent Appeal to Members "to make use of Art. 33" ECHR (inter-state 
complaint) v. Russia/ Violation of Human Rights in the Chechen Republic', 6 April, 2000, 
para. 18, in which Assembly appealed the member states to make use of Art. 33 of ECHIR 
with regard to Russian authorities for their grave and systematic violations of the Convention 
in the Chechen Republic, reproduced in (2000) 21HRLJ286. 
111 However, there are non-judicial mechanisms which operate as part of Council of Europe; a 
limited competence to make in situ investigations with regard to violations of torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment of people deprived of their liberty is provided under the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
1987, reprinted in I. Brownlie and G. S. Goodwin-Gill, Basic Documents, at p. 493; in terms of its 
Articles 2 and 7 the Committee established under this Convention has the competence to visit 
places where people are deprived of liberty by a public authority in required circumstances in 
addition to its periodic visits; Commissioner for Human Rights act on any information or to the 
requests of the Committee of Ministers or the Parliamentary Assembly and make visit to Member 
states. 
112 M. 0' Boyle, 'Reflections on the Effectiveness of the System for the Protection of human rights', 
in Bayefsky (ed. ), The UN Human Rights Treaty System in the 21" Century, (Kluwer, 2000), p. 169, 
at p. 179. 
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internal law ensures the effective 
ECHR. ' 13 
implementation of the provisions of 
As far as IDPs are concerned, ECHR does not provide for an actio 
popularis as in the IACHR for initiating individual communications. Therefore, 
an individual or group of individuals or Non-Governmental Organisation must be 
a victim i. e., directly affected by such violations, in order to file individual 
communications. ' 14 Due to the general vulnerability of IDPs in internal armed 
conflicts and their legitimate fear of reprisals from the government for resorting to 
international human rights mechanisms would reduce the number of individual 
communications to the European Court of Human Rights. As has been found in a 
number of communications against Turkey concerning destruction of houses, the 
authorities exerted some form of pressure on complainants to withdraw or modify 
their complaints, and the Court found such acts violated Article 34 (former Article 
25) which obliges the state not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the 
right of individual petitions. ' 15 These are the communications that managed to 
reach the Court, but such pressure would discourage the IDP victims from 
resorting to individual communication procedure at all. 
The European Court of Human Rights has dealt with numerous cases 
against Turkey under individual communications concerning destruction or 
burning of homes and displacement resulting in violations such as of Article 3 of 
ECHR on inhuman treatment, Article 8 of the same convention on respect for 
private and family life and home and Article I of Protocol I to the ECHR on 
peaceful en oyment of property. ' 16 However the European Court has not ruled in 
any such cases that the burning or destruction of homes, possessions and crops 
which deprived the Kurds of the security of shelter and livelihood and the 
resulting displacement from the villages are forced expulsions. Such destruction of 
houses and property did not occur as collateral damage but as deliberate 
113 Art 52 of the ECHR; in 15 December 1999, Secretary General made such a request for 
explanation from the Russian Federation as to the manner in which the Convention was being 
implemented in Chechnya. 
114 Article 34 of the ECIIR. 
115 Akdivar v. Turkey, Judgment, 16 September 1996, paras. 100-106; Dulas v. Turkey, paras. 76-82; 
Orhan v. Turkey, paras. 401-41 1 
116 Akdivar v. Turkey, ibid; Mentes v. Turkey (58/1996/677/867) 28 Nov 1997; Selcuk and Asker 
v. Turkey ; Bilgin v. Turkey ; Dulas v. Turkey; Orhan v. Turkey ; Yoyler v. Turkey (26973/95) 24 July 
2003; Ayder v. Turkey (23656/94) 8 January 2004; IPEK v. Turkey (25760/94) 17 February 2004; 
Altun v. Turkey Hasan Ilhan v. Turkey (22494/93) Judgment 9 November 2004. 
LechL oe. Liinjt (http). //wwýwA r. c 
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destruction in a consistent manner which in many cases has effectively resulted in 
displacement and may lead to the reasonable conclusion of forced eviction by 
the security forces. Such a finding would have resulted in the action being 
considered as a violation of right to freedom of movement, in particular of the 
right to remain, or right against arbitrary displacement. As far as Turkey is 
concerned, such a finding cannot fall within the scope of right to freedom of 
movement as it is not a party to Protocol IV to the ECHR. Despite the Court's 
acceptance of forced eviction in some cases, it decided that it was not necessary to 
consider whether the forced eviction per se was sufficient to constitute a separate 
violation of Article 8 of the ECHR and Article I of Protocol 1.117 Such a finding 
might have led to a finding of the violation of Article 14 of the ECHR in 
conjunction with at least Article 8 and Article I of Protocol 1.118 
The extension of ECHR to central and eastern European states has 
inevitably increased the length of Court proceedings, seriously affecting the 
credibility of the Court. " 9 As such, in situations of urgency, getting interim or 
provisional measures has become very important. Interim measures, which are 
not provided in the ECHR but in the Rules of the European Court of Human 
Rights, would be granted 'in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of 
proceedings before it. ' 120 These interim measures have binding force and failure 
to comply with such a measure by a state party to the ECHR constitutes a violation 
of Article 34 on the individual application of the Convention. 12 1 Despite their 
binding effect, the practical value of such measures to the IDPs are restricted until 
today because their application under the ECHR is only concerned with the direct 
risk to certain rights, namely, right to life, prohibition of death penalty, and torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, unlike the provisional measures 
117 Orhan v. Turkey, para. 379. 
118 Art. 14 of the ECHR states, '[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status. ' 
119 Approximately two years are taken for a decision on admissibility and altogether five to six 
years fi7om the filing until judgment on an application. M. O'Boyle, 'Reflections on the 
Effectiveness of the System' at p. 179, n. 39; Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR amending the control 
system of the Convention has been adopted to tackle the problem of excessive case load. 
120 
, Rule 
39(l), Rules of Court, (March 2005) Registry of the Court, Strasbourg. 
121 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (46827/99 and 46951/99) European Court of Human Rights 
(G. C) Judgment of 5 February 2005, para. 128 ; in contrast previously such measures were 
considered non-binding Cruz Varaa v. Sweden 20 March 1991; Conka and others v. Belgium 
(51564/99) 13 March 2001. 
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issued by the Inter-American Court which goes beyond the protection of life 
and limb. 122 Most of the interim measures under the ECHR were granted 
with regard to expulsion or extradition and in several cases concerning severe 
prison conditions and health conditions of detainees exposed to the risk of 
irreparable damage. Thus, there is a possibility of getting the protection of interim 
relief in severe health conditions of IDPs that result in irreparable damage, due to 
lack of food, medical facilities and sanitary conditions in a camp. The satisfactory 
feature of this system is the high rate 
measures by the State parties. ' 23 
of compliance with these interim 
The humanitarian consequences involved in internal displacement were 
explicitly considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Dogan v. Turkey. 
In that case the applicants lived in poor conditions during internal displacement 
after destruction of their homes and property by the authorities. Since the Court 
had confined its consideration to the denial of access to their possessions, the 
need to determine the justification for the interference of the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of one's property did not arise. 124 However, in the Court's opinion the 
exact cause of displacement, whether it was a forced eviction or a lawful eviction 
for the safety of the civilians or as a direct result of confrontations and destruction 
of homes, was not clear. 125 Nevertheless, the Court observed the fact that, in 
many similar cases, deliberate destruction of houses and possessions by the 
security forces deprived the civilians of their livelihood and forced them to 
leave their villages. 126 
The Court when considering the proportionality of such measure by the 
state with the right to peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions by refusing access 
to homes and livelihood, resorted to the Principles 18 and 28 of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement as an interpretative guide. Resorting to such 
IDP specific Guiding Principles to determine the legitimate needs of displaced 
persons provides enhanced protection to IDPs, as it requires the state to provide 
alternative accommodation or funds for living during displacement, irrespective of 
the lawfulness of the interference with peaceful enjoyment of possession. 
122 Y. Haeck and C. B. Herrera, 'Interim Measures in the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights' (2003) 21 NQHR 625, at p. 672. 
123 Ibid., at p. 670. 
124 Dogan and Others v. Turkey, at para. 143. 
125 ibid. 
126 Ibid., para. 142 
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In the light of a series of cases against Turkey concerning destruction of 
homes of Kurds and their evacuation from villages, leading to internal 
displacement, and in the absence of investigation, provision of alternative 
accommodation and compensation or ex gratia payments to the displaced persons 
by the state, one can probably come to the conclusion that such a consistent 
pattern of violations of human rights indicates existence of an official policy 
which discriminates against Kurds. 127 In many cases, alleged violation of Article 
14 on the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the ECHR without discrimination 
was claimed in conjunction with Articles 3,8,13 and Article I of Protocol I on the 
basis of applicants' status as members of a national minority. But the Court has 
never found a violation of Article 14, because of insufficient evidence. 128 
This is mainly due to the rigid interpretation of the standard of proof, 
namely, 'beyond reasonable doubt', as requiring a high degree of probability, as 
in criminal trials, without giving due consideration to the differences in the 
objectives of international protection of human rights and criminal jUStiCe. 129 The 
former does not have the objective of punishing individuals who have 
committed violations, but of protecting the victims and providing reparations for 
damages resulting from the responsibility of the state. 130 Requiring proof beyond 
reasonable doubt in the evidence produced by the applicant against the respondent 
state cannot serve this objective. Such proof should be related 'to the facts of the 
case as a whole, including "the conduct of the -parties. " 13 1 Failure to consider the 
context of the violation would result in the failure to identify systemic violations. 
The requirement of such a high standard of proof would result in the 'removal in 
practice of the human rights protection guaranteed by Article 14 in areas where 
the highest level of protection [to the minorities], rather than the highest level of 
proof, should be the priority. ' 132 
The high standard of proof required to establish the discriminatory 
motive for the destruction of homes and crops by the authorities is difficult to 
127 Mentes v. Turkeypara. 59. 
128 Hasan Rhan v. Turkey, para. 130; Altun v. Turkey, para. 79; Bilgin v. Turkey para. 129; but see the 
partly dissenting opinions of Judges Loucaides and Mularoni in Hasan Ilhan v. Turkey 9 November 
2004. 
129 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, at p. 172 
130 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 29 July 1988, para. 134. 
131 Hasan Ilhan v. Turkey Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides. 
132 Ibid., partly Dissenting opinion of Judge Mularono. 
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establish in cases of internal armed conflict, where the respondent state is in 
control of most of the evidence. But at least the impact of such acts on the people 
in the context of consistent occurrence of such acts would lead to the conclusion 
that such acts are discriminatory. In Orhan v. Turkey the Court considered that 
the finding of violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3,8, and Article I 
of Protocol I was not necessary as it had already found violations of the latter 
rights. 1 33 This had the effect of removing the applicants and other people from 
the 'highest level of protection' that could be provided by Article 14 against 
discriminatory acts or policies of the state that generate internal displacement. 
The finding of a violation of Article 14 by the Court can serve as an 
establishment of evidence of gross or systematic violations of certain human rights 
that result in displacement in a State concerned by an impartial mechanism. Even 
though such findings in individual communications cannot 'realistically and 
effectively' serve to correct the violations that occur as a result of deliberate state 
policy, 134 they can be beneficial to identify standards of conduct to be included in 
the political resolution, by determining the legal standards being violated and to 
prevent continuous occurrence of previous violations on such a level as a 
consequence of 'public and authoritative exposure of the situation. ' 135 Such 
judicial determinations will have some impact in the exertion of political pressure 
on the state concerned. 136 Above all, in the absence of explicit protective means in 
the ECHR for large scale violations of human rights with the exception of rarely 
used inter-state communications, a finding of violation of Article 14 can serve as a 
means of protection in such situations via individual communications-' 37 
The Court held in many of those cases of deliberate destruction of homes 
and property by the security forces, that such acts infringed the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of property, without recourse to the international humanitarian law 
133 Para. 399 
134 R. Mullerson, 'The Efficiency of the Individual Complaint Procedures: The Experience of 
CCPR, CERD, CAT and ECHR' in A. Bloed, L. Leicht, M. Nowak and A. Rosas (eds. ), Monitoring 
Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms, (Dordrecht, 1993) 
at p. 27. 
135 A. Reidy, F. Hampson and K. Boyle, 'Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey' (1997)15 NQHR 16 1, at p. 163. 
136 ibid 
137 However, such serious or massive violations may be considered under Article 43(2) which 
states that a request to decide a case that raises a 'serious issue of general importance' can be 
referred to the Grand Chamber. R. Murray, 'Serious or Massive violations Under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Comparison with the Inter-American and European 
Mechanisms' (1999)17 NQHR 109, at p. I 10, n. 4. 
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norms which explicitly prohibit the deliberate destruction of houses as civilian 
objects and as collective punishment. Incidental destruction of homes which 
is not proportionate to the military objective is also prohibited by international 
humanitarian law. If a massive destruction of houses occurred as a result of the 
confrontation between the government armed forces and PKK which is not 
proportionate to the military objective, then it can be considered as a violation of 
international humanitarian law and an unjustified interference with the peaceful 
enjoyment of the right to property. The Court, however, has been reluctant to use 
international humanitarian law explicitly as an interpretative guide in the 
application of the European Convention of Human Rights. Generally in the 
majority of cases concerning Turkey, a state of emergency existed in those regions 
where destruction of homes had taken place and therefore the Court had to decide 
the compliance of Turkey in its derogation of right to property with its other 
international law obligations, in particular, of relevant humanitarian law 
provisions. 138 The failure of the Court to resort to humanitarian law as an 
interpretative aid to determine the scope of derogation may be due to reluctance 
to brand the armed activities between government forces of Turkey and PKK as an 
internal armed conflict. 139 Rather, it has borrowed the language of humanitarian 
law, language namely, 'precautions', 'means and methods' and 'incidental loss of 
civilian life. ' without explicitly acknowledging them in the judgment. 140 
Again in two cases concerning IDPs in the internal armed conflict in the 
Russian Federation, the European Court did have the right opportunity to resort 
to international humanitarian law as an interpretative guide. In the case of 
Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, the applicants who were IDPs from 
Chechnya, when fleeing to escape from the military activity in Grozny to 
Ingushetiya, sustained injuries, their children were killed and their cars and 
possessions were destroyed in indiscriminate bombing by Russian Military 
138 Dogan and Others v. Turkey, para. 142. 
139 Human Rights Watch, 'Displaced and Disregarded' at p. 15 considers that the conflict in south 
eastern Turkey during 1984-99 was an internal armed conflict; L. Zegveld, The Accountability of 
Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, (Cambridge, 2002) at p. 4 considers the situation 
in Turkey since 1983 as internal armed conflict; Hans-Joachim Heintze, 'On the Relationship 
Between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law' at p. 812 states that 
the reason for non-application of humanitarian law by the European Court until now 
is by political 
grounds. 
140 In Ergi v. Turkey (66/1997/850/1057) 28 July 1998 para. 79 and in Ozkan v. Turkey 
(21689/93) 6 April 2004, para. 297. 
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planes on the civilian convoy at the administrative border between Chechnya and 
Ingushetiya. The European Court, in finding a violation of right to life of 
applicants, however, did not have recourse to humanitarian law as an interpretative 
aid, despite the fact that the applicants and third party submissions cited 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in this regard. In this case 
the Court indicated the effect of the 'extremely powerful' nature of the weapon' 
i. e., 12 S-24 non-guided air-to ground missiles, its creation of several thousand 
pieces of shrapnel and its excessive impact beyond 300 metres, causing mortal 
danger to anyone on the road at the time. 141 It was clearly an indiscriminate 
attack not only because of the indiscriminate effects caused by the nature of the 
weapon but also due to the target against which such weapon was used, namely 
the civilian convoy. 142 
Similarly, in Isayeva v. Russia the applicant was injured by indiscriminate 
bombing by the Russian military while escaping from fighting. In this case the 
European Court in its finding of violation of the right to life resorted to the 
language of humanitarian law, namely, the use of 'indiscriminate weapons 
within a populated area. ' 
143 It fuither stated that, 
144 
using this kind of weapon in a populated area, outside war time and without prior 
evacuation of the civilians, is impossible to reconcile with the degree of caution 
expected from a law-enforcement body, in a democratic society. No martial law 
and no state of emergency has been declared in Chechnya, and no derogation has 
been made under Article 15 of the Convention. The operation in question there re fo 
has to bejudged against a normal legal background. 
In the above discussed two cases decided by the Court, since the Russian 
Federation has not made any derogation under Article 15(2) of the ECHR requires 
that derogations from Article 2 shall be made 'in respect of deaths resulting from 
lawful acts of war. ' This is not the position in terms of the corresponding 
provisions in other human rights Conventions. Therefore without specific 
derogation, it is not technically possible to resort to international humanitarian 
law to interpret that clause. Despite the existence of an internal armed conflict in 
141 Para. 195. 
142 The other factors that make such attack clearly illegal are: four hours duration of the attack; 
good visibility of the conditions on the road by the descending planes; and the absence of any 
retaliation from the ground. 
143 Paras. 189,191. 
144 Para. 191 (emphasis added 
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Russian Federation at the time of the facts of the case, the Court's insistence on 
adherence to derogation from Article 2 on the right to life excluded the 
possibility of using humanitarian law as lex specialis, particularly in the 
existence of substantial body of customary rules of humanitarian law applicable to 
the conduct of hostilities in internal armed conflicts. 
It is to be noted that rigid application of the requirement of 
derogation is not convincing in an intensive internal armed conflict. The is 
evident from the reasoning of the court that it is impossible to reconcile, the 
use of weapon ' outside war time, ' because there was an internal armed 
conflict actually taking place at that time in Chechnya. Moreover, declaration 
of the state of emergency has no bearing on the existence of an armed 
conflict. A recalcitrant state can choose to remain without declaring a state 
of emergency in order to avoid such interpretation of the right to life. 
The application of human rights law alone would tend to provide more 
protection than humanitarian law to IDPs as it does not permit the use of lethal 
force in policing operations (and therefore even against combatants) except when 
it is absolutely necessary and therefore as a last resort. 145 Therefore in 
principle very few incidental loss of civilian lives would be permissible. 
The principle of proportionality in human rights law is concerned with the 
effect on the individual and therefore the use of minimum force is permitted 
and lethal force can only be used as a last resort. 146 Conversely, in humanitarian 
law, a combatant can be targeted even if he does not pose any immediate threat. 
The principle of proportionality in humanitarian law is concerned with the 
incidental loss of civilian lives and objects rather than the effect on 
combatants. Due to such fundamentally different approaches, branding the 
conduct of hostilities as law enforcement operations by the application of human 
rights law is flawed as that would be obviously inconsistent with the application 
of international law most directly relevant to an internal armed conflict, namely, 
humanitarian law as lex specialis. Such an overstretched application of human 
145 Art. 2(2) of the ECHR. 
146 N. Lubell, 'Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict', Conference to 
Mark the Publication of the ICRC Study on "Customary International Humanitarian Law", 
The Hague, 30-31 May 2005; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, UN GA 
Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979, Article 3 and Commentary; Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 1990, Princples 9-11. 
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rights law to internal armed conflicts would weaken it as a protective regime 
applicable in peace times and internal disturbances. 
147 
As the Court implicitly accepted the existence of an armed conflict in 
the Russian Federation by stating that it had not derogated from Article 2 'in 
respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war' under Article 15(2) of the 
ECHR, it acknowledged at least the applicability of international humanitarian 
law as an independent regime along with human rights law. The European Court 
could therefore have observed the existence of humanitarian law norms that 
prohibit direct and indiscriminate attack on civilians and civilian objects that 
correlate with the right to life in the ECHR, in the context of such a serious 
violations of right to life of IDPs. This would reinforce not only the right to life 
but the relevant nonns of international humanitarian law applicable to internal 
armed conflicts as well. 148 
As far as IDPs are concerned, the court has granted monetary 
compensation for loss of their houses, cultivated land, livestock and non-pecuniary 
damages for seriousness of violations in respect of Articles 3,8 and Article I of 
Protocol 1. However, as regards the restitutio in intergrum ie., to restore the IDPs 
to their previous position before breach by reconstructing their houses and villages 
for their return, even though the court accepted the respondent state's legal 
obligation to put an end to the breach, it decided that if restitution is practically 
impossible then it is a matter within the state's discretion to choose the means by 
which to comply with the judgment, subject to the supervision of the Committee of 
Ministers. 149 In Orhan v. Turkey, the applicant requested the Court to rule 
147 See for a contrary view, W. Abresch, 'A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict'. 
148 Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez in his separate concurring opinion in Bamaca-Velasquez v. 
Guatemala, Series C. No. 70 (25 November 2000) para. 25, states that, '[t]he Court can go ftirther in 
its application of this matter, [resorting to humanitarian law] even when it is not strictly required to 
under the terms of the application, [to interpret the human rights norms] and observe the presence 
of norms of jus cogens resulting from the evident correlation -which shows an international 
consensus-between the provisions of the American Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and 
"other international instruments"-as is indicated in para. 209 of the judgment-regarding "non- 
derogable human rights ( [sic]such as the right to life and the right not to be submitted to torture or 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. "' ; the African Commission on Human Rights had referred 
to the application of international humanitarian law in a similar manner with regard to right to life 
in 48/90 Amnesty International v. Sudan, 50/91 Comite Loosli Bachelard v. Sudan, 52/91 Lawyers 
Committeefor Human Rights v. Sudan, 89/93 Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference 
of East Africa v. Sudan, 13 th Annual Activity Report of the Aftican Commission on Human and 
Peoples'Rights, 1999-2000, AHG/222 (XXXVI) p. 124, para. 50 ( hereafter Amnesty International 
v. Sudan) 
149 Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, paras. 123-25; Orhan v. Turkey, paras. 450-5 1. 
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that, 'for the benefit of the Committee of Ministers, that there is no evidence to 
suggest that it would be impossible for the village to be re-built and for the 
applicant and his surviving relatives to return to their homes. 9150 But such a 
request was rejected by the Court. This is in contrast to the position of the Inter- 
American Court, where other forms of reparation such as resettlement have been 
directly specified by the Court. Specifically ordering individual and general 
measures other than monetary compensation in the judgment is preferable for 
the effective protection of IDPs as it would avoid the discretion of the state 
concerned in providing restitution and other remedies for non-repetition of similar 
violations. 151 
AI 
. Apart 
from supervising the enforcement of 'just satisfaction ordered by the 
court, the Committee of Ministers has the task of supervising the individual 
measures to ensure that the violation has ceased and the injured party being 
restored, as far as possible to his previous position and the general measures to 
prevent new violations, or to put an end to continuing violations. 152 The 
enforcement of judgment has been generally positive, even though it takes an 
excessive length of time in some cases. The factors that contribute to the relatively 
successful enforcement of judgments are inter alia., the legally binding nature of 
the final judgment of the European Court on the state parties in any case to which 
they are parties, and the involvement of a political body of the Council of Europe 
ie., the Committee of Ministers. 153 Moreover, the Committee of Ministers are 
supported in their close monitoring by another political organ of the Council of 
Europe, namely, the Parliamentary Assembly. 154 Therefore it can be stated that 
European Court of Human Rights is in a position to provide effective 
remedies to IDPs. 
150 Paras. 450-5 1. 
151 See above, Chapter 6, Section D. 
152 Rule 3(b) of the Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers for the Application of Article 
46, para 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (10 January 200 1). 
153 Art. 46(l)(2) of the ECHR; the Protocol No14 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention 
(adopted in 13 May 2004) which has to enter into force yet, grants power to Committee of Ministers 
to refer a situation to the Court of a refusal by a state to abide by a final judgment, to decide 
ftilfilment of its obligation under para. I of Article 46 of the EC14R under which the state party has 
undertaken to abide by the final judgment in any case to which it is a party. 
154 In case of persistent refusal by a government to implement the measures, the Parliamentary 
Assembly may recommend in terms of its Rules of Procedure, June 2005, to the Committee of 
Ministers to take action to suspend a State's rights of representation in the Council of Europe 
under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, London 1949 (http: //conventions. coe. int). 
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2. The Inter-American System 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is the main supervising body in 
the protection of human rights in the American Continent of the States which are 
members of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in accordance with the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948 and the American 
Convention on Human Rights of 1969.155 All the members of the OAS which was 
created by the Charter of the Organisation of American States are 'indirectly' 
bound by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man by the human 
rights obligations in the Charter of the OAS, which incorporates the former. 156 
However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which was established by 
the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 (ACHR), does not have 
jurisdiction to consider cases against states not parties to the Convention. 
Moreover, not all of the member States of the OAS have ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights. As the Commission was created prior to the Court, 
the function of the Inter-American Commission is significant as it has the power 
to monitor human rights obligations of States parties to the American Convention 
on Human Rights and the human rights obligations of all the members of the OAS 
which are not parties to the Convention, in accordance with the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 157 Consequently, it can monitor the 
human rights obligations of states that are parties to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in terms of both the Inter-American Convention and the 
Declaration. Moreover, unlike the Inter-American Commission, which can 
consider individual communications, locus standi before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights is only provided to states parties to the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission. Because of 
its broader subject matter jurisdiction and locus standi, the Commission is in an 
important position to protect civil and political rights as well as socioeconomic 
155 Art. 1(2) of the of the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (Approved 
by Resolution No. 447 taken by the General Assembly of the OAS at its ninth regular session in 
October, 1979). (http: //www. cidh. oas. org) 
156 D. J. Harris, 'Regional Protection of Human Rights : The Inter -American Achievement' in D. J. 
Harris and S. Livingstone, The Inter-American System of Human Rights (Oxford, 1998) 1, at pp. 4- 
5; however, the United States has often objected to the fact that it has legally binding obligations 
under the Declaration, D. Harris, ibid., at p. 6. 
157 The Commission was created in 25 May 1960; Article I of the Statute of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. 
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rights in all the OAS member states. 158 This is useful especially with regard to 
displaced persons in Latin American states affected by internal armed conflicts. 
The Commission has the competence to entertain individual and inter-state 
communications and to undertake studies in situations of gross violations of human 
rights to prepare country reports. 
Individual communications can be submitted to the commission by 'any 
person or group of persons or nongovernmental entity legally recognised in one or 
more of the Member States of the OAS' concerning them or third persons 
regarding alleged violations of human rights recognised in the Declaration and the 
Convention. 159 Such a provision of actio popularis does not require a petitioner 
to be a victim to submit petitions to the commission. Thus, it is advantageous to 
the protection of IDPs simply for the reason that many IDPs in third world 
countries lack knowledge of their rights or how to access the international human 
rights protection mechanisms, or are in a difficult position as a result of their 
displacement including fear of reprisals. In such situations, either IDPs can file 
petitions as a group or NGOs can file petitions of alleged violations on behalf of 
specific groups of IDPs. 
The Commission is equipped with a wide range of powers to carry out its 
protection activities effectively under individual communications in serious and 
urgent cases: to disregard the normal admissibility procedures; request the 
promptest reply from the state by using most expeditious means; on its own 
initiative or at the request of the party to grant precautionary measures against the 
state concerned to prevent irreparable harm to persons; to request the Inter- 
American Court in cases that have not yet been submitted to the Court for 
consideration to adopt provisional measures; and to conduct on-site investigation 
in cases it considers necessary. 160 In serious and urgent cases the Commission 
would disregard the admissibility procedure and proceed with the on-site 
investigation only with the presentation of a case that meets the requirements of 
admissibility. 161 Such powers, coupled with the flexible locus standi provision, 
158 As American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man contains both types of human 
Rights unlike the ACHR. 
159Art. 23 of the Rules and Procedures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2003) 
(ht! p: //www. cidh. pas. org); Art. 44 of the ACHR. 
160 Arts. 3 0(4), 25,74,40 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(2003) 
16 1 Article 40(2) ibid. 
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place the individual communications under the Inter-American system in a better 
position to respond effectively to the gross violations of human rights of IDPs, 
unlike the UN system under the lCCPR or the European system under the ECHR. 
Under the individual communications procedure, precautionary measures 
have often been granted by the Commission to protect the lives and safety of IDPs 
in Latin American countries. Precautionary measures are effective in preventing 
imminent threats to lives of displaced persons rather than providing 
reparations for the violation, at the end of lengthy proceedings. Many such 
precautionary measures were requested from Colombia, which has the second 
highest number of IDPS in the world. 162 
For instance, on January 2,2002, the Commission granted precautionary 
measures on behalf of Afro-Colombian Communities in 49 hamlets in the Naya 
River in Buenaventura regarding the threats and violence against them by the 
paramilitary members- United Self-defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) to make 
the inhabitants leave the area. The Commission requested Colombia to provide 
unarmed civil protection to prevent armed incursions in that area; to take 
preventive measures including to have the presence of law enforcement to prevent 
illegal actors entering into the hamlets; to strengthen its early warning system by 
implementing an effective communication system; and to investigate the alleged 
acts of violence and to impose sanctions against perpetrators. ' 63 Similarly, 
precautionary measures were granted to protect lives, to prevent forced 
displacement and for the return of displaced families to the humanitarian areas 
established by the communities in the case of 515 families of Afro-Colombian 
descent (2,125), members of the Jiguamiando Basin Community Council. 164 
These measures provide protection to individuals or unquantifiable groups 
of persons such as communities. 165 The Commission has granted such measures 
in favour of a large number of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin who 
could not be individually identified, from massive expulsions from Dominican 
Republic in November 21 1999. However, according to the reasoning of the 
162 On January 11 2002 on behalf of I 10 members of the La Balsita living and working community 
in Debeiba; on March 15,2002, on behalf of Embera Chami indigenous persons. Annual Report of 
the Inter-Amencan Commission on Human Rights 2002, OEA/Ser. LN/11.117, Doc. I rev. 1 (7 
March 2003) Ch. 111, paras. 22,25. 
163 Annual Report of 2002, ibid., Ch III, para. 2 1. 
164Ibid., Ch. Ill, para. 45. 
165 Ibid., Ch. III, para. 10. 
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Inter-American Court, such protection cannot be extended to the general protection 
of IDPs in a country, even though they seem to share the status of displaced by 
armed conflicts. This is because of the impossibility of individualising IDPs 
scattered in various geographical locations. To the Commission's request for a 
provisional measure to the same persons, the Court stated that individual 
identification of persons in danger of irreparable harm is essential and therefore 
without specific names or individualization, 'protecting generically those in a 
given situation or those who are affected by certain measures' through provisional 
measures is not feasible. ' 66 In its view, to extend the protection of precautionary 
measures to a community of persons, the members must be identifiable, constitute 
an organised community and situated in a specific geographic location and affected 
by similar risks of violence. 167 In that sense, even in individual cases, the 
protection against gross or systematic violations of human rights can at least be 
extended to identifiable group of IDPs in a specific geographical location rather 
than the general protection of IDPs in a country who share the status of being 
displaced by armed conflicts. Such an approach seems to be adopted to keep the 
protective measures a feasible remedy to prevent an urgent irreparable harm by 
limiting the protective functions of a state to a specific identifiable group of 
persons. On the other hand, in the light of the effectiveness of certain provisional 
measures, it is to be noted that in a country where the IDPs are generally targeted 
in a systematic manner, such identification of certain groups might make such 
groups vulnerable to reprisals. 
As such, as far as gross or systematic violations of human rights are 
concerned, a mechanism that would be able to make on-site observations and to 
publish such violations in country reports is better than the individual 
communications procedure since, even though the victims involved are a group of 
persons in the latter procedure, consideration of facts would be restricted to the 
individual cases rather than the general situation in a country. Moreover, even 
though a series of similar cases can give an inference on the general state policy as 
to the violations, if a forum such as the European Court of Human Rights is 
reluctant to consider the subsequent cases in that general context of the 
166 Case of Haitians and Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republican Republic 18 August 2000, 
(Ser. E) 'Considering' section, para. 8. 
167 The Case of the Communities of the Jiguamiando and the Curbarado, 6 March 2003, Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights (Ser. E) 2003. 'considering' section para. 9. 
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discriminatory state policy, an individual mechanism would not serve to protect 
victims from massive violations of human rights. 168 However, as far as the Inter- 
American Commission is concerned, this commonly stated view is not relevant, as 
investigation of an individual may result in a special country report on the human 
rights situation, with or without an on-site visit by the Commission. 169 For 
instance, the petition presented before the Inter-American Commission by an 
Indian Rights Organisation on the forced relocation of Indian Miskito people 
resulted in on-site investigation and a special Report of the Commission on the 
Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito 
Origin. 170 
The Commission's competence to prepare and issue country reports is the 
better way of addressing immediately an urgent and serious general situation, 
where civilians or displaced persons are subjected to widespread violations of 
human rights, due the specific features involved: 171 the active role of the 
Commission to begin the procedure on its own motion without any third party 
involvement when it gets information as to the widespread violations of human 
rights in a country; 172 power of the Commission to use all sources of information 
without any restriction; on this basis its ability to complete the report within a 
short period and with a flexible procedure with its preliminary recommendations 
and a set period for compliance; if necessary, the power to make on-site 
investigation with the consent of the state; and issue recommendations to States 
concerned to be complied with. 173 For instance, in its Third Report on Colombia 
based on its on-site visit to Colombia, the Commission was able to observe and 
report the 'difficult living conditions' in IDP camps such as overcrowded 
conditions, lack of privacy, inadequate food assistance, water, symptoms of 
advanced malnutrition among children and women and to make recommendations 
168 A. Reidy, F. Hampson and K. Boyle, 'Gross Violations of Human Rights' at p. 172 (in the 
context of European Commission and the Court) 
169C Cerna, 'The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: its Organization and Examinations 
of Petitions and Communications' in D. J. Harris and S. Livingstone, The Inter-American System of 
Human Rights (Oxford, 1998) 65, at p. 97. 
170 OEA/Ser. LN. 11.62, doc. 10 rev. 3 (29 November 1983) 
171 Art. 4 I (c ) (d) of the ACHR; See C. M. Quiroga, The Battle ofHuman Rights: Gross, Systematic 
Violations and the Inter-American System, ( Dordrecht, 1988)at p. 320. 
172 Article 18( c) of the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1979); one of 
the political organs of the OAS such as general assembly can request the Commission to carry out 
an on-site visit to a country and report to it regarding the human rights situation therein. 
173 C. M. Quiroga, The Battle ofHuman Rights, at pp. 320-21 
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in this regard. 174 Because of this procedure of country reports, failure of states to 
resort to the inter-state communications in situations of widespread violations of 
human rights in the member states of the OAS could not be considered as a major 
lapse in the protection of human rights in Americas. 175 
In country reports, the Commission has dealt extensively with the problems 
of internal displacements covering both civil and political rights as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights. Since the Convention does not contain the 
economic, social and cultural rights, the international obligations of the States 
parties to the Convention with regard to IDPs in this regard can be examined 
according to the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, to the extent that 
they are not covered by the Convention. 176 The Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement was considered by the Commission as a comprehensive restatement 
of norms on IDPs and provides authoritative guidance to the Commission in the 
application of general provisions of the American Convention. 177 On that basis, in 
its 1999 Third Report on Colombia, the Commission examined the problem of 
internal displacement in a separate Chapter and recommended inter alia that: the 
parties to the conflict should observe the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement to prevent internal displacement; and priority should be given to 
alleviate the difficult economic, social and cultural situations of IDPs. 178 Similarly 
UN Guiding Principles were used in the fifth report on Guatemala where the 
Commission discussed the problems of reintegration of IDPs who have returned to 
their places of origin or resettled in other areas. 179 It recommended in this regard 
that efforts be made to facilitate the legalization of land titles and resolution of 
legal disputes over the ownership of lands; basic infrastructure be provided for 
access to potable water and sanitary facilities, assistance be provided in housing; 
174 Third Report on Colombia, ChNI, 'Recommendations' section, paras. 45-46. 
175 Art. 45 of the ACHR, Art. 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights; moreover, inter-state communication is of limited use in the protection of human 
rights as it is only available against the parties to the Convention and only if both states concerned 
have recognised the competence of the Commission in this regard by a declaration. 
176 Article 26 of the ACHR is the only ( general ) provision on economic, social and cultural 
rights ; see C. Medina, 'The Role of Country Reports in the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights' in D. J. Harris and S. Livingston (eds. ) The Inter-American System of Human Rights 
(Oxford, 1998) p. 115, at p. 13 1; there are brief general or special reports on the human rights 
situations of countries involved in internal armed conflict in the Annual report of the Commission. 
Art. 57(l)(h), (2) of the Statute of the Commission. 
177 Third Report on Colombia, Ch. VI, paras. 5- 10. 
178 Ibid., Ch. VI, 'Recommendations' section, Ch. III recommendations section. 
179 Fifth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, 2001, OEA/Ser. LN/11.111, 
doc. 21. Rev, (6 April 2001), Ch. XIV, para. 12 
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the provision of identity documents to all IDPs be ensured ; and the completion of 
de-mining efforts be ensured. 180 Such recommendations indicate the guidance 
derived by the Commission in particular from the UN Guiding Principles 28 
through 30 in the application of the general provisions of the American 
Convention and Declaration to the IDPs. 
Moreover, in country reports and individual communications the 
Commission dealt not only with violations of human rights but also violations of 
humanitarian law that result in detriment to displaced persons. For instance in the 
1999 Report on Colombia it expressed concern that: 
'[h]uman rights violations and infringements of provisions of humanitarian law 
allegedly committed by members of the military and security forces against the 
civilian population go unpunished. This situation both encourages the continuation 
of such abuses and helps to protract and increase displacement itself. ' 181 
Such an approach of the Commission to draw the attention of the causes of 
displacement markedly differ from the approach of the Human Rights 
Committee with regard to concluding observations under the ICCPR. 
In the Commission's view, to aptly resolve the specific claims in individual 
petitions, either 'it is necessary at times to directly apply rules of international 
humanitarian law, i. e. the law of armed conflict, or to inform its interpretations of 
relevant provisions of the American Convention by reference to these rules. ' 182 
However, the Commission's competence for direct application of international 
humanitarian law norms was rejected by the Court on the basis that under the 
American system, neither the Commission or the Court has competence to attribute 
responsibility to a state concerned pursuant to humanitarian law treaties. 183 
Regarding effectiveness of compliance with recommendations by the 
Commission in individual Communications, the figures indicated by the 
Commission in its Annual Report 2004 provide a relatively impressive picture, 
given the fact that the Commission's recommendations do not have binding force 
on member states. According to the report, out of 70 cases decided during the 
180 Ibid., para. 42 
18 1 Third Report on Colombia, 1999, Ch. VI, para. 89. 
182 Ibid., Ch. IV, para. 8. 
183 See for detailed examination of the competence of the Court and the Commission to use 
international humanitarian law norms in the context of individual communications, L. Moir, 
4 Decommissioned? International Humanitarian Law and the Inter-American Human Rights 
System, ' (2003) 25 HRQ 182. 
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previous three years, the recommendations of the Commission were fully complied 
with in 5 cases, partially complied with in 42 and non-compliance was in 23 cases. 
Therefore, in two thirds of cases, the recommendations of the Commission were 
complied with in some way. ' 84 Compliance with individual cases is different from 
the compliance of recommendations of the Commission in the Country reports, as 
in the latter states often tend to deny that gross or systematic violations of human 
rights are taking place in their territory. Publicizing the violations would induce 
some states to correct their conduct within their territory, as they do not like getting 
their image tarnished at the international level. The Commission submits such 
reports to the General Assembly of the OAS to draw the attention of states and 
non-governmental organisations through public debate and this method has been 
proved successful in some cases. In many cases of gross violations of human 
rights, actions by political organs of the OAS would provide effective protection. 
Unfortunately, due to the lack of political will on the part of the OAS members, 
discussion of the contents of the report and the passing of resolutions with the 
recommendations to the state concerned or/and other joint actions of the OAS 
member states to pressurise compliance by the state concerned have rarely taken 
place to date. ' 
85 
The Inter-American Court's provisional measures, decisions on the merit, 
and decisions on reparations are binding on the parties to the Convention. ' 86 The 
Court has granted provisional measures with regard to the IDPs to protect right to 
life and right to humane treatment, to ensure humanitarian assistance and freedom 
of movement in particular to remain in and to return to their habitual places. 187 The 
Court has adopted such measures on the basis that they are not only 
precautionary in preserving the outcome of a pending case but also protective as 
they protect human beings from imminent violation of human rights and therefore 
in situations of extreme gravity and urgency they become a 'true preventive 
184 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2004, OEA/Ser. LN/11.122, 
Doc. 5 rev. 1( 23 February 2005), Ch. 111, paras. 58-59. 
185 C. Medina, 'The Role of Country Reports', at pp. 126-127. 
186 Arts. 63(l) (2) and 68 of the ACHR. 
187 The Case of the Communities of the Jiguamiando and the Curbarado, (Colombia) March 6 
2003, (Ser. E) 2003, 'Decides' section paras. 3-5; Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado Case 
(Colombia) (Ser. E), June 18 2002, 'Decides' section, paras. 1-5; Giraldo Caraldo case(Colombia) 
February 5 1997, 'Considering' section, para. 5. 
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jurisdictional guarantee' to the IDPs. 188 As such, similar to the jurisdictional 
guarantee of ensuring the enjoyment of a right and providing appropriate remedy 
to an injured party in contentious cases, Providing provisional measures is a 
jurisdictional guarantee of the Court for fundamentally protecting human beings 
and therefore certainly they have binding force on the State party concerned. 
The Court has often mentioned the relevant humanitarian law norms such 
as common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, along with human rights 
provisions of the American Convention, in cases concerning violations committed 
in internal armed conflicts. ' 89 However, relevant humanitarian law norms can be 
resorted to by the Court only for the purposes of interpretation of the rights in the 
American Convention and not for the application of the former to attribute 
international responsibility to the state for such violations of international 
humanitarian law. 190 In that sense, the Court stated that those acts that violate the 
human rights in the American Convention, 'also violate other international 
instruments for the protection of the individual, such as the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and, in particular, Common Article 3. '191 
As a step forward, the Court has granted provisional measures in the light 
of the provisions of the American Convention and relevant humanitarian law 
norms. 192 For instance, in granting provisional measures for providers of foodstuffs 
to the Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado who were subjected to attacks 
affecting their lives and their right to humane treatment on the basis of the general 
provisions of ACHR that provides protection to all within the jurisdiction of the 
state concerned, the Court also mentioned the international humanitarian law as it 
has specific provisions on the protection of personnel providing humanitarian 
assistance against attack. 193 In the light of the observations of the Court that the 
provisional measures are a 'jurisdictional guarantee, ' although the Court does not 
have the competence to apply the humanitarian law, it definitely has the 
188 Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado Case, Order of the Court of 18 June 2002, (ser. 
E)2002, 'Considering' section para. 4. 
189Bamaca Velasquez November 25,2000, para. 207. 
190 Las Palmeras Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of February 4,2000, paras. 32-34. 
191 Bamaca Velasquez, Judgment of November 25 2000, para. 208. 
192 Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado Case, June 18,2002, 'Considering' section, para. 11; 
The case of the Communities of the Jiguamiando and Curbarado, March 6,2003, 'Considering' 
section, para. 11, and 'decides' section, para. 4, also see concurring opinion of judge Cancado 
Trindade, paras. 5,6. 
193 Peace Community of San Jose de Apartado Case, Ibid. 
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competence to interpret the human rights provisions of the ACHR in consultation 
with relevant humanitarian law norms to provide provisional measures. 
The Court has the broad power under Article 63 (1) of ACHR to grant 
reparations namely, pecuniary compensation and other forms of reparation. 194 In 
a reparation judgment against Guatemala, the Court stated that Guatemala 
'must adopt the legislative and any other measures required to adapt the 
Guatemalan legal system to international human rights norms and humanitarian 
law... 
. Specifically, the State must adopt the national measures to apply 
international humanitarian law, as well as those for protection of human rights that 
ensure the free and full exercise of the rights to life, to personal liberty, to humane 
, 195 treatment, to judicial protection and to a fair trial, It is to be noted that 
even though such reparation as a preventive measure against future violations was 
granted in a context not related to IDPs, this indicates the possibility that the Court 
can extend such measures even with regard to IDPs, for the effective protection of 
human rights (by the recommendations to apply humanitarian law) in the American 
Convention. 
The outcome of resorting to humanitarian law norms as elements in the 
interpretation of general human rights provisions in the American Convention, in 
the course of finding out violations of human rights, in granting provisional 
measures and in providing reparations, would be the improved protection to the 
IDPs in conflict situations. 
3. The African System 
The African Commission and the Court on Human and Peoples' Rights are the 
main protective mechanisms for the protection of human rights stipulated in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981 and its Protocol on the 
Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights of 1998. The 
Protocol which establishes the Court entered into force on 25 January 2004 and 
the Court is not yet in operation. 
The protection activities of the African Commission are invoked through 
inter-state communications, and other communications from any individuals or 
194 jo. M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
( Cambridge, 2003) at p. 233. 
195 Bamaca Velasquez v. Guatemala Reparations February 22,2002, para. 85 (emphasis added by 
the Court) 
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NGOs concerning any violations of the African Charter and reports from state 
parties every two years as to the legislative or other measures taken to give effect 
to the rights in the Charter. ' 96 Inter-state communications has rarely been used in 
the African system, despite its particular usefulness in massive or systematic 
violations of human rights that produce refugees and IDPs, which is a 
characteristic of the conflicts in many states in the African Continent. 
The individual communications provide for actio popularis similar to the 
Inter-American system, so that any individual or NGOs can communicate with the 
commission on their own behalf or on behalf of other individuals. The 
provision of actio popularis with regard to individual communications is 
important and relevant to the realities of the African Continent, as the IDPs in 
African states are often in a vulnerable position to access to international legal 
mechanisms on their own behalf due to their lack of knowledge of their rights, 
poverty, fear of reprisals and above all, physical impossibility of access to any 
help to communicate with such mechanisms, as they are constantly on the move 
from one place to another as a result of violence or fear of violence. This is 
evident from the communications to the Commission, as most of them are from 
NGOs on behalf of other victims. 
Unlike the other two regional Conventions, the African Charter explicitly 
refers to 'serious or massive violations of human and peoples' rights' and 
distinguish them from individual Communications. 197 The Charter is not specific 
about the determination of individual communications, but with regard to 
special cases 'which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive 
violations of human and peoples' rights, ' it requests the Commission to inform 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 198 The latter body may request 
the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these cases with its findings 
and recommendations. 199 In practice, however, the Commission treats both 
individual violations and serious and mass violations of human rights under the 
individual communications procedure by adapting this procedure to deal with 
196 Arts. 45(2), 49,55 and 62 of the ACHPR. 
197 Arts. 55,58(l) of the ACHPR. 
198 Art. 58(l) of the ACHFR. 
199 Art. 58(2) of the ACHPR. 
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serious or massive violations. 200 As problems of internal displacement often 
involve serious or massive violations of human rights, this is a useful mode of 
protection for IDPs- 
In cases of serious violations of human rights, the Commission does not 
require strict adherence to the provision on exhaustion of local remedies, as it is 
impossible for the complainants to identify or name the victims, and given the 
great number of people involved, such remedies are unavailable or unduly 
prolonged . 
201 The possibility of filing communications by NGOs concerning 
a great number of individually unidentifiable victims is also a beneficial feature 
of the system, as otherwise reprisal actions could be taken against those 
victims by the state. 202 
The major disadvantage of dealing with massive violations of human 
rights through individual communication is that whenever there are such 
violations, the Commission has to wait until an individual or an NGO submits a 
communication for its consideration. 203 This is not a viable mode of protection 
for IDPs, when such problems need to be addressed immediately. There is a 
possibility for the Commission to initiate an in-depth study or investigation on its 
own motion in situations of massive violations under Article 46 of the 
ACHPR. 204 Such a reporting measure in dealing with massive violations of human 
rights can be seen in the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights. 
Because of the holistic approach to human rights found in ACHPR, in 
individual communications, the Commission has been able to apply and make 
justiciable the economic, social and cultural rights, similarly to civil and political 
rights. 205 In The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, even without explicit protection on 
200 R. Murray, 'Serious or Massive Violations Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, ' at p. 118. 
20 1A mnesty International v. Sudan, paras -30,3 8,3 
9. 
202 Amnesty International reports about such reprisals in Russia against those who have been 
submitted cases to European Court of Human Rights, Al, press release, Al index: 46/006/2005 
(24 
February 2005). 
203 C. S. Odinkalu, 'Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Under the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights', in MD. Evans and R. Murray, (eds. ), The 
Aftican Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 (Cambridge, 2002) p. 
178, at p. 
215 observes that 'the communications procedures are still severely underutilized. 
' 
204 R. Murray, 'Serious or Massive Violations Under the African Charter, ' at p. 118; Article 46 of 
the ACHPR states that the 'Commission may resort to any appropriate method of investigation; 
it 
may hear from the Secretary -General of the Organisation of Aftican 
Unity or any other person 
capable of enlightening it. ' 
205 Para 7 of the Preamble to the ACHPR. 
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housing, food and protection against forced eviction in the ACHPR, the 
Commission implicitly derived these rights from other rights in the ACHPR and 
found that Nigeria had violated such rights. 206 Such an active interpretation is 
crucial and beneficial for the protection of IDPs, particularly in the African 
region affected by poverty and lack of basic human needs such as clean water5 
food, shelter and medical health care, which would become heightened during 
armed conflicts. Even though this case was concerned with forced displacement 
of Ogoni people in connection with oil production operation in Ogoniland and 
not during an armed conflict, due to the non-derogable nature of such human 
rights in the ACHPR, core obligations of socio-economic rights must be 
applied with regardto IDPs in armed conflict situations. 
Thus, perhaps, the practical effect of non-derogable nature of the rights 
in the ACHPR even in armed conflict situations is that there is no need for the 
complementary protection of the humanitarian law during armed conflicts to 
determine the permitted criteria of derogability of each right. However, given 
that these rights contain limitation clauses, the general nature of economic, 
social and cultural rights, and the inevitable need for the interpretation of 
'arbitrary' deprivation of during armed conflict, humanitarian law can be used by 
the Commission. 207 
In fact the Commission, when dealing with extra-judicial killings during the 
civil war in Sudan, observed that since the 'civilians in areas of strife are especially 
vulnerable, ' it is the responsibility of the government to take all possible measures 
to ensure the treatment of civilians in terms of international humanitarian law. 208 
This indicates the willingness of the Commission to resort to humanitarian law in 
the interpretation of the provisions of ACHPR, apart from its frequent mentioning 
in the resolutions concerning the armed conflict situations of state parties. 209 
Notwithstanding the Commission's broader interpretation of the provisions 
of the ACHPR to provide normative protection, it provides remedy to the victims 
206 155/96,15 th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission, 2001-2002, paras. 60-65. 
207 The ACH`PR unlike the ECHR does not contain any guidance as to the situations that cannot be 
considered as arbitrary deprivation of life even in the normal situations, and therefore resorting to o 
humanitarian law norms becomes important for the interpretation of right to life in the former. 
208 Amnesty International v. Sudan, para. 50. 
209 Res-8 (xv)94: Resolution on the Situation in Rwanda (1994) '3. Calls on all parties to respect the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the principles of international humanitarian law... 
. '; Res. 
7(XIV)93: Resolution on the Promotion and Respect of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human and Peoples' Rights (1993) 
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only by means of recommendations, because, it does not have effective powers to 
make legally binding awards of compensation to the victims of human rights. 210 
Even though it recommends to the state concerned to: ensure protection of health 
and livelihood; conduct investigations; ensure adequate compensation including 
relief and resettlement assistance; restore property looted at the time of expulsion; 
and amend the legislation in accordance with the Charter, 211 and these can be 
considered as providing some form of remedy to the victims, they cannot be 
enforced as there is no enforcement mechanisms provided for in the Charter. 212 
Notwithstanding the lack of power of the Commission to make binding 
decisions, the 'impartiality and integrity of the process' and in the process of 
finding violations, the use of credible and impartially collected reliable information 
from on-site missions may provide some authority to the recommendations reached 
by the Commission and could positively impact the compliance rate of the 
States. 213 Although the Commissioners are expected to serve in their individual 
capacity, 214 the close associations of some commissioners with their home 
governments 'has compromised their ability to remain objective and 
independent. '215 The Commission's on-site missions for protective purposes cannot 
be considered as convincing, due to the lack of a set of guidelines to conduct an 
independent and impartial investigation and information gathering. 216 Above all, 
since the Commission acts as a subsidiary to the political organ, it can publish 
2 10 A. P. Van der Mei, 'The New African Court on Human Rights and Peoples' 
Rights: Towards an Effective Human Rights Protection Mechanism for Africa? ' (2005)18 
Leiden Journal ofInternational Law 113, at p. 117; C. Tomuschat, Human Rights,, at p. 167 
211 See The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria, at pp. 43-44 ; 54/91,61/91,98/93,164/97 and 196/97,210/98, Malawi Aftican 
Association v. Mauritania, 13'h Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, 1999-2000, AHG/222(XXXVI), at p. 161 ; 228/99, The Law Office of Ghazi 
Suleiman v. Sudan, 16'h Annual Activity Report of the ACHPR, 2002-2003, at p. 55. 
212 V. O. Orlu Nmehielle, The Aftican Human Rights System: Its Laws, Practice, and Institutions 
(Hague, 2001) at p. 239. 
213 R. Murray, The Aftican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and International Law 
(Oxford, 2000) at p. 57. 
214 Art. 31(2) of the ACHPR. 
215 For example, they serve as ministers and ambassadors to their home governments, R. 
Murray, The Aftican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights at pp. 11-12, nn. 27-29; 
A. P. Van der Mei, 'The New Affican Court on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights' at p. 117. 
216 R. Murray, 'Evidence and Fact-finding by the Aftican Commission' in M. D. Evans and R. 
Murray, (eds. ), The Aftican Charter on Human and Peoples'Rights: The System in Practice, 1986- 
2000 (Cambridge, 2002) p. 100, at p. 108 
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the Annual report only with the authorization of the Assembly of Heads of State 
217 and Government of the OAU/AU . 
The reporting procedure in Article 62 of the Charter is useful for the 
protection of IDPs, only if the state parties choose to submit reports to the 
Commission. State parties are not only required to report on the implementation 
measures taken generally to give effect to the human rights in the Charter, but in 
some individual cases the Commission has required the states concerned to report 
back under Article 62 of the specific measures taken in accordance with the 
Commission's recommendation. 218 Because of non-compliance with the reporting 
procedure by many states and of the periodic nature of the reports, this 
procedure cannot be an effective way of monitoring compliance to protect IDPs 
as their vulnerability requires immediate addressing of their needs .2 
19 As 
individual communications and the recommendations of the Commission are 
published in the Annual report on the activities of the Commission, one can hope 
that the publicity of such findings of violations would influence the compliance 
by African states, even though it is not an effective relief. 
A Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and internally 
displaced persons in Africa has been appointed by the Commission in June 2004 
to examine the situations of IDPs in a particular country by making fact-finding 
missions, investigations and visits to IDP camps and submit reports to the 
Commission on the situation of IDPs in Africa at its ordinary session. 220 
This can be useful in the monitoring the human rights of IDPs in Africa under the 
prevailing conditions of overdue and unsatisfactory reporting and an underutilized 
individual communication procedure. One of the issues of concern in this 
appointment, similar to the previous appointments of three Rapporteurs on 
different themes, is that the Rapporteur is a member of the African Commission 
217 Art. 59 of the ACHPR 
2 18 211/98 Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia para. 73,14 th Annual Activity report of the 
ACHPR, 2000-2001, AHG/229(XXXVII). 
2 19 As at May 2003 the number of states that have not submitted any report are 19. This means 
about one third of the member states of the African Union (out of 53 member states) have been 
failing in their obligation to report; even those states submitted reports had not been regular in their 
reporting; therefore such reports were submitted by combining all overdue reports. 
(www. achpr. org) 
220 Resolution on the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum seekers and 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (7th December 2004). 
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on Human and Peoples Rights as well . 
221 The previous experience with such 
appointments had been that the Commission 'found it difficult and uncomfortable 
to have to reprimand its own members for any short comings. )222 Furthermore, 
due to the Commissioners' function on a part-time basis in the African 
Commission on the Human and Peoples Rights, acting in the capacity of 
Rapporteur would not be practically effective in Africa, where IDP problems are 
endemic in the majority of states parties. 223 As much will depend on the 
personality of the Rapporteur and the forcefulness of his working method, it 
remains to be seen whether the Special Rapporteur will function effectively in 
theprotectionof IDPs in Africa. 
As far as the African Court is concerned, even though it is possible for 
individuals and NGOs to directly institute actio popularis, the optional status of 
such provision requiring separate declaration for the acceptance of the competence 
of the Court to receive such cases under Article 5(3) of the Protocol, would be 
an obstacle for IDPs seeking protection. 224 Moreover, it is not possible for all 
NGOs to file actions, since only NGOs with observer status before the 
Commission can directly institute cases. This can be an impediment for 
individuals or the NGOs to readily have access to the Court, which would be able 
to provide more effective protection than the African Commission, as the Court 
is able to deliver binding judgments with remedies including compensation and 
reparation on respondent states; 225 and has the back up of a political organ, 
namely, the Council of Ministers of the African Union to supervise the execution 
of the judgment. 226 
22 1 The three Rapporteurs deal with summary, arbitrary and extrajudicial execution, rights of 
women and prisons in Africa. 
222 M. Evans and R. Murray, 'The Special Rapporteurs in the African System' Commission' in MD. 
Evans and R. Murray, (eds. ), The Aftican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The System in 
Practice, 1986-2000 (Cambridge, 2002) p. 280, at p. 299. 
223 ibid. 
224 Art. 34(6) of the Protocol to the ACHPR, 1998' 
225 Arts. 27,30 of the Protocol to the ACHPR of 1998; F. Vi1joen and E. Baimu, 'Courts for Africa: 
Considering the Co-Existence of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African 
Court of Justice' (2004)22 NQHR 241, at pp. 249-50; F. Ouguergouz, 'The Establishment of an 
African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: A Judicial Premiere for the African Union' (2003)11 
A ican YearBook of International Law 79, at pp. 104-106; N. J. Udombana, 'Toward the Aftican fir 
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Better Late than Never, ' (2000)3 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J 
45, at pp. 90-91. 
226 Art. 29 (2) of the Protocol to the ACHPR of 1998; the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 
II July 2000 entered into force on 26 March 2001 and replaced the Charter of the OAU of 1963, 
includes the protection of human rights as one its objectives and contain the right of the African 
Union to intervene in grave circumstances of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
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The material jurisdiction of the Court in contentious cases is much wider 
than that of the Commission, as the latter can only apply the ACHPR, whereas the 
Court can interpret and apply additionally 'any other relevant Human Rights 
instrument ratified by the States concerned. 1227 This means that IDPs or NGOs 
filing cases on behalf of the IDPs would be able to invoke any violation of their 
rights, not only under the ACHPR but also under the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990 and Africa's mostly ratified UN 
228 Covenants, namely, ICCPR and ICESCR of 1966 . 
As IDP children displaced 
by internal armed conflict are specifically protected by the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child with regard to reunification with the family and 
humanitarian assistance and generally as a child from the effects of hostilities, the 
Court under its extensive jurisdiction, would be able to provide a binding judgment 
with remedy to the benefit of those children, which cannot be provided by the 
Committee of experts responsible for the implementation under the African 
229 Charter on the Rights of the Child . 
However, as individual communications in the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights are optional and therefore the normal way 
for individual communication to the Court is through the Commission, whose 
material jurisdiction is limited only with regard to the ACHPR. 230 It is therefore 
likely that the Court would to consider cases within the scope of the 
African Charter alone. 231 
and to impose sanctions on member states that fail to comply with the decisions and policies of the 
African Union. It can be expected that the Assembly of the Head of States and Government would 
support the Council of Ministers in an effective enforcement of the judgment of the Court. See 
Arts. 3 (h), 4(h), 9(l )b, e, 23(2) and 30 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
227 Art. 3(l), 7 of the Protocol to the ACHPR 
228 A. P. Van der Mei, 'The New African Court on Human Rights and Peoples' 
Rights' at P. 119. 
229 Arts. 22,23 (4), 25 (2) ( b) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Children, 1990. 
230 A. P. Van der Mei, 'The New African Court on Human Rights and Peoples' 
Rights' at p. 121, n. 62 states that out of 15 states that ratified the Protocol to the African 
Charter only one state was willing to accept the optional jurisdiction for cases by individuals 
and NGOs- 
231 F. Vi1joen and E-Baimu, 'Courts for Africa', at p. 250, n. 50. 
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Conclusion to Part IV 
The approaches of the various international mechanisms to the problems of 
IDPs indicate the extension of an ad hoc, inconsistent and incomplete protection 
as opposed to a comprehensive protection. The main reason for this is that none of 
the mechanisms are specifically designed to deal with the problems of IDPs; 
rather, they have the competence to deal with the violations generally against 
civilians or certain categories of civilians within a state. Therefore, as far as the 
human rights of the IDPs are concerned, under the UN treaty system, particularly 
in the Human Rights Committee, the protection of IDPs depends on the 
sensitivity with regard to the IDP issue of the particular treaty body. Such 
consideration has occurred only in massive displacements. Moreover, since each 
treaty deals with a specific set of human rights, both the civil and political 
rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights of IDPs are not covered by a 
single treaty. Despite the relatively comprehensive normative framework of the 
CERD, it also suffers from the inherent defects of the treaty system and the 
inadequate publicity of its concluding observations unlike the Human Rights 
Committee. 
Charter based mechanisms deal with the problems of IDPs better than the 
Treaty based system due to the broader mandate provided to the Special 
Rapporteurs and the associated political pressure, not only with regard to 
reporting of the general situation of large scale violations in a state but also in 
receiving communications as to violations or threat of violations. Regional 
systems, especially under the ECHR and ACHR, effectively deal with the 
problems of IDPs by providing tangible relief to them. However, the European 
System is not capable of dealing with large scale or systematic violations of the 
human rights of IDPs, like the Inter-American system. The effectiveness of the 
protection of these regional systems to the IDPs depends on their continued use of 
the UN Guiding Principles on IDPs and the humanitarian law for the interpretation 
of those rights in the relevant conventions. The African Commission on Human 
Rights provides some relief, though not effective, its existence can be considered 
as better for the protection of IDPs at least to bring the problem of internal 
displacement to the forefront of the international community. 
As far as the enforcement of humanitarian law is concerned, the ICC can 
provide effective remedy by way of imposing sanctions and reparations 
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that would break the cycle of impunity in a state, even during an on-going armed 
conflict. Again this depends on the cooperation of the states, particularly in the 
arrest and surrender of the indictees and seizure of assets of the convicted 
perpetrators. Moreover, it only provides an effective remedy with regard to large 
scale violations that constitute international crimes. 
Although the assertion of universal jurisdiction by third states over 
perpetrators of international crimes is also an effective measure of protection, it 
largely depends on the willingness of the state concerned. However, it can be 
expected that under the Statute of the ICC, the national courts would show more 
willingness to assert universal jurisdiction, as the Preamble to it recognises the 
legal 'duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible 
for international crimes. ' 1 
1 Para. 6 of the Preamble to the Statute of the ICC. 
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9. Adopting an International Treaty 
Protection of IDPs 
Relating to the 
Attempts to focus on the legal protection of IDPs have been subjected to criticisms 
that it is an 'unfair and inappropriate privileging of a subset of internal human 
rights victims. " The reason stated in this regard is that those who have not moved 
during armed conflicts may be in a worse situation than those who have displaced 
from their homes and providing specific protection to IDPs would undermine the 
protection of non-displaced conflict affected civilians. 2 Moreover it has been 
considered that an IDP specific legal protection would reinforce containment 
policies and therefore undermine the protection of asylum. 3 Proponents of this 
view rely heavily on the refugee law to argue that a specific legal regime 
would provide a legal status to the IDPs similar to refugees and this is not 
warranted as the protection needs of both are different and necessitates 
4 different approaches. According to them, therefore, there is no need for a 
specific legal regime for IDPs (or a legal definition of IDPs) as the protection of 
IDPs can be derived from the promotion of existing human rights law; 5 and 'a 
legal definition for internally displaced persons cannot create rights and 
obligations similar to those contained in the 1951 Reftigee Convention. '6 
To begin with, it is not necessary to confer a special legal status on 
the IDPs in the same way as refugees. 7 Unlike IDPs who are still within their 
own state and entitled for human rights as citizens, refugees externally displace 
to a foreign state and therefore as aliens they need special legal status and 
protection to enjoy the socio-economic rights and protection of asylum. 
Providing specific international legal protection to IDPs means setting out 
1 M. Stavropoulou, 'The Question of a Right not to be Displaced' (1996)90 ASIL Proceedings 549, 
at p. 562; M. Barutciski, 'Tensions Between the Refugee Concept and the IDP Debate' (1998) 3 
Forced Migration Review 11, at p. 12 
2 J. P. Lavoyer, 'Protection Under International Humanitarian Law' in J. P. Lavoyer (ed. ), Internally 
Displaced Persons, Report of the Symposium, 23-25 October 1995, ( Geneva, 1996), p. 26, at p. 35 
3 M. Barutciski, 'Tensions Between the Refugee Concept' at p. 14; C. Phuong, The International 
Protection ofInternally Displaced Persons, at p. 27 
4 C. Phuong, ibid, at pp. 27-28 
5 M. Barutciski, 'Tensions Between the Refugee Concept' at p. 13 ; C. Phuong, ibid., at pp. 26-28 
6 C. Phuong, ibid., at p. 28; M. Barutciski, ibid., states, 'some groups may sometimes be more 
vulnerable in particular scenarios is a matter for operational priorities, not for legal or 
conceptual development. ' 
7 E. Mooney, 'The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced 
Persons as a Category of Concern' (2005)24 Refiigee Survey Quarterly 9, at p. 13. 
8 See above, Ch. 2 section, B. Definition of IDPs. 
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objective standards for the adherence of states with regard to the treatment 
of their own citizens displaced due to internal armed conflicts including by 
seeking and receiving international protection in the form of assistance. 
In fact, in certain circumstances, the plight of non-displaced civilians such 
as those who have been besieged is worse than that of displaced civilians. But 
those who have displaced and become homeless are in a different and more 
vulnerable situation than those who stay in their homes. Moreover, as in present 
day internal armed conflicts displacing civilians has become an objective of the 
armed conflicts, protection of civilians is seriously undermined. Conferring special 
protection based on the existing international human rights and humanitarian law 
norms adapted to the situation of IDPs does not mean excluding the non-displaced 
from the protection of human rights and humanitarian law. Inclusion of all the 
violations of human rights which are generally protected in other human rights 
conventions rather than IDP specific ones in the UN Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, is also a reason for misconception that providing 
specific protection for IDPs would exclude the protection of non-displaced 
civilians. 9 Mentioning such general human rights violations as protection needs 
specific to IDPs is redundant for the protection of IDPs. 
Above all, becoming an IDP is often the first step before becoming a 
refugee. As refugees who are a subset of internal human rights victims have 
already been provided with international legal protection, there is no logic in 
arguing against the legal protection of IDPs. Placing more emphasis on refugees 
without addressing the problems of internal displacement legitimizes the status of 
IDPs and the human rights abuses of states that cause such displacement. 
That IDPs are already entitled to the protection of human rights does not 
mean that they should not be provided with specific protection by the 
improvement and codification of the same law, similar to the protection that has 
been already granted specifically to children or women in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and Convention in the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. The specific protection provided for children and 
women has not caused any operational difficulties in providing effective protection 
to other conflict affected civilians. In fact, the increasing protection to IDPs 
by the 
9 Examples, Principle 10 (1) on disappearances, genocide, murder, arbitrary execution, Principle 
I Ion rape, and slavery, Principle 12 (3) (4) on arrest and detention, Principle 13 recruitment of 
children to armed forces or groups. 
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UNECR does not seem to have reduced the protection of returnees. 10 Therefore 
providing specific protection does enhance the protection of IDPs as a special 
category but would not result in the exclusion of other non-displaced civilians 
affected by conflicts. Rather, it is a response by the international community to the 
pressing necessity to address the specific protection needs of IDPs caused by their 
displacement. 
Furthermore, providing protection to IDPs cannot be stated as undermining 
the protection of asylum, as the right to seek asylum is the necessary corollary 
of the enjoyment of the rights to remain in safety and dignity or to relocate to a 
safer part of the country, whenever such rights become impossible. An explicit 
provision of the right to seek asylum in a IDP specific framework would remove 
such concerns. 
Consequently, the adoption of a legal instrument in order to improve the 
rights of IDPs and responsibilities of States cannot be rejected by unduly relying 
on the different protection needs between refugees and IDPs, as adoption of 
a legal definition or description of IDP does not need to grant the same 
rights and obligations as in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Because, although 
generally both are vulnerable due to their socioeconomic conditions, the 
protection needs of IDPs are unique to their internal displacement. Similarly 
to the legal status granted to children due to their vulnerability, legal status can be 
granted to IDPs due to their vulnerability during displacement, in addition to 
existing human rights and humanitarian law. A specific legal status to IDPs 
would underscore their plight and ensure human rights protection specific to 
their situation. Just as, by 18 years of age, a person would not be considered 
as a child entitled to the specific protection of the CRC, IDPs would also cease 
to get any specific protection once their specific protection needs end. " 
It has been claimed despite the non-binding nature of UN Guiding 
Principles that it is 'much harder than many well-known soft law instruments, ' 
as it contents 'reflect and are consistent with international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law. ' 12 As discussed earlier, the UN Guiding Principles 
10 See generally, UNHCR, 'Internally Displaced Persons: The Role of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees', 6 March, 2000. 
11 Article I of the CRC. 
12 W. Kalin, 'How Hard is Soft Law? The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and 
the Need for a Normative Framework', Presentation at Roundtable Meeting Ralph Bunche 
Institute for International Studies CUNY Graduate Centre, New York, December 19 2001, at 
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on Internal Displacement specifically articulates and clarifies the existing 
norms of human rights and humanitarian law to the protection needs of IDPs. 
For instance, the right to request and require humanitarian assistance from 
national authorities, right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced and 
the right to non-refoulement. 13 Therefore it can be considered as an improvement 
on existing law and cannot be regarded as creating new human rights norms, 
even though some of these principles may be considered as on the emergence 
in particular, right to restitution of property at the time of its adoption in 
1998. 
Despite its usefulness as a document which clarifies the protection of 
IDPs at normative level, its over- and under - inclusiveness affect its value as 
a protective instrument of a vulnerable category of persons and authority even if 
it is relatively harder than any other soft law instrument. 
UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is under inclusive, in 
the sense that it does not contain the right to remain (in the positive sense) and 
the right to return, which are important to provide protection against the 
displacement per se in a comprehensive manner as a protective instrument. 
It is over inclusive as it deals with variety of situations that occur in 
both armed conflicts and peace which is not consistent to the convergence of 
international human rights and humanitarian law nonns for instance, 
(generalised violence. ' 14 
Moreover, the extension of applicability of Guiding Principles to 'all 
authorities, groups and persons' vis a vis IDPs, is also clearly incompatible with 
the adoption of a human rights convention in this regard, as human rights 
law binds only states. 15 Such an extension of human rights to armed groups 
would also blur the distinctions and specificities of each system, weakening their 
application as protective tools. This is evident for instance, with regard to 
issuance of personal documents, as this can be done only by the state authorities. 
p. 6; UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introductory paragraph 3. 
13 Principles 3,6 and 15 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
14 See above, Chapter 1. 
15 D. Thurer, 'The "Failed State" and International Law' (1999) No. 836 IRRC 73 1, at p. 74 1; 
L. Zegveld, Accountability ofArmed Groups, at p. 52; however, in certain occasions Special 
Rapporteurs have requested armed groups to comply with human rights law; for instance, even 
though the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution 
4 only allows her to intervene when the perpetrators are believed to be goverm-nent agents or have a 
direct or indirect link with the state, ' expressed concern 'over atrocities committed by non-state 
actors, which constitute serious violations of basic humanitarian and human rights principles. ' 
Report of the Special Rapporteur, on Extrajudicial Executions, E/CN. 4/2002/74 (9 January 2002), 
para. 71 
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The San Jose Agreement on Human Rights concluded between Slavadorian State 
and FMLN provided for the provision of 'identity documents required by law' to 
the inhabitants in the areas of conflict, which was interpreted by the United Nations 
Observer Mission in El Salvador as one of the tasks of the government, although 
both parties have obligations under the agreement. 16 These issues have to be 
addressed in the adoption of an international treaty on the protection of IDPs 
in internal armed conflicts based on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement. 
16 Cited in L. Zegveld Accountability ofArmed Groups, at p. 186, 
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General Conclusions 
Due to the unprecedented increase in the number of IDPs and the suffering they 
undergo as a consequence of displacement, especially by internal armed conflicts 
in the world today, internal displacement is ever more viewed as a harm. This is 
because IDPs remain within the territory and control of the parties to the conflict 
who caused their internal displacement, unlike refugees who have crossed the 
frontiers of the territory, and they are therefore more vulnerable than refugees. 
Because of the conceptual similarities between refugees and IDPs, the latter are in 
need of international legal protection that specifically meets their protection 
needs. Therefore devoting attention to the legal protection of IDPs should not be 
viewed as undermining the protection of the right to seek asylum in foreign 
countries which provides a more effective protection than the internal one. Rather, 
it should be considered as an attempt to provide legal protection of the pressing 
needs of vulnerable persons trapped within the confines of their country of origin 
which is unable or unwilling to extend protection to them. 
The examination of international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, and international criminal law applicable to internal armed 
conflicts indicates that a comprehensive normative protection of IDPs exists in 
international law in spite of the fact that the provisions are quite general and not 
straightforward as to the specific needs of the IDPs. Based on these general 
norms by the 'the use of analogy, by reference to context, by analysis of the 
alternative consequences, ' rights and obligations relating to specific needs of 
IDPs can be derived for their international protection. ' 
Addressing the protection of IDPs in internal armed conflicts as a human 
rights issue necessitates for a cross-fertilization among international human 
rights, humanitarian and criminal law (as secondary norms) to provide an effective 
and comprehensive normative framework, in particular in the light of the 
derogable nature of the human rights law in public emergency situations that 
constitute internal armed conflict. It is increasingly viewed that human rights and 
See R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it ( 'Oxford, 1994)at 
P. 10 
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2 humanitarian law are complementary and therefore not mutually exclusive. The 
disadvantage of dealing with both systems as mutually exclusive is that certain 
protection needs of IDPs in internal armed conflict cannot be effectively dealt with 
by human rights law alone. Therefore to provide effective human rights protection 
during an internal armed conflict which is also a state of emergency, resorting to 
definitive standards of international humanitarian law is necessary. For instance, 
displacement is categorically prohibited by humanitarian law except on two 
grounds. This does not mean that human rights law cannot deal with the problem 
on its own. For instance, destruction of houses in the internal anned conflict in 
Turkey as a method of war was considered by the European Court of Human 
Rights as a violation of the right to property and home without recourse to 
international humanitarian law. However, the explicit prohibition in humanitarian 
law against the destruction of civilian objects would strengthen such prohibition, 
render it as an internationally acceptable human right standard and facilitate the 
coherent application of human rights law in a state of emergency in internal 
armed conflict. 3 
Due to the convergence between human rights and humanitarian law their 
complementation of each other to enhance the protection of IDPs during armed 
conflicts becomes viable. As human rights norms are derogable in public 
emergency situations which constitute an internal armed conflict, they may not 
provide effective protection to IDPs during such times. In such situations, even 
though the principle of proportionality functions as a safeguard to limit the 
derogatory measures by the state, it depends on the nature and intensity of the 
situation and to some extent is subject to the margin of appreciation of the state. 
Thus, there is a need to specify core obligations or rights that function as non- 
derogable norms to the derogable human rights relevant to the protection of IDPs 
during internal armed conflict. This would provide credible standards or 
obligations which are internationally acceptable in the protection of IDPs rather 
2 See generally, Working Paper on the Relationship Between Human Rights Law and International 
Humanitarian Law by Francoise Hampson and Ibrahim Salama, E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/2005/14 (21 June 
2005) 
3 See for example, Principle 5.3 of the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees 
and Displaced Persons, which states that 'States shall prohibit forced eviction, demolition of houses 
and destruction of agricultural areas and the arbitrary confiscation or expropriation of land as a 
punitive measure or as a means or method of war. ' 
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than an inconsistent application of the human rights law by states during states 
of emergency in internal armed conflicts. 
However, the possibility of convergence between them does not mean 
that they can be merged to the extent of losing their distinctions. In a human 
rights approach to the protection of IDPs in internal armed conflicts, many 
humanitarian law obligations can be considered as human rights law obligations. 
However, the scope of protection of human rights is much broader in application 
than the humanitarian law which is only applicable to armed conflict situations, not 
even to the lesser situation of internal disturbances. 
To derive a set of internationally acceptable human rights standards of 
protection to IDPs, relevant international humanitarian law (and international 
criminal law ) norms should be of a customary nature, for the reason that not 
all states are parties to Additional Protocol II and also for the reason that the 
protection provided in Additional Protocol 11, especially relating to conduct of 
hostilities, is rudimentary in nature. The establishment of ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals and their jurisprudence has clarified the norms of human rights 
and humanitarian law with regard to crimes against humanity, genocide and war 
crimes. Moreover they have contributed to the confirmation of the existence of 
customary humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts. This trend has 
been reaffirmed by the adoption of the Statute of the ICC in relation to 
international crimes and by the ICRC study on the customary humanitarian law 
applicable to internal armed conflicts. Therefore, an endeavour to formulate 
internationally acceptable human rights standards of protection to IDPs has 
become viable due to the emergence of substantive rules of customary 
humanitarian law and international criminal law applicable to internal armed 
conflicts, as this removes any concern as to their applicability in such 
situations. 
The significant aspect of human rights law is that almost each and 
every obligation of humanitarian law can be covered within either the civil and 
political rights or economic, social and cultural rights. For instance, protection 
against using IDPs as human shields or reprisal attacks against IDPs can be 
accommodated within human rights law. However, due to the broader scope 
of human rights law than humanitarian law, the latter cannot be considered 
as lex specialis to human rights law as a whole, but only with regard to 
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certain civil and political rights and some aspects of obligations of certain 
socio-economic rights. 
Two broad trends have been noted from the examination of human rights 
law in convergence with humanitarian law. Firstly, as far as certain non-derogable 
and derogable human rights are concerned, humanitarian law can be resorted to as 
a lex specialis in order to interpret authoritatively the scope of protection in armed 
conflict situations in pursuance of the principle of consistency of Article 4(l) of the 
ICCPR, such as the right to life in conduct of hostilities or freedom of movement 
in armed conflict situations. Secondly, it can be used as reference to a 
corresponding human rights norm applicable in internal armed conflict, such as in 
situations of indiscriminate attack on IDPs or rape of IDPs, to strengthen their 
normative protection. 
Existence of protection against arbitrary displacement in human rights 
law indicates forced displacement as a harm, apart from its prohibition as 
genocide, crime against humanity and war crime. Total prevention of 
displacement resulting as a by-product of other human rights violations such as 
rape, disappearances and arbitrary arrest is not possible in internal armed 
conflicts. Therefore the significance of indirect protection from initial or 
secondary displacement provided by the other human rights provisions should not 
be underestimated. Excessive displacement as a collateral effect of armed 
conflict is not prohibited in international humanitarian law. Therefore, indirect 
protection against displacement provided by prohibition on indiscriminate 
attack and other prohibitions of humanitarian law would be useful. 
Apart from the causes of displacement, the consequences of it can be 
dealt with by the complementation of both systems of law or by human rights law 
alone. Instances of the latter type of formulation of human rights standards 
caused by the absence of humanitarian law norms in the protection of IDPs are 
the need for documentation, movement- related needs and the right to restitution 
of property. In defining the obligations of states during internal armed conflicts as 
to the protection of IDPs, humanitarian law is useful as lex specialis with regard to 
humanitarian assistance, needs of family reunification, protection of property and 
protection from direct and indiscriminate attacks, prohibition against being used 
as hurnan shields and reprisal attacks. 
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It is to be noted that viewing the protection needs of IDPs as a human 
rights issue would only provide accountability for the acts of state parties to the 
conflict and therefore excludes the accountability of armed opposition groups for 
their acts against IDPs. However, the practical value of such protection measures 
should not be underestimated, as most of the IDP problems in internal armed 
conflicts are due to the discriminatory practices of the state parties against ethnic 
groups and minority IDPs. 
Moreover, at the theoretical level, adopting a human rights approach to the 
protection of internal displacement through mutual complementation would cover 
almost all the violations of humanitarian law pertinent to IDPs by the government 
armed forces, due to the broad nature of human rights. 
Even those issues protected only by international humanitarian law can 
almost be related to human rights law, for instance, prohibition against reprisals 
and using IDPs as human shields. However, this does not mean that international 
humanitarian law has to be resorted to as lex specialis for every issue concerned 
with IDPs, as with regard to some protection issues, human rights law offers 
much broader protection than the former. For instance, the primary obligation of 
a state to provide basic survival needs as assistance to all IDPs within the state 
including those within the control of the armed opposition groups can be seen in 
terms of economic, social and cultural rights which are non-derogable during 
armed conflicts. It can therefore be stated that convergence with international 
humanitarian law as lex specialis is useful in order validly to identify and 
reinforce the minimum human rights standards applicable to the protection of 
IDPs in internal armed conflicts and to use the more specific obligations regulating 
the conduct of hostilities to elaborate the obligations in respect of the state 
which are provided only in international humanitarian law. 
The acts of armed groups against the IDPs, however, can be addressed 
by humanitarian law. It should not be forgotten that IDPs by internal armed 
conflicts are first and foremost victims of armed conflicts and therefore entitled to 
the protection of international humanitarian law which now contains an extensive 
body of customary law applicable to internal armed conflicts. Therefore IDPs can 
receive the protection of both of these systems of law at the same time, as their 
implementation and enforcement are different in nature. 
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The examination of implementation and enforcement of human rights and 
humanitarian law indicates two problems: firstly, issues relating to IDPs are not 
dealt with consistently and comprehensively in the reporting systems of UN human 
rights mechanisms; secondly, those IDP issues which have received the scrutiny 
of the monitoring bodies, however, have not been complied with due to the inbuilt 
defects in the implementation and enforcement mechanisms of human rights law, 
which generally affect compliance. The very specific defect is the absence of an 
individual communication procedure in the ICESCR, as most of the IDP specific 
rights are based on economic, social and cultural rights. 
Moreover, due to the convergence of both systems of law, humanitarian 
law violations against IDPs have been considered indirectly as human rights 
violations by regional human rights mechanisms, notably by the Inter-American 
Commission and Court of Human Rights. Such indirect implementation or 
enforcement of humanitarian law is possible to the extent that the human rights 
mechanisms candidly refer to a situation as an internal armed conflict. 
The enforcement of human rights and humanitarian law through the ICC 
and by the assertion of universal jurisdiction in national courts of third states 
against those who have committed or are behind the planning of displacement of 
civilians and other crimes against IDPs can be strengthened through the 
cooperation of states. However, such enforcement is only effective in large scale 
violations. 
It is important, therefore, to strengthen such human rights mechanisms and 
to sensitise the treaty bodies and other regional human rights enforcement bodies 
to use international humanitarian law, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement and Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees 
and Displaced Persons as authoritative interpretation guides and as reference in 
the application of human rights to IDPs. 
The examination of human rights law with regard to the protection of 
IDPs indicates the existence, mostly, of general human rights norms that can be 
formulated into IDP-specific human rights. Therefore, adoption of a legally 
binding treaty containing IDP-specific human rights that integrates the 
humanitarian law obligations and a monitoring body is preferable to the UN 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, to make states accountable for such 
human rights violations. In fact, such a treaty resulting from convergence among 
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human rights law, humanitarian law and criminal law could be an innovative one. 4 
However, such a human rights approach cannot be considered as an impediment to 
the adoption of a treaty, as the UN Guiding Principles have generally found 
acceptance by states in their national application and as an authoritative 
interpretation guide by several international human rights monitoring bodies. 5 
At present, the problems of IDPs are dealt with by the human rights 
monitoring mechanisms in a selective and inconsistent manner. This is clearly an 
inadequate response to a pressing human rights and humanitarian problem of 
internal displacement in the world today. An international treaty and a monitoring 
body would improve to some extent the problems of IDPs, in particular those in 
Asia and Affica. 
Apart from all these protective measures in terms of international law, 
caution needs to be expressed with regard to the problems of internal 
displacement in the effective exercise and enjoyment of these rights by the IDPs. 
Internal displacement cannot be prevented without resolving the root causes 
of internal armed conflict since internal armed conflict is only a proximate 
cause of internal displacement. Internal displacement can be precisely described 
as a problem embedded in the social and economic structural marginalisation 
of minorities that caused the internal armed conflict. International legal protection 
would indeed remove some surfacing discriminatory practices towards IDPs but it 
would not resolve the underlying structural inequalities. In such a context, 
addressing the proximate causes and consequences of internal displacement by 
international law would only provide a short-term protection. 
Without resolving internal armed conflict, the vicious cycle of internal 
displacement would never come to an end. Therefore any protection provided 
by international law cannot afford a durable and sustained solution for IDPs. A 
long-term or a durable protection that strengthens their physical and livelihood 
4 The 19 89 CRC adopts a similar approach (Article 3 8) though not as elaborative as the UN 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; another soft law instrument that adopts such an 
approach is, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, Annex to the Human Rights Resolution 2005/35 (19 April 2005). 
5 See Report of the Special -Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced 
Persons, Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, A/53/393 (26 
September 2003); Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 60/1,2005 World Summit 
outcome, 24 October 2005, para. 132 recognises the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement 'as an important international framework' for the protection of IDP. 
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protection depends on their ability to exercise their right to remain or return in 
safety and dignity and equal enjoyment of other civil, political, economic and 
social rights. This could only be provided to IDPs by addressing the root causes of 
the internal armed conflicts through a negotiated political settlement that 
accommodates the aspirations of minority IDPs and IDPs belonging to ethnic 
groups. Only by resolving the underlying causes of internal displacement to 
prevent internal armed conflicts, will the effective protection of the rights 
of IDPs be guaranteed. 6 
6 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Colombia, 
E/C. 12/l/Add. 74 (30/11/2001) para. 30 
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